Reincarnation is metaphysically-implied. There's an uncontroversial metaphysics that implies reincarnation. — Michael Ossipoff

What is your definition of metaphysics, please? What is the uncontroversial metaphysics in question? What do you understand by the term "implication"? And please lay out briefly that implication.

For example, if you mean that there are belief systems (e.g., Jainism) that "buy" reincarnation, and that such systems are "uncontroversial" (whatever that means), then you're arguably correct, but the proposition is not especially interesting because it doesn't say much of interest. Is that what you're saying?

Presumably the idea is that there is a sound argument with metaphysical premises (i.e. premises which concern existence) which are acceptable to all and that has as for its conclusion that reincarnation happens.
So, @Michael Ossipoff, over to you to lay out the premises one by one so we can subject them to scrutiny.

metaphysical premises (i.e. premises which concern existence) — jkg20

I'm pretty sure that's existentialism. But the problem for Michael stands.

Presumably the idea is that there is a sound argument with metaphysical premises (i.e. premises which concern existence) which are acceptable to all and that has as for its conclusion that reincarnation happens. — jkg20

Yes, well said. That's what I mean.

So, Michael Ossipoff, over to you to lay out the premises one by one so we can subject them to scrutiny.

Will do.

Michael Ossipoff

First I'll briefly reply to a few of Tim's questions, and then I'll describe the metaphysical proposal that I'm referring to, and how it implies reincarnation.

Time asks:

What is your definition of metaphysics, please? — tim wood

As I use the term, "metaphysics" means the discussion of what is, at the limits of what is discussable, describable, and meaningfully assertable and arguable. ...and, within that limitation, at the limits of generality.

I don't claim that metaphysics covers, discusses or describes all that is, or all of Reality. I don't claim that all of what is, all of Reality, is discussable, describable or meaningfully assertable or arguable. Here, I'm not making any assertions, claims, or even comments on that matter. Referring to the matter of what is, but isn't discussable, describable or meaningfully assertable or arguable...I'd call that "meta-metaphysics". I'm not making any claims or assertions about that (...and, by definition it wouldn't be meaningful to do so anyway.) I'm just discussing metaphysics here..

What is the uncontroversial metaphysics in question?

See below.

What do you understand by the term "implication"?

In logic, it's a proposition, P, about a relation between propositions A and B, such that P is false only if A is true and B is false.

I mean implication with a somewhat weaker meaning, in which the truth of one thing suggests another thing.

And please lay out briefly that implication.

See below. The discussion of the implication of reincarnation follows my description of my metaphysical proposal.

For example, if you mean that there are belief systems (e.g., Jainism) that "buy" reincarnation, and that such systems are "uncontroversial" (whatever that means)...

A statement is "uncontroversial" if no one can come up with a supportable reason for disagreeing with it.

I'm saying that my metaphysics is uncontroversial. I'm not saying that anything else is uncontroversial.

What I describe isn't a "belief-system".

, then you're arguably correct, but the proposition is not especially interesting because it doesn't say much of interest. Is that what you're saying?

No. See below.

Metaphysical Proposal:

Let me first summarize, and quote Faraday:

In 1844, the physicist Michael Faraday pointed out that what we observe in the physical world consists of mathematical and logical structural relational facts, and that there’s no particular reason to believe that the physical world consists of more than that.

In particular, there’s no particular reason to believe in the Materialist’s objectively-existent “stuff”.

He was right.

There are abstract if-then facts.

If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.

That’s true even if none of the Slithytoves are brillig.

That’s true even if none of the Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves.

That’s true even if there are no Slithytoves, and no Jaberwockeys.

When I say that there are abstract if-then facts, I mean only that they “are”, in the sense that they can be stated. I imply or clam nothing about the matter of whether or not they’re “real” or “existent”, whatever that would mean.

Of course, by definition, a fact is true. Otherwise it would be a proposition, but not a fact.

Also, I make no claim about the truth of the premises of the abstract if-thens that I speak of, in regards to the metaphysics that I propose. There’s no particular reason to believe that any of their premises are true.

Any fact about this physical world implies, corresponds to, and can be said as, an if-then fact:

“There is a traffic roundabout at the intersection of 34th & Vine.”

“If you go to the intersection of 34th & Vine, you’ll encounter, there, a traffic roundabout.”

Additionally, any fact about this physical world is (at least part of) the “if” premise of some if-then facts, and is the “then” conclusion of other if-then facts.

For example:

A set of hypothetical physical quantity-values, and a hypothetical relation among them (called a “physical law”) together comprise the “if ” premise of an if-then fact. …except that one of those physical quantity-values can be taken as the “then” premise of that if-then fact.

A proved mathematical theorem is an if-then fact, for which at least part of the “if ” premise consists of a set of mathematical axioms.

We’re used to speaking in declarative, indicative grammar. But I suggest that we believe our grammar too much. I suggest that conditional grammar better describes what metaphysically, discussably, describably is.

Instead of one world of “Is”, infinitely-many worlds of “If “.

In addition to abstract if-then facts, there are systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts. There are complex systems of them. …infinitely-many of those as well.

Among that infinity of complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts, there’s inevitably one that’s about events and relations that are those of your experience.

There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.

I call that your “life-experience possibility-story”.

Why are you in a life? Because you’re the hypothetical protagonist of a hypothetical life-experience possibility-story. To say it differently, there’s a hypothetical life-experience possibility-story that has, as its protagonist, someone just like you—you, in fact.

Now, if you’re in a life for a reason, then what if, at the end of this life, that reason still obtains? What does that suggest? …

At the end of life, there’s eventual unconsciousness and sleep. …”unconsciousness” only in the sense of absence of waking-consciousness. Of course eventually that ever deepening unconsciousness reaches a time when you don’t know (or care) that there ever were, or could be, such things as identity, individuality, worldly-life, time, or events …or hardships, problems, lack, or incompletion.

Of course, by the timescale of an outside observer of the shutting-down of your body, you’ll soon be completely shut-down. But you don’t know or care about that, because you don’t even know that there is, was, or could be such a thing as time or events. You’ve reached timelessness. The impending complete shutdown of your body, which will be observed by your survivors, is entirely irrelevant and unknown to you.

But I suggest that it isn’t certain that you’ll reach that deep, near-end, stage of shutdown at the end of this life:

But, before you reach the place in shutdown at which you’re quite unaware of life, time, events or worldly-experience, it’s reasonable to suggest that there’s a lesser degree of unconsciousness in which you merely don’t remember or know the exact details of the life that has just ended, or exactly what’s going on, but you still retain your old subconscious attributes, predispositions and inclinations.

Lacking factual information and waking-consciousness, you don’t know if you’re coming or going, but you retain your subconscious attributes, predispositions and inclinations, including a future-orientedness, and an orientation towards worldly-life.

There’s a life-experience possibility-story about you, as you are at that particular time. You’re the protagonist of that experience-story. That life-experience story necessarily starts where you are, as do all lives, with someone who is like you are at that time. …without waking-consciousness, without any factual knowledge of what’s going on.

Without explanation, not knowing what’s going on, you’re experiencing without waking-consciousness. That situation began at the end of a life, but you don’t remember that.

As I said above, if the reason why you were in a life before continues to obtain at the end of your life, then what does that suggest?

I emphasize that reincarnation isn’t _part of_ my metaphysics. It’s just, I suggest, an implied consequence it.

You can disagree with my suggestion that it’s an implied consequence of my metaphysics, without disagreeing with the metaphysics itself.

In one paragraph above, I described a particularly deep level of unconsciousness at the end of life. I suggest that few people reach that stage, because their retained subconscious inclinations and predispositions lead them elsewhere, as described above.

According to Hinduism and Buddhism, very few people reach the end-of-lives at the end of this life, basically for the reason that I described.

The suggestion of reincarnation isn’t really so fantastic. It’s no more fantastic than the various alternative suggestions. In fact, the fact that you’re in a life (even if an explanation can be suggested) is, itself, something remarkable, fantastic and surprising.

Anyway, whether or not you agree with the reincarnation-implication, the metaphysics that I propose implies an open-ness, loose-ness and lightness in stark contrast to Materialism’s grim accounting.

…an insubstantial , ethereal nature for what is describable and discussable.

I suggest that there’s something inherently good about “what-is”.

Michael Ossipoff

Ok, you define metaphysics as talk about what is.

I mean implication with a somewhat weaker meaning, in which the truth of one thing suggests another thing. — Michael Ossipoff

I think you're confusing the truth of the implication with the truth of the consequent. What you mean is, from the stronger, the weaker. The trouble is that absent existential import - i.e., when dealing with sets with no members - neither implication nor sub-alternation hold. And certainly the idea of "suggesting" is loose enough to be without any value at all.

Instead of one world of “Is”, infinitely-many worlds of “If “.
In addition to abstract if-then facts, there are systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts. There are complex systems of them. …infinitely-many of those as well.
Among that infinity of complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts, there’s inevitably one that’s about events and relations that are those of your experience.
There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that. — Michael Ossipoff

There's a difference between is and if; you're ignoring that difference. And of course your metaphysics of is got lost at the first turn.

In short, you're lost.

The suggestion of reincarnation isn’t really so fantastic. It’s no more fantastic than the various alternative suggestions. In fact, the fact that you’re in a life (even if an explanation can be suggested) is, itself, something remarkable, fantastic and surprising. — Michael Ossipoff

Correct, they're all fantastic. but fantastic in different senses, that you confuse.

If this is a sincere effort, then - I mean this kindly - you would take great pleasure in becoming an educated person. Become that person! Once educated you would not present such a discussion, anywhere! If other than sincere, your credibility is taking severe self-inflicted wounds. Who will read you once they see long nonsense like this? If you're just trolling, then you're just a fool.

I fear you are confusing facts with propositions:

There are abstract if-then facts.

If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.

That’s true even if none of the Slithytoves are brillig.

That’s true even if none of the Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves.

That’s true even if there are no Slithytoves, and no Jaberwockeys.

When I say that there are abstract if-then facts, I mean only that they “are”, in the sense that they can be stated. I imply or clam nothing about the matter of whether or not they’re “real” or “existent”, whatever that would mean.

In the above quotation the following conditional:

If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.

is a conditional proposition, which is a compound proposition claiming a relation of entailment between its component propositions. Propositions might be abstract entities (in fact they probably are) and by extension conditional propositions are also abstract entities. However, facts are usually regarded as those things that make individual propositions true. Insofar as conditional propositions are true, though, we do not introduce "if-then" facts to make them true, since the truth or falsity of conditional propositions is entirely accounted for by the truth or falsity of the antecedent and consequent. This is true for all compound propositions - their truth or falsity is accounted for entirely by the truth or falsity of their component propositions plus the truth-table rules for the logical connectives between those component propositions.

Of course, by definition, a fact is true.

This is a strange definition of a fact, the usual definition (philosophically speaking anyway) is that a fact is what makes true propositions true.

Don't get me wrong, there are all kinds of philosophical issues with what I have been saying (e.g. if facts make true propositions true, what makes false propositions false?) However, you seem right from the beginning of your proposal to be conflating notions that need to be distinguished, and once you start doing that, the rest of what you say becomes nigh impossible to follow.

I have to agree with @MetaphysicsNow - looks to me like you are confounding a few things (such as facts and propositions) that should be kept apart - at least to begin with. Let's take a look at this claim for instance:

Among that infinity of complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts, there’s inevitably one that’s about events and relations that are those of your experience.

There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.

Now the only sensible way to interpret "if-then fact" on the basis of what you have said in your introduction is that an "if-then fact" is just an unfortunately chosen name for a conditional proposition. That being so, the complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts you talk about here are just "bundles" of propositions with logical connections between each other. My experience is certainlyother than that because my experience is not a proposition at all, either simple or compound. There are true propositions about my experience, and there are also true conditional propositions in which propositions concerning my experience feature as antecedents and as consequents. My experience, whatever else it is, is something that is capable of making such propositions true.

In Tim’s post that I’m replying to here: Not only does he not support anything that he says, but he doesn’t even specify an instance of the alleged errors that he refers to.

Tim needs to learn to do a lot better at saying what he means.

In my replies to his comments below, I made a few guesses about what Tim might mean, but in general, it isn’t possible to reply to Tim if he can’t express himself more clearly.

So why reply at all?

One reply is necessary, so that it won’t seem as if I’m evading irrefutable statements.
--------------------------
Tim says:

Ok, you define metaphysics as talk about what is.

That isn’t what I said. But don’t worry about it—It’s close enough.

I’d said:

I mean implication with a somewhat weaker meaning, in which the truth of one thing suggests another thing.

Tim says:

I think you're confusing the truth of the implication with the truth of the consequent.

Maybe, before posting what he thinks, Tim should give it more thought.

In logic, an implication, by its truth-functional definition, is standardly said to be true unless its antecedent is true and its consequent false.

When “imply” is used outside of logic, with its everyday dictionary meaning, we don’t speak of an implication’s consequent or antecedent. I’d already clarified that I wasn’t using “imply” with its logic meaning.

What you mean is, from the stronger, the weaker.

No, I meant what I said. “Imply” has a stronger meaning in logic than it does in other usage. I clarified that I wasn’t using “imply” with the strong meaning that it has in logic.

The trouble is that absent existential import - i.e., when dealing with sets with no members - neither implication nor sub-alternation hold.

Oops! Tim forgot to specify an instance in which I said or implied that implication holds when dealing with sets with no members.

In academic articles defining “implication”, I didn’t find mention of sets, but it’s standard that, in its truth-functional definition, an implication is called true unless its premise is true and its conclusion is false. …even when its premise and conclusion refer to things that don’t exist.

…but I won’t try to guess what Tim means.

And certainly the idea of "suggesting" is loose enough to be without any value at all.

In usage outside logic, “imply” doesn’t have the strong meaning that it has in logic usage.

I used the word “suggest”, because I wanted to err on the side of caution. Instead of asserting that reincarnation necessarily follows from my metaphysics, I wanted to leave conclusions about that to the reader.

I encourage Tim to not let anyone tell him what he should value.

Tim quoted me:

Instead of one world of “Is”, infinitely-many worlds of “If “.

In addition to abstract if-then facts, there are systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts. There are complex systems of them. …infinitely-many of those as well.
Among that infinity of complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts, there’s inevitably one that’s about events and relations that are those of your experience.
There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.

Tim says:

There's a difference between is and if; you're ignoring that difference.

Well, when I spoke of one instead of the other, that didn’t imply that they’re the same. :D

As usual, it can only be guessed what Tim means. Maybe he means that “Is” and “If “ aren’t the same part of speech. “If “ is a subordinate conjunction, and “Is” is a verb. Did I ignore that difference? Sure, because I was talking, instead, about a distinction between conditional and indicative meanings.

And of course your metaphysics of is got lost at the first turn.

I don’t have or propose a metaphysics of is.

As is always the case in the post that I’m replying to, Tim isn’t being very clear with us about what he means.
.
I’d said:

The suggestion of reincarnation isn’t really so fantastic. It’s no more fantastic than the various alternative suggestions. In fact, the fact that you’re in a life (even if an explanation can be suggested) is, itself, something remarkable, fantastic and surprising.

Tim says:

Correct, they're all fantastic. but fantastic in different senses, that you confuse.

…and that’s quite a trick, given that I didn’t say or imply anything about the manner, way or sense in which those various things are fantastic. :D

Tim forgot to share with us a specification of the passage in which I said or implied something incorrect about senses in which those things are fantastic.
--------------------
After this one reply, I don’t have time to reply to more sloppy and vague rant, and I’m not going to take the time to reply to subsequent posts from Tim.

So that I won’t be expected to, it’s necessary that I declare now that I won’t reply to subsequent posts from Tim. My not replying won’t mean that Tim has said something irrefutable…only that his first effort didn’t justify continuing to reply to him.

Of course if anyone feels that there’s an error, a mis-statement, or that they have a legitimate, supportable disagreement, then they’re encouraged to specify it.

Though I myself don’t have time for more of Tim’s arguments, if anyone feels that, in some subsequent post, Tim has expressed a valid argument about my metaphysical proposal, then that person should feel free to quote that argument, with a claim that it’s valid (and any clarification that’s missing in the argument itself). Then I’ll reply to that person.

Michael Ossipoff

Well done! I respect the spirit of your reply - and the effort! As to content, perhaps better to leave that aside. If, however, you want to pick it up, I refer you to jkg20's post above and your reply thereto:

So, Michael Ossipoff, over to you to lay out the premises one by one so we can subject them to scrutiny. — jkg20

Will do.
Michael Ossipoff — Michael Ossipoff

Not done yet.

MetaphysicsNow says:

I fear you are confusing facts with propositions:

One of us is confusing facts with propositions.

MetaphysicsNow quoted me:

There are abstract if-then facts.

If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.

That’s true even if none of the Slithytoves are brillig.

That’s true even if none of the Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves.

That’s true even if there are no Slithytoves, and no Jaberwockeys.

When I say that there are abstract if-then facts, I mean only that they “are”, in the sense that they can be stated. I imply or clam nothing about the matter of whether or not they’re “real” or “existent”, whatever that would mean.

In the above quotation the following conditional:

“If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.”

…is a conditional proposition
[/quote]

…and it’s a fact.

It’s a true conditional proposition. And it’s a fact. If it makes you happy, you can call it a conditional fact, or an implication fact. I call it an if-then fact, because I’m writing for a broader audience.

…]
However, facts are usually regarded as those things that make individual propositions true.

Regarding the proposition “Someone posts here under the name of MetaphysicsNow”, what fact makes that proposition true? How about: The fact that someone here posts under the name of “MetaphysicsNow”.

Facts are defined in a number of ways. We often hear a fact is defined as “a state of affairs”, or “a state of affairs that obtains”.

(The latter sounds odd to me, because, if it didn’t obtain, it wouldn’t be a state of affairs…and so the “…that obtains” part seems unnecessary. Maybe someone meant “a hypothetical or putative state of affairs that obtains”…where “a hypothetical or putative state of affairs” could define a proposition.)

Insofar as conditional propositions are true, though, we do not introduce "if-then" facts to make them true

I didn’t introduce facts to make propositions true. I spoke of facts because facts were what I wanted to refer to.

, since the truth or falsity of conditional propositions is entirely accounted for by the truth or falsity of the antecedent and consequent.

I’ll say it again:

An implication-proposition, by its truth-functional definition, is true unless its premise (or “antecedent) is true and its conclusion (or “consequent”) is false.

I’d said:

Of course, by definition, a fact is true.

This is a strange definition of a fact


I didn’t offer it as a definition of a fact. I said that it follows from the various definitions of a fact.

, the usual definition (philosophically speaking anyway) is that a fact is what makes true propositions true.

That’s often said about facts, and it’s a reasonable statement. But you’ve mistakenly latched onto it as the definition of a fact.

Don't get me wrong, there are all kinds of philosophical issues with what I have been saying

,
You think?

…However, you seem right from the beginning of your proposal to be conflating notions that need to be distinguished, …

…like facts and propositions?

Judging by what you’ve been saying in this post that I’m replying to, there are differences that you don’t understand, between facts and propositions.

There isn’t a fact that the Earth is a gas-giant and (given the arithmetical axioms) 2 + 3 = 7. There is a (false) proposition that the Earth is a gas-giant and 2 + 3 = 7.

There’s an if-then fact that, if all Slitheytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slitheytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.

There’s an if-then fact that, IF the additive associative axiom of the real, rational and integer numbers is true, THEN 2 + 2 = 4.

…where the counting numbers are defined, in the obvious manner, in terms of the multiplicative-identity and addition.

You might want to check out the SEP (That stands for Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), on the subjects of facts, state of affairs, and propositions.

You’ll find that there’s rampant disagreement among academic philosophers, and endless quibble over what philosopherrs mean by various words…but, in general, the what I’ve said about facts is consistent with the consensus.

For you, I recommend less assertion and more reading.

Michael Ossipoff

If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.

This is just Barbara. The form is valid, but there is no truth in it or to it, nor any fact(s). Nor on the basis of valid form do you get to affirm the conclusion. It was originally composed as nonsense, and nonsense it is. This isn't open for debate or argument; it is how it works. You need to work on this stuff.

I have to agree with @MetaphysicsNow

Yes, much of what you say seems directly lifted from MetaphysicsNow’s post.

Therefore, as my reply to you on those matters, I refer you to my reply (above in this thread) to MetaphysicsNow.

But I’ll reply separately, below, to what you said that wasn’t quite word-for-word from MetaphysicsNow’s post.

Let's take a look at this claim for instance:

Among that infinity of complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts, there’s inevitably one that’s about events and relations that are those of your experience.
.
There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.

Now the only sensible way to interpret "if-then fact" on the basis of what you have said in your introduction is that an "if-then fact" is just an unfortunately chosen name for a conditional proposition.


Incorrect. “Fact” doesn’t mean the same thing as “proposition”.

For the difference between a fact and a proposition, I refer you to my reply to MetaphysicsNow…and to the SEP.

That being so, the complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts you talk about here are just "bundles" of propositions…

Facts.

…with logical connections between each other. My experience is certainly other than that because my experience is not a proposition at all

I didn’t say that your experience is a proposition. I said that there’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than a system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts.

I’ve defined a purposefully-responsive device’s “experience” as its surroundings and events from its point-of-view, in the context of its design-purposes—whether that device is a human or a Roomba. …but I speak of and define my metaphysics in terms of the individual’s experience, with that experience as its fundamental basis.

…your experience consisting of that system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals. An experience, for example, of being a human or a Roomba….a human in the case of the participants in this forum.

So it’s a subjectively-defined metaphysics. …an Eliminative Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism, to use accepted philosophical terms.

There are true propositions about my experience, and there are also true conditional propositions in which propositions concerning my experience feature as antecedents and as consequents.

There are facts like that.

My experience, whatever else it is, is something that is capable of making such propositions true.

…something referred to as facts.

You suggest that, in addition to the facts, there’s something else (concrete, fundamentally, independently and objectively existent material things and stuff) that the facts are about. Michael Faraday pointed out that there’s no reason to assume or invent such metaphysical entities or objects.

Our experience and observations, personal and scientific, are about structural, logical, and mathematical if-then relation-facts. There’s no evidence for metaphysical existence of other than that.

Michael Ossipoff

“If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.”

…is a conditional proposition

…and it’s a fact.

It’s a true conditional proposition.[/quote]

It is not a fact, and it does not even express a fact. At best it is a logically valid argument couched in the form of a conditional proposition. Any logically valid argument can be expressed as a conditional proposition, where the antecedent is formed by the conjunction of the premises and the conclusion forms the consequent. But where a logically valid argument is expressed as a conditional, it becomes a tautology, and tautologies are vacuously true - as @tim wood says, true uniquely in virtue of their logical form, not true in virtue of their content. What makes logically valid arguments interesting, from a philosophical perspective, is when they purport to be sound, which means when they are presented along with the assertion that all their premises are true.
You have yet to present us with a logically valid argument for the existence of reincarnation, when you do, we can address the matter of its soundness.

You suggest that, in addition to the facts, there’s something else (concrete, fundamentally, independently and objectively existent material things and stuff) that the facts are about..

No, nothing I said implied or suggested a belief in the existence in "material things and stuff". What I do think is that if there are facts then they are not atomic, they have identifiable parts. The fact that the Elizabeth tower of the Palace of Westminster is 316ft tall, for instance, and the fact that the Elizabeth tower of the Palace of Westminster houses Big Ben, are two distinct facts concerning one thing - the Elizabeth tower of the Palace of Westminster. Now, you might want to argue that what I am calling the Elizabeth tower of the Palace of Westminster is in fact some bundle of facts itself, but that would take argument, not simply assertion and appeal to the "authority" of Michael Faraday. You might like Wittgenstein's Tractatus - there you really do have a philosopher who believes that the world is the totality of facts not of things. Funny thing about the Tractatus, though, is that Wittgenstein doesn't give an argument for that claim, he just asserts it.

For you, I recommend less assertion and more reading.

For you, I recommend more careful thinking and less incoherent babbling.

“If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.”

…is a conditional proposition

I'd replied:
…and it’s a fact.

It’s a true conditional proposition.

It is not a fact, and it does not even express a fact. — MetaphysicsNow

We aren't speaking the same language. There' s nothing to say to your comment above, other than to refer you to SEP, so that you can find out what the terminology consensus is, and what "fact" means, in that consensus.

That's why I suggested that you do less asserting and more reading.

What makes logically valid arguments interesting, from a philosophical perspective, is when they purport to be sound, which means when they are presented along with the assertion that all their premises are true.

Referring to the complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts about hypotheticals that I refer to:

There's no reason to believe any of the premises of the if-then facts that I refer to are true.

I make no claim of soundness for that system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts.

You have yet to present us with a logically valid argument for the existence of reincarnation, when you do, we can address the matter of its soundness.

I merely mention that reincarnation is implied (in the weaker ordinary meaning of that word, not the logic meaning) by the metaphysics that I propose.

I emphasize that I make no claim of soundness for the system of inter-referring abstract if-then fact about hypotheticals to which my metaphysics refers.

There's no reason to believe or claim that any of the premises of those abstract if-then facts are true.

Michael Ossipoff







.

@Michael Ossipoff

We aren't speaking the same language. There' s nothing to say to your comment above, other than to refer you to SEP, so that you can find out what the terminology consensus is, and what "fact" means, in that consensus.

The central issue here is not about facts, the issue is about the difference between vacuously true propositions - i.e. tautologies that are made true by virtue of their logical form alone - and substantively true propositions, which are made true by facts. Of course, there is the fact that tautologies are made true by virtue of their logical form alone, but that is not the fact expressed by any tautology - the tautology expresses nothing, that is why they are true no matter what.

MO does not understand and/or accept the logical distinction between validity and soundness. I've been around and around this very not-so-merry-go-round with MO before. MO is apparently emotionally invested in his incoherent pet theory, and will just keep repeating the same uninformed assertions, and I think you will simply waste your breath if you try to disabuse him of it.

MO does not understand and/or accept the logical distinction between validity and soundness. — Janus

There are many available articles defining validity vs soundness, as those terms are used in logic, and I've never disagreed with anyone here about those words' defined meanings....unless someone mis-stated those definitions. ...which is entirely possible, given what we've seen in this thread.

I've been repeatedly emphasizing that, regarding the abstract if-then facts that I've been referring to, there' s no reason to believe that any of them are "sound", in the logic sense There's no reason to believe that any of their premises are true.

.In fact, I said that just a few postings ago.

So no, I wouldn't have a motive to refuse to accept the meaning of soundness or validity.

I've been around and around this very not-so-merry-go-round with MO before.

No, not really. But it makes a good story.

MO is apparently emotionally invested in his incoherent pet theory

Oops! Janus forgot to tell where my metaphysical proposal is incoherent.

But then he also forgot to on the previous occasions when I invited him to be more specific in his rants.

, and will just keep repeating the same uninformed assertions

On the previous occasions when Janus kept repeating that statement, and ones like it, I invited him to specify an incorrect assertion of mine. He hasn't done so.

Janus demonstrates for us the common Internet tactic of making lots of attack-worded, but unsupported criticisms of a position that he wants to argue against. Like other people using that tactic Janus seem to believe that the more such sludge he spew,s and the worse his manners, the more effective he will be.

Michael Ossipoff

Your incorrectly calling actualities "if-then facts", when "if-thens" are actually propositions, shows your conflation of soundness and validity.

I know...I'm wasting my breath...and I should know better...

Thanks for the advice - I think I will indeed move on to other more interesting threads.

Oh, I cannot help myself, correcting conceptual errors is addictive.
@Michael Ossipoff

I've been repeatedly emphasizing that, regarding the abstract if-then facts that I've been referring to, there' s no reason to believe that any of them are "sound", in the logic sense There's no reason to believe that any of their premises are true.

Take the last sentence, to what does the possessive pronoun "their" refer? Your if-then facts. Facts do not have premises, arguments have premises. Your writing is peppered with these kinds of errors, and thus manifests an at best superficial appreciation of philosophy, and in all cases a very deep confusion. So now you might try to say, "oh, but you foolish boy, by "premise" I of course mean the "if" part of if-then facts, so if-then facts are arguments and so do have premises". Well, if you are going to take that kind of Humpty-Dumpty view of language, wherein words can mean whatever you want them to mean whenever you want them to mean them, the only person who will ever understand you is you. However, I get the distinct feeling you really do not care whether you are understood by others or not.

...assertion and appeal to the "authority" of Michael Faraday — MetaphysicsNow

I don't appeal to the authority of Michael Faraday. You seem to be suggesting that I'm appealing to Faraday's authority because he's a physicist, and anything a physicist says must be true. But many or most physicists are Materialists, so obviously I'm not saying that Faraday is right because he was a physicist.

I mentioned Faraday partly just to give him credit as the first Westerner that I've heard of, to say what he said. Also, though, I mention him because, even though not everything a physicist says is necessarily true, the fact that a physicist has made those statements shows that not all physicists are Materialists, and that Materialism isn't necessary to or implied by science. ...that science and Eliminative Ontic Structuralism aren't incompatible.

You might like Wittgenstein's Tractatus - there you really do have a philosopher who believes that the world is the totality of facts not of things. Funny thing about the Tractatus, though, is that Wittgenstein doesn't give an argument for that claim, he just asserts it. — MetaphysicsNow

I don't assert it.

I've many times admitted that I can't prove that the Materialist's objectively and fundamentally-existent world, and its objectively existent things, don't superfluously exist, as non-verifiable, non-falsifiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts that I've described.

Michael Ossipoff

The central issue here is not about facts, the issue is about the difference between vacuously true propositions - i.e. tautologies that are made true by virtue of their logical form alone — MetaphysicsNow

No, that issue isn't central to any evaluation of my metaphysical proposal, because the abstract facts that I speak of aren't tautologies, or facts blatantly equating the same thing worded two ways.

I used the Slithytove example because I wanted to use, as an example, a particularly simple fact. The simplicity, the obviousness that you object to, was my reason for choosing it. I wanted simplicity for that example.

But disregard it if you want to. I've described other if-then facts, including, for example, the fact that IF the additive associative axiom is true, THEN 2 + 2 = 4.

...where the counting numbers are defined by repeated addition of the multiplicative identity.

I've described how hypothetical physical quantity-values and hypothetical relations among them (physical laws) are parts of if-then facts.

As I said, the Slithytove syllogism isn't part of my metaphysical proposal, so, no, there's nothing "central" about your tautology issue

Anyway, even aside from that the point of what you're saying isn't at all clear. If you're saying that a tautology like the Slithytove syllogism isn't a fact, then there's the question of on what "fact" definition you base that claim.

...or is it just your personal feeling that a tautology isn't a fact?

...if that's what you mean--and I don't know what you mean.

In the various definitions of the word "fact", I didn't find any stipulation that a tautology isn't a fact.

For example, a tautoloogy, however trivially-obvious, is a state of affairs, and its an obtaining state of affairs.

Another definition of "fact" that has been stated is "A true bearer of truth-value". A tautology, merely by being true, would then seem to qualify as a fact.

"Bearer of truth value" is often given as a definition of "Proposition". So then, from those two definitions, a fact would be a true proposition.

Or a proposition could be defined as a putative or hypothetical state of affairs.

the tautology expresses nothing, .

You mean that a statement of a tautology doesn't provide new information.

You seem to not want to call a tautology a fact because a tautology can't be false, but neither can any proved abstract proposition or theorem.

The difference that a tautology's truth is immediately-obvious, while that isn't necessarily so for theorems or propositions in general. But where does it say that a fact can't be obvious? As I said, I don't know where you get such a definition of "fact".

Anyway, as I said, I don't know what you mean--but that's ok. Don't explain it.

I mention this elsewhere too: Academic philosophy is full of rampant disagreement, and is a thoroughgoing muddle of mutually-contradictory definitions. So then, one common tactic at a philosophy forum is to say, "We can't know what you mean when you don't use the standard terminology":--when the terminology and definitions are thoroughly inconsistent and disputed.

Yes, there's some consensus though, and my use of "facts" is consistent with that consensus.

Michael Ossipoff

Your incorrectly calling actualities "if-then facts", when "if-thens" are actually propositions... — Janus

If an "if-then" proposition, an implication-proposition, might not be true, then it can't be called a fact. It's only a proposition.

One of the definitions of "fact" that I've found is:

"A true bearer of truth-value". In other words, "A true proposition".

So then a fact can be defined as a true proposition, and so a true if-then proposition can reasonably be called an if-then fact.

A fact has also been defined as a state of affairs, or a state of affairs that obtains.

If A implies B, then that A implies B is a state of affairs. ...a fact. ...a fact that could reasonably be called an "if-then" fact.

Alternatively, if a fact is defined as a state of affairs, then a proposition could be defined as a putative or hypothetical state of affairs.

(I know that, in philosophy, it's often said that a state of affairs doesn't necessarily obtain, and that a fact is a state of affairs that obtains. But a supposed "state of affairs" that doesn't obtain isn't a state of affairs.)

, shows your conflation of soundness and validity.

An argument is valid if its premise implies its conclusion.

An argument is sound if it's valid and its premise is true.

By the way, in all the articles I've run across, validity and soundness are applied only to arguments. My metaphiysics refers to implication facts, for which there' s no reason to believe that their premises are true.

A proposition isn't an argument, though the arguments that "valid" and "sound" apply to are based on an implication proposition.

By the way, though it's often said that an implication has an antecedent and a consequent, those are often referred to as "premise" and "conclusion". (...though some want to say that "premise" and "conclusion" only apply to arguments).

I've been referring to "antecedent" and "consequent" as "premise" and "conclusion". There's ample precedent for that usage.

In philosophy, of course there's rampant disagreement about definitions, but my usage is consistent with the basic consensus of those definitions.

A common tactic here consists of taking advantage of philosophy's definitional disagreements, to frivolously and maybe dishonestly take issue with the usage in a post that you can't otherwise find disagreement with.

I know...I'm wasting my breath...and I should know better...

Then why don't you stop.

Michael Ossipoff

I’d said:

I've been repeatedly emphasizing that, regarding the abstract if-then facts that I've been referring to, there' s no reason to believe that any of them are "sound", in the logic sense There's no reason to believe that any of their premises are true.

(…but I realize that “valid” and “sound” really apply only to arguments. Strictly speaking then, an implication proposition (such as the true ones that I call implication-facts) isn’t what “valid” and “sound” are applied to.

…even though of course the arguments to which those words apply make use of an implication-proposition which may or may not be true, and whose premise may or may not be true.)

MetaphysicsNow says:

Take the last sentence, to what does the possessive pronoun "their" refer? Your if-then facts. Facts do not have premises, arguments have premises.

It’s sometimes said that arguments have premise and conclusion, but that implication-propositions instead have antecedent and consequent.

But, in actual usage, we often encounter an implication-proposition’s antecedent referred to as its premise…and its consequent referred to as its conclusion. That’s sometimes found in academic articles.

If an implication-proposition is true, then it’s a true proposition. It’s also a state of affairs. Those are both definitions of a fact.

If an implication-proposition can have an antecedent, which can be called its “premise”, then the fact that an implication-proposition is a true proposition doesn’t mean that it no longer has a premise (antecedent).

Then, as a true proposition, and as a state of affairs, that implication-proposition is now an implication-fact, or an “if-then” fact. …and guess what: That true implication-proposition still has a premise (antecedent).

So yes, an implication fact, a true implication-proposition, has a premise.

Are you done quibbling? :)

Your writing is peppered with these kinds of errors

Like all of the “errors” you cite, the usage of mine that you referred to above isn’t an error. It’s a usage consistent with consensus for definitions and terms, and an instance of you mis-applying a term or definition.

As I’ve said before, academic philosophy is full of rampant disagreement about terms and definitions. But there’s some consensus, and my usages are consistent with that consensus.

I’ve been suggesting that you do some reading about that. The SEP would be a good place for you to start.

I invited people to specify any incorrect statement or unsupported conclusion in my metaphysical proposal.

What I'm getting instead are fallacious quibbles based on misuse and/or misunderstanding of accepted definitions and terms.

If that's the best "disagreement" that you can find, then I don't have time to continue arguing with you.

Let's just agree to disagree, and terminate this discussion.

Michael Ossipoff

If an "if-then" proposition, an implication-proposition, might not be true, then it can't be called a fact. It's only a proposition. — Michael Ossipoff

And what is it that determines whether or not any proposition is true?

So then a fact can be defined as a true proposition, and so a true if-then proposition can reasonably be called an if-then fact.

A fact has also been defined as a state of affairs, or a state of affairs that obtains. — Michael Ossipoff

This is where your conflation lies. 'Fact' has two senses; a semantic sense, or the sense in which a fact is considered to be a true proposition, and a substantive sense, a sense in which substantive facts make propositional facts true. Only the latter kinds of facts are equivalent to states of affairs. The former kinds of facts are propositional descriptions of states of affairs.

"Paris is the capital of France' is not a state of affairs, it is a statement. Paris being the capital of France is a state of affairs.This distinction is the first thing you need to get clear. There is no such thing as an "if-then fact". Propositions, not facts, may be in the form of 'if-then'. Tautologies don't count as facts either. You are distorting sensible usage in sophistical ways.

Consider Tarski's formulation: "'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white"; 'Snow is white' is a propositional
or semantic fact if it is a substantive fact that snow is white. For every propositional or semantic fact there is a corresponding substantive fact. Which is to say that for every (propositional) truth there is an actuality.

A common tactic here consists of taking advantage of philosophy's definitional disagreements, to frivolously and maybe dishonestly take issue with the usage in a post that you can't otherwise find disagreement with. — Michael Ossipoff

It has nothing to do with being dishonest or "rude"; it has to do with frustration at seeing the same simplistic mistakes and vacuous sophistry being peddled over and over.

Apart from the fact that you are equivocating on the meaning of 'fact', there is also the apparent lack of any cogent argument to support your "system".

Why not lay out your argument (if you have one) in a clear, concise form showing your major premise(s) and your conclusion, then you should be able to determine once and for all whether it is even a valid argument let alone a sound one.

Consider this question: In all the time that you have been posting on forums have you found even one person who agrees with your 'argument'?

I used the Slithytove example because I wanted to use, as an example, a particularly simple fact. The simplicity, the obviousness that you object to, was my reason for choosing it. I wanted simplicity for that example.

But disregard it if you want to. I've described other if-then facts, including, for example, the fact that IF the additive associative axiom is true, THEN 2 + 2 = 4. — Michael Ossipoff

Neither fact nor truth with Slithytoves.

As to 2+2=4, that is not a fact; it is a true proposition. There's a difference between facts and truths; usually it doesn't matter too much, but for your arguments it does. Consider this: all facts are historical facts. Chew on that for a while.

@Michael Ossipoff

the fact that IF the additive associative axiom is true, THEN 2 + 2 = 4.

And here you display your equally superficial knowledge of number theory - I guess you pick that up from a cursory reading of websites as well as your philosophy. In most systems of number theory, the associative property of addition is not an axiom, it is a theorem that can be proven from the axioms of the theory.
I suppose there could be a number theory in which it could appear as an axiom, however, in those theories the conditional you give would be false, since you would need more than just the additive associative axiom to be able to infer that 2+2=4, you would need all the axioms of the system.
If you meant to say "Given all the axioms of number theory, then 2+2=4" - well, firstly, why didn't you say that? and secondly if that is what you meant, then what you meant is a tautology (not a simple one, but a tautology in the mathematical sense of being vacuously true under all interpretations of its symbols).
You might see this as quibbling, but the fact is that you are slapdash in your understanding of the difference between an axiom and a theorem is just one more indication of a slapdash mentality in general, and slapdash mentalities, whatever merit they have, do not merit being taken seriously.
I do need to wheen myself of making a fool of you, but I cannot go cold turkey it seems.

I think the most sensible thing we can draw out from these various exchanges before we move on to other things, is that the distinction between logical truth and substantive truth is important and complex and is being totally ignored by MO.