Sure, thinking involves distinctions; and we can think about the possibility that there is a distinction between a distinction that is merely conceptual and a distinction which reflects something more substantial. This is the traditional distinction between epistemic and ontic differences. — Janus

You seem to be saying that concepts aren't substantial. What do you mean by that? What are your ontological commitments?

Is it a matter of being up in knots? — Janus

When I wrote that we are separate from the world, I meant world as the not-me. That me/not-me distinction is missing from pre-reflective consciousness. It's there upon reflection.

What did you mean by world? Something like a possible world?

You seem to be saying that concepts aren't substantial. What do you mean by that? What are your ontological commitments? — frank

Concepts are abstractions, generalizations and are thus not, by definition, substantial. That which is substantial is that which can be perceived. The concept of a tree is not itself a tree, for example.

When I wrote that we are separate from the world, I meant world as the not-me. That me/not-me distinction is missing from pre-reflective consciousness. It's there upon reflection — frank

Right, so now we are going around in circles ("tied up in knots"). You should already know that I agree that the separation from the world exists only in reflective or abstractive thought. But the possibility of that distinction is always already implicitly inherent in pre-reflective experience (otherwise how would we ever be able to arrive at the conceived separation?).

What did you mean by world? Something like a possible world? — frank

No, a possible world is an idea of a world. You can also have an idea of the actual world, and draw a distinction between your idea of the actual world and the actual world that your idea if of. Of course there is the further question of whether your ideas, as mental processes, are themselves separate from the world; and I would say they are not.

But the possibility of that distinction is always already implicitly inherent in pre-reflective experience (otherwise how would we ever be able to arrive at the conceived separation?). — Janus

I've been enjoying this discussion. But I'm quite confused by what you mean by "always already implicitly inherent in pre-reflective experience"? What I mean is exactly how is the possibility of a distinction (which I interpret here as 'concept') implicit? To me there seem to be two ways of interpreting what you mean. Either you mean (1) that know-how contains various non-conceptual competencies, skills, distinctions, feelings, etc. that can be (sometimes very poorly and sometimes not at all) articulated through present at hand concepts. In other words that we can attempt to articulate our know-how in a know-that way (through language). Or do you mean (2) that the concept is somehow already "implicit" in the pre-conceptual/pre-reflective know-how. On this view knowing-that would seem to be more primary than knowing-how which seems weird.

Or do you NOT mean that the concept itself is implicit? If so then I agree (with 1) that know-how involves non conceptual distinctions that can in turn be (for better or worse) articulated conceptually.

If so then I agree (with 1) that know-how involves non conceptual distinctions that can in turn be (for better or worse) articulated conceptually. — bloodninja

It's a tricky one to talk about! I think I agree pretty much with what you write here. I would probably say 'non-conceptual differences' rather than 'distinctions'. But then I also think (pace Kant) that all perception involves conception, even in a pre-linguistic, non-reflective way for animals. Perhaps we need a term such as 'proto-conception'. :wink:

But the possibility of that distinction is always already implicitly inherent in pre-reflective experience (otherwise how would we ever be able to arrive at the conceived separation?) — Janus

So it's part of your pre-reflective experience, but you don't experience it? My answer would be that the separation straight doesn't exist until analysis is brought to bear. The shift between whole and separated is kin to the shift we associate with duck/rabbit, except it's many/whole.

I don't explain how the separation pops into existence because I don't know how it works. Phenomenologically speaking, it just does. I was putting emphasis on the necessity to thought of certain kinds of separation because I think that's what makes us think the separation exists beyond a certain kind of focus (because it's necessary to rational thought).

I'm really not trying to attack your viewpoint. I'm sorry if I'm coming off that way. I think it's interesting that we would have differing assumptions.

So it's part of your pre-reflective experience, but you don't experience it? — frank

Why would you say that because you are not reflectively aware of it, it follows that you don't experience it?

I'm really not trying to attack your viewpoint. I'm sorry if I'm coming off that way. I think it's interesting that we would have differing assumptions. — frank

You don't need to worry about that. I want you to attack my viewpoint, with arguments that are as strong as possible, so that I can discover if there is an incoherency or inconsistency within it.

Heidegger argues that we are pre-ontological. I think this might help our discussion. I'll try to research what exactly he means by this today.

You don't need to worry about that. I want you to attack my viewpoint, with arguments that are as strong as possible, so that I can discover if there is an incoherency or inconsistency within it. — Janus

As much fun as it is to spar with arguments, I've become suspicious that all I'm doing with that is insulating my psyche, providing justifications for my stance, and otherwise just circling my precious. I don't believe a logical argument that conflicts with the phenomenon gets me closer to seeing the truth. To believe that, I'd have to be an full-fledged idealist, and I'm not. I have no ontology, or rather I think all I have is mythology.

That's why I said earlier, I don't think we ever get past our own biases when we try to go past phenomenology. Do you agree or disagree with that?

BTW, I found some interesting discussions about Dreyfus vs Everybody Else on reddit.

I think you're right; there is always a competitive element and an element of self-justification and even self-protection that I can see in myself when I participate in these exchanges. I try my best not to let those elements cloud my judgement, and to agree with and say what I genuinely think is closest to the truth.

The way I see it logical arguments cannot, in virtue of their mere logic, "conflict with the phenomenon". We can certainly make assumptions that form our starting premises that have no grounding in phenomenology, though, which wouldn't seem to be a good idea.

So, if you are saying that a phenomenological approach makes for the best beginning to philosophical investigations, then I would agree. A phenomenological approach could help us to see our own biases, which would be the first step in "going past" them.

I'll check out the Dreyfus link, thanks. Years ago when I was intensely interested in Heidegger I listened to these lectures by Dreyfus: https://archive.org/details/Philosophy_185_Fall_2007_UC_Berkeley

I found them really helpful, and over the last few weeks have been listening again and experiencing some different insights.

Thanks for the links, I'll be listening to them.

Also found some lectures by Dreyfus on Merleau Ponty which i haven't listened to:

http://afterxnature.blogspot.com.au/2017/03/complete-recordings-of-dreyfuss-merleau.html