"The bowl is empty" is not meaningful to Jack, it's meaningful to us.
— creativesoul

Tell that to Jack. — Banno

Make an argument for it. I could easily make one against it. "The bowl is empty" is a statement in English. Jack doesn't know English. Therefore...

You avoid talking about mind like the plague...
— creativesoul

Rubbish. This whole thread is about mind. — Banno

Good. My apologies.

What does Jack's mind consist of? Ah, nevermind. Belief is adequate. Nevermind "mind"...

"No, Banno - there is in addition an irreducible, invisible thing-in-the-mind had by those who understand 'heavy' - the concept of heavy."

And when you and I both understand "heavy", we have the same concept in our minds? Is there one concept, shared, or is there one concept each?

And if there is one concept that we all share, what sort of thing could it be?

But if we have one concept each, how can it be the same concept? How is "heavy" for me the same as "heavy" for you? — Banno

This seemed to go unaddressed, so I will continue my line of thought.

If we follow Wittgenstein's injunction to look to the use rather than the meaning, the dilemma I set up here dissipates.

You and I both use the word "heavy"; The concept, so far as there is one, is not one thing in your head and another thing in my head, but our shared use of the word.

Conceiving of a concept as an item in one;s mind, or a pattern in the firing of one's neurones, or in any other way that makes it a thing inside the head, is ill-conceived.

If concepts are to be anything, they must be shared.

And that means that what we thought was in our heads, isn't.

Do you agree that we need to determine as precisely as possible what non-linguistic belief contains and/or consists of; the content? — Sam26

For my purposes I don't see the need. — Sam26

How then can you claim to know what you're saying about it? — creativesoul

For me it's simple, and not as complicated as most people are making it. We see the actions of animals and humans, and based on these actions we can reasonably infer that they have beliefs apart from statements/propositions. When we communicate these beliefs with one another we use language, but beliefs aren't necessarily dependent on language. Beliefs are only dependent upon language if we want to communicate that belief.

Another way to put it is the following: Pain behavior is not dependent on language, but our talk of pain behavior is. Pain can be observed apart from language, and so can beliefs, both are shown in the acts of both humans and animals.

So to answer your question, "How can I claim to know...?" - I can claim to know based on observation. I don't need to know every aspect of what a belief consists of to draw this conclusion. If you want to be more precise about it that's fine, but just remember that it's not necessary to have a precise definition to be able to talk about these concepts, we do it all the time. The word belief spans a wide array of language-games, so precision, although important, may escape you.

Any belief, including the beliefs of creatures that do not have the capacity for language, can be placed in the form of a relation between an individual and a proposition, by a creature with the capacity for language. — Banno

I agree Banno.

Uhum … (strictly propositional) beliefs explain but do not (always) determine actions

A person might act in ways contradictory to their propositional and abstract beliefs if she holds vying and less abstract beliefs that doing so is to her benefit … otherwise her behaviors would be ontically random (?).

To hold a motive upon which one acts is to hold a belief-that upon which one acts, even if this belief is non-propositional, i.e. not linguistically experienced at the time held. So too with choices made; e.g. choosing A rather than B given motive X.

Doubt this will get a reply … but, just in case, please be so kind as to explain why the just stated is incorrect in your reply. Generally speaking …

And that means that what we thought was in our heads, isn't. — Banno

I fully grant there being interpersonally shared concepts. What of those non-interpersonal concepts experienced and sometimes newly gained via dreams?

This seemed to go unaddressed, so I will continue my line of thought.

If we follow Wittgenstein's injunction to look to the use rather than the meaning, the dilemma I set up here dissipates.

You and I both use the word "heavy"; The concept, so far as there is one, is not one thing in your head and another thing in my head, but our shared use of the word.

Conceiving of a concept as an item in one;s mind, or a pattern in the firing of one's neurones, or in any other way that makes it a thing inside the head, is ill-conceived.

If concepts are to be anything, they must be shared.

And that means that what we thought was in our heads, isn't. — Banno

You are correct, any concept, which by necessity is based on a language, and the shared rules of that language, is social in nature. This social nature necessitates that the concepts are not some phantasm based in the head, but live and breathe in the social nature of language.

I don't think you're denying that nothing is going on in the head, only that when it comes to language, it's not dependent on what's going in the head. Is that correct?

I don't understand. Are you agreeing with me?

I don't think you're denying that nothing is going on in the head, only that when it comes to language, it's not dependent on what's going in the head. Is that correct? — Sam26

Dependent...

I'm increasingly inclined to think of mind as the interaction between brain and world. It depends on what goes on in the head, but occurs in both head and world.

Well yes, in part. Where the partial disagreement emerges from: I hold that motives acted on are often non-propositional beliefs ... and that all of our actions are contingent upon motives. Hence, because all motives we act on are our beliefs-that (edit: be these beliefs propositional or not), I'm maintaining that beliefs in general do determine actions. This conclusion then being in disagreement with your original post on the matter.

Not every word has an objective referent, but every meaningful word has a subjective referent, namely its subjective meaning. — Hanover

This is wrong.

The meaning of a word - so far as there can be such a thing - cannot be its "subjective referent" - whatever that might be - because you and I can mean the very same thing with the same word; that would imply that the subjective referent in your head was the very same subjective referent as in my head, thus contradicting the very idea of it being subjective.

The notion that the meaning of a word is a piece of mind-furniture is incoherent.

non-propositional beliefs — javra

What's that, then?

A belief that cannot be placed in the canonical form B(a,p)?

Or just an unstated belief?

What's that, then?

A belief that cannot be placed in the canonical form B(a,p)?

Or just an unstated belief? — Banno

Obviously describing what a non-propostional belief is via linguistic concepts could not evidence such belief being possible, since it would be here linguistic in all cases. So we need to point our fingers at examples, so to speak.

My example was that of motives, such as in our motives for partaking of this forum, or this discussion, or for the words we use to express ourselves. Not all these motives are propositional at the moments first held and acted upon ... though most if not all can be expressed to varying degrees of accuracy after the fact.

Animals, for example, have motives in what they do.

B(a,p) can, to my mind, of course be used to express all non-propositional beliefs--just as you've previously mentioned. But this is conditional on our suppositions of what an animal's beliefs, for example, are being in fact true; i.e. correlating to the actual non-propositional belief of the animal.

As to "unstated beliefs" I find it possible that some beliefs might not be state-able, at least not in mean that comprehensively express the belief in total. I'm preferential to beliefs concerning the aesthetics of artistic works. A less fuzzy example might well be people's belief of what "God" entails (regardless of whether they are religious or atheistic).

As to "unstated beliefs" I find it possible that some beliefs might not be state-able — javra

Give us an example... :wink:

An unstatable belief could not be used to effectively explain an action. "Why did you do it?" is not answered by hand-waving.

So based on your last reply, I'm not sure if you agree or disagree?

Nor am I :fear:

But I am not claiming that nothing is going on in people's brains. Some people, anyway.

I already did: beliefs of what is aesthetic to individual works of art and belief of what God is. Art can inspire revolutions due to its conveyed aesthetics (rarely, but an example does come to mind) and beliefs of what God is ... well, in the world I live in, these motivate people galore to all sorts of actions all the time.

But I'm not clear on where you stand. Do you disagree with motives being beliefs-that?



... been procrastinating on doing, well, what I've got to do. Will get back eventually if replied to.

I already did: beliefs of what is aesthetic to individual works of art and belief of what God is. Art can inspire revolutions due to its conveyed aesthetics — javra

That doesn't work. One might be inspired by art to believe this or that; the this or that is expressible, especially if you want it to lead to revolution.

What is a motive? A desire, or a belief in a way to bring about that desire? Or both?

The meaning of a word - so far as there can be such a thing - cannot be its "subjective referent" - whatever that might be - because you and I can mean the very same thing with the same word; that would imply that the subjective referent in your head was the very same subjective referent as in my head, thus contradicting the very idea of it being subjective. — Banno

No, it would imply that it's likely we both are referencing a similar subjective impression of a beetle when we said "beetle," but we couldn't be sure.

I can't be sure your utterance of "beetle" is heard the same for me as you. It too is a beetle. Language is only assumed public.

But I am not claiming that nothing is going on in people's brains. Some people, anyway. — Banno

:up:

You again appear to be working with a picture of language that has been thoroughly debunked.

So, it seems that the only significant difference between our views is the importance being placed upon what belief consists of...

One problem I see, and I'm sure I'm not alone, is how we can know what the non-linguistic creature's belief is. I mean, one could come up with a variety of different explanations for the same set of behaviours. All of these would be propositional, for that's what our reports consist of.

How to choose between the equally valid explanations?

I'm still a bit curious though Banno...

What is the relation between Jack and "The food bowl is empty"?

Are you saying that the relation is Jack's belief?

The notion of being state-able is misleading. Creature's that cannot state anything can have belief. That belief is unstate-able in one important sense. Our stating what that belief is is our explanation. Our explanation is not equivalent to the belief. Being un-state-able seems to me to be about explanations of beliefs and not the beliefs themselves. Again, it harks back to knowledge claims and justification...

One problem I see, and I'm sure I'm not alone, is how we can know what the non-linguistic creature's belief is. I mean, one could come up with a variety of different explanations for the same set of behaviours — creativesoul

You know any being's belief by its behavior whether it's by their gestures, movements, or utterances. Language is behavior just like your cat looking for its bowl. All external behavior offers an incomplete report of the internal belief, which could result in alternative explanations, just like you remain uncertain of Banno's beliefs in this thread despite his explicit linguistic behavior attempting to explain himself.

That doesn't work. One might be inspired by art to believe this or that; the this or that is expressible, — Banno

(Saw creativesoul's post just recently; all the same:) I didn’t use the word “expression” but “state-able”, i.e. being expressible via language. Communication/expression is not limited to language. Lesser animals communicate/express things to themselves all the time, both intra-species and inter-species (as in a pet cat’s meowing a human for its lunch).

I by definition take art—even linguistic art such as poetry and to a lesser extent literature—to express things otherwise not expressible via language (via ordinary language when it comes to language based art)—thereby making what art expresses non-propositional at root, but only partially expressible via language subsequent to its non-propositional expressions having been picked up on. A picture tells a thousand words, but those thousand words will not perfectly depict the picture.

That that perspective aside, I’ve already acknowledged that the topic of aesthetics is a fuzzy example. One person’s aesthetics is another person’s urinal—and the first most often finds it impossible to express the aesthetics to the second.

Why pick on an easy target and not address the issue of belief concerning what God is? The word is meaningful even to an atheist—though maybe not ever to two atheists/theist in exactly the same way. Yet the concept as belief causes actions.

What is a motive? A desire, or a belief in a way to bring about that desire? Or both? — Banno

Without heading into philosophy of mind/self issues, a motive is tmk defined as “a reason for sentient behavior”. If one holds motive X one will trust/believe that X is beneficial to obtain or else realize—thereby (teleologically, I'd argue) causing one’s actions of obtaining or else realizing X.

A desire can most commonly be defined as a drive that holds a motive—and, thereby, a belief-that some X is beneficial—for its impetus. Otherwise, the desire is enactive, i.e. is one with (perfectly unified with) who one momentarily is … “I am desiring to whistle,” rather than something along the lines of, “I feel tempted to whistle (this later instance being an inward drive one feels in some way, akin to how one would physiologically feel an object, rather than a drive which one momentarily is actively being). [Yes, a contentious proposition, but again, I’ll shy away from philosophy of mind/self. Still, you asked, and this is my best current reply.]

That said: Do you disagree with motives being beliefs-that?

If yes, give your own understanding of what a motive is ... such that it does not consist of believing that some given is beneficial to obtain or realize.

But hey, if you don’t want to interact by not overlooking significant portions of what I post, no gripe on my part. We can just leave it here.

Well, I've nothing to say about the ineffable. Nor about other folk's invisible friends. And I want to talk about belief, not motive.

You know any being's belief by its behavior... — Hanover

All external behavior offers an incomplete report of the internal belief, which could result in alternative explanations... — Hanover

Care to reconcile this?

Communication/expression is not limited to language. — javra

All communication IS language.

WTF???