It has nothing to do with either Descartes or with reification. I am not saying that either numbers, or mind, are 'substances' in the sense that Descartes uses. I favour the model of hylomorphic dualism. The problem is, when the word 'intelligible object' is used, it sounds like a reification, but in this case the use of the word is allegorical, to convey that a number is something the mind grasps or sees, 'analogous to the way a hand grasps a pencil', to use Frege's analogy. — Wayfarer
Does superstring theory, or colliding 11 dimension branes in the multiverse count as a meaningful scientific debate? I think so, on a theoretical grounds, but some have said it's pure metaphysics and shouldn't be in science. — Marchesk
There is a consensus that both players are all-time greats at basketball, but there isn't a consensus as what counts as being greater between the two (which often means the best ever).
And yet there are many discussions on this. What happens is that the Lebron James supporters will list criteria that supports their claim that Lebron is better, and reasons why Jordan is not. And the Jordan supporters will do the same.
This isn't because they don't understand each other, it's because they don't agree. Similar to political debates where a conservative and a liberal will base their arguments on their political persuasion. They can usually understand each other, but they don't agree on the politics of the other side's position. — Marchesk
It seems to be arguing something like 'religion relies on faith, metaphysics is like religion, therefore we can't say anything objective about metaphysics'. But by concentrating on particular aspects of the Aristotelian tradition of metaphysics - and, after all, the term 'metaphysics' was invented specifically in relation to Aristotle's works - it is possible to at least converse meaningfully about specific metaphysical ideas and doctrines, as I am attempting to do with the discussion about the ontological status of numbers and universals. I think there is a central theme in that discussion, about metaphysics generally, which has considerable consequences for culture and philosophy. — Wayfarer
The reason many positivists have such an aversion to metaphysics, is because if mathematical platonism is true, then their preferred philosophical model of naturalism and/or materialism is not. — Wayfarer
I don't think that a shared metric for deciding what answer is superior is required for a meaningful debate. That would make a debate end, but many debates do not end and yet are still meaningful. Agreement is not the basis of meaning, nor does there need to be some metric for statements to be meaningful. — Moliere
some people like a higher degree of decidability, and some people don't care either way. — Moliere
In the debate on consciousness it is understood what it means to be wrong. Further, "consciousness" is clearly defined. — Moliere
But just because I'm not interested in some debate that does not then mean that everyone over there interested in it is speaking gobbledeegoop. — Moliere
But now I'm starting to see your position relying on a mystical faith after all. "...by concentrating on particular aspects of the Aristotelian tradition of metaphysics...it is possible to at least converse meaningfully about specific metaphysical ideas and doctrines" - All we have to do is 'concentrate' on them and their truth will be revealed to us? Sounds more like divine revelation than discourse. — Pseudonym
Yes, and such debates are meaningless. If the two sides do not agree on the meaning of the term 'better', then how is it different to debating which player is the most 'flibertyjibit' - another term which neither side agree the meaning of, yet we would easily see the sentence Michael Jordan is the most flibertijibit player as being nonsense. — Pseudonym
I don't believe we could coherently imagine what such a reality could be except that it consists in some kind of timelessly existing Idea (Platonism). But the notion that there is a timeless somehow independently existent idea for every generality (and there would need to be a unique idea for every individual similarity and difference) leads to absurdity. It's a really overloaded, top-heavy, cumbersome and in the final analysis, incoherent, ontology, so why should we adopt it or even bother with it? — Janus
Is that really so odd? I'd say it's the rule rather than the exception! — Aaron R
So what is the basis then. What makes a debate about the colour of unicorn's tails meaningless, but a debate about universals meaningful? — Pseudonym
Again, I'm not talking about preferences, people can debate whatever they want, but in order to follow through your argument about preferences you'd have to sacrifice the use of the term meaningful altogether, after all, what could possibly qualify as meaningless if it's all just preference about decidability. Are you saying there's no such thing as a meaningless debate? — Pseudonym
Really, so what is it to be wrong in such a debate and what is the definition of conciousness which is universally agreed on? — Pseudonym
No, but if you want to reserve the ability to define some conversations as meaningless (gobbledegook), then you need some measure of meaningfulness, so what is your measure if it's not shared agreement on terms? — Pseudonym
if two people arguing understand one another, and can articulate eachother's position -- then it's just true that the debate is not nonsense. — Moliere
If two people can disagree while being able to explicate the position of who they disagree with then that's a good indicator that the terms are being used the same. — Moliere
So what I’m saying is that by concentrating on the aspects of metaphysics that recognisably relate to the Aristotelian tradition, then you do have at least a ‘domain of discourse’ within which their might be rational discussion. — Wayfarer
There is no such thing as an "if-then fact"; there are if-then propositions — Janus
there are if-then propositions
propositions are not facts.
I'm amazed you're still going on about this,
Yes, and such debates are meaningless. — Pseudonym
I think we realize too little how often our arguments are of the form:-- A.: "I went to Grantchester this afternoon." B: "No I didn't."
I think essences in the things themselves would be an alternative to Platonism, but it's not without it's own difficulties. So sure, what you said is a standard criticism of realism about universals. — Marchesk
I think that is really the issue; not that such speculation is meaningless, because it is obviously meaningful in that it involves using words and phrases that mean something to us; the issue is that it is undecidable. The mistake of the Logical Positivists was to conflate 'undecidable' with 'meaningful'. — Janus
Better already exists as a comparison in language. There's no problem saying that MJ or LJ are better than the average player. You will get consensus on that. And better here means superior statistics, MVP awards and all-star selections, championships, and a general recognition of rare ability while watching a player play the game. — Marchesk
And so then people are free to choose what criteria they wish to use.
This isn't a matter of better being meaningless, it's rather imprecise and opinionated. — Marchesk
It is again a thought-child of Aristotle's (understandably) naive realism. Generality is undeniably an element of perception; without generality we would not be able to perceive any particular as the the kind of thing it is, but the idea of essences wants to locate universals 'in' the naively real objects themselves, rather than in every part of the relationally real process of perception. — Janus
I'd say as long as both sides can articulate the other's then the propositions that two people are using to debate have meaning. So in the case of consciousness I can say what it would mean to believe in property dualism, eliminative materialism, epiphenomenalism, and panpsychism -- I know what the propositions are, and I know why I would argue for or against each of these. — Moliere
if two people arguing understand one another, and can articulate each other's position -- then it's just true that the debate is not nonsense. — Moliere
consciousness is the fact that the world feels like something. Pizza tastes like pizza, and not nothing, or carrots. Brahms has a certain quality of sound. We experience the world and experiences feels like something. — Moliere
To be wrong in the debate would be to take a false position. So an eliminative materialist will commonly say that such feeling is an illusion of the mind, or some such. If consciousness is an illusion of the mind, has no reality outside of this, then we'd say that all the sorts of beliefs that attempt to explain consciousness are false. — Moliere
If two people can disagree while being able to explicate the position of who they disagree with then that's a good indicator that the terms are being used the same. — Moliere
I like now & then to quote Ramsey:
I think we realize too little how often our arguments are of the form:-- A.: "I went to Grantchester this afternoon." B: "No I didn't." — Srap Tasmaner
So, would it not then be true to say that the discourse is only rational to those who agree with the terminology and metric of sucess within that field? So, stating that universals have such and such properties would be meaningful to someone invested in the argument, but saying to a materialist that an Aristotlean metaphysical proposition "proves" that materialism is wrong must be meaningless, because the Aristotlean and the materialist do not agree on the meaning of the terms 'prove' and 'wrong' so how can they have meaningful discussion using them? — Pseudonym
Within the Christian Church, it would be a meaningful discussion because all agree that the coherence with the words in the bible is the metric by which ideas are measured. But include a Muslim, or an atheist in the debate and it becomes meaningless, how are the Christian and the atheist going to analyse the ideas in any joint way?
So it is with metaphysics, there is no agreement among the participants in the discussion about what it is that measures 'rightness'. Even attempts to do so like coherence, consistency, simplicity are all far too vague to achieve anything. — Pseudonym
where does disagreement resides between theistic metaphysicians if not in their different conceptualisations of basic metaphysical terms? — Πετροκότσυφας
Except for those who don't agree, like Churchland, Dennett, Rosenburg for whom conciousness is not that and we a re deluded into thinking that the world feels like something. — Pseudonym
Again, I'd ask what measure you're using to determine that the two people actually understand each other. Presumably, there has to be some metric, otherwise it would not be possible to misunderstand. The whole system of university education in philosophy would be pointless (a conclusion I'm inclined to agree with), there would be no sense to the term "you haven't understood X's position", and yet these are the mainstay of philosophical debate. — Pseudonym
I'm not getting from this what you think 'wrong' is. You've just given a synonym 'false'. What actually is 'wrong/false'? — Pseudonym
I can disagree with your statement that "Unicorns have pink tails" by simply stating that "Unicorns have blue tails". At no point does my ability to do this indicate anything about my understanding of you use of the term 'Unicorn', all I did was construct a grammatically correct sentence with the term in it. All I needed to do that was to understand if the term was a noun or a verb, I don't need to understand anything of what you actually meant by it. — Pseudonym
I can disagree with your statement that "Unicorns have pink tails" by simply stating that "Unicorns have blue tails". At no point does my ability to do this indicate anything about my understanding of you use of the term 'Unicorn' — Pseudonym
A meaningless debate might go something like this
"of shcrik in the water too"
"gavagai"
I have no idea what those terms mean. It is purely nonsense.
So given that standard I'd likely say there isn't such a thing, insofar that the words have meaning. — Moliere
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