It has nothing to do with either Descartes or with reification. I am not saying that either numbers, or mind, are 'substances' in the sense that Descartes uses. I favour the model of hylomorphic dualism. The problem is, when the word 'intelligible object' is used, it sounds like a reification, but in this case the use of the word is allegorical, to convey that a number is something the mind grasps or sees, 'analogous to the way a hand grasps a pencil', to use Frege's analogy. — Wayfarer

So you think the mind is something other than the body/ brain? If you do think so then you are a dualist, and not merely a hylomorphic dualist either. If, instead you merely want to say that 'brain' and 'mind' are two different kinds of description of the one thing, descriptions that are not reducible to one another, then you'll get no argument from me.

Does superstring theory, or colliding 11 dimension branes in the multiverse count as a meaningful scientific debate? I think so, on a theoretical grounds, but some have said it's pure metaphysics and shouldn't be in science. — Marchesk

As I said, I agree with Quine that it is not a simple case of things being either meaningful or not, some are more meaningful than others depending largely on the extent of agreement about metrics and terms. In Physics, there is widespread agreement on metrics (correspondence with empirical evidence, or with mathematical axioms) and widespread agreement on the meaning of terms, so most discussion in that field are meaningful, even though, with a current lack of empirical evidence or even falsifiability, they may well be metaphysical.

There is a consensus that both players are all-time greats at basketball, but there isn't a consensus as what counts as being greater between the two (which often means the best ever).

And yet there are many discussions on this. What happens is that the Lebron James supporters will list criteria that supports their claim that Lebron is better, and reasons why Jordan is not. And the Jordan supporters will do the same.

This isn't because they don't understand each other, it's because they don't agree. Similar to political debates where a conservative and a liberal will base their arguments on their political persuasion. They can usually understand each other, but they don't agree on the politics of the other side's position. — Marchesk

Yes, and such debates are meaningless. If the two sides do not agree on the meaning of the term 'better', then how is it different to debating which player is the most 'flibertyjibit' - another term which neither side agree the meaning of, yet we would easily see the sentence Michael Jordan is the most flibertijibit player as being nonsense.

It seems to be arguing something like 'religion relies on faith, metaphysics is like religion, therefore we can't say anything objective about metaphysics'. But by concentrating on particular aspects of the Aristotelian tradition of metaphysics - and, after all, the term 'metaphysics' was invented specifically in relation to Aristotle's works - it is possible to at least converse meaningfully about specific metaphysical ideas and doctrines, as I am attempting to do with the discussion about the ontological status of numbers and universals. I think there is a central theme in that discussion, about metaphysics generally, which has considerable consequences for culture and philosophy. — Wayfarer

I honestly haven't a clue what this means, with my Christianity example I quite clearly stated that it is meaningful to the Christian because of the shared metric of correspondence with the words in the bible. It has nothing whatsoever to do with faith. It might well have been a discussion among Civil War re-enactors, whose metric is whether the idea corresponds with what actually happened in the Civil War.

But now I'm starting to see your position relying on a mystical faith after all. "...by concentrating on particular aspects of the Aristotelian tradition of metaphysics...it is possible to at least converse meaningfully about specific metaphysical ideas and doctrines" - All we have to do is 'concentrate' on them and their truth will be revealed to us? Sounds more like divine revelation than discourse.

The reason many positivists have such an aversion to metaphysics, is because if mathematical platonism is true, then their preferred philosophical model of naturalism and/or materialism is not. — Wayfarer

Aside from your unwarranted denigration of the motives of positivists (maybe they're just trying to find the truth like everyone else?), mathematical platonism in some form has been investigated for more than 2000 years, even in specific modern form for several decades, and no one has managed to prove it true yet, I don't think they're exactly quaking in their boots about the prospect.

I don't think that a shared metric for deciding what answer is superior is required for a meaningful debate. That would make a debate end, but many debates do not end and yet are still meaningful. Agreement is not the basis of meaning, nor does there need to be some metric for statements to be meaningful. — Moliere

So what is the basis then. What makes a debate about the colour of unicorn's tails meaningless, but a debate about universals meaningful?

some people like a higher degree of decidability, and some people don't care either way. — Moliere

Again, I'm not talking about preferences, people can debate whatever they want, but in order to follow through your argument about preferences you'd have to sacrifice the use of the term meaningful altogether, after all, what could possibly qualify as meaningless if it's all just preference about decidability. Are you saying there's no such thing as a meaningless debate?

In the debate on consciousness it is understood what it means to be wrong. Further, "consciousness" is clearly defined. — Moliere

Really, so what is it to be wrong in such a debate and what is the definition of conciousness which is universally agreed on?

But just because I'm not interested in some debate that does not then mean that everyone over there interested in it is speaking gobbledeegoop. — Moliere

No, but if you want to reserve the ability to define some conversations as meaningless (gobbledegook), then you need some measure of meaningfulness, so what is your measure if it's not shared agreement on terms?

But now I'm starting to see your position relying on a mystical faith after all. "...by concentrating on particular aspects of the Aristotelian tradition of metaphysics...it is possible to at least converse meaningfully about specific metaphysical ideas and doctrines" - All we have to do is 'concentrate' on them and their truth will be revealed to us? Sounds more like divine revelation than discourse. — Pseudonym

no, that’s not it. I’m referring to the fact that the term ‘metaphysics’ has a distinct meaning, starting from its coining by one of the editors of Aristotle’s works - the ‘meta-physica’ referred to the works ‘after physics’. But ‘metaphysics’ is also used in relation to many ideas that are generally spiritual. So what I’m saying is that by concentrating on the aspects of metaphysics that recognisably relate to the Aristotelian tradition, then you do have at least a ‘domain of discourse’ within which their might be rational discussion.

And, again, metaphysical ideas such as mathematical platonism cannot be proven - well, not to the satisfaction of the empiricist. And why, is a metaphysical issue.

Yes, and such debates are meaningless. If the two sides do not agree on the meaning of the term 'better', then how is it different to debating which player is the most 'flibertyjibit' - another term which neither side agree the meaning of, yet we would easily see the sentence Michael Jordan is the most flibertijibit player as being nonsense. — Pseudonym

Better already exists as a comparison in language. There's no problem saying that MJ or LJ are better than the average player. You will get consensus on that. And better here means superior statistics, MVP awards and all-star selections, championships, and a general recognition of rare ability while watching a player play the game.

So better is not like the made up word flibertijibit. The problem with better is that it's not precise enough when you have two players close enough in career achievements to fix the criteria for determining who is better. And so then people are free to choose what criteria they wish to use.

This isn't a matter of better being meaningless, it's rather imprecise and opinionated.

I don't believe we could coherently imagine what such a reality could be except that it consists in some kind of timelessly existing Idea (Platonism). But the notion that there is a timeless somehow independently existent idea for every generality (and there would need to be a unique idea for every individual similarity and difference) leads to absurdity. It's a really overloaded, top-heavy, cumbersome and in the final analysis, incoherent, ontology, so why should we adopt it or even bother with it? — Janus

I think essences in the things themselves would be an alternative to Platonism, but it's not without it's own difficulties. So sure, what you said is a standard criticism of realism about universals.

As on poster in this thread pointed out, the odd thing about this debate is that none of the positions is without problems. I don't think this is because of lack of meaning in the dispute.

There are ongoing debates in matters like unsolved crimes where there isn't a question about meaning. What's questioned is the interpretation of the known or alleged facts and related matters for the case.

As on poster in this thread pointed out, the odd thing about this debate is that none of the positions is without problems. — Marchesk

Is that really so odd? I'd say it's the rule rather than the exception!

Is that really so odd? I'd say it's the rule rather than the exception! — Aaron R

Sure, and no doubt that is ammo for the anti-metaphyics side. Questions raised about meaningfulness in this thread:

Can a debate be meaningful if the different sides can't agree on what constitutes an acceptable answer?

Can a statement be meaningful if it's imprecise?

Is meaning grounded in the empirical and analytical such that you can't make meaningful claims about that which is beyond experience?

Is meaning a precise term or is it fuzzy?

Is a statement claiming that all statements of type X are meaningless a member of X?

So what is the basis then. What makes a debate about the colour of unicorn's tails meaningless, but a debate about universals meaningful? — Pseudonym

I'd say as long as both sides can articulate the other's then the propositions that two people are using to debate have meaning. So in the case of consciousness I can say what it would mean to believe in property dualism, eliminative materialism, epiphenomenalism, and panpsychism -- I know what the propositions are, and I know why I would argue for or against each of these.

Not having an interest in the problem of universals I couldn't tell you -- it's not something I've read much about other than the occasional SEP article. But if two people can understand one another then I don't see why I'd call it meaningless.

Also, I wouldn't say that a debate about the unicorn's tails is meaningless. I understand those words well enough. Worth my time? Not so much. It's not something I'm interested in.

Again, I'm not talking about preferences, people can debate whatever they want, but in order to follow through your argument about preferences you'd have to sacrifice the use of the term meaningful altogether, after all, what could possibly qualify as meaningless if it's all just preference about decidability. Are you saying there's no such thing as a meaningless debate? — Pseudonym

A meaningless debate might go something like this

"of shcrik in the water too"

"gavagai"

I have no idea what those terms mean. It is purely nonsense.

So given that standard I'd likely say there isn't such a thing, insofar that the words have meaning. I'm not attached to trying to sort out debates that are good from debates that are bad. There are things that interest me, and things that don't. All the same if I understand the words -- if two people arguing understand one another, and can articulate eachother's position -- then it's just true that the debate is not nonsense.

Really, so what is it to be wrong in such a debate and what is the definition of conciousness which is universally agreed on? — Pseudonym

Universal agreement? I'm sure you can find someone out there who will say "But that's not what it is!" -- but within the debate on consciousness it's very well defined, and takes some time to define -- but in shorthand consciousness is the fact that the world feels like something. Pizza tastes like pizza, and not nothing, or carrots. Brahms has a certain quality of sound. We experience the world and experiences feels like something.

To be wrong in the debate would be to take a false position. So an eliminative materialist will commonly say that such feeling is an illusion of the mind, or some such. If consciousness is an illusion of the mind, has no reality outside of this, then we'd say that all the sorts of beliefs that attempt to explain consciousness are false.

No, but if you want to reserve the ability to define some conversations as meaningless (gobbledegook), then you need some measure of meaningfulness, so what is your measure if it's not shared agreement on terms? — Pseudonym

This is a different standard than the one you previously proposed. You said there needed to be a metric for deciding correctness. Agreement on terms is exactly what I'm saying is needed. If two people can disagree while being able to explicate the position of who they disagree with then that's a good indicator that the terms are being used the same.

if two people arguing understand one another, and can articulate eachother's position -- then it's just true that the debate is not nonsense. — Moliere

That's what makes sense to me.

If two people can disagree while being able to explicate the position of who they disagree with then that's a good indicator that the terms are being used the same. — Moliere

I suppose a third person could come along and claim the disagreement is meaningless, as what happens in this thread. But then how do you decide whether the third person is right, or the other two are right that it's meaningful?

If one group claims a statement is meaningful, and another claims it is not, then what determines who's right? An argument about the definition of meaning? And what if there is no consensus on meaning?

It seems to me that the claim to meaninglessness tends to undermine itself.

I guess I'd just shrug and say, "You can't please everyone!" :D

So what I’m saying is that by concentrating on the aspects of metaphysics that recognisably relate to the Aristotelian tradition, then you do have at least a ‘domain of discourse’ within which their might be rational discussion. — Wayfarer

My mistake, I misinterpreted your use of the term 'concentrate'.

So, would it not then be true to say that the discourse is only rational to those who agree with the terminology and metric of sucess within that field? So, stating that universals have such and such properties would be meaningful to someone invested in the argument, but saying to a materialist that an Aristotlean metaphysical proposition "proves" that materialism is wrong must be meaningless, because the Aristotlean and the materialist do not agree on the meaning of the terms 'prove' and 'wrong' so how can they have meaningful discussion using them?

In front of me is a cup. It is made of paper and covered with wax. It is light blue with a black design. I say these as I consider “what” this cup is. I consider its nature. But at any time I can turn my attention away from “what” it is and consider the fact “that” it is. When I do I cease to consider its nature and consider instead ontology which is clearly metaphysical - meta ta physis.

To the left of this cup isn’t another identical cup. Now I can consider that the identical cup, by hypothesis matches exactly the nature of the first cup I described in all ways Nothing is different save that the second cup does not exist.

Carnap’s thought, and it’s decendents are absurd. (Consider Donald for example and his relationship with his suicidal brother, and unloving father, his interpretation that he has superior genetics)

Statements like Carnap’s are not as innocent as they seem for our biologies are possessed by powerful survival instincts. In fact there is a struggle between those who experience existence, and awareness of it, as itself the core value of a person, and those like Nietszhe, that attempt to define the good of a person by considering the nature of the person. There are very deep insights that are lost, and the loss was demonstrated in the attempt to suppress metaphysics. You can hear it even now at places like MIT. One must be “suspicious” of metaphysics. No my engineering friends, one must be suspicious, very suspicious, of the lack of metaphysics.

The idea that metaphysics is suspect is involved in religious issues like Maya, or the Catholic doctrine of original sin, the fallen-ness of man, or the forgetfulness of being described by Heidegger. It is not just a bad or incorrect idea - it is a kind of sickness of the mind and of the culture and ultimately of our biology.

So too satori, the sudden awakening of a person into awareness of existence, the attainment of enlightened awareness and associated ecstasy, the opposite of Carnap’s thinking in a sense, belies any claim to lack of meaningfulness.

Poor Wittgenstein! A monk trapped! The only things saving him his honesty, his art, his urge to poverty- “Tell them I had a wonderful life” to paraphrase his final words! Wonderful? If only that damn British dismissal had not taken root!

They have eyes but they do not see. You might say that of Carnap but not Wittgenstein, yet he remained trapped never realizing his potential! All because he lived before we realized the disaster of that thought!

There is no such thing as an "if-then fact"; there are if-then propositions — Janus

Janus must be referring to the fact that, Propositional Logic is (unsurprisingly) about propositions.

Propositional logic is about the relations among propositions. It speaks of (A --> B) as a proposition that is true unless A is true and B is false.

there are if-then propositions

Of course there are. And Propositional Logic discusses them, because propositions and their inter-relations are what Propositional Logic is about.

But Janus is confusing that topic with what "implication" means.

An implication is an implying. ...an implying of one proposition by another.

That's different from a proposition about an implying of one proposition by another.

If there's an implying of B by A, that's the same as saying that A implies B, and that there's a fact that A implies B.

Depending on how someone insists on definitional-quibbling, an implication of B by A is a fact (...in keeping with a definition of a fact as relation among things (like propositions), or as the possession of a property by one or more things). ...or someone could quibblingly say that the only fact there is the fact that A implies B (...instead of calling the implication of B by A a fact).

In case someone takes the latter interpretation, I often say "implication-fact" instead of "implication.+

I say that also to distinguish what I'm referring to from an implication-proposition, in case someone thinks that's what "implication" means.

But I've clarified that by "an implication of B by A", I mean also a fact that A implies B. ...and certainly not a proposition that A implies B.

propositions are not facts.

Indeed they aren't.

I'm amazed you're still going on about this,

Yes, you brought this up some time ago, and I answered it then. You should be amazed that you're re-cycling the same already-answered objection again.

Michael Ossipoff

Yes, and such debates are meaningless. — Pseudonym

I like now & then to quote Ramsey:

I think we realize too little how often our arguments are of the form:-- A.: "I went to Grantchester this afternoon." B: "No I didn't."

I think essences in the things themselves would be an alternative to Platonism, but it's not without it's own difficulties. So sure, what you said is a standard criticism of realism about universals. — Marchesk

"Essences in the things themselves" is basically Aristotle's alternative to Plato. I think the problem is that this idea tries to circumvent the relational nature of perception. It is again a thought-child of Aristotle's (understandably) naive realism. Generality is undeniably an element of perception; without generality we would not be able to perceive any particular as the the kind of thing it is, but the idea of essences wants to locate universals 'in' the naively real objects themselves, rather than in every part of the relationally real process of perception.

The process of perception presents a world of things and events, and this process is at once material, embodied and abstract; generality and particularity belong to every phase of the process. The process is a real process, a wholistic process, and it does not involve a disembodied mind trying to interact with or understand a separate world of physical objects.

I think this is the situation phenomenologically speaking. Metaphysical speculation as to what ultimately "lies behind" or provides the conditions of the possibility or, more importantly, the actuality, of this situation is not empirically decidable. I think that is really the issue; not that such speculation is meaningless, because it is obviously meaningful in that it involves using words and phrases that mean something to us; the issue is that it is undecidable. The mistake of the Logical Positivists was to conflate 'undecidable' with 'meaningful'.

I think that is really the issue; not that such speculation is meaningless, because it is obviously meaningful in that it involves using words and phrases that mean something to us; the issue is that it is undecidable. The mistake of the Logical Positivists was to conflate 'undecidable' with 'meaningful'. — Janus

That might be so. Colin McGinn postulated this is because we lack the cognitive makeup to answer such questions, although we can ask them somehow.

Better already exists as a comparison in language. There's no problem saying that MJ or LJ are better than the average player. You will get consensus on that. And better here means superior statistics, MVP awards and all-star selections, championships, and a general recognition of rare ability while watching a player play the game. — Marchesk

Right, so there's no debate, the one with the most of those things is better.

And so then people are free to choose what criteria they wish to use.

This isn't a matter of better being meaningless, it's rather imprecise and opinionated. — Marchesk

That's fine where there's some fuzzy, vague definition, almost all words are a bit fuzzy around the edges when you examine them. But in your example here your talking about real things (awards, championships etc). As I mentioned before, from Quine, it's the degree of fuzziness which makes propositions increasingly meaningless. There's no cut off point we can point to in the same way as no one can say how many grains of sand make a 'pile', but at some point the words become too vaguely defined for sentences containing them to carry any meaning.

It is again a thought-child of Aristotle's (understandably) naive realism. Generality is undeniably an element of perception; without generality we would not be able to perceive any particular as the the kind of thing it is, but the idea of essences wants to locate universals 'in' the naively real objects themselves, rather than in every part of the relationally real process of perception. — Janus

I don't think your analysis really comes to terms with Aristotle. The fact that you designate him a 'naive realist' speaks volumes. In fact, his analysis of the 'four causes' is precisely what has fallen out of modern epistemology, and, you will note, has had to be re-imported back into biosemiotics, because of the necessity of allowing for telos in the way organisms operate (which is why Apokrisis keeps saying that he allows for 'four causes' even if one of them just turns out to be thermodynamic necessity.)

So by all means, criticize hylomorphic dualism, but on the basis of what it actually is. I think trying to reconstruct the meaning of universals in the basis of sensations is never going to get there.

I'd say as long as both sides can articulate the other's then the propositions that two people are using to debate have meaning. So in the case of consciousness I can say what it would mean to believe in property dualism, eliminative materialism, epiphenomenalism, and panpsychism -- I know what the propositions are, and I know why I would argue for or against each of these. — Moliere

I'd argue that you don't. Being able to repeat the propositions and deriving any meaning from them are not the same thing.

if two people arguing understand one another, and can articulate each other's position -- then it's just true that the debate is not nonsense. — Moliere

Again, I'd ask what measure you're using to determine that the two people actually understand each other. Presumably, there has to be some metric, otherwise it would not be possible to misunderstand. The whole system of university education in philosophy would be pointless (a conclusion I'm inclined to agree with), there would be no sense to the term "you haven't understood X's position", and yet these are the mainstay of philosophical debate.

consciousness is the fact that the world feels like something. Pizza tastes like pizza, and not nothing, or carrots. Brahms has a certain quality of sound. We experience the world and experiences feels like something. — Moliere

Except for those who don't agree, like Churchland, Dennett, Rosenburg for whom conciousness is not that and we a re deluded into thinking that the world feels like something.

To be wrong in the debate would be to take a false position. So an eliminative materialist will commonly say that such feeling is an illusion of the mind, or some such. If consciousness is an illusion of the mind, has no reality outside of this, then we'd say that all the sorts of beliefs that attempt to explain consciousness are false. — Moliere

I'm not getting from this what you think 'wrong' is. You've just given a synonym 'false'. What actually is 'wrong/false'?

If two people can disagree while being able to explicate the position of who they disagree with then that's a good indicator that the terms are being used the same. — Moliere

I can disagree with your statement that "Unicorns have pink tails" by simply stating that "Unicorns have blue tails". At no point does my ability to do this indicate anything about my understanding of you use of the term 'Unicorn', all I did was construct a grammatically correct sentence with the term in it. All I needed to do that was to understand if the term was a noun or a verb, I don't need to understand anything of what you actually meant by it.

I like now & then to quote Ramsey:

I think we realize too little how often our arguments are of the form:-- A.: "I went to Grantchester this afternoon." B: "No I didn't." — Srap Tasmaner

That one is going on my list, thanks. Note (as I suspect you already have) that that quote comes not only from Ramsey talking about what isn't a discussion (presumably why you felt it pertinent), but also from talking about how most discussions claiming to be about Philosophy (in this case Ethics) are actually about psychology, which I think is also pertinent to the discussion about what has meaning...but then I would, wouldn't I?

So, would it not then be true to say that the discourse is only rational to those who agree with the terminology and metric of sucess within that field? So, stating that universals have such and such properties would be meaningful to someone invested in the argument, but saying to a materialist that an Aristotlean metaphysical proposition "proves" that materialism is wrong must be meaningless, because the Aristotlean and the materialist do not agree on the meaning of the terms 'prove' and 'wrong' so how can they have meaningful discussion using them? — Pseudonym

Just noticed this comment. Actually, that is pretty close to the mark. And that's why I am increasingly finding that more and more of the discussions I'm having are not about philosophy as such, so much as about the history of ideas (or even just history.) A lot of modern materialism has lost sight of why metaphysics was rejected or what it really meant to begin with. So concentrating on some themes in the metaphysics that originated with Aristotle, allows for, let's say, a meaningful discussion of metaphysics, rather than simply declaring that it's all so vague, the meaning so imponderable, that it simply can't be discussed. Although that does seem fairly close to what we might term your 'master thesis', does it not?

Within the Christian Church, it would be a meaningful discussion because all agree that the coherence with the words in the bible is the metric by which ideas are measured. But include a Muslim, or an atheist in the debate and it becomes meaningless, how are the Christian and the atheist going to analyse the ideas in any joint way?

So it is with metaphysics, there is no agreement among the participants in the discussion about what it is that measures 'rightness'. Even attempts to do so like coherence, consistency, simplicity are all far too vague to achieve anything. — Pseudonym

Going back to this comment - there was a lot of interaction between Islamic and Christian philosophers in the middle ages, and there are names, like Averroes and Avicenna, that are Muslim philosophers and commentators on Aristotle, whose influence is visible in Western thought (remembering that it was the Muslims who preserved Aristotle in the so-called Dark Ages). But introducing modern atheism does queer the pitch somewhat, as it is to all intents incommensurable as the underlying assumptions are so profoundly different to traditional metaphysics. But even so, understanding the history of the ideas, and how modern materialism developed historically from the earlier metaphysics, does help to clarify the philosophical issues.

The belief that the Universe is essentially mindless or lifeless matter~energy is profoundly different from both Christian and Islamic beliefs. Even though the latter two are vastly different [and indeed Catholicism is inclined to view Islam as a heresy], they are both theistic religions, so in that sense they have more in common than either of them do with scientific materialism.

The point I was trying to make, was that the word ‘metaphysics’ was coined in relation to Aristotle’s work in particular - and this is an historical fact. Now I don’t mean to say that, therefore, Aristotelian metaphysics comprises the entire subject, but I do think it is helpful to keep that in mind. Otherwise ‘metaphysics’ can become a catch-all phrase for all kinds of ideas and therefore quite susceptible to the criticism that I was responding to - namely, that metaphysics is impossible to define due to the vast diversity of views that it encompasses. Whereas there are some specific themes and ideas that originated with Aristotle and the Greek philosophical tradition, then subsequently adopted by both Christian and Islamic theology and philosophy, which do provide at least some common definitions and a recognisable domain of discourse.

[incidentally I have noticed an external course being run by Oxford on this very topic, which I am considering enrolling in for the next session.]

Since ancient times, there have always been atheist and materialist philosophers. However I think it’s fair to say that they didn’t comprise the mainstream of Western philosophy until modern times [if indeed they now do].

where does disagreement resides between theistic metaphysicians if not in their different conceptualisations of basic metaphysical terms? — Πετροκότσυφας

Islamic, Christian, and Hindu philosophers or teachers, might profoundly disagree about many points of doctrine, even on what is the 'nature of the divine' - whether to conceive of it as the divine person, or the Trinity, or the impersonal Brahman of the Hindus, and so on. But they agree that there is something corresponding to what is designated 'divine', about which they disagree. Whereas for atheism generally, there is nothing whatever that corresponds to that designation. It's an empty set. So whatever their disagreements are with the others, in their view, they're not even agreeing about what it is that they disagree about. Which is pretty close to where this thread started.

Except for those who don't agree, like Churchland, Dennett, Rosenburg for whom conciousness is not that and we a re deluded into thinking that the world feels like something. — Pseudonym

Is that somehow different from saying that consciousness is an illusion? And don't they understand the meaning of the word in responding like this?

Again, I'd ask what measure you're using to determine that the two people actually understand each other. Presumably, there has to be some metric, otherwise it would not be possible to misunderstand. The whole system of university education in philosophy would be pointless (a conclusion I'm inclined to agree with), there would be no sense to the term "you haven't understood X's position", and yet these are the mainstay of philosophical debate. — Pseudonym

What metric do you use to determine that a child has learned how to speak? Is there really some set of criteria you apply, or do you just understand the words being said?

Surely it's possible to be misunderstood. If you said consciousness was awareness, for instance, then in the debate on conscioussness you'd be using the term incorrectly.

I'm not getting from this what you think 'wrong' is. You've just given a synonym 'false'. What actually is 'wrong/false'? — Pseudonym

"Consciousness is an illusion" is true

Then the eliminative materialist is right.

"Consciousness is real" is true

Then the eliminative materialist is wrong.

I can disagree with your statement that "Unicorns have pink tails" by simply stating that "Unicorns have blue tails". At no point does my ability to do this indicate anything about my understanding of you use of the term 'Unicorn', all I did was construct a grammatically correct sentence with the term in it. All I needed to do that was to understand if the term was a noun or a verb, I don't need to understand anything of what you actually meant by it. — Pseudonym

So what?

This seems to be asking for some kind of apodeictic certainty in communication. Just because there is the possibility that someone doesn't understand a term, but only the grammar, doesn't mean that everyone using said term is in the same situation.

Consider the 5th postulate of geometry. The same would hold there. All that one would have to do is append a "not" in the appropriate place, and yet could get by without understanding the 5th postulate of geometry.

But surely the possibility of petulant students doesn't invalidate a field.

I can disagree with your statement that "Unicorns have pink tails" by simply stating that "Unicorns have blue tails". At no point does my ability to do this indicate anything about my understanding of you use of the term 'Unicorn' — Pseudonym

Come on! Unicorns aren't hard to understand, anymore than drgaons or wizards are. They're just fictional creations. That doesn't make them meaningless.

Now an Invisible Pink Unicorn has an inherent contradiction in what sort of thing it's supposed to be, so that falls under the umbrella of incoherency, which was the point of the term (to parody incoherent religious concepts). Just like a four sided triangle is an incoherent concept. But a triangle in a time travel story isn't incoherent, it's just part of a fictional story.

A meaningless debate might go something like this

"of shcrik in the water too"

"gavagai"

I have no idea what those terms mean. It is purely nonsense.

So given that standard I'd likely say there isn't such a thing, insofar that the words have meaning. — Moliere

It is true that accusations of "meaninglessness" (as well as some others, such as "incoherency") are often thrown around rather loosely. But, returning to the topic of the thread, you need to remember that Carnap was a positivist, and so he had stringent and, perhaps to our ear, rather idiosyncratic criteria of meaningfulness.

But let's not nitpick vocabulary. I think the idea in this particular instance is that some debates just lack substance and worth. Some - in fact, probably many - questions that have been mainstays of philosophy, and metaphysics in particular, are pseudo-questions.

My own approach when it comes to questions of ontology, debates over realism vs. nominalism, etc. is to ask, What is at stake? Why is this important? What difference in our worldview would one position make vs. the other? If it seems to me that nothing substantial is at stake, except perhaps minor differences in language, then I judge such questions to be - let's say "worthless," if you don't like "meaningless."