My reply to your questions will be along this afternoon, tonight or tomorrow morning. I'll make my best effort to have enough computer-time to send it this afternoon or tonight.
My replies tend to be long, because I like them to be complete, and that can mean that they take a little longer. — Michael Ossipoff
Interesting approach. Perhaps I'm just unaccustomed to this practice, but it would seem to make a series of three or four replies most cumbersome.(I don't use nested quotes, because they don't seem to work. I separately quote what I was quoted saying, and the other person's reply) — Michael Ossipoff
If there's anything in those posts that counts as "noncontroversial metaphysics", it's slipped by me again. Would you care to point out which of your statements is "noncontroversial"?Yes. See my previous posts about it in this thread. — Michael Ossipoff
What does it mean to say that a reason is "more fundamental and original" than an explanation in terms of physical causation?That's best answered by saying what I don't mean: I don't mean the reason in terms of physical causation in this world. I'm talking about a reason more fundamental and original than that. — Michael Ossipoff
I interpret the phrase "in a life" variously depending on context.Nothing other than what you surely must interpret it to mean. — Michael Ossipoff
As it's a philosophy forum, I suppose to begin with it's an open question, how biology and physics are to be integrated into our philosophical conversations.In terms of physical causation in this physical world, you're alive because you were conceived and then born. No one denies that.
But this is a philosophy forum, not a biology forum. — Michael Ossipoff
What is a metaphysics? What does it mean to say that "in a metaphysics... there are... systems of ... facts"?First, a brief summary of my metaphysics (which I describe and justify in more detail in previous posts in this thread):
In the metaphysics that I propose, and described and justified in previous postings in this thread:
There are infinitely-many complex systems of inter-referring abstract implication-facts (instances of one hypothetical proposition implying another). — Michael Ossipoff
Why "inevitable"? The fact that a system contains infinitely many subsystems does not entail that it contains every possible subsystem.Among those infinitely many such systems, there is inevitably one whose events and relations are those of your experience. — Michael Ossipoff
Do you mean to suggest: There's no reason to believe that my experience is anything other than one subset of an infinite system of hypothetical propositions with implicatory relations?There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that. — Michael Ossipoff
This concession seems to threaten the claim that your picture is noncontroversial.Of course I can’t prove that the Materialist’s objectively, concretely, fundamentally existent physical world, and its objectively, concretely existent stuff and things don’t superfluously exist, as an unverifiable and unfalsiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the hypothetical logical system that I described above. — Michael Ossipoff
I'd say even more emphatically, that experience is a good starting point for all philosophy.I emphasize that, in this metaphysics, I regard the experiencer and his/her experience as primary. — Michael Ossipoff
.”(I don't use nested quotes, because they don't seem to work. I separately quote what I was quoted saying, and the other person's reply)” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Interesting approach. Perhaps I'm just unaccustomed to this practice, but it would seem to make a series of three or four replies most cumbersome.
.If there's anything in those posts that counts as "noncontroversial metaphysics", it's slipped by me again. Would you care to point out which of your statements is "noncontroversial"?
.In particular, the claim "there's an uncontroversial metaphysics that implies reincarnation" seems highly controversial to me. I would contest it, if you would care to argue in support the claim here.
.”That's best answered by saying what I don't mean: I don't mean the reason in terms of physical causation in this world. I'm talking about a reason more fundamental and original than that.” — Michael Ossipoff
What does it mean to say that a reason is "more fundamental and original" than an explanation in terms of physical causation?
.I see no reason to suppose there is any such thing..
., and I expect on the basis of past experience that many others will agree with me.
.In that regard it seems your view is controversial before it's even off the ground.
.For you affirm that this "fundamental and original" reason is supposed to "generate the implication" of reincarnation.
.”Nothing other than what you surely must interpret it to mean.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I interpret the phrase "in a life" variously depending on context.
.
In the context of your metaphysical speculations, I suppose you mean to suggest that something like a soul
.-- whatever it is that's said to be reincarnated -- is found now in one life, now in another.
.Perhaps from time to time as a hungry ghost
., a lion, a deer
., a washerwoman, a queen, and so on.
.But I see no reason to suppose that there is such a thing.
.”First, a brief summary of my metaphysics (which I describe and justify in more detail in previous posts in this thread):
.
In the metaphysics that I propose, and described and justified in previous postings in this thread:
.
There are infinitely-many complex systems of inter-referring abstract implication-facts (instances of one hypothetical proposition implying another).” — Michael Ossipoff
.
What is a metaphysics?
.What does it mean to say that "in a metaphysics... there are... systems of ... facts"?
.Is such a metaphysics just a story that someone tells?
.Can't we always tell another sort of story, even an incompatible one?
.When you say "in the metaphysics I propose, there are such and such facts..."
., do you mean to suggest that this is an apt characterization of the way things are
., or merely that this is one possible way to depict the world? Is it the only way?
.Is it a noncontroversial way?
.Moreover, it seems to me perhaps you've jumped ahead, by claiming that your metaphysical picture is necessary and noncontroversial, before you've even cleared up your terms:
.
What is a fact? Is there a noncontroversial definition of "fact"?
.What is an implication-fact?
.What is an abstract implication-fact
., and is there any other sort of implication-fact?
.What is a "complex system of abstract implication-facts"?
.In what sense are the abstract implication-facts in a complex system "inter-referring"?
.Do you define an "abstract implication-fact' as an "instance of one hypothetical proposition implying another"?
.Then it seems hypothetical propositions are the basis, or basic unit of the "complex systems" you describe.
.How do you distinguish between one such "complex system" and the "infinitely many others" you indicate?
.Why not say there is only one infinitely complex system?
”Among those infinitely many such systems, there is inevitably one whose events and relations are those of your experience.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Why "inevitable"? The fact that a system contains infinitely many subsystems does not entail that it contains every possible subsystem.
.I suggest it's "inevitable" just because you have inserted this inevitability into your landscape, along with all the rest of the scenery.
.What does it mean to say that a set of propositions and implications among propositions has "events and relations" that *are* the "events and relations of my life"?
.So far as I can see, an event described is not the same as a description of that event. Surely it would be controversial to say so.
."It's raining (here, now)" may be called a proposition. That's not the same as the rain or the rain-event thus described.
.What kind of propositions are we talking about here?
.When does one hypothetical proposition imply another?
.For instance, "It's raining" doesn't imply that I'll take an umbrella on my walk, and "I'm hungry" doesn't imply that I'll eat before morning.
.Can you give particular examples of the fine-grained propositions and implications you have in mind?
.”There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Do you mean to suggest: There's no reason to believe that my experience is anything other than one subset of an infinite system of hypothetical propositions with implicatory relations?
.Here's one reason: It seems my experience is actual, not hypothetical.
.In fact it seems our experience is the very basis of our concepts of actuality and possibility, among other concepts.
.”Of course I can’t prove that the Materialist’s objectively, concretely, fundamentally existent physical world, and its objectively, concretely existent stuff and things don’t superfluously exist, as an unverifiable and unfalsifiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the hypothetical logical system that I described above.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
This concession seems to threaten the claim that your picture is noncontroversial.
.In this context, the adverb "superflously" seems grossly tendentious.
.By now it seems you've begun to speak as if your complex system of hypothetical propositions is a thing that "exists", even apart from and independently of any physical world. But this claim is extremely controversial.
.It's one thing to sketch a model of hypotheses
.…and , another to claim that the system of hypotheses "exists" apart from and prior to the physical world. How would you support such a claim, if that's what you're suggesting?
.”I emphasize that, in this metaphysics, I regard the experiencer and his/her experience as primary.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I'd say even more emphatically, that experience is a good starting point for all philosophy.
.
It seems we reach rather different conclusions from this starting point.
.Do you have something like the "possible worlds" of modal logicians in mind here?
.An important, but significantly different notion of possibilism known as modal realism was developed by the philosopher David Lewis."[1] On Lewis's account, the actual world is identified with the physical universe of which we are all a part. Other possible worlds exist in exactly the same sense as the actual world; they are simply spatio-temporally unrelated to our world, and to each other. Hence, for Lewis, "merely possible" entities—entities that exist in other possible worlds—exist in exactly the same sense as do we in the actual world; to be actual, from the perspective of any given individual x in any possible world, is simply to be part of the same world as x.
.According to the indexical conception of actuality, favoured by Lewis (1986), actuality is an attribute which our world has relative to itself, but which all the other worlds have relative to themselves too. Actuality is an intrinsic property of each world, so world w is actual just at world w. "Actual" is seen as an indexical term, and its reference depends on its context.[6] Therefore, there is no feature of this world (nor of any other) to be distinguished in order to infer that the world is actual, "the actual world" is actual simply in virtue of the definition of "actual": a world is actual simpliciter.
.
At the heart of David Lewis's modal realism are six central doctrines about possible worlds:
.
Possible worlds exist – they are just as real as our world;
[…but I make no claim that the hypothetical physical worlds (consisting of systems of abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and of self-consistent configurations of mutually-consistent hypothetical truth-values for those hypothetical propositions) exist other than in the sense that we can refer to them and speak of them.
In agreement with Lewis, I speak of our own “actual” physical universe as really no different in kind, or in existence-status, from all the other hypothetical logical systems called “physical worlds”.]
.
Possible worlds are the same sort of things as our world – they differ in content, not in kind;
.
Possible worlds cannot be reduced to something more basic – they are irreducible entities in their own right.
.
Actuality is indexical. When we distinguish our world from other possible worlds by claiming that it alone is actual, we mean only that it is our world.
.
Possible worlds are unified by the spatiotemporal interrelations of their parts; every world is spatiotemporally isolated from every other world.
.
Possible worlds are causally isolated from each other.
.By now it seems you've begun to speak as if your complex system of hypothetical propositions is a thing that "exists", even apart from and independently of any physical world. But this claim is extremely controversial. — Cabbage Farmer
....independently of any physical world.
.Catastrophic counterintuitiveness The theory does not accord with our deepest intuitions about reality.
.This is sometimes called "the incredulous stare", since it lacks argumentative content, and is merely an expression of the affront that the theory represents to "common sense" philosophical and pre-philosophical orthodoxy.
.Lewis is concerned to support the deliverances of common sense in general: "Common sense is a settled body of theory — unsystematic folk theory — which at any rate we do believe; and I presume that we are reasonable to believe it. (Most of it.)" (1986, p. 134). But most of it is not all of it (otherwise there would be no place for philosophy at all), and Lewis finds that reasonable argument and the weight of such considerations as theoretical efficiency compel us to accept modal realism. The alternatives, he argues at length, can themselves be shown to yield conclusions offensive to our modal intuitions.
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