The first solution might be thinking "free will" as an emergent phenomenon, like the "phases of matter". But clearly this "emergent" phenomenon is quite strange (for example, I do not think that it is possible to make a mathematical model that describes it). — boundless
The second solution is to accept that our ability of "free agency" has an origin in time and that it is impssible to explain it with a natural explanation. In this case we need to assume a "supernatural" origin and a theist might argue that our soul is a creation of God.
A third possibility might be assuming that we are in a situation like the beginningless "samsara" of many Indian philosophies and religions (or something close to it). In this case our "souls" or (as the Buddhist would say) "mindstreams" have no beginning and therefore their "free agency" is beginningless (and therefore has no cause*).
I am assuming you are referring to a cause "in time" and not an "ontological" cause, which is more general and can be atemporal.
I agree with your comments. However it wouldn't matter if the prediction did take into account that I would be informed about its content (assuming it didn't include a reward or threat). I would still be free to either accept or reject that prediction (i.e., to drink either tea or coffee) and there would be no inconsistency in either outcome. — Andrew M
While at the same time, but not in relation to the same things, so the they cannot be compared like that. To the noninteracting observer (the guy outside the box), no observation has been make and the odds of the outcome of the eventual measurement is still 1. In relation to the more local observation (the geiger counter and the cat it didn't kill), there is only one outcome, not both. RQM seems to never allow multiple outcomes.It would seem so, but I'm not really sure. Per RQM, the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily for an external non-interacting observer (i.e., the superposition is maintained) while at the same time the quantum state reduces to a single definite outcome for the interacting observer (where that outcome is undefined, not merely unknown, for the non-interacting observer). — Andrew M
I must disagree. This lack of need for instantiation is critical to the view that the universe is such a structure.Conway game of life is such a structure. Not a physical thing, just formal construct. It does however have physical things in it, with particles that zoom around at varying speeds with casual laws, etc.
— noAxioms
If Conway's Game of Life is instantiated on a computer, then gliders and the like emerge. But without that instantiation, it's just a formal construct where nothing happens at all.
Apart from the difficulties you noted, the problem with this solution would again be that a physical cause or determining conditions would be posited for something which, if it is truly what it is purported to be, must be unconditioned. — Janus
Let's assume that babies do not have free will. But the idea that free will could have an origin in time just is the idea that it is an emergent phenomenon, it seems. Free will in each person's life must have an advent in time; but it does not follow from this that its origin must be temporal. — Janus
Personally, I don't resonate with the idea of beginninglessness. An actually infinitely extended past seems to be impossible, as does an actually infinitely extended future (even though the future could go on forever it could never be infinitely extended). I prefer the idea that souls are eternal. We each have only one temporal life, and that life taken as a whole exists 'all at once', as it were, eternally. Freedom could then be thought to have an origin in eternity. — Janus
Yes, I think the problem is that we cannot conceive of atemporal causation. This is the problem of ascribing causation to the noumenal which Heidegger, I think, referred to as "ontotheology". — Janus
P.S. I had some problems in posting this reply. In fact I edited two precedent versions of it and they "disappeared" automatically. I apologize for the inconvenience. — boundless
They were caught by our (apparently not very good) spam filter. Apologies for that. — Michael
What if the "doing" is not within each frame but consists in the the succession itself? — Janus
What if the "doing" is not within each frame but consists in the the succession itself? — Janus
Then we just go back to the prior problem. We have to account for the production of the frames, and the mechanism which displays them. When I said this already, you said, what if it's the frame itself which produces the next frame. — Metaphysician Undercover
We can speculate that babies have free will but are unaware of it. In this case, there is no problem with time. Souls are created with free will as an intrinsic property. It becomes manifest when we gain the "awareness" of it. In this case, its origin is not temporal. In fact it is simply hidden. — boundless
We have now two possibilities. The first is that the "soul" is not only unchanging but also "eternal". In this case there is no need to think of a cause for its existence (and its free will). Or we accept for example theism, where God creates the unchaning soul at a certain point (indeed we need "theism" and not "deism", i.e. we need that God interacts with the "temporal" world) with its intrinsic property to have "free agency". (I do not find a "logical" problem with thinking that an unchanging entity might be created at a certain point in time...) — boundless
Well I agree that it is a weird concept (and yes maybe even the world "causation" is misleading). Anyway for "atemporal causation" I mean the idea found in some philosophies where the temporal exists thanks to an "eternal" cause. For example IMO in Platonism there is a "vertical"/atemporal causality due to the participation of the Forms and a "horizontal" causality which happens in time (i.e. the "causal nexus"). Without the Forms according to Platonism no "thing" in this world can exist but at the same time things in this "changing world" affect each other. So in this sense we can think of a double causation. — boundless
There is no contradiction. One frame gives rise to the next, without any activity being either in each frame or between them. It is the succession itself that we perceive as activity.
There may be "forces' operating "behind the scenes", including free will; but these do not appear within the frames; we do not perceive any operation of forces or exchange of energy, these are merely inferences to causation. — Janus
Yes, that "free will" is certainly possible in determinism. Nobody denies the "phenomenon" of "willing" and that in principle it is possible to choose tea rather than coffee. — boundless
On the other hand, if determinism is true then all my choices are inevitable even if there are different options and if is not forced to choose in a way. — boundless
While I agree that the occurrence of the prediction, and the presentation of its putative content to the agent, take away nothing from the agent's freedom of choice, it must be noted that this setup may make it impossible for the prediction to be successful. That's because if the agent has set up her mind to do the opposite from whatever she is told that she had been predicted to do, then, conditionally on her being presented with the prediction that she would drink tea, say, the predictor will predict that she will drink coffee, and vice versa. So, under those conditions, the prediction, as written down and shown to the agent, can't succeed. — Pierre-Normand
In relation to the more local observation (the geiger counter and the cat it didn't kill), there is only one outcome, not both. RQM seems to never allow multiple outcomes. — noAxioms
But, let us imagine that O' measures the spin of S, and finds it to have spin down (and note that nothing in the analysis above precludes this from happening). What happens if he talks to O, and they compare the results of their experiments? O, it will be remembered, measured a spin up on the particle. This would appear to be paradoxical: the two observers, surely, will realise that they have disparate results.
However, this apparent paradox only arises as a result of the question being framed incorrectly: as long as we presuppose an "absolute" or "true" state of the world, this would, indeed, present an insurmountable obstacle for the relational interpretation. However, in a fully relational context, there is no way in which the problem can even be coherently expressed. — Relational Quantum Mechanics - Wikipedia
The gliders and such exist as 'physical' parts of that universe. — noAxioms
The point is that if reality consists in discrete durational moments within which no change occurs, there may or may not be forces at work which are not themselves perceptible within those changeless moments, and those forces may or may not be quantized into discrete changeless moments. I am still seeing no contradiction. — Janus
Wow, a lot of context is missing here. Had to go back to the wiki entry to figure out the scenario being described. O' is observing system O and S. One could say that O is the cat, and O' is the guy outside the (initially closed) box.Which is to say, multiple measured outcomes can occur, but this can't be coherently expressed in relational terms since no interactions between the worlds occur. That is, in relational language, the other worlds are not real for observers in this world and neither is our world real to them. — Andrew M
Yes. Except I'm not sure about the necessity of the frame of reference. Both universes are formal structures from either frame of reference, but each is its own local reality. So CGol structure is not part of my personal reality, and our universe is not part of theirs. Each is not real to the other, but there is no objective (instantiated) reality to any of them.OK. So to clarify, you're saying that CGOL (as a formal and non-instantiated structure) nonetheless has its own internal physics. And from inside the structure, gliders are physical but, from their frame of reference, their universe is formal.
And similarly for us, birds, trees and human beings are physical. But our universe is formal. — Andrew M
I didn't say "exhaustively consists", so your objection is inapt. — Janus
Again, you're assuming 'exhaustive' when that was not what you intended. 'Reality' is a very plastic term; the forces are assumed to be part of reality but are really inferred not observed; so they may or may not be part of reality; whereas what we observe is obviously part of reality as it is perceived by us. — Janus
I have only been putting forward, and trying to think through, a possibility; that at the 'smallest' levels, reality is quantic, and consists of a succession of unchanging frames or moments, rather than a seamless progression where any discrete position or moment becomes arbitrary. — Janus
Wow, a lot of context is missing here. — noAxioms
Looking for inconsistencies in the view. I really like the view since it removes the need for instantiation, which always seems rationalized, and not actually rational, when I see it explained for other views. Cosmological argument for God is such an example. — noAxioms
There are two states in superposition (in relation to O''). That superposition has always been many worlds. The photon takes both paths and then interferes with itself. The cat is both dead and alive, and does not interfere with itself. The latter macroscopic picture is closer to many-worlds than is the one where interference is still likely.Sorry! What I was actually drawing attention to in that quote was that observer O' measures particle S with spin-down. But, earlier, observer O had measured particle S with spin-up.
In quantum mechanics, subsequent spin measurements of a particle in the same basis give the same result. So there would seem to be a paradox here, since (in realist terms) the measurements by observer's O and O' contradict each other.
But, per RQM, no comparison can be made until observer's O and O' physically interact and compare results. And when they do, they will find their two spin measurements are in agreement, just as quantum mechanics predicts! So there is no paradox in relational terms.
That should seem a bit fishy. Is there any possible mechanism by which that agreement could come about without bringing in many physical worlds? — Andrew M
Well, I'd have to say two kinds of ontology: The structures themselves, which have no ontology, and the things in it (galaxies, cups, photons, gliders) which have a relationship to the structure as a whole. That relation is 'is a member of' as best I can articulate it, and is effectively as close as you're going to get to ontology. So 5 exists in the set of integers because it is a member of that set.Looking for inconsistencies in the view. I really like the view since it removes the need for instantiation, which always seems rationalized, and not actually rational, when I see it explained for other views. Cosmological argument for God is such an example.
— noAxioms
OK, I'll take up the challenge. :-) Are the physical things in the universe also merely formal? Or does your ontology have two kinds of things - the formal structures (the universes) and substantial (physical) things in the universes? — Andrew M
I think they can be trivial universes on their own. Does x=1 mean anything that just '1' doesn't? What is '1' if the set has no other members? The universes are so trivial that there seems to be no way to have any relations except the identity relation. The universe have no requirement to have meaning, lacking something external to give it that. But we're considering them here, so in the context of this discussion, '1' should have meaning to us I think. Don't think I was out of line to ask it.Also is the equation "x = 1" a universe? How about just individual numbers, like the number 1? Or 0?
There is a matter of distinguishing the concept from the thing which it is a concept of. The Newtonian concept of space was derived from an understanding of objects, and the need for a "space" for them to move in. In this way, space is derived from objects, but that's only conceptually, in abstraction. We can look at the relationship between space and objects logically (if there are objects then there is space) and conclude that space is necessary for the existence of objects. Therefore space is prior to objects. Of course the real existence of point particles would defy this principle, but as you say, the trend is to make space a property of what exists, not vise versa. We can look at time in the same way. The concept of time is derived from an understanding of motion and change. It is a generalization. So we can say "if there is change then there is time". This logical process leads to the necessity of positing "time" as something real, but its reality is only apprehended directly by the mind (intuited). But we cannot logically support "if there is time then there is change". So this allows for the proposition that time is prior to change. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is probably beyond my capacity to explain or even understand, but since you seem to have a fundamental understanding of my hypothesis I'll offer some further speculation. — Metaphysician Undercover
Consider Galilean relativity. Motion is determined relative to an inertial frame, but it could be any inertial frame, and the motion is through the medium, empty space. Now Einstein created consistency between Galilean relativity, and the constancy of the speed of light, so light is brought into this conception of space, which allows for objects moving in space. Light is positioned as the boundary to this conception of objects in space, but it is important to note that it is a conception of objects in space, rather than the alternative conception of light, which was waves in an ether. So light is placed into positive space, therefore it can only be understood, under the precepts of special relativity, as an object in space. Now we have a massless non-inertial particle, a photon, and this is a precedent for other such particles to follow in conception. — Metaphysician Undercover
When we look at a massive object, we see a solid object. But sight sees in the negative space, so we are not really seeing the mass of the object. Mass doesn't really exist as solid objects it exists as tiny particles at the nucleus of the atom, with space between them. So there is space, as positive space, between particles of mass, and the representation of an object of mass as having a centre point of gravity cannot be accurate. Each particle of mass has its own spatial location. The problem is that this space within objects (or between massive particles) is understood by us through the interactions of light, electrons, and other massless particles which is most likely the activity of negative space. So our approach to positive space, using the speed of light as a constant, is through negative space and we have an inadequate understanding of negative space. This becomes more evident if we extrapolate to larger and larger massive objects, like the solar system, and the galaxy. Each planet is seen as a massive object with space between, and we understand and measure this space through the activity of light. But space between massive objects is positive space, and the activity of light is in negative space. So we have basic principles which measure distance in positive space, then we relate the activity of light as if it were moving in positive space, and we derive a speed of light. The designated speed of light is inaccurate because of this conflation of negative space with positive space. — Metaphysician Undercover
To derive the true speed of light we must bring light into the positive space, as a particle of mass, having determinate, actual existence, instead of existing as possibilities. But this may be just out of the range of the breadth of the present of human perception, because light appears to us as the possibility for change. So it must be redefined as an actuality and this requires locating individual particles in relation to massive objects and establishing a positioning in this way. This could create the base for the zero dimension line. — Metaphysician Undercover
The speed of light is now the base speed for activity in the negative space. It is derived from the left hand side of the orthogonal timelines when space has fully inverted and spatial separation at 'the present" has maximized its meaningfulness. As we look toward the source of the orthogonal timelines, to the right, when the inversion of space is just beginning, spatial separation is completely different, allowing for interactions between particles, which if they were related at the other end of the timeline would appear as faster than the speed of light. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is why if we want to accept the proposition that reality consists of discrete moments, we must assume active discrete moments. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's possible, but what could it mean to have free will if you could neither experience nor conceive of that freedom, let alone exercise it? — Janus
Free will could be a result of the soul's temporal development, that is, its advent could be temporal without necessitating that it's origin must be temporal. — Janus
I see no contradiction between the idea that the soul is eternal and the idea that God created the soul. If eternity is the condition for the existence of the soul then the soul is in a sense created by eternity. This is because eternity is greater than the soul; even if the soul is eternal it cannot be the whole of eternity.
I also don't see why we need the notion of God "interacting" with the temporal world. The temporal world could be the expression of God, not something Dre interacts with. I don't interpret Theism as a claim that God "creates the unchanging soul at a certain point"; rather I understand that the soul is created by Dre* from all eternity.
* 'Dre' is a non-gendered personal pronoun I created because I don't like referring to God as 'He' or 'She' — Janus
I think of this situation as the eternal being the condition for existence of the temporal. If the existence of the temporal is necessary, though, then the temporal is equally as much a condition for the existence of the eternal. Could the Forms exist without the "changing world"?
As Plato says "Time is the moving image of eternity". We could equally say that eternity is the unmoving image of time. I think the idea of interaction or activity occurring between eternity and time is incoherent. — Janus
I would just note that it is the agent herself that is the locus and determinant of her choice, not her will or desires. (As Pierre-Normand explains in his last sentence here.) — Andrew M
I think it's worth considering something like Rovelli's (and Bitbol's) relational approach here. Bob may be able to secretly predict the outcome of Alice's choice with certainty, per Bob's deterministic theory. But there is no specific outcome that Alice should regard as certain, since she can always reject that outcome and choose differently.
In my view, both those perspectives should be taken as equally valid. Which means that whether or not an outcome is inevitable is indexed to the agent considering the outcome, it's not an absolute claim. — Andrew M
‘To be, is to be related’ ~ Krishnamurti — Wayfarer
I understand the relationship between the Forms and the "changing world". To exist every table necessitates the existence of the Form of the table. The table in the "changing world" is a possible instantiation of the related Form. And in Plato's case there is not even the constraint that all possible "instantiations" must be realized. So since (supposedly) not all possible "instantiations" are actualized then the Form of the table existed in the past, exists now and will exist in the future even if some possible instantiations are never realized. From this IMO it is clear that the Forms have an ontological priority over the changing world. — boundless
the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present century.
This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory some forty years ago has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use then of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.
During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?
I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or—in Plato's sense—Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.
Well said. I had something of an epiphany when I realised the power of the ‘theory of ideas’ - that ideas are real as possible modes of existence, but are in some sense prior to any and all particulars. I’m still researching it. (You might find an article by Kelly Ross relevant - Meaning and the Problem of Universals. I have read it many times, I don’t agree with all of it, or understand all of it, but I still feel it has a useful interpretation of this question from a contemporary point of view.) — Wayfarer
...whether there is an arising of Tathagatas or no arising of Tathagatas, that element still persists, the stableness of the Dhamma, the fixed course of the Dhamma, specific conditionality...
Oh, and there’s another web essay that you might be interested in - The Debate between Plato and Democritus, by Heisenberg. It’s the transcript of a lecture. He too comes down in favour of Plato over Democritus, or idealism over materialism: — Wayfarer
In this model instead space and time are ontologically "prior" to objects. Objects need space and time for their existence. Space and time therefore are not merely an "abstraction" we use to "individuate" objects, but in fact are what allow objects to be "individuable". This is the big distinction between - as far as I understand - Kant/Schopenhauer and Newton. According to Newton space and time have no ontological role, so to speak. Instead in our case and in trascendental idealism space and time are necessary for the existence of objects (or phenomena). With space and time there is individuation. — boundless
Yes, in SR everything we can observe is in the space of objects, not in the space of potentialities. But IMO this was also true in the Newtonian case: in that theory everything physical was "in" the space of objects. But "our" model splits the "potentialities" and "actualities", and therefore seems to take into account the double nature of quantum particles by saying that each aspect of "particles" is "real" in the two spaces. — boundless
If this is so then photons are in fact not "objects" but in fact "potentialities". — boundless
The problem is that objects do interact with light as it is an "actual" object. Think about the photoelectric effect. In that case you need to take into account the particle nature of light. — boundless
While in fact I can think about our experience as given by the "projection" on the positive space of the negative, I do not understand how a physical massive object can interact with a massless one in the model we are discussing. In fact in the negative space we have the interaction of the fields (e.g. QED describes the interaction between an atom and a photon as the interaction of fields, after all) but in the positive space we have the corrisponding interaction between particles. In fact the interaction between, say, two massive atoms is an interaction that takes place in the positive space. Whereas the interaction of a massless and a massive one is solely in the negative space (and the positive we have a "projection" of it). — boundless
The problem for this is if a moment is active it cannot be fundamentally discrete, because if it is active then there will be change, process, within it which can then be divided into further discrete moments and so on ad infinitum. — Janus
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