But you can't model the world predictively unless you are modelling the causes of its material patterns. That is what the mathematico-logical framework of a theory does. It describes a formal structure of entailment. — apokrisis

All that is required is to model the patterns, run the model, and it will hand you the prediction directly derived from the patterns. Why would you need to know anything about the causes of the patterns? Making claims concerning the causes would just be speculation.

Why would you need to know anything about the causes of the patterns? — Metaphysician Undercover

You mean, the pattern of the causes?

Let's get real. What do you even mean by "cause" here? What is your model of "a cause" - the "true" one?

The OP started as a discussion of the Aristotelian model of how to break down the holism of substantial actuality in some generically useful fashion. That is what leads towards the necessity of four "becauses". And as I've often mentioned, that reduces to a general model of holism based on an systems-style interaction between top-down acting constraints, or boundary conditions, and bottom-up constructing degrees of freedom, or initial conditions. A causal story composed of generals and particulars.

So we can contrast, in a broad sense, between an atomistic model of causality and a more properly holistic representation of reality. One model is larger and more comprehensive than the other. The other is matchingly more compact and less work.

Where do you think your "true story on causality" fits into this metaphysical analysis of nature's underlying causal structure?

You mean, the pattern of the causes? — apokrisis

No, it's a pattern of events, occurrences, observed appearances.

Let's get real. What do you even mean by "cause" here? What is your model of "a cause" - the "true" one? — apokrisis

I wasn't talking about cause, I was talking about prediction; and specifically, the contrast between seeking to produce a capacity to predict, and seeking to know the truth.

We model a pattern of events, based on observed appearances, and produce predictions. There is no need to concern ourselves with "cause" when we are seeking to produce models with the capacity to predict. You've introduced that word "cause" as an obfuscation, so don't ask me what I mean by it.

No, it's a pattern of events, occurrences, observed appearances. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, there might be a bunch of events. But you are talking about a pattern. And to even think there is a pattern is to hypothesise the existence of some set of relations, some explanatory form of connection sufficient to produce an observed regularity. A generic cause, in short.

Positing a Platonic idea or exemplar implies, for example, that some individuals are more human (better reflect the exemplar) than others. This can only foster prejudice and injustice. — Dfpolis

Well now, I am not a Platonist by any stretch, but this is unfair. The most obvious Platonic take on humanity would be that some individuals are closer to the human ideal (which, I suppose, would be Christ in Christian neo-Platonic philosophy). That's not so "fascist," is it?

some individuals are closer to the human ideal — SophistiCat

Yes, those individuals being Greek, male, and - serendipitous delight! - philosophers. Animals, females, slaves, labourers, and foreigners all being unsurprisingly not all that close to the 'human ideal': "The philosopher maintains his closeness to the divine, moving upward in the scale of beings, while men who fail in the effort of philosophy are punished by becoming women in their second lives. No woman can be a philosopher; she must wait until after death, when her soul might be reincarnated in the body of a man. In a descending ladder of creation, Plato lays out the structure of the kosmos. Just as in the myth of the metals, difference is defined in terms of relative value, and of progressive estrangement from the good. The Greek male citizen is no longer at the center surrounded by "others;" as the philosopher, he stands at the top of the chain of being, closest to the divine and to immortality. As the man of gold, the best, the aristos, he rules over all who live in the republic.

...The male sex is assimilated to the divine part of the soul; men, like that divine soul, must be protected from the miasma, the pollution represented by women. That worse part of the soul, likened to women, is superior to the worse of the body, which is like an animal .... Anger and appetite, bestiality and women, are metaphorically associated here.... Women, like slaves, like animals, are by their nature inferior; each is in varying degrees deprived of proximity to the divine. The fantastic creation myth of the Timaeus, which establishes the creation of various creatures in order, according to the behavior of the soul in its first incarnation, justifies the hierarchization of kinds in the present. Within the state, as within the body, appetite, anger, female, slave, animal, must be restrained and excluded from the places where decisions are made" (Dubois, Centaurs and Amazons).

2000 years later and we still treat this shitstain of a philosopher as authoritative.

Again, there might be a bunch of events. But you are talking about a pattern. And to even think there is a pattern is to hypothesise the existence of some set of relations, some explanatory form of connection sufficient to produce an observed regularity. A generic cause, in short. — apokrisis

This is just the typical theist/atheist debate. The theist sees order in the universe and claims there must be a cause of it and concludes God. The atheist claims no need to assume a cause of order, it could simply "emerge", or come about by random chance. Since the atheist perspective is the one accepted in science, there is no need to assume a cause of the observed regularity, in order to do the science. Questions concerning "the cause" are speculative.



So, you take one paragraph from a philosopher who wrote volumes, and refer to this to judge him as a shitstain of a philosopher. That's a wonderful example of your capacity for unbiased judgement of philosophy. Do you recognize that these myths were Timaeus' account, not Plato's, and that they were presented by Timaeus as myths? In the referred passage, the unruly part in men ((the sexual drive) was being compared to the unruly part in women. "The very same causes operate in women" 91b. In The Republic, in which Socrates discusses the ideal, just state, it is insisted that men and women must be socially equal in communal living.

Prior to this time, men, rather than women, were those seen as seeking power, as well as having power, and therefore social status. If the men have power, then the women are subjugated. In Timaeus' myth, the desire for power had been associated with the male sex drive, and therefore proper to men rather than women. It was perceived as natural that men have power over women. But Timaeus puts an end to the segregation enhanced by this myth. "This is why, of course, the male genitals are unruly and self-willed, like an animal that will not be subject to reason and, driven crazy by its desires, seeks to overpower everything else. The very same causes operate in women." 91b.

So, you take one paragraph from a philosopher who wrote volumes, and refer to this to judge him as a shitstain of a philosopher. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not at all. I quoted a representative study of Plato's thought. And yes, Plato's philosophy is full of just those kinds of retrospectively ratiocinated origin myths, which he variously pulls out of his arse to justify and pseudo-rationalize his usually awful opinions on just about everything.

Why continue stating falsities? — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it false to say that what motivates a scientist may not be what motivates those funding her research? Based on personal experience, I would say not. My interest in physics was always to come to a fundamental understanding of nature -- to know, purely for the sake of knowing. Funders have their own reasons. Sometimes, as with the funding of colliders and space telescopes, they do not expect any short-term return on investment. Other times they do.

the predictive capacity of the model does not rely on knowing that certain things are true. — Metaphysician Undercover

I beg to differ. I suspect that our difference is not on facts, but on our understanding of "truth." I said in my original post in this thread, "Following Isaac ben Israel and Aquinas, I take truth to be the adequacy (not correspondence) of what is in the mind to reality." I went on to explain that adequacy is an analogous term. What is adequate to one need may be inadequate to another.

Since Thales succeeded in his goal of predicting the eclipse, clearly his understanding of astronomic cycles, of his place in those cycles and of the relevant mathematics was adequate to the reality of concern to him (when the eclipse would occur). So, by definition, his knowledge was true. If he had an inadequate knowledge of astronomical cycles, his place in them, or the relevant mathematics, his knowledge would have been inadequate and so false.

You seem to fault Thales for supporting geocentrism. I think this is based on facts not in evidence; however, let's assume he did. How did his belief in geocentrism make his knowledge inadequate to the requirements of eclipse prediction? It did not. The fact is that the Ptolemaic model provided more accurate predictions than the heliocentric model throughout the 18th century -- up until La Place published his Celestial Mechanics.

Go ahead, insist that there is no such thing as "truth" in this matter, declare that it's all reference dependent, you are only arguing against your own claim that we need to know that certain things are true. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're not grasping what I'm saying. Going back to Isaac ben Solomon Israeli (ca. 855–955), and seconded by Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), truth has been defined as the adequatio (approach to equality) between intellect and reality. Approach to equality is not a univocal concept, but depends on our contextual need. How close to reality do our mental representations need to be? Close enough for the purpose at hand -- a concept reflected by the modern term "adequacy."

So, I'm not saying there is no truth about frames of reference. Rather, many frames can give adequate representations. (Remember, frames of reference are not aspects of nature, but means of representation -- just as quantum phenomena can be represented by matrices or wave equations.) Still, some frames are more adequate to specific needs than others. Thus, in the 18th c, the Ptolemy's geocentric model was more adequate to prediction, while the Newton's heliocentric model was more adequate to the dynamics.

the "reality" of what is being modeled depends on the model. — Metaphysician Undercover

This misunderstands of one of the central insights of 20th c. physics: Features that depend on our choice of representation are not features of nature. For example, there is nothing wrong with assuming the earth is at rest, or the center of the universe, as long as we recognize that these things are subjective choices rather than physical facts.

How can there be a veridical appearance when how things appear depends on the frame of reference? — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are misunderstanding. Appearances (phenomena) do not depend on what frame of reference we choose -- mathematical representations do. Phenomena are aspects of how the cosmos acts on us. It is only after the cosmos has acted on us (or our instruments), when we describe the data mathematically, that we choose a frame of reference. There is nothing irrevocable in the choice -- we can transform data represented in one frame into another frame whenever we want.

I am not a Platonist by any stretch, but this is unfair — SophistiCat

If there is an ideal, an exemplar human being, then that exemplar is male or female, of some particular race, introverted or extroverted, attracted to men or women, masculine or feminine in demeanor, etc. Those who lack one or more of these qualities are less than the ideal -- defective with respect to it. That can only be a basis for prejudice. We saw this kind of prejudice in 19th century slave holders who posited that blacks we not fully human; in Nazis who thought Jews, Poles and homosexuals sub-human; and in those contemporary Americans who seek to deny human rights and entry to the "inferior races" who come to the southern border -- even going so far as to steal their children.

So, no, this is not "unfair."

Is it false to say that what motivates a scientist may not be what motivates those funding her research? — Dfpolis

No. but what the scientist does is in accordance with what the funders want or else the funding would not be there.

I beg to differ. I suspect that our difference is not on facts, but on our understanding of "truth." I said in my original post in this thread, "Following Isaac ben Israel and Aquinas, I take truth to be the adequacy (not correspondence) of what is in the mind to reality." I went on to explain that adequacy is an analogous term. What is adequate to one need may be inadequate to another. — Dfpolis

I've never heard "truth" defined in this pragmatic way, such that "truth' is reduced to adequacy. The following statement, "I take truth to be the adequacy of what is in the mind to reality." is nonsensical. You are denying correspondence, so "adequate correspondence to reality" is denied. All that is left is to assume "adequate" in the sense of providing acceptable principles for actions, for dealing with reality. But that's usefulness, pragmatism, which is totally distinct from truth. Truth has to do with the way that reality is, not the way that we deal with reality. That is the subject of ethics, the way that we deal with reality. So you've taken truth from what is, to what ought to be.

But OK, I'm ready to accept your pragmatic definition of truth, as a premise, for the sake of argument. Let's proceed.

So, I'm not saying there is no truth about frames of reference. Rather, many frames can give adequate representations. (Remember, frames of reference are not aspects of nature, but means of representation -- just as quantum phenomena can be represented by matrices or wave equations.) Still, some frames are more adequate to specific needs than others. Thus, in the 18th c, the Ptolemy's geocentric model was more adequate to prediction, while the Newton's heliocentric model was more adequate to the dynamics. — Dfpolis

Now, as you say, frames of reference are means of representation. However, you also say that they are not aspects of nature. Frames of reference are real things, but not part of nature. They are artificial, and this sets them apart from being natural. Do you agree that we can judge various frames of reference according to their adequacy? And, since frames of reference are representations, as you say, we can judge how adequate they are for this purpose, representing. I'm not talking about adequate for prediction, or adequate for any other purpose, except for the purpose of representing. So, despite the fact that different frames of reference may give adequate representations for different needs, the fact remains that they are being used to provide representations, and they might still be judged on their capacity to provide representation, in general. And this would be the highest judgement brought to bear on those representations because the best representation overall would be the most useful. Isn't this just a judgement of correspondence? The judgement of "most adequate", in the sense of a representation, is a judgement of correspondence.

Again, you are misunderstanding. Appearances (phenomena) do not depend on what frame of reference we choose -- mathematical representations do. Phenomena are aspects of how the cosmos acts on us. — Dfpolis

This is all confused. As "phenomena" is how we perceive the cosmos through means of our senses. We cannot jump across the gap between how we perceive the cosmos, and what is acting on us, to assume that phenomena is what is acting on us.

It is only after the cosmos has acted on us (or our instruments), when we describe the data mathematically, that we choose a frame of reference. — Dfpolis

This is wrong as well. We, as sensing human beings have already inherent within us a perspective form which we observe. And if we choose to use instruments as our means of observation, a 'frame of reference" is inherent within the composition and calibration of the instruments.

Again, I have no interest in defending Plato's own views (I am, frankly, not all that interested in what his views were, although I do have some idea along the lines of the gloss that you give here). Progenitors and namesakes of ideas don't own the ideas. Newton, who by all accounts was a very disagreeable person and had some wacky ideas, doesn't own Newtonian mechanics. And Plato doesn't own Platonism, which is what was originally at issue here. And although, again, I have little sympathy with the philosophy, I also dislike this uncharitable smear. You literally Godwined the discussion!

If there is an ideal, an exemplar human being, then that exemplar is male or female, of some particular race, introverted or extroverted, attracted to men or women, masculine or feminine in demeanor, etc. — Dfpolis

Not necessarily. One can abstract all these details, leaving only essentials. Whatever those essential may be, they may reasonably exclude all the things that you list here. I am not going to play Plato's advocate here - there are plenty of good ones out there (present company excluded, unfortunately); I am only calling for charity and intellectual honesty.

I don't really believe that these ideas are separable from 'Plato's views' (on women, on slaves, on foreigners), as though an amendment or rider tacked-on at the end. Credit given where credit's due, Platonic metaphysics is so enduring precisely on account of its rigorous internal consistency in which the entire metaphysical edifice is built in order to affect such exclusions and subordinations so as to justify them. The invocation of Newtonian mechanics is simply disanalogous here - the mechanics does not 'build-in' chauvinism from the get-go, whereas Plato's entire system, right down to it's very poetics and use of imagery, is orientated and premised on the naturalization of ancient Greek prejudices arrogated to the status of metaphysical grandeur (Page Dubois* and Adriana Cavarero are among the best documenters of this that I know).

And while I understand that one speaks nowadays of Platoism-about-this-or-that, in ways different from Plato himself, these Ideas are compromised right at the level of their form, and not merely their content. They were built, from the bottom-up, to stigmatize and dominate, regardless of the many attempts - over millennia - to simply rejig and redesignate the objects of such stipulated inferiority. The model is broken, not merely the parameters.

*PD: "The social conflicts of the fourth century, the greater dependence on slavery, after a decline at the end of the Peloponnesian War, made [Plato's] attempt to justify and rationalize the social relationships of the polis comprehensible. Difference had invaded and disrupted the city, and was acknowledged and almost despaired of by Euripides. Plato's response to the presence of difference was to look even more deeply inward and to justify the differences within the city in terms of an attribute of the citizen, logos. The Greek male human being thus reconstructed his notion of the world; the dominance of the citizen, the philosopher, was justified not in terms of autarkeia, but rather in terms of inevitable and natural superiority. The contradictory position of women, in which they were both objects of exchange necessary for the reproduction of the city, and outsiders, bestial and irrational, was also rationalized in a new way. Women were associated with the body, which was inferior to the mind; thus they, like the body, served the soul, the head, the philosopher, the male".

I've never heard "truth" defined in this pragmatic way, such that "truth' is reduced to adequacy. The following statement, "I take truth to be the adequacy of what is in the mind to reality." is nonsensical. You are denying correspondence, so "adequate correspondence to reality" is denied. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am sorry that you've never heard of the definition used by the most prominent medieval metaphysician.

I fail to see why adequacy is in the least "nonsensical."

You seem confused. If we are discussing metaphysics, only the most precise statements are adequate. If we are discussing singulars, then adequacy and correspondence come to the same thing. However, while correspondence does not work for negations or universal propositions, adequacy does. It also works for teaching. When we begin teaching a subject, we can't possibly teach all the complexities we know, Instead, we teach the students something suitable to their level of understanding -- something adequate. Doing so is not lying, but advancing them in true knowledge. Teaching Newtonian physics is not teaching falsehoods. Nor does teaching relativistic quantum field theory give students an understanding fully corresponding to reality.

It is only if you take "truth" as naming something unattainable by humans that one can avoid the notion of adequacy. I see "truth" as applying to what humans actually know, not a Platonic ideal. What we actually know is always limited, not exhaustive, but generally adequate to the needs of the lived world.

The problem with pragmatism is that it works in some cases, but not for the whole range of cases. If I don't know how to shoe a horse, I can't shoe a horse. Thus, true knowledge of horseshoeing is knowledge adequate to shoeing a horse. In the same way, true knowledge with respect to God's existence is adequate to deciding the reality of God's existence -- something that may have no pragmatic consequences. So, if our need is practical (to control being), adequacy approximates pragmatism. If our need is theoretical (to know being), adequacy is unrelated to pragmatism, being closer to correspondence.

The judgement of "most adequate", in the sense of a representation, is a judgement of correspondence. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what you are thinking of as corresponding to what in the discussion of frames of reference. It is the case (correspondence) that if the universe has an overall curvature, a Euclidean frame of reference would be inadequate to represent it. Is that what you are thinking of?

Let me say again, I'm not rejecting correspondence when it works. I'm saying that it only works in a limited number of cases (e.g., not for negations or universals as no real thing corresponds to either) while adequacy works in all the cases I know and becomes correspondence in some cases.

As "phenomena" is how we perceive the cosmos through means of our senses. We cannot jump across the gap between how we perceive the cosmos, and what is acting on us, to assume that phenomena is what is acting on us. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not saying that a phenomenon is acting on us. I am saying that a phenomenon is some aspect of the cosmos acting on us. How can we perceive an apple unless it scatters light into our eyes, pushes back when we touch it, or emits a scent? Clearly, if an object can't act on us, it can't change our neural state to form a sensory representation. The object's action on the subject informs the subject's representation of the object.

We, as sensing human beings have already inherent within us a perspective form which we observe — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we have a perspective -- a standpoint from which we observe. But, a standpoint is not a frame of reference. We may be on a train and yet chose a frame that is anchored in the world (so we see ourselves as moving) or we may anchor our frame in ourselves as resting, and see the world as moving. Neither is predetermined by what we observe (the phenomena).

Not necessarily. One can abstract all these details, leaving only essentials. — SophistiCat

One may, but then one has no adequate plan for creating an individual. Where does the other information (the things you wish to abstract away) come from? Remember, the role of the ideal is to explain the intelligibility of the individuals we observe.

In the Timaeus Plato is quite explicit about the relation of the Ideal to individuals, saying that individualization is the result of the Ideal making an imperfect impression in matter, as a seal makes an impression in wax. Thus, explicitly, all individuality is imperfection.

I am sorry that you've never heard of the definition used by the most prominent medieval metaphysician. — Dfpolis

I've read a lot of Aquinas and have yet to see where he defines truth as adequacy. Aristotle taught in his Nicomachean Ethics, that there is differing degrees of certainty which are proper to the different fields of study, such that ethics doesn't obtain the same degree of certainty that science does. Is this what you mean?

You seem confused. If we are discussing metaphysics, only the most precise statements are adequate. If we are discussing singulars, then adequacy and correspondence come to the same thing. However, while correspondence does not work for negations or universal propositions, adequacy does. It also works for teaching. When we begin teaching a subject, we can't possibly teach all the complexities we know, Instead, we teach the students something suitable to their level of understanding -- something adequate. Doing so is not lying, but advancing them in true knowledge. Teaching Newtonian physics is not teaching falsehoods. Nor does teaching relativistic quantum field theory give students an understanding fully corresponding to reality. — Dfpolis

Teaching is giving instruction on how to do something, method. So of course what is going to be taught is adequacy. But unless one utilizes deceit, this has nothing to do with lying. And although one may apply a method in an attempt to determine truth, truth is not the method itself. So I still don't see how you equate adequacy, which refers to method, with truth, which refers to how things are.

It is only if you take "truth" as naming something unattainable by humans that one can avoid the notion of adequacy. I see "truth" as applying to what humans actually know, not a Platonic ideal. What we actually know is always limited, not exhaustive, but generally adequate to the needs of the lived world. — Dfpolis

Well that's your problem right here then. You are trying to lower truth from an ideal, so what remains is adequacy. The problem is that "truth" really means something other than adequacy so all you are really left with is a compromised sense of "truth", a bogus definition. You have a definition of "truth" which is adequate for you, and your purposes, but it's not acceptable to me because I see that you've compromised the ideal. What good is such a definition?

Let me say again, I'm not rejecting correspondence when it works. I'm saying that it only works in a limited number of cases (e.g., not for negations or universals as no real thing corresponds to either) while adequacy works in all the cases I know and becomes correspondence in some cases. — Dfpolis

I don't see what you are talking about in rejecting correspondence in the sense of truth "for negations or universals". Let's take the universal "triangle" for example. Do you not believe that there is a real definition of "triangle", such that if I were to give a definition of triangle, it must correspond to that real definition of triangle in order to be a correct definition? Isn't this the case with all universals? Any definition or description of the universal must correspond with the real concept in order that it be a true definition.

This is why I say your definition of "truth" is bogus. it doesn't correspond with the real definition of truth, it's one you just made up to suit your purpose. You'd say that if a definition is adequate for the purpose intended, then it is true. But I can see past this simple form of sophistry to know that this would allow anyone to make a logical argument proving any conclusion they desired, simply by designing the definitions which are adequate for the purpose of proving the conclusion they desired.

I don't really believe that these ideas are separable from 'Plato's views' — StreetlightX

I do, and apparently so do other philosophers who took up the idea. I am not buying this primordial taint line.

*PD: "The social conflicts of the fourth century, the greater dependence on slavery, after a decline at the end of the Peloponnesian War, made [Plato's] attempt to justify and rationalize the social relationships of the polis comprehensible. Difference had invaded and disrupted the city, and was acknowledged and almost despaired of by Euripides. Plato's response to the presence of difference was to look even more deeply inward and to justify the differences within the city in terms of an attribute of the citizen, logos. The Greek male human being thus reconstructed his notion of the world; the dominance of the citizen, the philosopher, was justified not in terms of autarkeia, but rather in terms of inevitable and natural superiority. The contradictory position of women, in which they were both objects of exchange necessary for the reproduction of the city, and outsiders, bestial and irrational, was also rationalized in a new way. Women were associated with the body, which was inferior to the mind; thus they, like the body, served the soul, the head, the philosopher, the male". — StreetlightX

Or perhaps Plato's attitude towards women was simply due to his preference for boys. You know, I have little regard for such speculative sociopsychology.

One may, but then one has no adequate plan for creating an individual. Where does the other information (the things you wish to abstract away) come from? Remember, the role of the ideal is to explain the intelligibility of the individuals we observe. — Dfpolis

The role of the ideal is to identify an essence of an individual thing, separating it from other, inessential qualities, but what that essence is in any particular case is arguable. One may claim that the essence of humankind is not bound up with race or gender, just as when we identify some object as a chair, say, we abstract away a lot of the things that would be required to create the individual chair, like its precise shape and size and material and manufacturer. Or something like this. You should rather take this up with a competent Platonist.

One may, but then one has no adequate plan for creating an individual. Where does the other information (the things you wish to abstract away) come from? Remember, the role of the ideal is to explain the intelligibility of the individuals we observe.

In the Timaeus Plato is quite explicit about the relation of the Ideal to individuals, saying that individualization is the result of the Ideal making an imperfect impression in matter, as a seal makes an impression in wax. Thus, explicitly, all individuality is imperfection. — Dfpolis

There seems to be a disconnect here between "creating an individual", and, "the intelligibility of the individuals", as these two are quite distinct. I think that this is the heart of the problem which Aristotle tried to deal with. His law of identity "a thing is the same as itself" is meant to bring the individual into the realm of intelligibility, when prior to this law of identity, the individual was seen as a material object, something "sensible" in Plato's terminology, therefore distinct from intelligible as Plato imposed a division between the sensible and the intelligible.

One may claim that the essence of humankind is not bound up with race or gender, just as when we identify some object as a chair, say, we abstract away a lot of the things that would be required to create the individual chair, like its precise shape and size and material and manufacturer. Or something like this. You should rather take this up with a competent Platonist. — SophistiCat

This is an example of identity in the faulty sense, the sense identified by Aristotle as being vulnerable to the sophist's abuse. When you identify an object as "a chair", it is identified according to a universal, and this does not give it an identity as an individual. It is a faulty form, of identity because it allows that numerous different things have the same identity, and this may be utilized in sophistry. So Aristotle introduced his law of identity which applies to the particular, recognizing the particular for what it is, and providing the basis for identity of the individual.

I have little regard for such speculative sociopsychology. — SophistiCat

The recognition that a philosophy is of its time is hardly 'speculative sociopsychology'; it's an effort to stave off the supreme naivety of thinking that philosophical systems spring forth from the good graces of capital-R Reason (or atomized and inscrutable individual desires for that matter) as if the weight of history and context of society were merely an inconvenience or hobbyist's curiosity. That others have unthinkingly inherited - despite every reason not to - the terms in which Plato defines his inquiries - stopping only to squabble over things like which essence is the right one, as opposed to rejecting as maleficent the entire idea of essences (understood Platonically) - makes them more and not less complicit in the ethical failures of Platonism.

The role of the ideal is to identify an essence of an individual thing, separating it from other, inessential qualities, but what that essence is in any particular case is arguable. — SophistiCat

I agree that this is a possible version of Platonism, even though it is not that of Plato in the Timaeus. Clearly, this version can avoid my criticism of making some people more fully human than others. Still, depending on the imagined nature of the Ideal, it may remain subject to that criticism.

Still, I can see no reason to support the existence of Platonic ideals of this or any type. They are not needed to explain the existence of universal ideas in individual minds, as the ability to abstract (to focus on certain notes of comprehension to the exclusion of others) is adequate for ideogenesis. Nor are ideals required to explain how many individuals can instantiate the same universal. Shared dynamics and/or common ancestry suffice for that. The old problem of how many individuals can participate in one Ideal remains unsolved.

I've read a lot of Aquinas and have yet to see where he defines truth as adequacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Its kind of hard to miss if you've read much Aquinas in Latin. De Veritate q.1, a.11, resp: "alio modo diffinitur secundum id in quo formaliter ratio veri perficitur, et sic dicit Ysaac quod Veritas est adequatio rei cum intellectus". Q.1.a.1: "Isaac dicit in libro De definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus." Summa Theologiae I, q.16., a.2. a.3: "Isaac dicit in libro De definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus." In I Sententiarum, d.19, q.5.a.1; Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 59; "Veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei"

As I said, adaequatio means "approach to equality" (according to McKeon) Translators sometimes say "agreement," but the Latin is telling. He does not say aequatio (equality) as would be expected if he meant correspondence, but "approach to equality," which leaves open the question: how close we need to be to be speaking truth? It seems clear that we need to be close enough not to mislead our audience, and that depends both on the audience and the context. So, I have chosen the English cognate of adaequatio, "adequacy," to express this.

So I still don't see how you equate adequacy, which refers to method, with truth, which refers to how things are — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not applying "adequacy" to method, but to the need implicit in the context of discourse. Arguably, we all want to know the truth. As reality is virtually inexhaustible, no amount of abstract thought or verbal discourse is going to give a full account of the reality being considered. So, no "truth" can fully correspond to reality. Nonetheless, we can have an account that is adequate to the needs implicit in our reflection or discourse. I'm saying that such an account qualifies as true.

All I'm doing is defining truth so it can actually be found in finite minds. I fully agree with Aristotle when he said that when we say what is, is, or what is not, is not, we are speaking the truth. The only difference is recognizing the impossibility of grasping "what is" exhaustively. What we know may not be exhaustive, but it can be adequate.

You are trying to lower truth from an ideal, so what remains is adequacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have a definition of "truth" which is adequate for you, and your purposes, but it's not acceptable to me because I see that you've compromised the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. When I assert "God is Truth," I'm accepting the ideal. I'm not sullying the ideal by recognizing that humans will never have truth as God has truth. Following Aquinas, I recognize "truth" as an analogous, not a univocal term. It is analogous by an analogy of proportionality -- true discourse is proportioned to the needs imposed by its context

Do you not believe that there is a real definition of "triangle", such that if I were to give a definition of triangle, it must correspond to that real definition of triangle in order to be a correct definition? — Metaphysician Undercover

. Human truth is partial, not exhaustive. It approaches (adaequatio) reality -- it is not reality as God's Truth is.

You may define your terms as you wish, but if you set the standard of truth so high that no limited mind can attain it, you rule out logical (salve veritate) discourse amongst humans. I am unwilling to do that.

Do you not believe that there is a real definition of "triangle", such that if I were to give a definition of triangle, it must correspond to that real definition of triangle in order to be a correct definition? Isn't this the case with all universals? Any definition or description of the universal must correspond with the real concept in order that it be a true definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know that we have a concept <triangle> that is evoked when we encounter actual triangles. I also know that the term "triangle" is a linguistic convention for expressing the concept <triangle>. So, if we want people to understand us when we utter "triangle," we need to define the term so it reflects the concept. Is that what you mean by the "real definition"?

In discussing truth I'm primarily considering what is in the mind and how it relates to reality. I'm only considering language to the extent that it expresses what is in our minds. Suppose I have a universal concept, <triangle>. There is no Platonic Triangle corresponding to it. There are many real and potential objects that have three straight, joined sides and so the objective capacity to evoke the concept <triangle>. The concept does not "correspond" to these real and potential objects -- there is no one-to-one mapping. Some of these objects don't even have actual existence. Still, my <triangle> concept is perfectly adequate to my needs in thinking about triangles.

this would allow anyone to make a logical argument proving any conclusion they desired, simply by designing the definitions which are adequate for the purpose of proving the conclusion they desired. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're forgetting the terms joined by "adequacy": "Veritas est adaequatio] intellectus et rei" -- truth is the adequacy of intellect to reality. I'm not talking about what's adequate to win an argument, but what's an adequate to reality (rei).

Slaveowners in the US did not justify themselves with Plato, but instead with Locke and Bentham.

Oh, man, don't get me started on liberalism ("Liberalism, the most dogged enemy of freedom" - Domenico Losurdo) :vomit:

There seems to be a disconnect here between "creating an individual", and, "the intelligibility of the individuals", as these two are quite distinct. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, they are distinct, but they are related. In the Timaeus Plato is trying to explain the existence of multiple instances of the same universal -- say <man>. He thinks that matter is entirely unintelligible, so all intelligibility has to come from Form (Ideals). Still, in some vague way, individual differences arise from "defects of the matter" as different impressions impressions of the same seal in wax might differ due to impurities.

So, in his system, you can't instantiate an intelligible individual with a partially specified form. Nor is it clear how you can instantiate different intelligibilities without different forms. All you can do to explain how individuals differ is to say they are defective images of the Form.

That is rather the whole point: unbelief was the point of departure, so belief is the only point of return. — Galuchat

I am interested in the tectonics, so to speak. It is expressed outwardly in terms of belief and unbelief, but they're outer manifestations of a deeper, inward shift that is the metaphysical or metacognitive. But one consequence is that unbelief is that it generally dictates what kinds of ideas will be considered or what lines of research to consider.

Certain kinds of ideas can't be accomodated with the naturalistic framework that is taken for granted in secular culture and so are bracketed out of consideration on those grounds. This happens on a cultural level - it is not just a matter of individual choice. But it is implicitly enforced through what kinds of ideas will be considered in peer-reviewed science journals, and so on; what amounts to 'a scientific attitude' and what doesn't.

Science speaks to the pragmatics of a modelling relation with the world. — apokrisis

Which is fine from the perspective of engineering. Semiotics allows for much more realistic modelling of the behaviours of life and mind.

Whereas, philosophy as I conceive it, is about a shift in first-person perspective. This no doubt will be categorised as 'romantic' or 'theological' or whatever. I did study religion from both anthropological and sociological perspectives and found some things of value in those perspectives. But to say that these perspectives 'explain' religion, again, can't be anything other than reductionist, as it is saying that the rationale is other than, and less than, what its devotees understand it to be. Science-as-religion, again.

[Plato] thinks that matter is entirely unintelligible... — Dfpolis

Because the testimony of sense is inherently unreliable, right? That mathematical and geometric ideas are know-able in a way that objects of perception are not, because they are grasped directly the intellect in a way that material particulars cannot be. Which was to develop, much later, into the basis of Aristotle's hylomorphic dualism.

Certain kinds of ideas can't be accomodated with the naturalistic framework that is taken for granted in secular culture and so are bracketed out of consideration on those grounds. This happens on a cultural level - it is not just a matter of individual choice. But it is implicitly enforced through what kinds of ideas will be considered in peer-reviewed science journals, and so on; what amounts to 'a scientific attitude' and what doesn't. — Wayfarer

I think this is true only to a small extent, and in extremis. What you say about peer-reviewed science journals may be true to a degree, and would seem to be perfectly appropriate for science journals. I think if there are restrictions on what gets published they would have more to do with politics and funding than metaphysical concerns.

In any case such constraints are not significantly the case when it comes to philosophy. Today's philosophical landscape is vast and wide-ranging, more so than ever in the past.It may well be true that moden and so-called post-modern philosophy is predominately of a nominalistic cast, but then it is up to realists of the various stripes to present more convincing arguments to turn the tide. Merely complaining about or pointing out the situation won't make any difference.

You’re prettty adept at complaining, yourself. :smile:

You might be right, but, if so, I can't for the life of me think of what it is that I complain about. Hopefully you'll be able to point it out for me. :smile:

Depends on what you mean by "liberalism". There are many 'liberalisms'. Idea or historical practice?

Its kind of hard to miss if you've read much Aquinas in Latin. De Veritate q.1, a.11, resp: "alio modo diffinitur secundum id in quo formaliter ratio veri perficitur, et sic dicit Ysaac quod Veritas est adequatio rei cum intellectus". Q.1.a.1: "Isaac dicit in libro De definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus." Summa Theologiae I, q.16., a.2. a.3: "Isaac dicit in libro De definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus." In I Sententiarum, d.19, q.5.a.1; Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 59; "Veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei" — Dfpolis

I think you're a little out of whack with your references. I'll verify Summa Theologica Q16, a2 for you. The quote is taken from the objections. My translation "Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions , that truth is the equation of thought and thing."

So in the main article, Aquinas goes on to say "Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing."

"Has the likeness of the thing known", sounds like correspondence to me. How do you interpret this as "adequacy'?

As I said, adaequatio means "approach to equality" (according to McKeon) Translators sometimes say "agreement," but the Latin is telling. He does not say aequatio (equality) as would be expected if he meant correspondence, but "approach to equality," which leaves open the question: how close we need to be to be speaking truth? It seems clear that we need to be close enough not to mislead our audience, and that depends both on the audience and the context. So, I have chosen the English cognate of adaequatio, "adequacy," to express this. — Dfpolis

As you can see, my translation is "equation" of thought and thing. And you say that some translate this as "agreement". And you have chosen "adequacy". Clearly it's a bogus translation you offer. Furthermore, this quote is what Isaac says, and Aquinas raises it as an objection, and the article is concerning something different, the relationship between intellect and truth. The quote is taken right out of context, by you, and given an unacceptable translation.

So, no "truth" can fully correspond to reality. Nonetheless, we can have an account that is adequate to the needs implicit in our reflection or discourse. I'm saying that such an account qualifies as true. — Dfpolis

This is completely unacceptable. You are saying that since we cannot have correspondence in a complete, and perfect way, then lets just settle for something less than that, and call this "truth" instead. Anything which is adequate for the purpose at hand, we'll just say it's the truth.

Human truth is partial, not exhaustive. It approaches (adaequatio) reality -- it is not reality as God's Truth is. — Dfpolis

More evidence of bogus translation here. "Adequatio" cannot be translated as "approaches". These have completely different meaning. The problem with your perspective is quite clear. We cannot say that "God's Truth" is different from human truth. What you are claiming is nonsense. The truth is the truth, and if human truth is different from God's Truth, how could anyone claim that it's the truth. What you're putting forward is completely nonsensical.

You may define your terms as you wish, but if you set the standard of truth so high that no limited mind can attain it, you rule out logical (salve veritate) discourse amongst humans. I am unwilling to do that. — Dfpolis

Do you not recognize that there is a difference between valid logic and truth? Valid logic does not necessitate truth, so nothing prevents us from doing logic when it's not necessarily the truth which we are obtaining with that logic. It is already presupposed that logic does not necessitate truth. So we continue with our logical activities regardless of this, and the lack of truth does not rule out logical discourse as you claim. That's nonsense just like most of the rest of what you are claiming.

Suppose I have a universal concept, <triangle>. There is no Platonic Triangle corresponding to it. — Dfpolis

On what basis do you make this assertion? If there is not some independent idea of triangle, which your concept must correspond with, then you could make your concept however you please. If there are some rules which you must follow in your conception, then why aren't these rules an independent part of reality, like the Platonic idea? Consider that when scientists like physicists produce the laws of physics, there is something real, independent, which must be followed when producing these laws. The laws must correspond with reality. So why wouldn't the laws for conceiving a triangle be the same as the laws for conceiving of physical reality, they must correspond with reality?

You're forgetting the terms joined by "adequacy": "Veritas est adaequatio] intellectus et rei" -- truth is the adequacy of intellect to reality. I'm not talking about what's adequate to win an argument, but what's an adequate to reality (rei). — Dfpolis

Nonsensical. What's "an adequate to reality". Seems you're having difficulty covering up your bogus translation.