If life isn't worth starting, can it be worth continuing?

_db

An obvious argument for antinatalism would be to argue that life sucks, across the board. It's miserable, tedious, scary, and all sorts of negative things. This leads to the conclusion that this kind of life is not worth starting.

But if a life is not worth starting (because of the aforementioned structural issues apparent in it), how can it possibly be worth continuing?

One option is that is ain't. You wouldn't want to get the flu, and if you do indeed get the flu then it's not worth extending its duration. Similarly if life sucks so much that it's not worth starting, then it's not worth continuing either. To accept that it's not worth starting because of its suckiness and yet consciously embrace life regardless is either contradictory or masochistic.

So if you personally do not enjoy life, I have no argument against this. I cannot tell you that your life is better than you personally believe it to be (Schop1 IIRC called this the "optimistic mafia").

But perhaps one could argue that life is not worth living but yet still live life despite this, because of certain excuses. One excuse might be that one is fearful of death. In this case, this is a legitimate excuse, so long as it is honest.

We have to be careful, though, that our excuses for continuing life (if life is so bad) don't become reasons to continue life. For if we have reasons to continue life, then life isn't (as) bad as was originally thought to be. Excuses do not make a life worth living, reasons do.

Still, one could adopt the view (pace Zapffe and Becker) that humans continue to exist because they create various psychological walls for comfort and security. This is also a legitimate hypothesis, so long as it is honest. But this also leads to the realization that oneself creates these walls of comfort and security, which leads to a kind of disillusionment. Once it is realized what they are and that we ourselves have them, then they seem to lose their ability.

From this, it can be seen that if one adopts an antinatalism solely based upon the apparent suckiness of life, they cannot logically enjoy life in the non-deprivationalist sense. The only position that I can see to be legitimate and not contradictory is to wish one was dead, or at least understand that one would be better off dead. For it does not make sense to say that life is sucky-enough to not start a life, but not sucky-enough to end it. Even if life is mediocre, one still would have (to a lesser extent) a wish to die to rid oneself of the mediocrity.

How did the classic philosophical pessimists view suicide? I know Schopenhauer thought every man had the right to end his life. And Cioran had a rather confusing view that it's not worth killing yourself because you do it too late, something about attachments or something...

Of course, there are other arguments for antinatalism, such as the risk involved. But I'm more interested in knowing how someone like Schopenhauer, who thought life was shit and that it was not worth living, managed to not kill himself (and wasn't apparently suicidal either). Did his aesthetics allow him to "transcend" the crap of life? Can everyone transcend this and become something like a Buddha? It seems hard to reconcile the belief that life is really bad (enough not to have children) but not bad enough to force someone to kill themselves, especially if we're able to overcome the suffering by certain ways, like Schopenhauer and his aesthetics.

The conclusion of all this is that it is indeed possible to have a life worth living despite it not worth starting, so long as one does not argue that it is not worth starting because it is necessarily bad.

BC

In one sense, a life is valuable from the very beginning and does not become more valuable by the achievements of the person. In another sense, a life becomes more valuable on the basis of the person's achievements. So, a 2 year old has accumulated more "value" than a 1 year old. A 30 year old is more valuable than a 20 year old, and 69 year olds like myself are priceless.

These "values" aren't monetary. Value here is a measurement of accumulated experience. Each day of life adds to the sum total of one's experiences. A bad experience (like having a burning marshmallow stuck to one's fingers) enriches one's life despite the pain. Good food is better than bad food (you read it here first) but bad food is better than no food (usually. There are times I've thought nothing would have been better than, say, toxic chow mein).

_db

Value here is a measurement of accumulated experience. — Bitter Crank

What if you lose your memory? Are you no longer valuable?

A bad experience (like having a burning marshmallow stuck to one's fingers) enriches one's life despite the pain. — Bitter Crank

These little pains are something to shrug off and laugh about after with your friends.

But something like cancer is not. If you survive, you went through a tremendous amount of turmoil and doubt. If you didn't survive, well...you didn't survive. What part of cancer enriches a person's life? What good part of cancer is not just placed upon it in a post-hoc manner?

Sinderion

I never understood the insistence that there must be some objective meaning or value in life in order for it to be worth living. What, exactly, is wrong if I think that there is some meaning to my life, and that therefore I think my life is worth living? I'm not making any claims on anyone else's life, I can freely admit that other people might not see any value in their lives. In what way must these facts necessarily inform how I value my life? (or you, yours).

So I would think from this, I could hold that life is necessarily objectively meaningless and crappy, but still be able to rationally assert that I do have a subjective reason for living (possible reasons might include preaching the gospel of suffering, enlightening the foolish, happy optimists, hastening the arrival of the end times, or maybe just being a decent person to other persons trapped in the same hell-hole as I am)

_db

So I would think from this, I could hold that life is necessarily objectively meaningless and crappy, but still be able to rationally assert that I do have a subjective reason for living (possible reasons might include preaching the gospel of suffering, enlightening the foolish, happy optimists, hastening the arrival of the end times, or maybe just being a decent person to other persons trapped in the same hell-hole as I am) — Sinderion

The point I was trying to make is that without these subjective reasons, would you kill yourself or have the desire to kill yourself? If so, then I there's no argument here.

If not, then something is keeping you from embracing non-existence. Something good. I'm hesitant in making assumptions of people, but I assume you aren't solely devoted to the reasons above and probably aren't suicidal. If you aren't suicidal, then this means that the things life has thrown at you haven't been great enough to break your spirit, and that you have other positive attachments keeping you from intentional death. Like I said before, it's difficult to say that life isn't good enough to be born into but is good enough to continue to experience, at least for yourself.

I guess the bottom line here is: were you glad you were born? How can one be glad they were born and yet also believe it was not worth starting based upon objective features of life (and not other arguments like risk)?

Sinderion

The answer to your bottom line question is precisely subjective reasons. If you're instead asking, how can one both be glad they were born, and also believe life is not worth starting for any reason, well: starting life and continuing life are separate issues. It's possible to draw some kind of distinction I suppose.

Not that I think any of this means much. Even if this world is complete garbage, unless you actually think that all actions are morally equivalent there's still going to be good stuff to do.

schopenhauer1

In one sense, a life is valuable from the very beginning and does not become more valuable by the achievements of the person. In another sense, a life becomes more valuable on the basis of the person's achievements. So, a 2 year old has accumulated more "value" than a 1 year old. A 30 year old is more valuable than a 20 year old, and 69 year olds like myself are priceless.

These "values" aren't monetary. Value here is a measurement of accumulated experience. Each day of life adds to the sum total of one's experiences. A bad experience (like having a burning marshmallow stuck to one's fingers) enriches one's life despite the pain. Good food is better than bad food (you read it here first) but bad food is better than no food (usually. There are times I've thought nothing would have been better than, say, toxic chow mein). — Bitter Crank

The problem is "value" has to be "cashed out". There is no Platonic cashing out of value. It has to be valuable to someone.

BC

What if you lose your memory? Are you no longer valuable? — darthbarracuda

A life does not lose value because one loses one's memory.

Henry Gustave Molaison, 1926-2008, was a young man who lost his capacity to form new permanent memories as a result of a drastic experimental brain operation to control very severe seizures.

Without episodic memories (memory of discrete events in life) or semantic memories, general knowledge of the world, including the meanings of newly encountered words), or declarative memory—the ability that allows you consciously to retrieve past happenings and facts learned in the past, Molaison had no new permanent memories for most of his life. He could, however, remember his life (up till his early 20s) before the surgery.

Molaison became an extremely valuable subject, and through study of his condition, a great deal was learned about memory. People who suffer from dementia do not lose value, because of their shared experiences with other people, before and after dementia.

But something like cancer is not. If you survive, you went through a tremendous amount of turmoil and doubt. If you didn't survive, well...you didn't survive. What part of cancer enriches a person's life? What good part of cancer is not just placed upon it in a post-hoc manner? — darthbarracuda

People do not desire to have cancer, true enough. But we are all going to die, sooner or later, from one cause or another. The difference between cancer and a sudden fatal stroke or heart attack is that one has time to recollect, complete some tasks in life, to say farewell, to share one's dying with one's loved ones.

Before 1996, when AIDS became manageable if not curable, quite a few people claimed it as an important and valuable experience. They had time to embrace their mortality, recollect, complete tasks, etc. Further, this was sometimes a collective experience. People with AIDS often knew each other, formed support groups, received services together, etc. Very bad experience, but meaningful.

BC

Two things (at least) save our human lives from not being worth starting and not being worth continuing, should we suffer the indignity of being born:

First, "all creation" so to speak is part of the universe. This fact doesn't grant meaningful existence to creatures whether they can conceptualize meaning or not, but it does place every creature (and thing) into a larger context. I don't know whether the universe intended life, but it happened, and we are all tied together in a web of connection, whether we like it or not. And some don't like it.

Second, some creatures can institute meaning for themselves. It is possible to decide that life was not worth starting and not worth continuing, and thus blow one's brains to smithereens at one's earliest convenience. Most people opt for the institution of meaning that gives their birth, life, and death value, meaning, and purpose. The universe does not provide this service -- we have to do it, or it doesn't happen.

(Granted, individuals don't start from scratch in their meaning-making. There are various meaning packages one can buy; their purchase is either mandatory or optional. Either way, templates are available.)

However one approaches the problem of meaning, life is going to be a mixed bag.

BC

The problem is "value" has to be "cashed out". There is no Platonic cashing out of value. It has to be valuable to someone. — schopenhauer1

What? No Platonic bank? I've been robbed!

Cashing out the value of life is a fine example of bourgeois thinking.

Hanover

An obvious argument for antinatalism would be to argue that life sucks, across the board. It's miserable, tedious, scary, and all sorts of negative things. This leads to the conclusion that this kind of life is not worth starting. — darthbarracuda

That's not an argument. It's a conclusion. If life sucks, then sure, let's not have life. The question is whether life sucks. I say it doesn't. What is obvious is that if you begin with the conclusion that life has no meaning, nihilism follows by definition.

schopenhauer1

That's not an argument. It's a conclusion. If life sucks, then sure, let's not have life. The question is whether life sucks. I say it doesn't. What is obvious is that if you begin with the conclusion that life has no meaning, nihilism follows by definition. — Hanover

I think he is addressing this to pessimists (the handful on here). The argument for him is IF the premise IS that life sucks, then why don't you just kill yourself. This is kind of the knee-jerk question people ask antinatalists all the time. I gave my response above.

schopenhauer1

I guess the bottom line here is: were you glad you were born? How can one be glad they were born and yet also believe it was not worth starting based upon objective features of life (and not other arguments like risk)? — darthbarracuda

You sort of answered your own questions. Most people fear death and the end of their personal identity. It's not like ending a bad habit, this is the very self that experiences the world in the first place. Clearly this is only a problem for us the living. Also, to end one's own very existence, is not a light decision. As I said in the other thread, not many pessimists think life is complete and utter agony where the self must be destroyed at all costs and as soon as possible. Rather, pessimists will continue to experience the happy moments when this occurs but keep in mind a certain aesthetic as well, based on personal experience, reflection, and consideration.

However, the pessimist will probably keep in mind the aesthetic I mentioned in the other thread. The world imposes on us the needs of survival and unwanted pain in a certain environmental and cultural constraints. Our individual wills impose upon ourselves the need to transform boredom into goals and pleasure. Being that we can never have true satiation, we are always in flux and never quite getting at anything in particular. It is a world to be endured. One may try to become ascetic, or simply live out the normative lifestyle but simply keeping this aesthetic in mind.

_db

I think he is addressing this to pessimists (the handful on here). The argument for him is IF the premise IS that life sucks, then why don't you just kill yourself. This is kind of the knee-jerk question people ask antinatalists all the time. I gave my response above. — schopenhauer1

Sort of. I'm not arguing that you should actually kill yourself. I'm arguing that IF these are your premises (life sucks across the board), THEN you have to at least desire for the suckiness to end, i.e. suicide.

What I am not arguing for is anyone actually carrying out a suicide, as it may be impossible for fear of death and other constraints. But if we remove these constraints (excuses) for not dying, would you continue to live (because of reasons)?

_db

You sort of answered your own questions. Most people fear death and the end of their personal identity. It's not like ending a bad habit, this is the very self that experiences the world in the first place. This is not a light decision. As I said in the other thread, not many pessimists think life is complete and utter agony where the self must be destroyed at all costs and as soon as possible. Rather, they will continue to experience the happy moments when this occurs. However, the understanding is that our world imposes on us needs of survival and unwanted pain in a certain environmental and cultural constraints. Our individual wills impose upon ourselves the need to transform boredom into goals and pleasure. Being that we can never have true satiation, we are always in flux and never quite getting at anything in particular. It is a world to be endured. One may try to become ascetic, or simply live out the normative lifestyle but simply keeping this aesthetic in mind. — schopenhauer1

So like I said before in the other thread, life is like cake: sometimes really good, but ultimately fattening and bad for you. You can't have cake without the fat. And so it's an aesthetic issue instead of an actual experience issue like a toothache.

schopenhauer1

So like I said before in the other thread, life is like cake: sometimes really good, but ultimately fattening and bad for you. You can't have cake without the fat. And so it's an aesthetic issue instead of an actual experience issue like a toothache. — darthbarracuda

Yes, but I might use a different analogy because the cake thing seems like it is about moderation. If you have just a little, it's not as bad, etc. But as far as the aesthetic vs. actual experience, I think that might be closer to the answer. The aesthetic I describe.. let's shorten it to survival/boredom/flux for the sake of brevity (still not brief I know), is a sort of inescapable understanding. One can have a pleasure and successive moments of happiness, but this understanding does not change. One does not let the aesthetic takeaway your happy experiences, but one does not find the happy experiences are all there is, and indeed fits into a larger picture of how existence operates.

But I may be misinterpreting you. You might have to explain where you say it's an aesthetic issue instead of an actual experience issue like a toothache.

Hanover

I think he is addressing this to pessimists (the handful on here). The argument for him is IF the premise IS that life sucks, then why don't you just kill yourself. This is kind of the knee-jerk question people ask antinatalists all the time. I gave my response above. — schopenhauer1

The reason most people don't just kill themselves doubtfully is related to anything rational anymore than the decision to kill one's self is rational. Suicide most often occurs during very emotional episodes, with the rare exception being euthanasia after prolonged illness. the decision is rarely rational.

In any creature that has arisen from an evolutionary system that promotes survivability, you'd have to assume that few would exist who don't have a strong desire to live. Our desire for self-preservation is trumped only by our desire to protect our young or those within our group. All of this is to answer the question of "why don't we all kill ourselves?" is because we are programmed not to. That's the real reason.

_db

The aesthetic I describe.. let's shorten it to survival/boredom/flux for the sake of brevity (still not brief I know), is a sort of inescapable understanding. One can have a pleasure and successive moments of happiness, but this understanding does not change. One does not let the aesthetic takeaway your happy experiences, but one does not find the happy experiences are all there is, and indeed fits into a larger picture of how existence operates. — schopenhauer1

In other words, I take your (and basically my) position to be that pleasure is contingently dependent upon structural issues.

If these structural issues aren't enough to make life worthless to continue (because of real pleasures) then why should we be against birth (if we argue the structural issues route)? It seems like the aesthetic understanding of our world is inherently connected to disillusionment (the breaking of fantasies). But is this breaking of fantasies by itself enough to warrant no-birth or even suicide? Couldn't we just say "whatever" and pursue pleasures?

schopenhauer1

In other words, I take your (and basically my) position to be that pleasure is contingently dependent upon structural issues.

If these structural issues aren't enough to make life worthless to continue (because of real pleasures) then why should we be against birth (if we argue the structural issues route)? It seems like the aesthetic understanding of our world is inherently connected to disillusionment (the breaking of fantasies). But is this breaking of fantasies by itself enough to warrant no-birth or even suicide? Couldn't we just say "whatever" and pursue pleasures? — darthbarracuda

The evaluation of the survival/boredom/flux dynamic is negative for pessimists. Simply because pleasure is accounted for in the system does not mean that one needs to put another human into the system in the first place to experience pleasure. But this is now moving the topic of your original question from why continue to exist to why start existence for another and that will simply lead to another antinatalist thread. I am not going to rehash arguments over again for antinatalism, but I will try to stick with where your original question was going with why we continue to exist. Anyways, it is enough to warrant no birth, but the aesthetic alone does not warrant immediate suicide. Again, we are not in utter agony.

schopenhauer1

The reason most people don't just kill themselves doubtfully is related to anything rational anymore than the decision to kill one's self is rational. Suicide most often occurs during very emotional episodes, with the rare exception being euthanasia after prolonged illness. the decision is rarely rational.

In any creature that has arisen from an evolutionary system that promotes survivability, you'd have to assume that few would exist who don't have a strong desire to live. Our desire for self-preservation is trumped only by our desire to protect our young or those within our group. All of this is to answer the question of "why don't we all kill ourselves?" is because we are programmed not to. That's the real reason. — Hanover

Yes I agree with this. Due to evolutionary reasons we have a strong aversion to destroying our very existence. Thus, it's the ideation of suicide that becomes more of a coping mechanism, not the actual suicide.

_db

Anyways, it is enough to warrant no birth, but the aesthetic alone does not warrant immediate suicide. Again, we are not in utter agony. — schopenhauer1

Right, I just want to get a clearer understanding here. Does the aesthetic alone attack our sense of pride or individuality? Like Voltaire said, every man shits from his butt hole. Some just do it in more stylish clothing. This is supposed to show that no man is aesthetically "superior" and to show that the King is just like everyone else.

So in the every day, we go along like nothing is wrong, but with the aesthetic outlook we find ourselves in a kind of nihilism. But is this nihilism alone enough to warrant no-birth? If the aesthetic does not by itself harm someone, and if most people are not in misery, then how can the aesthetic by itself lead to antinatalism? There needs to be an additional argument, that of risk and the potential for a really bad life.

schopenhauer1

So in the every day, we go along like nothing is wrong, but with the aesthetic outlook we find ourselves in a kind of nihilism. But is this nihilism alone enough to warrant no-birth? If the aesthetic does not by itself harm someone, and if most people are not in misery, then how can the aesthetic by itself lead to antinatalism? There needs to be an additional argument, that of risk and the potential for a really bad life. — darthbarracuda

Again, I don't want to get into another antinatalism argument. At this point, you can probably dig through all my previous posts and find perfectly good answers that I would use for these questions. However, I will say that your questions sort of answer itself. If you do not have this aesthetic, then no, I guess you would not see any reasons for an antinatalist position. If you do have this aesthetic, you would see reasons for an antinatalist position. You are caught up in the idea that if not all people are pessimists, then pessimists must be wrong by the mere fact that others are not pessimist. Like any argument, pessimists can argue their position, explain why it is correct, and let other evaluate it on their own. It is not handed down on tablets from Moses and everyone just gets it. Let me explain further...

Most people live in the world of the small. Everyday is just a day at work, a day to go home, a day to do this or that. There are negative moments, there are positive moments, but there is very little evaluation of it on a larger scale. If they start doing this, they may start seeing patterns, noticing certain things. The pessimist conclusion comes from seeing these patterns and understanding it in a certain way. Once they see this, their world becomes more understandable. Not everyone will see these patterns.

_db

Again, I don't want to get into another antinatalism argument. At this point, you can probably dig through all my previous posts and find perfectly good answers that I would use for these questions. — schopenhauer1

But in this case, arguing for antinatalism by appeal to structural issues of life is inherently connected to suicide. If you don't want to participate, nobody is forcing you to. But that's the topic of this thread.

You are caught up in the idea that if not all people are pessimists, then pessimists must be wrong by the mere fact that others are not pessimist. — schopenhauer1

I'm not though, considering I'm a pessimist myself. I'm just interested in what the classic pessimists like Schopenhauer thought about suicide and how they managed to have such a bleak view of existence and yet apparently not wish to die themselves.

Most people live in the world of the small. Everyday is just a day at work, a day to go home, a day to do this or that. There are negative moments, there are positive moments, but there is very little evaluation of it on a larger scale. If they start doing this, they may start seeing patterns, noticing certain things. The pessimist conclusion comes from seeing these patterns and understanding it in a certain way. Once they see this, their world becomes more understandable. Not everyone will see these patterns. — schopenhauer1

I get it, I notice these patterns as well. And actually I think most people do notice these patterns, too. It's why satirical comedy is so popular. But does this recognition of patterns and its subsequent disillusionment lead to antinatalism? Do these patterns threaten the "vision" of humanity so much that we can't be allowed to continue?

schopenhauer1

But in this case, arguing for antinatalism by appeal to structural issues of life is inherently connected to suicide. If you don't want to participate, nobody is forcing you to. But that's the topic of this thread. — darthbarracuda

I have participated MANY times. I know you think every thread is modular, but it isn't to me. I have stated my reasons. I just don't want to go through all the reasons again. So, as you say, since I am not forced to, I am going to decline at least that part of it, as I think I answered it over and over many times.

I'm not though, considering I'm a pessimist myself. I'm just interested in what the classic pessimists like Schopenhauer thought about suicide and how they managed to have such a bleak view of existence and yet apparently not wish to die themselves. — darthbarracuda

Taking out the fear of death and pain, then for some, I imagine there is little holding them back. Otherwise, I think I sufficiently answered your question. Life is not utter agony and that is usually not the position. Rather, for the pessimist, it is a sufficient burden to not perpetuate to others, but it is a burden one can endure while one is alive, since for most it is not utter agony.

Also, in Schopenhauer's case, he said that suicide would still be "willing" one's own death. Will would be diminished by means of asceticism which is somehow not Willing but denying the Will. I rather not try to defend that position particularly, but you did ask what Schopenhauer's view of suicide is, and that was it.

schopenhauer1

I get it, I notice these patterns as well. And actually I think most people do notice these patterns, too. It's why satirical comedy is so popular. But does this recognition of patterns and its subsequent disillusionment lead to antinatalism? Do these patterns threaten the "vision" of humanity so much that we can't be allowed to continue? — darthbarracuda

I don't get this question really. I guess I will expand a bit..

Why does everything have to be utter agony to not perpetuate it? The aesthetic does not "hurt" anyone, but the understanding is that life does indeed put us in this situation.

_db

Taking out the fear of death and pain, then for some, I imagine there is little holding them back. Otherwise, I think I sufficiently answered your question. Life is not utter agony and that isusually not the position. Rather, for the pessimist, it is a sufficient burden to not perpetuate to others, and endure while one is alive. — schopenhauer1

This is what I wanted to discuss. Sounds to me that this "sufficient burden" implies a certain level of mediocrity. Not enough to kill oneself over, but not worthy enough to begin a new life. It still implies a measure of risk, though. The worst case scenario trumps the best case scenario, even if the best case scenario is worth living for (which is my position if you want to know).

Additionally, if life is merely mediocre (and doesn't have risks for really bad experiences), then there's no reason to be abhorrent towards birth. It's just something that happens, nobody has been harmed, because life is merely mediocre. But if life is bad, then birth is problematic, but this also leads us into suicidal tendencies.

The trouble is that I don't really think the classic pessimists thought life was merely mediocre - they thought it was bad. Like, really bad. And I don't understand how someone can think life is really bad and yet not be the least bit suicidal.

I don't get this question really. — schopenhauer1

It's okay, don't worry about it for now, we'll discuss this part later.

schopenhauer1

The trouble is that I don't really think the classic pessimists thought life was merely mediocre - they thought it was bad. Like, really bad. And I don't understand how someone can think life is really bad and yet not be the least bit suicidal. — darthbarracuda

It depends on what you mean by "bad" here. I don't think the classic pessimists thought "bad" means utter agony where you simply can't take it anymore. Though this can happen in certain cases (extreme physical pain, etc.), it was the aesthetic I was speaking of earlier that sees it as bad. So what is happening is that you are speaking apples and oranges and trying to equate the two, when they are not the same. Utter agony and the aesthetic views can both be considered bad, but they are not the same thing. The threshold for pessimists is such that, since things fall into the aesthetic view, and that is evaluated as bad, it is not good to perpetuate this, though it is not agonizing enough to commit suicide over either.

_db

↪schopenhauer1

Can aesthetics be a justification for ethical action (or lack thereof in this case)? If aesthetics aren't bad in the pain/pleasure dichotomy sense, how can it be bad in the ethical sense?

schopenhauer1

Can aesthetics be a justification for ethical action (or lack thereof in this case)? If aesthetics aren't bad in the pain/pleasure dichotomy sense, how can it be bad in the ethical sense? — darthbarracuda

Yes, aesthetics can be a justification. Pleasure and pain is one way of looking at things, but not the only way. Hedonistic or utilitarian calculus is but one of many ethical theories. No doubt, pleasure and pain is built into the aesthetics, but it is not the only part of it. Unwanted pains is a constraint of the world and an imposition. I call this kind of pain contingent, as it is contingent on particular circumstances, conditions, events, and so on. However, not everything is brute pleasure or pain calculating in this view.

_db

↪schopenhauer1

What if aesthetics is subjective? Unlike pleasure or pain, how the world affects a person aesthetically seems to be subjective.

In the end, aren't aesthetic judgements based in pleasure or pain?

schopenhauer1

What if aesthetics is subjective? Unlike pleasure or pain, how the world affects a person aesthetically seems to be subjective. — darthbarracuda

Well, some people will just say the same about pleasure and pain, unless it's physical. Then it will be about how people look back on the pleasure and pain. But, since I sort of addressed this earlier, let me quote myself earlier.

You are caught up in the idea that if not all people are pessimists, then pessimists must be wrong by the mere fact that others are not pessimist. Like any argument, pessimists can argue their position, explain why it is correct, and let other evaluate it on their own. It is not handed down on tablets from Moses and everyone just gets it. — schopenhauer1

If life isn't worth starting, can it be worth continuing?

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