He gives no meaning to "transcendental", so anyone can explain it how he sees fit. — Pussycat

So in other words you don't know what it means and think you can define it in any way you see fit. Is this an example of your “improvising”? It is nothing more than a dodge, an attempt to sidestep the incompatibility of your interpretation with the text.

The term has a specific meaning and anyone familiar the term does not need to be given a meaning by Wittgenstein. It means the a priori condition of the possibility of experience through representation (See Critique of Pure Reason, "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories"). Disagreement is not about the meaning of the term itself. Thus logic is transcendental because it allows us to picture the world. Ethics is transcendental because it allows us to experience the moral/aesthetic meaning and value of the world, to see it as mystical.

It doesn't mean it exists either. Or that the ethical that has been transcended has anything to do with what is obtained at the end of this transcendence, it might be something completely different. — Pussycat

Wittgenstein does not say and it does not follow from anything he does say that the ethical has been transcended. It is just the opposite, the ethical transcends the facts of the world. (6.41)

So he says that the mystical shows itself, not the ethical. — Pussycat

Wittgenstein connects the mystical and ethical/aesthetic via linked statements about the world, its limits, and what is experienced beyond those limits. The sense of the world and its value is not to be found in the world (6.41) It is because the sense and value of the world cannot be found in the world that there can be no ethical propositions (6.42). The good and bad exercise of the will and the experience of the world as a whole of the happy and unhappy man (6.43) The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time (6.4312). God does not reveal himself in the world (6.432). The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution (6.4321) The existence of the world is mystical (6.44). Viewing it sub specie aeterni and feeling it as a limited whole is mystical (6.45)

In support of my last post regarding the meaning of transcendental as the condition of possibility, from the Notebooks:

“Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic.” (NB, 24.7.16)

Wittgenstein does not say and it does not follow from anything he does say that the ethical has been transcended. It is just the opposite, the ethical transcends the facts of the world. (6.41) — Fooloso4

But when he writes that: "he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly". This surmount, climb through, on and over these (nonsensical and ethical) propositions, isn't that transcendence?

I mean, can't we rewrite the above as: "he who understands me finally recognizes the ethical propositions as senseless, when he has transcended them", without changing the meaning?

But when he writes that: "he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly". This surmount, climb through, on and over these (nonsensical and ethical) propositions, isn't that transcendence? — Pussycat

He has made it clear that ethics is not about propositions and so the transcendence of propositions is not the transcendence of ethics. It is only when such propositions are surmounted that one can see the world aright. It is the ethical that is the transcendental condition that makes this experience possible.

So for the man that finally understands Wittgenstein, it wasn't ethics/the ethical that was transcended, but rather propositions about it: the ethical was needed for this experience of transcendence, having been the condition. But what happens to ethics afterwards?

But what happens to ethics afterwards? — Pussycat

Do you mean ethics in the sense of rules or standards of proper conduct? If so, Wittgenstein says nothing about this. The closest he gets in the comment in the Notebooks about conscience quoted in an earlier post:

Living in agreement with the world is living in accord with one’s conscience, which is the voice of God.

I am then, so to speak, in agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent. That is to say: “I am doing the will of God” (NB 8.7.16) — NB

Do you mean ethics in the sense of rules or standards of proper conduct? If so, Wittgenstein says nothing about this — Fooloso4

No, I meant ethics as the transcendental: if it was employed as a means to see the world aright, then what is its use after this?

The closest he gets in the comment in the Notebooks about conscience quoted in an earlier post: — Fooloso4

I think he uses this as a simile like he says so in the lecture: when someone is happy then he says and feels as if he is with God or in heaven, where being with God and heaven mean something pleasant. The same holds for the ethical rewards - reward must be something acceptable. Equivalently, when someone is unhappy then he says and feels as if he is with the Devil or in hell, where the Devil and hell mean something unpleasant - punishment be something unacceptable. Or doing the will of God, so to speak, he means it also as a simile for when he is happy and in accordance with his own conscience, not that he is actually doing God's will.

My whole tendency and, I believe, the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language.

No, I meant ethics as the transcendental: if it was employed as a means to see the world aright, then what is its use after this? — Pussycat

It is not like sightseeing. It is not a once and done experience.

I think he uses this as a simile like he says so in the lecture: when someone is happy then he says and feels as if he is with God or in heaven, where being with God and heaven mean something pleasant. — Pussycat

It is an attempt to put into words what cannot be put into words. When he says "ultimate value", however, it suggests something much more profound and important than something pleasant. When he says that he is "so to speak" in agreement with the will of God, again I think he means something far more profound and significant than something pleasant. When he says that his conscience is the voice of God, he is not stating a matter of fact. To attempt to ascribe a more specific meaning to it is antithetical to the Tractatus.

It is not like sightseeing. It is not a once and done experience. — Fooloso4

haha, well done Fooloso4, you have a sense of humour after all!

It is an attempt to put into words what cannot be put into words. When he says "ultimate value", however, it suggests something much more profound and important than something pleasant. When he says that he is "so to speak" in agreement with the will of God, again I think he means something far more profound and significant than something pleasant. When he says that his conscience is the voice of God, he is not stating a matter of fact. To attempt to ascribe a more specific meaning to it is antithetical to the Tractatus. — Fooloso4

The word "meaning" can have different meanings. We use it differently when we say "the meaning of a chair is something that we use to sit on", when we say that "this object has a special meaning for us", and when we inquire into the meaning of life. The word-sign may be the same, but it has a different form, so it means something else in each case. So in the case of "ultimate or absolute value", I think he means the source of all value, the transcedental ethics, or God so to speak, but not the actual value, since no such ultimate value can be ascribed or described, and the source is not the same as what emanates from it.

But anyway Wittgenstein must have had a rather peculiar view of ethics and morality in general. It struck me as odd when I read his lecture where he equates an act of murder to that of a falling of a stone:

If for instance in our world-book we read the description of a murder with all its details physical and psychological, the mere description of these facts will contain nothing which we could call an ethical proposition. The murder will be on exactly the same level as any other event, for instance the falling of a stone. Certainly the reading of description might cause us pain or rage or any other emotion, or we might read about the pain or rage caused by this murder in other people when they have heard of it, but there will simply be facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics.

I mean, a normal person I think would have said that the murder was quite unethical and immoral, and denote the murderer as unethical and immoral too. But not Wittgenstein, he only sees facts.

In any case, I think we can safely say where Wittgenstein places all ethical propositions, somewhere next to the lifeline. :grin:

I mean, a normal person I think would have said that the murder was quite unethical and immoral, and denote the murderer as unethical and immoral too. But not Wittgenstein, he only sees facts. — Pussycat

It is not that he cannot see the immorality of the act, it is that the immorality does not reside in the facts themselves.

But the fact is certainly related to the act. So if he cannot see the immorality in the facts themselves, then how can he see it in the act? Is it only that we cannot speak of it/say it (that it is immoral), as if we were deaf and mute or something, but everything else is the same as before?

The act is a fact. Part of the problem is that murder is defined as wrongful killing, but if it were an act that took place in war or in self-defense a factual description of the act would not change. Some might claim that war is immoral so the act of killing would be immoral. Some might even claim that killing in self-defense is immoral. Where in a description of the facts do we find the fact that the act is or is not immoral? If it were a fact shouldn't we be able to agree on that in the same way we agree that one person was hit in the head with a rock by another on a Tuesday afternoon? Propositions with a sense picture or represent what is the case, some state of affairs. Disagreement over the morality of the act is not an agreement or disagreement over the facts but over our assessment of the facts.

I'm back, hehe!

So let us conclude this if you like. First of all, I think your reading of the Tractatus sees the transcedental ethics as providing the condition for meaning and value both: without ethics, there would be no value, and no meaning either; ie the condition for meaning and value is the same. Is that what you are saying?

And as to happiness, do you think that Wittgenstein is saying that whoever surmounts these ethical propositions and sees the world aright, will be happy? Because if so, then how do you explain the fact that he led a most unhappy life himself?

I must say that this thread is a delicacy.

Thank you, Fooloso and Pussycat.

Meow!

and no meaning either; ie the condition for meaning and value is the same. Is that what you are saying? — Pussycat

We need to make a distinction between meaning as Sinn or sense and meaning as significant or of value.

And as to happiness, do you think that Wittgenstein is saying that whoever surmounts these ethical propositions and sees the world aright, will be happy? Because if so, then how do you explain the fact that he led a most unhappy life himself? — Pussycat

Happiness is said to be a reward for the good exercise of the will (6.43)

We need to make a distinction between meaning as Sinn or sense and meaning as significant or of value. — Fooloso4

Alright, can you bring an example that clearly shows this distinction?

Happiness is said to be a reward for the good exercise of the will (6.43) — Fooloso4

So if that is the case, combined with the fact that W. was not happy in his life, we can safely infer that he did not exercise his will in a good way, and thus he was not rewarded, right?

hey hi Wallows!

Woof!

We need to make a distinction between meaning as Sinn or sense and meaning as significant or of value.
— Fooloso4

Alright, can you bring an example that clearly shows this distinction? — Pussycat

Compare:

4.022
A proposition shows its sense.
A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand.


4.031
Instead of, ‘This proposition has such and such a sense’, we can simply say, ‘This proposition represents such and such a situation’.

with:

6.41

The sense of the world must lie outside the world.

The same distinction in use can be found with Bedeutung. In English we also use the term 'meaning' in different ways.

So if that is the case, combined with the fact that W. was not happy in his life, we can safely infer that he did not exercise his will in a good way, and thus he was not rewarded, right? — Pussycat

If Wittgenstein was correct in claiming that happiness is the reward for the good exercise of the will and it was true that he was not happy, then that seems to be a correct conclusion. If you read Monk's biography and well as comments made by Wittgenstein in Culture and Value and elsewhere it is clear that he sometimes is critical of his actions. See also his comments about confession.

The same distinction in use can be found with Bedeutung. In English we also use the term 'meaning' in different ways. — Fooloso4

So you are saying that 'sense' in 4.022/4.031 and 'sense' in 6.41 mean different things? But yes, because I cannot see how the "sense of the world" would represent some situation. So in 6.41, value is meant as "sense"? And in that sense, does he see value and meaning as essentially the same? Is this why you said to me previously:

So I see here W argue in favour of amorality, just like Nietzsche, the opinion that ethics is non-existent, in thinking or in saying, in this world or beyond.
— Pussycat

Here you betray your lack of understanding not only of Wittgenstein but of Nietzsche as well. What they have in common is the fundamental importance of value and meaning for life. They differ, however, in where that is to be found. For Nietzsche it is the revaluation of values. — Fooloso4

I mean to express the position that: if one discards ethics as the condition for value, then one has to discard meaning as well. That is, the world cannot have a meaning, one's life cannot have a meaning, but be utterly meaningless, if one does not accept at least some value coming from the ethical.

If Wittgenstein was correct in claiming that happiness is the reward for the good exercise of the will and it was true that he was not happy, then that seems to be a correct conclusion. If you read Monk's biography and well as comments made by Wittgenstein in Culture and Value and elsewhere it is clear that he sometimes is critical of his actions. See also his comments about confession. — Fooloso4

Yes, I remember reading it some years ago, but diagonally like they say, some excerpts only. Wittgenstein said he wasn't happy, in several occasions, but in any case this is evident. Nowadays, he would have been diagnosed with some mental illness, for sure, bipolar disorder, manic depression, OCD most probably.

Right, so number 1 is that, whether for W. meaning and value are actually the same, whether they are essentially the same - same same but different like the asians usually say (same same, in short) -, and whether they have the same source (ethics).

Now number 2 relates to happyness, if, again for W and the Tractatus, it coincides with "good willing", which coincides with doing God's will, for whatever that means, and seeing the world aright, in which case I think we may call this particular interpretation of the Tractatus as the "stairway-to-heaven" interpretation, with the rungs of the ladder referring to this stairway.

You are trying to put into words what Wittgenstein says cannot.

And what was this then?

It is quite clear that there is ethical experience. One knows what it is, according to W., to be a happy man. One knows what it is to be in agreement with the world, with one's conscience, the will of God. One knows what it is for life to have value and meaning. One knows what it is to live in the eternal present. One knows the mystical (it makes itself manifest). One know how to see the world aright and what it is to see the world aright. One knows how all things stand, how it is all related, that is, God. — Fooloso4

Something that someone just knows but cannot put into words? I am asking, because it looked like a sermon to me, and I wouldn't take Wittgenstein to be a preacher.

Something that someone just knows but cannot put into words? — Pussycat

Yes. We went over this.

I am asking, because it looked like a sermon to me, and I wouldn't take Wittgenstein to be a preacher. — Pussycat

Wittgenstein was deeply concerned with religious and moral matters. But here you are quoting me regarding things known that cannot be put into words. That is not a sermon by Wittgenstein.

Well for one I very much doubt that all the above are things that one knows. I said previously what I think W. meant by the world of the happy man, and in the case of religious experience: that one speaks in similes, relating happiness to God or some divine providence, but this is not to be taken literally; and as we do not have words for God or the divine, similarly we do not have words for this happy experience. But as you said we went over this. So you agree that it was your own sermon?

But I think you are claiming the same for the Tractatus and for Wittgenstein as Father Copleston did, in his debate with Russell I linked to before. In there he writes:

http://www.scandalon.co.uk/philosophy/cosmological_radio.htm

C: ... Well, perhaps I might say a word about religious experience, and then we can go on to moral experience. I don't regard religious experience as a strict proof of the existence of God, so the character of the discussion changes somewhat, but I think it's true to say that the best explanation of it is the existence of God. By religious experience I don't mean simply feeling good. I mean a loving, but unclear, awareness of some object which irresistibly seems to the experiencer as something transcending the self, something transcending all the normal objects of experience, something which cannot be pictured (huh, it's not a picture) or conceptualized, but of the reality of which doubt is impossible (what one knows)-- at least during the experience. I should claim that cannot be explained adequately and without residue, simply subjectively. The actual basic experience at any rate is most easily explained on the hypotheses that there is actually some objective cause of that experience.

and

C: ... I'm speaking strictly of mystical experience proper, and I certainly don't include, by the way, what are called visions. I mean simply the experience, and I quite admit it's indefinable, of the transcendent object or of what seems to be a transcendent object. I remember Julian Huxley in some lecture saying that religious experience, or mystical experience, is as much a real experience as falling in love or appreciating poetry and art. Well, I believe that when we appreciate poetry and art we appreciate definite poems or a definite work of art. If we fall in love, well, we fall in love with somebody and not with nobody....

Just as Copleston says that the objective/transcendent object and cause of religious/mystical experience is God, so you say that for Wittgenstein, the condition for these kind of mystical experiences is the ethical. Which is also the condition for beauty - poetry and art, right? And that this is what Wittgenstein was getting at in the Tractatus, well at least in these two pages of his book?

Well for one I very much doubt that all the above are things that one knows. — Pussycat

If they are not part of your experience then they are not things you know via experience.

So you agree that it was your own sermon? — Pussycat

You can call it my own sermon if you like, but they are all things that Wittgenstein says, all things that were referenced. As to why you think calling it a sermon serves any purpose, I will leave to you. And as to why you drag Copleston into this I will also leave to you.

... relating happiness to God or some divine providence, but this is not to be taken literally — Pussycat

It is not a proposition. It tells us nothing about anything in the world.

Just as Copleston says that the objective/transcendent object and cause of religious/mystical experience is God — Pussycat

Wittgenstein would not agree. He does not regard God as an object, objective/transcendent or otherwise.

You can call it my own sermon if you like, but they are all things that Wittgenstein says, all things that were referenced. As to why you think calling it a sermon serves any purpose, I will leave to you. And as to why you drag Copleston into this I will also leave to you. — Fooloso4

Right, leave everything to me then! :) If it looks like a sermon, acts like one, then it is what it is. Copleston was dragged because I think he expresses the same views as yours regarding the ethical part of the Tractatus. I put in bold the parts that I find relevant.

Wittgenstein would not agree. He does not regard God as an object, objective/transcendent or otherwise. — Fooloso4

Whether God is that transcendent/objective object or otherwise, he (Copleston) certainly attributes religious/mystical experience to God, one way or another. Whereas, in your reading of the Tractatus, this mystical/ethical/religious experience is attributed to ethics. But then again, you seem to link ethics to God as in the sermon above, so essentially, these two different views are the same.

Whether God is that transcendent/objective object or otherwise, he (Copleston) certainly attributes religious/mystical experience to God, one way or another. Whereas, in your reading of the Tractatus, this mystical/ethical/religious experience is attributed to ethics. But then again, you seem to link ethics to God as in the sermon above, so essentially, these two different views are the same. — Pussycat

And if black and white are both colors then black and white are the same.

Of course not, but rather if black and white are colours, then they must have something in common, they must share a connection, so they are essentially the same, although different. In tractarian terms, their form is the same, but their content is different.

In tractarian terms, their form is the same, but their content is different. — Pussycat

The form of all propositions is the same. The form of all relations between objects is the same. Just because we say things about both houses and cows does not mean that houses and cows are the same.

Whereas, in your reading of the Tractatus, this mystical/ethical/religious experience is attributed to ethics. — Pussycat

As you quote, Copleston's:

... hypotheses is that there is actually some objective cause of that experience.

This is at odds with Wittgenstein. There is no objective cause of that experience, no state of affairs, no facts that cause such an experience. The ethical, according to W. has nothing to do with what happens in the world. He denies the possibility of ethical propositions (6.42). And yet Copleston speaks as if what he says represents facts of the world. You treat Wittgenstein as if he were saying the same thing that Copleston is, as if he were talking about some facts that must be the objective cause of ethical/aesthetic/religious experience.

Wittgenstein warns against the rabbit hole that Copleston goes down when he treats such questions as if they were propositional, as it they refer to some objective cause that he hypothesizes must exist that he can attribute them to. You do the same when you talk about the mystical/ethical/religious experience as if they are attributed to ethics.