The first solution might be thinking "free will" as an emergent phenomenon, like the "phases of matter". But clearly this "emergent" phenomenon is quite strange (for example, I do not think that it is possible to make a mathematical model that describes it). — boundless

Apart from the difficulties you noted, the problem with this solution would again be that a physical cause or determining conditions would be posited for something which, if it is truly what it is purported to be, must be unconditioned.

The second solution is to accept that our ability of "free agency" has an origin in time and that it is impssible to explain it with a natural explanation. In this case we need to assume a "supernatural" origin and a theist might argue that our soul is a creation of God.

Let's assume that babies do not have free will. But the idea that free will could have an origin in time just is the idea that it is an emergent phenomenon, it seems. Free will in each person's life must have an advent in time; but it does not follow from this that its origin must be temporal.

A third possibility might be assuming that we are in a situation like the beginningless "samsara" of many Indian philosophies and religions (or something close to it). In this case our "souls" or (as the Buddhist would say) "mindstreams" have no beginning and therefore their "free agency" is beginningless (and therefore has no cause*).

Personally, I don't resonate with the idea of beginninglessness. An actually infinitely extended past seems to be impossible, as does an actually infinitely extended future (even though the future could go on forever it could never be infinitely extended). I prefer the idea that souls are eternal. We each have only one temporal life, and that life taken as a whole exists 'all at once', as it were, eternally. Freedom could then be thought to have an origin in eternity.

I am assuming you are referring to a cause "in time" and not an "ontological" cause, which is more general and can be atemporal.

Yes, I think the problem is that we cannot conceive of atemporal causation. This is the problem of ascribing causation to the noumenal which Heidegger, I think, referred to as "ontotheology".

I agree with your comments. However it wouldn't matter if the prediction did take into account that I would be informed about its content (assuming it didn't include a reward or threat). I would still be free to either accept or reject that prediction (i.e., to drink either tea or coffee) and there would be no inconsistency in either outcome. — Andrew M

While I agree that the occurrence of the prediction, and the presentation of its putative content to the agent, take away nothing from the agent's freedom of choice, it must be noted that this setup may make it impossible for the prediction to be successful. That's because if the agent has set up her mind to do the opposite from whatever she is told that she had been predicted to do, then, conditionally on her being presented with the prediction that she would drink tea, say, the predictor will predict that she will drink coffee, and vice versa. So, under those conditions, the prediction, as written down and shown to the agent, can't succeed.

It would seem so, but I'm not really sure. Per RQM, the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily for an external non-interacting observer (i.e., the superposition is maintained) while at the same time the quantum state reduces to a single definite outcome for the interacting observer (where that outcome is undefined, not merely unknown, for the non-interacting observer). — Andrew M

While at the same time, but not in relation to the same things, so the they cannot be compared like that. To the noninteracting observer (the guy outside the box), no observation has been make and the odds of the outcome of the eventual measurement is still 1. In relation to the more local observation (the geiger counter and the cat it didn't kill), there is only one outcome, not both. RQM seems to never allow multiple outcomes.

Conway game of life is such a structure. Not a physical thing, just formal construct. It does however have physical things in it, with particles that zoom around at varying speeds with casual laws, etc.
— noAxioms

If Conway's Game of Life is instantiated on a computer, then gliders and the like emerge. But without that instantiation, it's just a formal construct where nothing happens at all.

I must disagree. This lack of need for instantiation is critical to the view that the universe is such a structure.
The CGoL needs instantiation (via simulation by us on a computer for instance) only for us (not part of it) to view the structure. But the structure is unaltered by said instantiation. Time is built into the structure (I'm picturing 2d space and a third time dimension, an eternal view), just like it is in this universe. An eternal view is necessary since we are not part of the CGoL and the block has no 'current state' from our point of view. The simulation might, but not the structure itself.
I would agree that instantiation of sorts would be needed to define a 'present', something external that moves that present along. Presentism doesn't fit well with the view, nor does dualism, both involving things external to the structure.

So the ontology of the structure need not exist for the physics of the thing to be there. The gliders and such exist as 'physical' parts of that universe. If the structure was sufficiently complex, thinking beings could be part of it, that deduce the nature of their world and contemplate their ontology. But the instantiation of the structure is unnecessary for any of these thinking-relationships to be part of it, just as surely as 3+5=8 does not require numbers to have Platonic existence in order to be true.

P.S. I had some problems in posting this reply. In fact I edited two precedent versions of it and they "disappeared" automatically. — boundless

They were caught by our (apparently not very good) spam filter. Apologies for that.

No worries. Thank you for the explanation :wink:

Apart from the difficulties you noted, the problem with this solution would again be that a physical cause or determining conditions would be posited for something which, if it is truly what it is purported to be, must be unconditioned. — Janus

Yes! also this is true. Free agency is a real enigma (I think that Kant regarded it as an antinomy for the reason you said here). The simplest "explanation" is to say that we have an "effective" free will, but honestly I find it unsatisfying. Anyway, it is even worth mentioning that it is only partially unconditioned since our "souls" do interact with the "external world". So in fact IMO it is neither "conditioned", if by that we mean it is completely "determined", neither "unconditioned", if by that we mean it is totally unaffected by conditions. It is a true enigma, in fact.

Let's assume that babies do not have free will. But the idea that free will could have an origin in time just is the idea that it is an emergent phenomenon, it seems. Free will in each person's life must have an advent in time; but it does not follow from this that its origin must be temporal. — Janus

We can speculate that babies have free will but are unaware of it. In this case, there is no problem with time. Souls are created with free will as an intrinsic property. It becomes manifest when we gain the "awareness" of it. In this case, its origin is not temporal. In fact it is simply hidden.

Personally, I don't resonate with the idea of beginninglessness. An actually infinitely extended past seems to be impossible, as does an actually infinitely extended future (even though the future could go on forever it could never be infinitely extended). I prefer the idea that souls are eternal. We each have only one temporal life, and that life taken as a whole exists 'all at once', as it were, eternally. Freedom could then be thought to have an origin in eternity. — Janus

Although I am very drawn to Indian religions (especially Buddhism) the notion that the "world cycles" have no beginning (and no end) is a notion that is very hard for me to accept (let alone the idea that my "mindstream" or "soul" has "wandered" since "beginningless" time). Anyway, I do not find that notion incoherent and actually IMO it has its good points.

If we have one temporal life, then I agree that we might have an unchanging "soul" (loosely in this case "my soul" can be defined as what makes me, me). And I agree that a property of the soul may be the fact that during the "temporal" life has the ability of "free agency". We have now two possibilities. The first is that the "soul" is not only unchanging but also "eternal". In this case there is no need to think of a cause for its existence (and its free will). Or we accept for example theism, where God creates the unchaning soul at a certain point (indeed we need "theism" and not "deism", i.e. we need that God interacts with the "temporal" world) with its intrinsic property to have "free agency". (I do not find a "logical" problem with thinking that an unchanging entity might be created at a certain point in time...)

Yes, I think the problem is that we cannot conceive of atemporal causation. This is the problem of ascribing causation to the noumenal which Heidegger, I think, referred to as "ontotheology". — Janus

Well I agree that it is a weird concept (and yes maybe even the world "causation" is misleading). Anyway for "atemporal causation" I mean the idea found in some philosophies where the temporal exists thanks to an "eternal" cause. For example IMO in Platonism there is a "vertical"/atemporal causality due to the participation of the Forms and a "horizontal" causality which happens in time (i.e. the "causal nexus"). Without the Forms according to Platonism no "thing" in this world can exist but at the same time things in this "changing world" affect each other. So in this sense we can think of a double causation.

P.S. I had some problems in posting this reply. In fact I edited two precedent versions of it and they "disappeared" automatically. I apologize for the inconvenience. — boundless

They were caught by our (apparently not very good) spam filter. Apologies for that. — Michael

I got a pile of notifications.

What if the "doing" is not within each frame but consists in the the succession itself? — Janus

Then we just go back to the prior problem. We have to account for the production of the frames, and the mechanism which displays them. When I said this already, you said, what if it's the frame itself which produces the next frame. So you are just going back and forth, proposing one completely different scenario to resolve the problems involved with the other scenario, then going back to the other to resolve the problems of that one. Since the two are completely different models, and mutually exclusive, they cannot both be the case.

The other thing is the issue of free will which is being discussed. Whatever type of "frame" model one proposes, it must allow that the free willing being can interfere with the production of the frames, to the effect of real change.

What if the "doing" is not within each frame but consists in the the succession itself? — Janus

Then we just go back to the prior problem. We have to account for the production of the frames, and the mechanism which displays them. When I said this already, you said, what if it's the frame itself which produces the next frame. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no contradiction. One frame gives rise to the next, without any activity being either in each frame or between them. It is the succession itself that we perceive as activity.

There may be "forces' operating "behind the scenes", including free will; but these do not appear within the frames; we do not perceive any operation of forces or exchange of energy, these are merely inferences to causation.

We can speculate that babies have free will but are unaware of it. In this case, there is no problem with time. Souls are created with free will as an intrinsic property. It becomes manifest when we gain the "awareness" of it. In this case, its origin is not temporal. In fact it is simply hidden. — boundless

It's possible, but what could it mean to have free will if you could neither experience nor conceive of that freedom, let alone exercise it?

Free will could be a result of the soul's temporal development, that is, its advent could be temporal without necessitating that it's origin must be temporal.

We have now two possibilities. The first is that the "soul" is not only unchanging but also "eternal". In this case there is no need to think of a cause for its existence (and its free will). Or we accept for example theism, where God creates the unchaning soul at a certain point (indeed we need "theism" and not "deism", i.e. we need that God interacts with the "temporal" world) with its intrinsic property to have "free agency". (I do not find a "logical" problem with thinking that an unchanging entity might be created at a certain point in time...) — boundless

I see no contradiction between the idea that the soul is eternal and the idea that God created the soul. If eternity is the condition for the existence of the soul then the soul is in a sense created by eternity. This is because eternity is greater than the soul; even if the soul is eternal it cannot be the whole of eternity.

I also don't see why we need the notion of God "interacting" with the temporal world. The temporal world could be the expression of God, not something Dre interacts with. I don't interpret Theism as a claim that God "creates the unchanging soul at a certain point"; rather I understand that the soul is created by Dre* from all eternity.

* 'Dre' is a non-gendered personal pronoun I created because I don't like referring to God as 'He' or 'She'

Well I agree that it is a weird concept (and yes maybe even the world "causation" is misleading). Anyway for "atemporal causation" I mean the idea found in some philosophies where the temporal exists thanks to an "eternal" cause. For example IMO in Platonism there is a "vertical"/atemporal causality due to the participation of the Forms and a "horizontal" causality which happens in time (i.e. the "causal nexus"). Without the Forms according to Platonism no "thing" in this world can exist but at the same time things in this "changing world" affect each other. So in this sense we can think of a double causation. — boundless

I think of this situation as the eternal being the condition for existence of the temporal. If the existence of the temporal is necessary, though, then the temporal is equally as much a condition for the existence of the eternal. Could the Forms exist without the "changing world"?

As Plato says "Time is the moving image of eternity". We could equally say that eternity is the unmoving image of time. I think the idea of interaction or activity occurring between eternity and time is incoherent.

There is no contradiction. One frame gives rise to the next, without any activity being either in each frame or between them. It is the succession itself that we perceive as activity.

There may be "forces' operating "behind the scenes", including free will; but these do not appear within the frames; we do not perceive any operation of forces or exchange of energy, these are merely inferences to causation. — Janus

I'm quite sure there's contradiction here. If "one frame gives rise to the next", then it is impossible by way of contradiction, that there are forces behind the scenes.

The question is, what is it that really gives rise to each frame, is it forces behind the scene, or is it the prior frame? I suggest to you, that it is impossible that one frame gives rise to the next, because this cannot account for the difference between the two, unless the frame is active, but you've already denied that the frame is active.

The point is that if reality consists in discrete durational moments within which no change occurs, there may or may not be forces at work which are not themselves perceptible within those changeless moments, and those forces may or may not be quantized into discrete changeless moments. I am still seeing no contradiction.

Yes, that "free will" is certainly possible in determinism. Nobody denies the "phenomenon" of "willing" and that in principle it is possible to choose tea rather than coffee. — boundless

I would just note that it is the agent herself that is the locus and determinant of her choice, not her will or desires. (As Pierre-Normand explains in his last sentence here.)

On the other hand, if determinism is true then all my choices are inevitable even if there are different options and if is not forced to choose in a way. — boundless

I think it's worth considering something like Rovelli's (and Bitbol's) relational approach here. Bob may be able to secretly predict the outcome of Alice's choice with certainty, per Bob's deterministic theory. But there is no specific outcome that Alice should regard as certain, since she can always reject that outcome and choose differently.

In my view, both those perspectives should be taken as equally valid. Which means that whether or not an outcome is inevitable is indexed to the agent considering the outcome, it's not an absolute claim.

While I agree that the occurrence of the prediction, and the presentation of its putative content to the agent, take away nothing from the agent's freedom of choice, it must be noted that this setup may make it impossible for the prediction to be successful. That's because if the agent has set up her mind to do the opposite from whatever she is told that she had been predicted to do, then, conditionally on her being presented with the prediction that she would drink tea, say, the predictor will predict that she will drink coffee, and vice versa. So, under those conditions, the prediction, as written down and shown to the agent, can't succeed. — Pierre-Normand

Exactly. So, per my comments to boundless above, the agent should never regard any specific outcome as inevitable for her since she can always choose otherwise if she wants to. Whereas a specific outcome may be appropriately regarded as inevitable from the predictor's perspective.

In relation to the more local observation (the geiger counter and the cat it didn't kill), there is only one outcome, not both. RQM seems to never allow multiple outcomes. — noAxioms

I haven't seen Rovelli directly discuss the issue of multiple outcomes but the Wikipedia entry on RQM does:

But, let us imagine that O' measures the spin of S, and finds it to have spin down (and note that nothing in the analysis above precludes this from happening). What happens if he talks to O, and they compare the results of their experiments? O, it will be remembered, measured a spin up on the particle. This would appear to be paradoxical: the two observers, surely, will realise that they have disparate results.

However, this apparent paradox only arises as a result of the question being framed incorrectly: as long as we presuppose an "absolute" or "true" state of the world, this would, indeed, present an insurmountable obstacle for the relational interpretation. However, in a fully relational context, there is no way in which the problem can even be coherently expressed. — Relational Quantum Mechanics - Wikipedia

Which is to say, multiple measured outcomes can occur, but this can't be coherently expressed in relational terms since no interactions between the worlds occur. That is, in relational language, the other worlds are not real for observers in this world and neither is our world real to them.

The gliders and such exist as 'physical' parts of that universe. — noAxioms

OK. So to clarify, you're saying that CGOL (as a formal and non-instantiated structure) nonetheless has its own internal physics. And from inside the structure, gliders are physical but, from their frame of reference, their universe is formal.

And similarly for us, birds, trees and human beings are physical. But our universe is formal.

The point is that if reality consists in discrete durational moments within which no change occurs, there may or may not be forces at work which are not themselves perceptible within those changeless moments, and those forces may or may not be quantized into discrete changeless moments. I am still seeing no contradiction. — Janus

So these forces are not part of reality then? If they are real forces, then it is false to say that reality consists of those discrete unchanging moments. If they are not real forces, they are irrelevant, and are not "at work".

Thanks for the replies.

Which is to say, multiple measured outcomes can occur, but this can't be coherently expressed in relational terms since no interactions between the worlds occur. That is, in relational language, the other worlds are not real for observers in this world and neither is our world real to them. — Andrew M

Wow, a lot of context is missing here. Had to go back to the wiki entry to figure out the scenario being described. O' is observing system O and S. One could say that O is the cat, and O' is the guy outside the (initially closed) box.

As you quote, no paradox was described in the scenario when the question is correctly framed. A full description of the interaction between O and O' (with all worlds in superposition) can always be expressed by some outside O'' so long as interaction with O'' does not take place.

OK. So to clarify, you're saying that CGOL (as a formal and non-instantiated structure) nonetheless has its own internal physics. And from inside the structure, gliders are physical but, from their frame of reference, their universe is formal.

And similarly for us, birds, trees and human beings are physical. But our universe is formal. — Andrew M

Yes. Except I'm not sure about the necessity of the frame of reference. Both universes are formal structures from either frame of reference, but each is its own local reality. So CGol structure is not part of my personal reality, and our universe is not part of theirs. Each is not real to the other, but there is no objective (instantiated) reality to any of them.

Looking for inconsistencies in the view. I really like the view since it removes the need for instantiation, which always seems rationalized, and not actually rational, when I see it explained for other views. Cosmological argument for God is such an example.

I didn't say "exhaustively consists", so your objection is inapt.

I didn't say "exhaustively consists", so your objection is inapt. — Janus

Inapt? You said "if reality consists in discrete durational moments within which no change occurs, there may or may not be forces at work which are not themselves perceptible within those changeless moments," Clearly you implied that these "forces" are outside of reality because you said that the discrete moments (reality) are changeless. If you bring the forces into reality, assume that they are real, then how is it that these forces are not acting on the discrete moments, such that the discrete moments are not actually changeless? The assumption of discrete unchanging moments is now contradictory to the assumption of forces acting on the discrete moments, because then they would be changing It's as I said already, you're just going back and forth between two incompatible models, refusing to address the real problems with your model, which is that it is inherently contradictory..


So what are you trying to say then, reality appears to us as discrete frames, but another part of reality is other than the discrete frames? But reality doesn't even appear to us as discrete frames, it appears to us as continuous. And since you have the need to assume a continuity, as the forces behind the discrete frames, then why even posit discrete frames in the first place? Why not just consider the discrete frames as a product of the imagination?

Again, you're assuming 'exhaustive' when that was not what you intended. 'Reality' is a very plastic term; the forces are assumed to be part of reality but are really inferred not observed; so they may or may not be part of reality; whereas what we observe is obviously part of reality as it is perceived by us.

It's true that reality is perceived by us as continuous, just as movies are, but if it can only be understood in terms of discrete frames, then we have a problem. I have only been putting forward, and trying to think through, a possibility; that at the 'smallest' levels, reality is quantic, and consists of a succession of unchanging frames or moments, rather than a seamless progression where any discrete position or moment becomes arbitrary.

Again, you're assuming 'exhaustive' when that was not what you intended. 'Reality' is a very plastic term; the forces are assumed to be part of reality but are really inferred not observed; so they may or may not be part of reality; whereas what we observe is obviously part of reality as it is perceived by us. — Janus

I understand, but the point is this. You have posited unchanging discrete moments of reality, with temporal duration. You have also posited other "forces". If the forces have any real effect, then they must act on, and therefore change the unchanging discrete moments. Obviously that's contradictory. If they do not act on the frames to bring about some effect, then necessarily, they are completely irrelevant to reality as it appears to us, and we can dismiss them as unreal, imaginary, having no basis in reality.

I have only been putting forward, and trying to think through, a possibility; that at the 'smallest' levels, reality is quantic, and consists of a succession of unchanging frames or moments, rather than a seamless progression where any discrete position or moment becomes arbitrary. — Janus

Do you remember how we started this engagement? I had proposed active frames. You made some points about the relationship between time and the frames. Now I am just demonstrating to you the reason why we cannot assume "still frames". The assumption of stills disallows the possibility of change. That is why if we want to accept the proposition that reality consists of discrete moments, we must assume active discrete moments. And this necessitates the two dimensional time.

Wow, a lot of context is missing here. — noAxioms

Sorry! What I was actually drawing attention to in that quote was that observer O' measures particle S with spin-down. But, earlier, observer O had measured particle S with spin-up.

In quantum mechanics, subsequent spin measurements of a particle in the same basis give the same result. So there would seem to be a paradox here, since (in realist terms) the measurements by observer's O and O' contradict each other.

But, per RQM, no comparison can be made until observer's O and O' physically interact and compare results. And when they do, they will find their two spin measurements are in agreement, just as quantum mechanics predicts! So there is no paradox in relational terms.

That should seem a bit fishy. Is there any possible mechanism by which that agreement could come about without bringing in many physical worlds?

Looking for inconsistencies in the view. I really like the view since it removes the need for instantiation, which always seems rationalized, and not actually rational, when I see it explained for other views. Cosmological argument for God is such an example. — noAxioms

OK, I'll take up the challenge. :-) Are the physical things in the universe also merely formal? Or does your ontology have two kinds of things - the formal structures (the universes) and substantial (physical) things in the universes?

Also is the equation "x = 1" a universe? How about just individual numbers, like the number 1? Or 0?

Sorry! What I was actually drawing attention to in that quote was that observer O' measures particle S with spin-down. But, earlier, observer O had measured particle S with spin-up.

In quantum mechanics, subsequent spin measurements of a particle in the same basis give the same result. So there would seem to be a paradox here, since (in realist terms) the measurements by observer's O and O' contradict each other.

But, per RQM, no comparison can be made until observer's O and O' physically interact and compare results. And when they do, they will find their two spin measurements are in agreement, just as quantum mechanics predicts! So there is no paradox in relational terms.

That should seem a bit fishy. Is there any possible mechanism by which that agreement could come about without bringing in many physical worlds? — Andrew M

There are two states in superposition (in relation to O''). That superposition has always been many worlds. The photon takes both paths and then interferes with itself. The cat is both dead and alive, and does not interfere with itself. The latter macroscopic picture is closer to many-worlds than is the one where interference is still likely.

- - -

Looking for inconsistencies in the view. I really like the view since it removes the need for instantiation, which always seems rationalized, and not actually rational, when I see it explained for other views. Cosmological argument for God is such an example.
— noAxioms

OK, I'll take up the challenge. :-) Are the physical things in the universe also merely formal? Or does your ontology have two kinds of things - the formal structures (the universes) and substantial (physical) things in the universes? — Andrew M

Well, I'd have to say two kinds of ontology: The structures themselves, which have no ontology, and the things in it (galaxies, cups, photons, gliders) which have a relationship to the structure as a whole. That relation is 'is a member of' as best I can articulate it, and is effectively as close as you're going to get to ontology. So 5 exists in the set of integers because it is a member of that set.
This here glider exists in some CGoL block, having perhaps finite duration. It seems appropriate to use 'physical' to describe that since it has analogies to our universe. But other cellular automata don't really have objects or sub-structures like that, and it becomes less appropriate to use the term 'physical' to describe states or movements of 'objects'. At least it is a temporal structure. The universe of the Mandelbrot set has an obvious 'physical' object in it, but it isn't temporal. So is it appropriate to use that term then?

Also is the equation "x = 1" a universe? How about just individual numbers, like the number 1? Or 0?

I think they can be trivial universes on their own. Does x=1 mean anything that just '1' doesn't? What is '1' if the set has no other members? The universes are so trivial that there seems to be no way to have any relations except the identity relation. The universe have no requirement to have meaning, lacking something external to give it that. But we're considering them here, so in the context of this discussion, '1' should have meaning to us I think. Don't think I was out of line to ask it.

‘To be, is to be related’ ~ Krishnamurti

There is a matter of distinguishing the concept from the thing which it is a concept of. The Newtonian concept of space was derived from an understanding of objects, and the need for a "space" for them to move in. In this way, space is derived from objects, but that's only conceptually, in abstraction. We can look at the relationship between space and objects logically (if there are objects then there is space) and conclude that space is necessary for the existence of objects. Therefore space is prior to objects. Of course the real existence of point particles would defy this principle, but as you say, the trend is to make space a property of what exists, not vise versa. We can look at time in the same way. The concept of time is derived from an understanding of motion and change. It is a generalization. So we can say "if there is change then there is time". This logical process leads to the necessity of positing "time" as something real, but its reality is only apprehended directly by the mind (intuited). But we cannot logically support "if there is time then there is change". So this allows for the proposition that time is prior to change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mmm, interesting. Regarding Newtonian space it is interesting to note that "space" is not a "thing" in that model. In fact it is simply the "backstage" of phenomena and in fact if we "remove" objects we are left with "nothing", i.e. simply the absence of objects. In the same way "Newtonian time" is also a "backstage". Space and time in Newtonian mechanics are often regarded as "absolute" when in fact they are simply the "backstage". What is absolute in that theory is simply the measure of distances and durations. But distances and durations are not a property of space or time but are meaningful concepts in the presence of objects themselves. So in fact even in the Newtonian picture the observable "properties" of space are in fact dependent on the objects.
In this model instead space and time are ontologically "prior" to objects. Objects need space and time for their existence. Space and time therefore are not merely an "abstraction" we use to "individuate" objects, but in fact are what allow objects to be "individuable". This is the big distinction between - as far as I understand - Kant/Schopenhauer and Newton. According to Newton space and time have no ontological role, so to speak. Instead in our case and in trascendental idealism space and time are necessary for the existence of objects (or phenomena). With space and time there is individuation.

This is probably beyond my capacity to explain or even understand, but since you seem to have a fundamental understanding of my hypothesis I'll offer some further speculation. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I am very grateful for your effort! Unfortunately, I am not very sure to have really understood this time. So what I wrote might be completely wrong.

Consider Galilean relativity. Motion is determined relative to an inertial frame, but it could be any inertial frame, and the motion is through the medium, empty space. Now Einstein created consistency between Galilean relativity, and the constancy of the speed of light, so light is brought into this conception of space, which allows for objects moving in space. Light is positioned as the boundary to this conception of objects in space, but it is important to note that it is a conception of objects in space, rather than the alternative conception of light, which was waves in an ether. So light is placed into positive space, therefore it can only be understood, under the precepts of special relativity, as an object in space. Now we have a massless non-inertial particle, a photon, and this is a precedent for other such particles to follow in conception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, in SR everything we can observe is in the space of objects, not in the space of potentialities. But IMO this was also true in the Newtonian case: in that theory everything physical was "in" the space of objects. But "our" model splits the "potentialities" and "actualities", and therefore seems to take into account the double nature of quantum particles by saying that each aspect of "particles" is "real" in the two spaces.

When we look at a massive object, we see a solid object. But sight sees in the negative space, so we are not really seeing the mass of the object. Mass doesn't really exist as solid objects it exists as tiny particles at the nucleus of the atom, with space between them. So there is space, as positive space, between particles of mass, and the representation of an object of mass as having a centre point of gravity cannot be accurate. Each particle of mass has its own spatial location. The problem is that this space within objects (or between massive particles) is understood by us through the interactions of light, electrons, and other massless particles which is most likely the activity of negative space. So our approach to positive space, using the speed of light as a constant, is through negative space and we have an inadequate understanding of negative space. This becomes more evident if we extrapolate to larger and larger massive objects, like the solar system, and the galaxy. Each planet is seen as a massive object with space between, and we understand and measure this space through the activity of light. But space between massive objects is positive space, and the activity of light is in negative space. So we have basic principles which measure distance in positive space, then we relate the activity of light as if it were moving in positive space, and we derive a speed of light. The designated speed of light is inaccurate because of this conflation of negative space with positive space. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that there is a possible problem here. "Fields" and "potentialities" are properties of the negative space, whereas objects are a property of "positive" space. According to QFT, fields are both of massive and massless particles. If what we said before is correct then for massive particles the interpretation is easy: fields live in the negative space whereas their associated particles live in positive space. At the same time we said that light give us information about potentialities and not actualities. If this is so then photons are in fact not "objects" but in fact "potentialities".

Massless particles are not strictly speaking real. They arise as the projection of light into the "physical space". In fact we need them to make a unitary picture of our perception of the two spaces. With other senses we acquire informations about the physical objects in the positive space. With sight we "see" the negative space, but to have a unitary picture of reality we "translate", so to speak, the information into the positive space. This means that when we look a tree we do not see the "negative" space, but rather we see a fictional projection of what we see (in fact we see the negative space) into the positive space. In fact our "experience" (say for evolutionary reasons) must be unitary and therefore we conflate the two space into one.

The problem is that objects do interact with light as it is an "actual" object. Think about the photoelectric effect. In that case you need to take into account the particle nature of light. While in fact I can think about our experience as given by the "projection" on the positive space of the negative, I do not understand how a physical massive object can interact with a massless one in the model we are discussing. In fact in the negative space we have the interaction of the fields (e.g. QED describes the interaction between an atom and a photon as the interaction of fields, after all) but in the positive space we have the corrisponding interaction between particles. In fact the interaction between, say, two massive atoms is an interaction that takes place in the positive space. Whereas the interaction of a massless and a massive one is solely in the negative space (and the positive we have a "projection" of it).

To derive the true speed of light we must bring light into the positive space, as a particle of mass, having determinate, actual existence, instead of existing as possibilities. But this may be just out of the range of the breadth of the present of human perception, because light appears to us as the possibility for change. So it must be redefined as an actuality and this requires locating individual particles in relation to massive objects and establishing a positioning in this way. This could create the base for the zero dimension line. — Metaphysician Undercover

If massless particles are not real I think that you are right here. The only way to observe "massive light" is to change completely our perception. But this may even not be possible IMO.

The speed of light is now the base speed for activity in the negative space. It is derived from the left hand side of the orthogonal timelines when space has fully inverted and spatial separation at 'the present" has maximized its meaningfulness. As we look toward the source of the orthogonal timelines, to the right, when the inversion of space is just beginning, spatial separation is completely different, allowing for interactions between particles, which if they were related at the other end of the timeline would appear as faster than the speed of light. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems follow from the above reasoning. The fact that we do not observe particles faster than light is because we do not observe light as a massive object. In fact it is because we superimpose observed light in the negative space on the positive space that we observe light as the speed limit. So in fact if we could separate the observation of the two spaces then we might a rather different experience.

That is why if we want to accept the proposition that reality consists of discrete moments, we must assume active discrete moments. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem for this is if a moment is active it cannot be fundamentally discrete, because if it is active then there will be change, process, within it which can then be divided into further discrete moments and so on ad infinitum. If moments are discrete then we must posit fundamental discrete moments which are not active. So, as I said activity consists in the progression of discrete moments or it a seamless continuum. We don't know which, but at least those two positions make sense.

It's possible, but what could it mean to have free will if you could neither experience nor conceive of that freedom, let alone exercise it? — Janus

Well, IMO it is like learning a particular skill. It is not that babies do not have free will, but rather they cannot "use" it. Over time however they learn from experience and they gradually begin to "master" that ability.

Free will could be a result of the soul's temporal development, that is, its advent could be temporal without necessitating that it's origin must be temporal. — Janus

Yes, this is another possibility.

I see no contradiction between the idea that the soul is eternal and the idea that God created the soul. If eternity is the condition for the existence of the soul then the soul is in a sense created by eternity. This is because eternity is greater than the soul; even if the soul is eternal it cannot be the whole of eternity.

I also don't see why we need the notion of God "interacting" with the temporal world. The temporal world could be the expression of God, not something Dre interacts with. I don't interpret Theism as a claim that God "creates the unchanging soul at a certain point"; rather I understand that the soul is created by Dre* from all eternity.

* 'Dre' is a non-gendered personal pronoun I created because I don't like referring to God as 'He' or 'She' — Janus

Interesting! But if eternity means "timelessness" then this implies that we always existed from the perspective of the "temporal world" and in fact this creation coincides with "atemporal causation".

I think of this situation as the eternal being the condition for existence of the temporal. If the existence of the temporal is necessary, though, then the temporal is equally as much a condition for the existence of the eternal. Could the Forms exist without the "changing world"?

As Plato says "Time is the moving image of eternity". We could equally say that eternity is the unmoving image of time. I think the idea of interaction or activity occurring between eternity and time is incoherent. — Janus

Ok, I see your point here but I (respectfully) disagree. But think about Spinoza's "pantheism". According to him all things are "modes" of the single Substance. This means that whatever can happen, happens neessarily. In turn this implies that sub specie aeternitatis both the Substance and the modes are necessary. But even here IMO there is a clear ontological hierarchy: the modes exist because there is the Substance, instead one a mode is destroyed the Substance persists.

This is how I understand the relationship between the Forms and the "changing world". To exist every table necessitates the existence of the Form of the table. The table in the "changing world" is a possible instantiation of the related Form. And in Plato's case there is not even the constraint that all possible "instantiations" must be realized. So since (supposedly) not all possible "instantiations" are actualized then the Form of the table existed in the past, exists now and will exist in the future even if some possible instantiations are never realized. From this IMO it is clear that the Forms have an ontological priority over the changing world.

This means that the temporal does not affect the eternal while the temporal cannot exist without the eternal. And I think that with this in mind we can speak even of "causation".

I would just note that it is the agent herself that is the locus and determinant of her choice, not her will or desires. (As Pierre-Normand explains in his last sentence here.) — Andrew M

Ok, I can be in agreement with this. But at the same time the agent is still bound to make a precise choice. If determinism is true the agent cannot make another choice (ideally it is possible, but it is not possible in reality).

I think it's worth considering something like Rovelli's (and Bitbol's) relational approach here. Bob may be able to secretly predict the outcome of Alice's choice with certainty, per Bob's deterministic theory. But there is no specific outcome that Alice should regard as certain, since she can always reject that outcome and choose differently.

In my view, both those perspectives should be taken as equally valid. Which means that whether or not an outcome is inevitable is indexed to the agent considering the outcome, it's not an absolute claim. — Andrew M

Well, the relational approach is very interesting in this issue. But again, the outcomes of choices are either random or deterministic (in the "reference frames" of the various agents) and randomness cannot explain free will. On the other hand, if we allow the existence of libertarian free will in the case of Alice, maybe we can still assume that in Bob's "reference frame" the choice was inevitable. I wonder if this makes sense (if it does we actually solved the problem of "free will" and omniscence using an interpretation of QM :wink: Sometimes life can be very surprising :rofl: )

‘To be, is to be related’ ~ Krishnamurti — Wayfarer

I wonder what Krishnamurti would have thought about the relational interpretation of QM. Probably he would have preferred it over Bohm's.

As you probably know, Krishnamurti and Bohm had a long-lasting friendship, many of their dialogues were published. That’s how I heard of Bohm in the first place; it is why I bought his ‘Wholeness and the Implicate Order’. I never really warmed to that book. It’s more that that particular aphorism of Krishnamurti says something profound in respect of the discussion about ‘relatedness’ and things only existing in relation.

I understand the relationship between the Forms and the "changing world". To exist every table necessitates the existence of the Form of the table. The table in the "changing world" is a possible instantiation of the related Form. And in Plato's case there is not even the constraint that all possible "instantiations" must be realized. So since (supposedly) not all possible "instantiations" are actualized then the Form of the table existed in the past, exists now and will exist in the future even if some possible instantiations are never realized. From this IMO it is clear that the Forms have an ontological priority over the changing world. — boundless

Well said. I had something of an epiphany when I realised the power of the ‘theory of ideas’ - that ideas are real as possible modes of existence, but are in some sense prior to any and all particulars. I’m still researching it. (You might find an article by Kelly Ross relevant - Meaning and the Problem of Universals. I have read it many times, I don’t agree with all of it, or understand all of it, but I still feel it has a useful interpretation of this question from a contemporary point of view.)

Oh, and there’s another web essay that you might be interested in - The Debate between Plato and Democritus, by Heisenberg. It’s the transcript of a lecture. He too comes down in favour of Plato over Democritus, or idealism over materialism:

the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present century.

This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory some forty years ago has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use then of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.

During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?

I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or—in Plato's sense—Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.

Yes the two had apparently a close relationship. In fact there is a lot of confusion about what "Bohmian mechanics" is. Most physicists use that term to refer to the original paper of 1952: the deterministic non-local theory with point particles, the real wvefunction and the quantum potential. In the last twenty years from that work it was derived the "nomological Bohmian mechanics" where the universal wavefunction is treated as simply a "law" (rather than a "real thing", so to speak) and the "quantum potential" has been removed. Among physicists apparently this "kind" of Bohmian approach is the most studied. From the 70's to the 90's Bohm introduced many other concepts with (supposedly) the strong influence of Krishnamurti. In fact concepts like "Inplicate and Explicate order" are found in the later stages of the work of Bohm. Among non-scientists, this approach is what is usually called "Bohmian mechanics". But this later work is not really scientific but philosophical. And much skepticism in the scientific community to Bohm's early and later work also derives from this "metaphyisical" tendeicies later part of his work. Recently Rovelli compared his "relational" interpretation with the work of Nagarjuna and in fact many times "summarised" his views but saying that things are processes, relations, events etc. So, IMO Krishnamurti would be certainly fascinated by RQM (I suggest you the article on SEP or Wikipedia about it).

Well said. I had something of an epiphany when I realised the power of the ‘theory of ideas’ - that ideas are real as possible modes of existence, but are in some sense prior to any and all particulars. I’m still researching it. (You might find an article by Kelly Ross relevant - Meaning and the Problem of Universals. I have read it many times, I don’t agree with all of it, or understand all of it, but I still feel it has a useful interpretation of this question from a contemporary point of view.) — Wayfarer

Thanks for the link. I have already read it too some time ago, but I forgot to re-read it. Anyway I remember that when I read it, I had a similar impression. I take this opportunity to re-read it :wink:

Anyway since we are both attracted by Buddhism and Platonism, I found this interesting sutta, SN 12.20:
https://suttacentral.net/sn12.20/en/bodhi (Ven. Bodhi's translation)
This sutta reads at a certain point:

...whether there is an arising of Tathagatas or no arising of Tathagatas, that element still persists, the stableness of the Dhamma, the fixed course of the Dhamma, specific conditionality...

IMO this means that eternal "truths" are in fact not rejected by Buddhism - as far as we do not understand them as "things". Therefore, I think that "timeless" truths are compatible to Buddhism.

In fact I had a similar experience when I first encountered Plato in high school, when the professor mentioned the "second navigation". So, to be really honest I am maybe more a Platonist than anything else.

Oh, and there’s another web essay that you might be interested in - The Debate between Plato and Democritus, by Heisenberg. It’s the transcript of a lecture. He too comes down in favour of Plato over Democritus, or idealism over materialism: — Wayfarer

Well, I am still reluctant to endorse idealism but I appreciate his reasoning. After all, mathematically the "foundemental thing" is the state in the Hilbert space. Even the wavefunction is actually a "representation" in the position space. This means that we can think the wavefunction as an "aspect", an instantiation of the abstract state. And of course the "outcome" of our measurement can be also thought as an instantiation. So yes, when one begins to reflect on these things then the "strangeness" of the Copenaghen interpretation* begins to become "reasonable", so to speak.

*Also the same could be said of MWI.

In this model instead space and time are ontologically "prior" to objects. Objects need space and time for their existence. Space and time therefore are not merely an "abstraction" we use to "individuate" objects, but in fact are what allow objects to be "individuable". This is the big distinction between - as far as I understand - Kant/Schopenhauer and Newton. According to Newton space and time have no ontological role, so to speak. Instead in our case and in trascendental idealism space and time are necessary for the existence of objects (or phenomena). With space and time there is individuation. — boundless

I wouldn't go so far as to say that "space" is simply a backdrop for Newton because I think he looked at space in different ways, depending on the purpose of his inquiry. For the purpose of describing the motions of physical objects, space is just a backdrop. But Newton was one of the pioneers in the experimentation with optics, and he proceeded to speculate into the nature of light itself. In this more metaphysical speculation it is evident that Newton believed space to be more than just a backdrop for physics. Although he put forth a corpuscular theory of light, Newton did extensive experimentation with refraction, and I believe he attributed the wave properties of light to something other than the light itself, but to its interactions with an aetheral space. Also, if I remember correctly he posits a type of spatial inversion between matter and light which he claims to occur within the sun.

Yes, in SR everything we can observe is in the space of objects, not in the space of potentialities. But IMO this was also true in the Newtonian case: in that theory everything physical was "in" the space of objects. But "our" model splits the "potentialities" and "actualities", and therefore seems to take into account the double nature of quantum particles by saying that each aspect of "particles" is "real" in the two spaces. — boundless

Right, so in the space of potentialities, negative space, we cannot accurately say that particles are real. We have to look at positive space to find actual particles. And a real particle will occupy space, and have mass.

If this is so then photons are in fact not "objects" but in fact "potentialities". — boundless

I wouldn't go so far as to make this conclusion either. The problem which I alluded to in the last post is with the definition of "light". It is defined in the mathematics of physics as energy, meaning the capacity to do work, and therefore it is necessarily, by definition, a potentiality. But since it actually does work, then it must get related to physical objects in the cases that it actually does work, and so it must be described in an actual form which can relate to physical objects. This is the photon.

The problem is that objects do interact with light as it is an "actual" object. Think about the photoelectric effect. In that case you need to take into account the particle nature of light. — boundless

Great, you've followed well. Now we get to the nitty gritty of dealing with the incompatibilities of other theories, which necessitates picking apart the other theories if we want the model to survive. What I suggested in the last post is that the current representation of the speed of light is inaccurate. Do you agree that an electron has mass, and that it has a variable velocity? Having a variable velocity is directly related to having mass. A photon cannot have a variable velocity, nor can it have mass, due to conventional definition. So what I think is needed, is an adjustment to the constancy of the velocity of light, allowing that a photon can have an actual position on the orthogonal timelines.

Remember, the speed of light is currently measured as a phenomenon in the negative space, related to objects in the positive space. On the orthogonal lines, the nature of space is actually changing. So if we give more time on the orthogonal line, beyond the range of human perception, to allow light to come into positive space, we ought to allow that distances would change due to the changing space, the distance between the same massive particles would increase. This seems to imply that the actual velocity of a photon would be greater than the recorded speed of light. If we do not allow light into the positive space of actuality, it becomes the infinite possibility, which feeds the notion of time travel. But that's just a basic idea, there are different things to sort out, such as the relationship between different frequencies. If we establish the orthogonal lines, it may be the case that different frequencies of electromagnetism actually become fixed at a slightly different position on the line, and so have different photons. There are complexities here that need to be worked out, and we probably ought to start by fixing the position of the electron.

Now let's plug this into the model. We have two time dimensions, the traditional timeline, and the orthogonal timelines of each moment in passing time. There is a different type of activity associated with each timeline. The traditional timeline affords us change of place, locomotion. The orthogonal lines afford us "real change", and this is what I called spatial inversion. If we take an individual orthogonal timeline, an individual moment in time, the right side extends indefinitely toward the beginning (future), while the left indefinitely toward the end (past). The line indicates how things come to be at the present moment. They come to be from the future (potential), and establish actual existence of determinate being, toward the past. The human experience of being at the present, thought and sense perception, occupies an important section of this line. However we should assume that the orthogonal timelines extend beyond the limits of human perception.

Human beings have come to notice temporal extension of being, of objects. This is the continuity of sameness across the orthogonal lines, along the traditional timeline, existence. The continuity of sameness is attributed to mass, and inertia, and this is what we attribute to the determinateness provided by coming to be in the past. As something comes to be in the past its spatial position is fixed and it is passive. So from our perspective, massive objects come to be on the right side of our perspective of the orthogonal timelines, so we see them as passive matter with mass and inertia. They are always on the past side of the zero line present, from our perspective.

If we go to the other end of the human perspective, we'll find the energy of light. It is always on the future side of the present, from our perspective so we define it in terms of potentialities. Notice that the electron would be in between, and could be viewed in both ways. But let me get to the issue with the current theories involving the speed of light. An object, or particle, must have a fixed place on each orthogonal line in order that it may be engaged in locomotion. Locomotion is the particle's relative position from one orthogonal line to the next. If the particle has mass its position from one line to the next will be orderly according to laws of inertia. And, to fix the particle's position on the orthogonal lines is to give it mass. If it had a position without inertia, its relative position from one line to the next would be random and there would be no way of knowing its position. This is what happens to the photon under current definitions of light. Because the velocity of light is fixed, constant, and it is fixed in the position of negative space, potential, the photon cannot have a position on the orthogonal line. Not only is its position forced to be beyond the realm of human perspective, it is forced right off the end of the orthogonal line. By definition, the photon is not allowed to be apprehended as a determinate passive object, with a fixed spot on the orthogonal lines.

While in fact I can think about our experience as given by the "projection" on the positive space of the negative, I do not understand how a physical massive object can interact with a massless one in the model we are discussing. In fact in the negative space we have the interaction of the fields (e.g. QED describes the interaction between an atom and a photon as the interaction of fields, after all) but in the positive space we have the corrisponding interaction between particles. In fact the interaction between, say, two massive atoms is an interaction that takes place in the positive space. Whereas the interaction of a massless and a massive one is solely in the negative space (and the positive we have a "projection" of it). — boundless

Interaction is not a problem, because at the far right of the orthogonal lines, all existence must come from the negative space (potentiality). So in this zone, of the very beginning of the present moment, where even massive particles are in the form of potential, interaction occurs. Massive particles are compelled by the forces described by inertia, so they are not very susceptible to interference. However, changes to electrons can affect more massive particles, and electrons can be changed by photons. Even things at the low end of the scale (photons) can interfere with determined massive existence through the medium of electrons and existing instability.

It would not be correct therefore to describe any such interaction as within the positive space. In relation to "real change", activity takes place only within negative space, as negative space moves to become positive. In positive space, the position of things is fixed, as in the past, and the only change is locomotion, which is the fixed position of objects from one moment to the next. So a massive atom may move in relation to another, but this is strictly the locomotion of the massive nucleus. The electron however has an obscured motion because its locomotion (activity as an actual massive particle in positive space) is conflated with its real change (activity as potential within negative space). From one perspective, the electron has a potential position in its relations to the coming into being of massive nucleus, but from another perspective it has an actual position in relation to the coming into being of the photon. From the human perspective, the electron may be described as existing in negative space relative to the nucleus, or as in positive space relative to the photon. We model all real things as changing from potential to actual at each moment in time. This means we must adjust the constancy of the speed of light to allow that photons have actual existence.

The problem for this is if a moment is active it cannot be fundamentally discrete, because if it is active then there will be change, process, within it which can then be divided into further discrete moments and so on ad infinitum. — Janus

I don't see the logic here. You are claiming that a discrete entity cannot be divided. I don't see your principle to support this claim. A unity is a discrete entity, and a unity can be divided.