You really should check the text before saying such things: — Fooloso4
6.43
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — Tractatus
Yes ok. So? Why do you see good willing to be a characteristic of the happy man, and bad willing that of an unhappy man? Because they are placed in the same order afterwards? If he wrote:
"The world of the unhappy man is a different one from that of the happy man",
would you have said that the good exercise of the will is that of the unhappy man, and bad willing that of the happy man?
I don't see the connection, in fact, I don't think they are related at all, in that happiness does not have anything to do with the will, as it is stated above, I am saying that the two statements are unconnected. — Pussycat
6.41
In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have
no value.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.
6.42
So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
6.421
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)
6.422
There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.
(And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.)
6.423
It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes.
6.43
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — Tractatus
The numbering system in the Tractatus is not ornamental. The remark about the world of the happy man is not some offhand remark unrelated to the statement in which it occurs. It follows from the prior related statements. — Fooloso4
According to 6.41 value is not found in the world. This is followed by 6.42 which states that there can be no ethical propositions because propositions cannot express anything higher. Ethics is transcendental (6.421). This is followed by 6.422 which states there must be ethical rewards and punishments, and that they reside in the action itself. 6.423 states that it is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes. This is because the will is not a thing in the world. Rather than attributes of the will it is the actions or exercise of the will that is at issue, but it cannot change what happens in the world, it changes the world as a whole (6.43). — Fooloso4
What relation do you think the general form of truth-function has with 6.4? — Pussycat
6.42
So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher. — Tractatus
All this however, is purely psychological, since believing, willing, judging etc something does not necessarily make it so, which is the foundation for all psychology. — Pussycat
And thus the Tractatus has explained how value judgements are possible. — Pussycat
However, because "logic fills the world", it mixes with our soul and psyche somehow — Pussycat
and it is not a happy coincidence that the word itself "psycho-logical", bears a logical part, — Pussycat
And I think that 6.43 was purposely numbered so by Wittgenstein, being in equal section under 6.4 (All propositions are of equal value) and not under 6.42 (as in 6.424 for example) where he discusses ethics, in order to show that what is contained there (the will and feelings of happiness and unhappiness) pertains to psychology, mostly, and not ethics. — Pussycat
Ethics has nothing to do with truth-functions, for propositions can express nothing higher. — Fooloso4
He has done no such thing. There is no talk of value judgment in the Tractatus. It is a matter of seeing of what makes itself manifest (6.522). — Fooloso4
Where does he say that logic mixes with the soul? Once again you have missed an essential element of the Tractatus, the "I" or self or soul is not in the world, it stands outside it. — Fooloso4
The term psychological does not mean that there is a logical part of the psyche. Logic is derivative of the Greek "logos", which meant originally to gather together, and thus to give an account, to speak or say. Psychology is the logos of the psyche. — Fooloso4
The reason it is not "6.424" is because it is not a continuation of 6.423, which says that it is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes. The subject is still ethics. Ethics is not about attributes of the will. It is about the exercise of the will. How we choose to act and the rewards or punishment that follow. — Fooloso4
So if ethics has nothing to do with truth-functions, does this mean that no truth comes out of ethics? — Pussycat
I didn't say that there was talk of value judgement in the Tractatus, but only an explanation how these are possible. — Pussycat
Well yes, he doesn't, but seeing that you get ahead of yourself, I took the liberty to improvise as well, I mean why should there be only you that has that privilege? — Pussycat
So psychology is the logos of the psyche, not the logic of the psyche? — Pussycat
By what you are reasoning here, you say why it is not a continuation of 6.423, but you don't actually say why or how it is a continuation of 6.42, where ethical propositions are discussed. — Pussycat
Do you think that in 6.44 and 6.45, the subject is still ethics? — Pussycat
And if so, how is ethics connected with these propositions? — Pussycat
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (6.54) — Tractatus
No propositional truths. — Fooloso4
He provides no such explanation, and if he did wouldn't he have to discuss it, that is, talk about value judgments? You miss the point. It is not about value judgments but the experience of value. — Fooloso4
First of all, I am not ahead of myself. I have followed the Tractatus. In a few places I cited his other writings. There is nothing else in addition to these points that I have said that cannot be found in the Tractatus. Second, your claim about mixing logic and soul is contrary to the Tractatus. If you like you can assert the "privilege" of saying things that are contrary to the text but you should be aware and make note of the fact that they are. — Fooloso4
Don't for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense.
'ologies' are the talk about or examination of or study of the subject matter. Biology is not the logic of life, it is the study of life. Psychology is not the logic of the psyche, it is the study of the psyche. — Fooloso4
Ethics and aesthetics are the same (6.421) 6.44 and 6.45 refer to aesthetic experience, meaning and value. — Fooloso4
What sort of truths then? Truths that cannot be expressed in language? Is this what you say? Personal truths? What exactly? — Pussycat
Do you think that this experience of value is of the same form of everyday experience? Somewhat related, or entirely different? — Pussycat
So you are saying that logic plays no role at all in biology or psychology? — Pussycat
Again, per my question as to these experiences. — Pussycat
We have been over this. Experiential. A proposition does not tell me if I am happy or in pain. — Fooloso4
I am talking about the etymology and meaning of the terms. The term biology does not mean that logic is mixed with life. The term psychology does not mean that logic is mixed with psyche. More to the point,
Wittgenstein marks the limits of logic and world and the "I" is not within those limits. They are separate and distinct, not mixed. — Fooloso4
Again, are you asking me to put into words what Wittgenstein says cannot be put into words? The problem can be seen, as I pointed out, with mundane experiences such as the taste of vanilla ice cream. This is an experience that most of us can relate to. In the Investigations he talks a great deal about the experience of pain. When someone says that they are in pain we know what they mean. But the experience of the mystical is not one we can so easily understand since it is not a common experience. — Fooloso4
... It is the paradox that an experience, a fact, should seem to have supernatural value.' — Fooloso4
I was asking so that I could understand what you mean. But if you think that what I am asking cannot be put into words, but only shown, then I guess that your efforts should have been better focused on the latter, the showing. — Pussycat
For example, in one of my previous comments to you, I used the word privilege ironically ... — Pussycat
Yes, it would seem or appear so, but you know what they say, appearances can be deceiving. — Pussycat
This was a direct quote from the lecture. Are you saying that Wittgenstein was deceived in believing that certain experiences have supernatural value? Or are you still accusing me of not understanding him? — Fooloso4
So, given my adoration for the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, I was wondering if anyone is interested in participating in a reading group of it.
The text is available in a very nice and convenient format online, which can be found here.
It's fairly short and not too burdensome. — Wallows
This was a direct quote from the lecture. Are you saying that Wittgenstein was deceived in believing that certain experiences have supernatural value? Or are you still accusing me of not understanding him?
— Fooloso4
Accuse is a bit harsh for a choice of words, but yes, I am saying that you don't understand him. "should seem to have" is not the same as "has", I wonder how and why you don't see that. — Pussycat
I have no idea what you are trying to get at. I see no indication that you were using the word ironically. What I saw was you falsely accusing me of getting ahead of myself and improvising, and using that as your defense for ignoring what the text actually says and making unfounded claims. The rest of the paragraph might be your idea of improvising, but it is meaningless. It is like someone who does not understand the music getting up at a jam session and making noise, with no regard to the form or melody of the song. — Fooloso4
Yup. Your patience must be wearing thin. All this din. — Amity
The poster Pussycat has repeatedly challenged him. Fair enough. However, each time he provides the answer it is ignored, there is a move to something else. It is not clear whethet his careful responses are getting through or whether there is a better understanding of the text. — Amity
Fooloso4 in his understanding of Wittgenstein would probably point out that the reason why Wittgenstein said: "should seem to have" is because that refers to how things are to Wittgenstein.
If Wittgensteun used "has" he would be making a factual claim, and he rejects factual claims about ethics. — Amity
That is correct. This is a basic Tractarian distinction. One that I have repeatedly pointed to only to have it ignored and the same mistake repeated — Fooloso4
Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water and if I were to pour out a gallon over it.
The book’s point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it. And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won’t see that it is said in the book. For now, I would recommend you to read the preface and the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the book. [emphasis added] — Letter to von Ficker
Sorry, my mind has been preoccupied with some dumb shit. Personally, I've been enjoying the dialogue between Pussycat and Fooloso4. I'm not an expert on Wittgenstein, and anyone who claims that they are, are likely full of shit. So, I don't know what issues I should intervene.
I'll try and keep a more watchful eye out for the sake of this thread.
I must admit though, that my interest in philosophy has been lackluster as of late. Ehh. — Wallows
I do appreciate Fooloso4's interpretation of the unsaid in the Tractatus, which is hard to find in any textbook. — Wallows
Is not this the reason why men to whom after long doubting the sense of life became clear, could not then say wherein this sense consisted? — 6.521
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. — 6.54
Of course there is then no question left, and just this is the answer.
Ethics still of course exists, in a sense, or rather not in a sense, it actually exists, for those that are still on the bottom of the ladder or climbing it up, but once they reach the top, they see it as something senseless, it just won't make sense to them at all then. — Pussycat
I mean if one would do some research on the Tractatus, he would find plenty of different views ... — Pussycat
And yet at the penultimate rung of the latter at 6.421 he says that ethics is transcendental. How do you explain this? — Fooloso4
when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions.
What one sees when the world is seen aright is not simply that propositions about what cannot be put into words are senseless but that the world is mystical. — Fooloso4
What is inexpressible would be nonsense if one attempted to express it. This does not mean that the mystical or the ethical does not exist. It does, it shows itself. What is senseless is not the ethical but rather propositions about the ethical. — Fooloso4
There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.
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