Sam, I am fairly certain that you and I agree upon much.

I'm having trouble understanding why you don't like the phrase "meaningful to the believer"...

The believer is the creature who we are claiming believes something or other. I think it seems to be basic common sense that whatever we claim that that creature believes, the belief itself belongs to the creature, and we are simply reporting upon it. Thus, if we are correct, then what we set out as the creatures belief ought be something that is meaningful to that creature.

This is not to say that our discourse can be. However, our discourse must set out something that can, lest we're just pissin in the wind...

I'm not saying it's not meaningful. I'm just saying that it's seems weird to talk of beliefs in this way. All beliefs are meaningful in some way, it's a kind of truism.

Right. However, if we claim that some statement or other is Jack's belief, well...

We're wrong.

The content of non-linguistic belief cannot be propositional.

Jack's belief consist of that which is meaningful to Jack.

The content of non-linguistic belief cannot be propositional. — creativesoul

I agree.

All beliefs are meaningful to the one who has them, but I don't see how this adds anything to the discussion.

Think about what has been claimed as the belief(s) of non-linguistic creatures...

Name a concept that is prior to language. — creativesoul

Imagination is prior to language.

If the content of belief is propositional... — creativesoul

That's a big "if"...

The point I'm attempting to make here, with you, is that some things that we call "concepts" are prior to language. Others not.

Do you agree?

If so, then not all concepts are prior to language.

That's a big "if"... — Sapientia

Well, that's what the conventional historical notion of belief claims... that the content of belief is propositional. That's also what the conventional historical notion of JTB calls for as well...

The content of non-linguistic belief cannot be propositional.
— creativesoul
I agree.

All beliefs are meaningful to the one who has them, but I don't see how this adds anything to the discussion. — Sam26

Well Sam...

Given that Witty worked from the conventional notion of JTB, and that notion claims that the content of belief is propositional, then what I've been arguing ought add some understanding with regard to that...

In the bigger picture, one in which we're all attempting to take proper account of non-linguistic thought and belief, it would seem to me to be of vital importance to understand what that kind of belief consists in/of.

So, by my lights, it adds quite a bit...

In short, it helps us to set the bounds; help determine what can and cannot be said with regard to what Jack believes...

My position doesn't require mentalese...
— creativesoul

Yes. It doesn't seem to require or involve an explanation in any form. — apokrisis

Ask a relevant question, and as always... I'm more than happy to bear any burden. Aside from that, I'm not interested in your typical rhetorical drivel. I cannot possibly compete with you in that regard, nor do I want any practice...

Banno,

You avoid talking about mind like the plague... and yet began a topic in the forum section dedicated to philosophy of mind... funny that.

A playful one you are.

The point I'm attempting to make here, with you, is that some things that we call "concepts" are prior to language. Others not.

Do you agree? — creativesoul

Not without good reason. I don't consider fairness, justice, love or casualty to be examples of concepts that were dependent on language to arise. If you do, then please explain why. The first three require thought and feeling, and the fourth requires thought. Your additional posit of language requires justification, and the burden is on you.

Well, that's what the conventional historical notion of belief claims... that the content of belief is propositional. — creativesoul

And there's historical precedent going against that, cf. the British Empiricists.

Given that Witty worked from the conventional notion of JTB, and that notion claims that the content of belief is propositional, then what I've been arguing ought add some understanding with regard to that... — creativesoul

I don't think it's accurate to say that W. worked from the conventional notion of JTB. He examined the notion of knowing using a variety of language-games, and not all of them can be neatly fit into JTB, some can, but some not. I use JTB because it generally works.

Well no. I have no burden in this thread regarding that. It's not about the differences between our notion of "concepts". It's about belief. If you want to say that it is a concept that does not require language, then we agree in part at least. Some belief requires language, some not.

I don't think it's accurate to say that W. worked from the conventional notion of JTB. He examined the notion of knowing using a variety of language-games, and not all of them can be neatly fit into JTB, some can, but some not. I use JTB because it generally works. — Sam26

I'll take your word for this Sam.

I'm not aiming at Witt. There's many a book about and/or of his writing that I have in my possession but have yet to have taken the time to study.

Do you agree that we need to determine as precisely as possible what non-linguistic belief contains and/or consists of; the content?

Do you agree that we need to determine as precisely as possible what non-linguistic belief contains and/or consists of; the content? — creativesoul

For my purposes I don't see the need. This discussion, if I remember correctly, started in my thread on epistemology, and one of my points was that there are beliefs that are pre-linguistic. I was trying to establish that there are beliefs that are basic or foundational and outside the need for justification.

Well no. I have no burden in this thread regarding that. It's not about the differences between our notion of "concepts". It's about belief. If you want to say that it is a concept that does not require language, then we agree in part at least. Some belief requires language, some not. — creativesoul

Ha, funny. It was your point, so if it lacks relevance, then you know who to blame. Although it actually precedes you and leads back to Banno. I'm not going to trace it any further back than that. Not sure how it ended up being about concepts.

Yes, we agree that at least some - if not all - belief does not require language.

From the OP:

A belief is a propositional attitude.
That is, it can be placed in a general form as a relation between someone and a proposition. So "John believes that the sky is blue" can be rendered as

Believes (John, "The sky is blue")

B(a,p)

There's ill will in some circles towards this sort of analysis. Think of this as setting up a basic structure or grammar for belief. A belief is a relation between an individual and a proposition. That there is much more to be said about belief is not in contention; this is just a place to start. This is set as a falsifiable proposition. If there are any examples of beliefs that are not relations between individuals and propositions, this proposal would have to be revisited. — Banno

It has been suggested that animal and other non-linguistic beliefs are a falsification of this suggestion. The argument is that non-linguistic creatures can have beliefs and yet cannot express these beliefs as propositions, and that hence beliefs cannot be propositional attitudes.

But that is a misreading of what is going on here. Any belief, including that of creatures that cannot speak, can be placed in the form of a propositional attitude, but those who can speak. A cat, for example, can believe that its bowl is empty, but cannot put that belief in the form B(a,p).

Beliefs explain but do not determine actions
Beliefs are used to explain actions. Further, such explanations are causal and sufficient. So if we have appropriate desires and a beliefs we can explain an action.

So, given that John is hungry, and that John believes eating a sandwich will remove his hunger, we have a sufficient causal explanation for why John ate the sandwich.

One may act in ways that are contrary to one's beliefs. A dissident may comply in order to protect herself and her family.

So given that John is hungry, and has a sandwich at hand, it does not follow that John will eat the sandwich.

There's a hint that tree, trust and true involve being sturdy, upright, solid.

Grasping the concept is the concept? — frank

But I did not say that. And I failed to follow your comments about the moon.

It has been suggested that animal and other non-linguistic beliefs are a falsification of this suggestion. The argument is that non-linguistic creatures can have beliefs and yet cannot express these beliefs as propositions, and that hence beliefs cannot be propositional attitudes.

But that is a misreading of what is going on here. Any belief, including that of creatures that cannot speak, can be placed in the form of a propositional attitude, but those who can speak. A cat, for example, can believe that its bowl is empty, but cannot put that belief in the form B(a,p). — Banno

The argument is that the belief of a non-linguistic creature must be meaningful to the creature. "The bowl is empty" is not meaningful to Jack, it's meaningful to us. You are conflating your report of Jack's belief with Jack's belief.

It's all about the content of belief. If there is such a thing as non-linguistic belief, then at it's core, it must be the same as linguistic belief, otherwise why call it belief?

That content cannot be propositional, for non-linguistic creatures do not have language and propositions require language.

All propositions consist of correlations.

The content of non-linguistic belief cannot be propositional.
— @creativesoul
I agree.

All beliefs are meaningful to the one who has them, but I don't see how this adds anything to the discussion. — Sam26

Any belief, including the beliefs of creatures that do not have the capacity for language, can be placed in the form of a relation between an individual and a proposition, by a creature with the capacity for language.

Do you agree that we need to determine as precisely as possible what non-linguistic belief contains and/or consists of; the content?
— creativesoul

For my purposes I don't see the need. — Sam26

How then can you claim to know what you're saying about it?

Yes. We can report upon non-linguistic creature's belief. — creativesoul

OK. We have agreement.

Any belief, including the beliefs of creatures that do not have the capacity for language, can be placed in the form of a relation between an individual and a proposition, by a creature with the capacity for language. — Banno

Yes. We can report upon non-linguistic creature's belief.

You avoid talking about mind like the plague... — creativesoul

Rubbish. This whole thread is about mind.