Sure, thinking involves distinctions; and we can think about the possibility that there is a distinction between a distinction that is merely conceptual and a distinction which reflects something more substantial. This is the traditional distinction between epistemic and ontic differences. — Janus
Is it a matter of being up in knots? — Janus
You seem to be saying that concepts aren't substantial. What do you mean by that? What are your ontological commitments? — frank
When I wrote that we are separate from the world, I meant world as the not-me. That me/not-me distinction is missing from pre-reflective consciousness. It's there upon reflection — frank
What did you mean by world? Something like a possible world? — frank
But the possibility of that distinction is always already implicitly inherent in pre-reflective experience (otherwise how would we ever be able to arrive at the conceived separation?). — Janus
If so then I agree (with 1) that know-how involves non conceptual distinctions that can in turn be (for better or worse) articulated conceptually. — bloodninja
But the possibility of that distinction is always already implicitly inherent in pre-reflective experience (otherwise how would we ever be able to arrive at the conceived separation?) — Janus
So it's part of your pre-reflective experience, but you don't experience it? — frank
I'm really not trying to attack your viewpoint. I'm sorry if I'm coming off that way. I think it's interesting that we would have differing assumptions. — frank
You don't need to worry about that. I want you to attack my viewpoint, with arguments that are as strong as possible, so that I can discover if there is an incoherency or inconsistency within it. — Janus
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