Here is some interesting video conducted by a quartet of some top theoretical physicists, including a Nobel Laureate, discussing how all the information in the universe can be stored as a holographic surface (not volume). — Rich

That's a great video, I've listened to it several times over the past couple of years. I was first introduced to the idea of a holographic universe when I read Michael Talbot's book The Holographic Universe back in the mid 90's. The holographic principle probably explains many things about our brains, which in some ways show signs of being holographic.

Yes the brain like everything else is embedded in the holographic weave of the universe, but its purpose is not to store memory but rather to reconstruct it. Stephen Robbins had some excellent videos explaining this idea, which is based upon Bergson's metaphysics. A bit slow to get to the point, but very methodical. Just think of the brain as a the source of the reconstructive wave.

The holographic principle probably explains many things about our brains, which in some ways show signs of being holographic. — Sam26

So the holographic principle - the one that current physics is talking about - is concerned about the fundamental dynamics of spacetime. It speaks to a limit on the information content of a region that is either highly curved, like the event horizon of a black hole, or expanding at light speed, like the Hubble radius of a light cone in a flat expanse of the Universe.

Which of these stories apply to a flesh and blood organ like a brain I wonder. Is a brain more like a black hole or a Hubble region? :-}

fundamental dynamics of spacetime — apokrisis

No, it is totally reworking the underlying theory of gravity.

There is no space-time other than a metaphysical interpretation of GR mathematics. The holographic approach is looking at it in terms of quantum information entanglement. No space-time anywhere though the mathematics may turn out to be equivalent - or maybe not.

Which of these stories apply to a flesh and blood organ like a brain — apokrisis

Well, the flesh and blood brain is just like everything else, quantum information (or as Bergson described it 100 years ago, Memory) meshed into the holographic fabric.

Well, the flesh and blood brain is just like everything else, quantum information meshed into the holographic fabric. — Rich

I agree with this. Based on my metaphysics, the brain is like a receiver, and it's existence is holographic, just like everything else in the universe.

Moreover, for me, all of existence, metaphysical or otherwise is a product of consciousness. Consciousness, it seems to me, is the fundamental stuff behind all that exists. However, consciousness is not created, it's primary, and it's at the bottom of the universe. All that can be said to exist is set into motion by consciousness.

Consciousness, it seems to me, is the fundamental stuff behind all that exists. — Sam26

Of course. It is inevitable. However, if a scientist wishes to have continued access to funding, it is advisable to use the term quantum information entanglement. Certain words get funding and others do not.

So, consciousness is an emergent phenomena or not?

My opinion, it's not an argument, but it's based on some evidence of what people experienced in an NDE, is that there is a primary consciousness that links everything together. This primary consciousness is not emergent, which is why I call it primary. There is nothing for it to emerge from.

Again, another opinion based on some evidence, is that we exist as part of that consciousness, and we can participate in every possible reality that that consciousness can create. We can insert ourselves into various realities. I believe we are eternal, and that our existence never ends.

Consciousness, it seems to me, is the fundamental stuff behind all that exists. However, consciousness is not created, it's primary, and it's at the bottom of the universe. All that can be said to exist is set into motion by consciousness. — Sam26

Do you see any specific analogies for this view in previous philosophy? Or do you think this is something that is only now just being discovered?

There is not such a thing like emergence. Do you believe in magic?

There is not such a thing like emergence. Do you believe in magic? — bahman

I believe in Godel's Incompleteness Theorems.

I believe in Godel's Incompleteness Theorems. — Posty McPostface

What Godel's Incompleteness Theorems has to do with emergence?

A lot, methinks.

Your comment reminds of people thinking that a flying machine would be magic, it's similar. New ideas, or ideas that seem strange, are always looked at with scorn.

I think what intuitively bothers me about these ideas is the treatment of 'consciousness' - why not use the word 'mind'? - as something that can be known objectively. Whereas if the mind is actually creating the Three-D image - which is the reality we dwell in - then how do you see outside of that, in such a way as to perceive what is purportedly the origin of that? Even the attribution of the purported + or - value to the so-called 'bit' that occupies the 'planck space' is an activity of the observing mind (per Kant).

As for Susskind's 'landscape' video - note this paragraph from a George Ellis cover story in Scientific American, Does the Multiverse Exist?

Fundamental constants are finely tuned for life. A remarkable fact about our universe is that physical constants have just the right values needed to allow for complex structures, including living things. Steven Weinberg, Martin Rees, Leonard Susskind and others contend that an exotic multiverse provides a tidy explanation for this apparent coincidence: if all possible values occur in a large enough collection of universes, then viable ones for life will surely be found somewhere.

DOES THE MULTIVERSE REALLY EXIST? (cover story). By: Ellis, George F. R. Scientific American. Aug 2011, Vol. 305 Issue 2, p38-43. 6p. 2

Pause for a moment to consider whether the notion that the natural universe is one of 10⁵⁰⁰ 'other universes' is indeed 'a tidy explanation' of anything whatever. That number is many orders of magnitude larger than the number of atoms in the known universe. (I'm sure William of Ockham would be rolling in his grave.)

I think there's a fundamental issue when science seeks to explain nature herself. Science, being natural philosophy, can explain many things, given nature. But why should it be able to explain nature? I think this is where scientists are over-stepping the mark, and devising metaphysical theories which are now masquerading as science (which is the subject of a criticism by science columnist Jim Baggott in his book Farewell to Reality: How Modern Physics Has Betrayed the Search for Scientific Truth).

When I use consciousness, I'm using it as a synonym for mind. So yes, for me at least, it does mean mind. I don't see what else it could mean. And when I use mind in this broad sense, I'm using it as something separate from the brain.

Fair enough. Of course I agree that 'mind' and 'brain' are not the same (unlike the hardcore materialists, who insist is no difference.) But the epistemological point that I'm trying to make is that 'mind' or 'consciousness' is never an object of perception.

Now I know that's a difficult and contentious point, but bear with me, I have an argument for it. I believe the way of thinking that treats mind as an objective reality is descended from Cartesian dualism. The modern 'mind-body' problem goes back to that. When Descartes posited the res cogitans, he made an object of the mind, as if it were a something that objectively exists. That was the very reason why, later, the criticism of the 'ghost in the machine' could fairly be made of Descartes' philosophy. The idea of the 'ghost in the machine' is very much a consequence of that, even if it really might not have been what Descartes himself meant to say. (The specific criticism of Descartes on these grounds can be found in Husserl's The Crisis of the European Sciences.) Perhaps it is a result of the literalistic interpretation of an abstract idea, but there it is.

Now, from a different perspective altogether, I do of course agree that 'mind' or 'consciousness' is fundamental. But I think the implications of that understanding are (shall we say) subversive to naturalism. If mind is indeed fundamental, but it's not an object of cognition, then this perspective is more akin to non-dualism than to scientific naturalism. And the reason that it's subversive to naturalism, is that naturalism always assumes the division of subject and object, knower and thing known (a.k.a. 'the epistemic cut'.) Whereas 'mind' is 'what knows', not 'what is known', so that trying to 'know the mind' is trying to know that which is never 'other' to us; it's akin to 'the eye trying to see itself'. (And if this sounds like a Zen Koan, it is not entirely coincidental.)

This does have precedent in Western philosophy - hence my earlier question. But that precedent, is the Greek idea of nous, which is the seminal notion of the nature of 'the intellect' in Platonism and Neo-Platonism. You will find that kind of understanding in pre-modern philosophy, but not in modern philosophy, as it is descended from Descartes and operates within the objectivist paradigm which is nowadays so taken for granted that it's practically impossible to question.

Whereas 'mind' is 'what knows', not 'what is known', so that trying to 'know the mind' is trying to know that which is never 'other' to us. (If this sounds like a Zen Koan, that is not entirely coincidental.) — Wayfarer

I think what you seem to be saying is something akin to the eye verses its visual field, i.e., within the visual field one cannot observe the eye because it's not in the visual field. If this is what you're saying, I would agree, but only if there was one mind, but there are other minds, at least according to my metaphysical take on things, and other minds can perceive and know objectively that these other minds exist.

is this Husserl's argument? If not, how does it differ? Is it closer to Hegel' absolute subject?

I'm not familiar with Husserl's argument.

I'm rusty in it myself, but as I recall Hisserl's transcendental ego is not an object and also not a subject in the way that Hegel understands it. It's more of an irreducible site of subject-object interaction. This ego, which is not like an individual being , is unthinkable outside of its acts of relation to objects.

As the holographic universe unfolds along with quantum physics it becomes more and more remarkable v how prescient was Bergson. De Broglie, one of the original quantum theorists, wrote a long essay 70 years ago describing how many of Bergson's ideas dovetailed was was later discovered as quantum physics. Stephen Robbins shows how Bergson's holographic theory of mind and perception preceded the discovery of holography by two decades, and now corresponds to the latest efforts by quantum scientists to explain the nature of the universe in holographic terms.

Putting aside the genius of Bergson, one must ask, how the heck did he do it?? My best guess is that he intuited a model that somehow fit the nature that he observed in a multidimensional manner. Absolutely amazing.

I guess the question is what are the minimum requirements of a consciousness? Are ofher animals conscious? Which ones, and where and how do we draw the line? If we don't have to draw a line or argue for emergence, then we still have to differentiate between what would be an irreducible precondition for reality of any sort and what psychologists mean when they talk about consciousness as an evolutionary product of biology.

If Dennett claims that dumb bits in adaptive interaction are the 'man behind the curtain' of consciousness( or the dumb bits behind the man behind the curtain) , and that explanation seems wholly unsatisfying, then how 'smart' do these bits have to be? Or how feeling-laden? Just what is the recipe for a primordially world-constituting consciousness?

Or maybe he just invented it, and the nature of his invention dovetails with the inventions of this generation of physicists. It makes one look forward to the ways that physicists will eventually discover how remarkably the ideas of the generation of philosophers who have moved beyond Bergson dovetail with their future inventions.

If this is what you're saying, I would agree, but only if there was one mind, but there are other minds, at least according to my metaphysical take on things, and other minds can perceive and know objectively that these other minds exist. — Sam26

I can infer that there are other minds, but we only ever know mind in the singular and in the first person. And even then, we don't know it but mind is 'that which knows'. And even if I say to you, 'you have a fine mind' I'm only inferring that, based on what you write or say or do. Obviously I can't see or know your mind directly. What we think we know of the mind is really a kind of place-holder.

I recall Husserl's transcendental ego is not an object and also not a subject in the way that Hegel understands it. It's more of an irreducible site of subject-object interaction. — Joshs

That's a good summary. I think another way of putting it is that objects and subjects 'co-arise' but Husserl likewise was strongly critical of the attempt to 'naturalise' the mind.

I guess the question is what are the minimum requirements of a consciousness? — Joshs

Again - you're dealing with the question naturalistically, as if 'consciousness' is something that appears within nature. That is, then, cognitive science, not philosophy of mind - cognitive science is dealing with how conscious acts appear to you as an observer. But again, it's a third-person perspective. Let me put it to you that we have internalised that perspective in such a way that it seems natural but that actually it's really a kind of mental construction. This is precisely why Dennett's critics, such as Nagel and Searle, have said for about the last half-century that Dennett consistently ignores what he purports to explain. (Although I think it's safe to ignore Dennett, as, according to his own work, he is just a kind of 'moist robot' that makes apparently-meaningful noises.)

@Rich - sorry about barging into your thread. I will butt out now.

But the thing is, it wouldn't be difficilt to add a correction to Dennett's model that recognizes an irreducible interrelarionalty to all experience , one which is presupposed in all empirical accounts. I say this because writers who make this move, like Shaun Gallagher, is not so far from Dennett's perspective, while rejecting the perspectives of Searle and Nagel.

If you want to call it a re-figured naturalism, or radical immanentism-materialism, you could embrace Deleuze. If you want to call it a metaphysics or irreducible conditions of possibility ( or quasi-transxendentalism), you could go the route of Derrida, Nietzsche or Heidegger. Or something in between like Merleau-Ponty or Maturana and Varela. They all reject the idea that this irreducible is a consciousness of any sort. That's
why I was asking you what are the minimum requirements of a consciousness. Because such minimum requirements are preaupppsed by Nagel and Searle in their embrace of a constituting intentionality.

Or maybe he just invented it, and the nature of his invention dovetails with the inventions of this generation of physicists — Joshs

He definitely intuited it and what he intuited went againstall of the established science of his age. And while he enjoyed great popularity and a Nobel Prize for a short period of time, materialists in both science and philosophy quickly worked to banish him from academia and the popular press, preferring their materialist godfather Einstein.

All of his works predated by several decades the new scientific discoveries of quantum behavior and holographic photography which is absolutely mind-boggling.

Rich - sorry about barging into your thread. I will butt out now. — Wayfarer

No problem at all. Did I suggest otherwise? If so, I apologize. I've been enjoying what you and everyone else have been discussing.