Ok, so my point is that a propositions being true is not the very same thing as a propositions being verifiable; there are, of course, verifiable falsehoods... — Banno


He's saying that a statement is true iff it can be verified as true (and presumably false iff it can be verified as false). — Michael

Well, Michael understood the point and even pointed it out to you.

I doubt that I have missed much. — Banno

You actually don't know whether you have missed much, or what you might have missed, now do you? Perhaps open your mind up a little to other possibilities beyond your apparently fixed views...?

Ah. you are here - that might help clean things up.

So, I'm defending a minimalist view of truth. I gather you want truth to involve verification.

IS that a start?

OK, I want to say that a proposition is not true because it is verifiable; it is verifiable or falsifiable because it is truth-apt. The other point is that it makes no sense to say that a proposition is true unless it is verified; but "verified" here simply means that we have no reason to doubt its truth. We have to leave open the possibility that that could change.

The problem with what seems to be your absolutist view is that you seem to hold that a proposition could be true and yet never ever be known to be true. The question then would be as to what could make it true. Put it another way, do you want to say that there could have been true propositions if humans had never existed, or could be true propositions after humans are extinct?

This is a difficult topic to talk about coherently to be sure!

it is verifiable or falsifiable because it is truth-apt. — Janus

But Godel showed that there are truths that cannot be proven within a given system. Hence, there are unverifiable truths.

The other point is that it makes no sense to say that a proposition is true unless it is verified; — Janus

I think your "...it makes no sense to say that a proposition is true..." here hides that you are adopting an attitude towards the proposition. That is, you have stoped talking about truth, and moved on to talking about belief.

Are truths confined to just one system then? The other point is that axioms are not truths, but absolute presuppositions or regulative assumptions. If they can't be proven, then on what basis can you claim they are truths? Are you taking refuge in Kant's notion of the absolute truth of the a priori?

I think your "...it makes no sense to say..." here hides that you are adopting an attitude towards the proposition. That is, you have stoped talking about truth, and moved on to talking about belief. — Banno

Not at all. I am saying that although of course we could be wrong about the truth of any proposition it makes no sense to say that a proposition is true unless it is verified to the best of our current ability. To say that we believe it is true is the same as to say that it is true, is it not? Of course, saying that it is true does not entail that it is true.

There is no contradiction to this unless we take an absolutist view of truth. An absolutist view is really a correspondence view, and the logic of a deflationary view such as Tarski's is really no different, even though it purports to abjure metaphysics and confine itself to semantics.

let’s follow the argument, then.

So given a system that is capable of arithmetic, there are truths that cannot be deduced.

Perhaps we might discover such a truth by building a second system that talks about the first, and can display for us the unproven truth in the first system.

So now we have a new system, consisting of the first and the second systems combined. And we know that there are truths in this third system that cannot be proven within that system.

So we have a regress in which there are always unproven truths.

But if we take all the possible systems, this entire heirachy - then we must have all the truths defined musn’t we? But that would be yet another system; and hence there would be truths unprovable even in that setup. Cantor's diagonal strikes again.

Could one argue that natural languages somehow bypass this approach? Well, this post is in a natural language, one in which we talk about such systems, so it appears that natural languages contain all these proposed systems. I don't see a way out - do you?

I am saying that although of course we could be wrong about the truth of any proposition it makes no sense to say that a proposition is true unless it is verified to the best of our current ability. — Janus

Sure. And I am saying that is wrong. I don't see that there is any such relationship between truth and proof. That is certainly the case in formal systems, as mentioned above, and it's the contention of philosophers since ancient Greece. What is an axiom if not an unverified truth?

And hinge propositions or bedrock propositions or whatever you wish to call them, are unverified truths.

What is an axiom if not an unverified truth?

And hinge propositions or bedrock propositions or whatever you wish to call them, are unverified truths. — Banno

How do you know they are truths if you have no way to verify them? When, and if, you can verify an axiom, hinge proposition, absolute presupposition, regulative assumption or whatever you want to call it, it will cease to be such, and will become, for all intents and purposes, a true proposition; true that is; until and unless it is later demonstrated to be false.

S0, I am saying there are only truths for us, because reality is reality only relative to us. This is not to say that it completely depends on us, though; we do not invent it; we are constrained by the given. You still haven't attempted to answer my question as to whether there were true propositions before the advent of humanity, or whether there will be after humanity is extinct.

You still haven't attempted to answer my question as to whether there were true propositions before the advent of humanity, or whether there will be after humanity is extinct. — Janus

I've answered it so many times I've lost track.Some here may remember the chairs at the end of the universe. But I hadn't noticed you asking it. If I had, I would probably not bothered to reply to your other posts.

SO did a triceratops have three horns?

How do you know they are truths if you have no way to verify them? — Janus

Again, knowing that some proposition is true is not the same as that proposition's being true.

SO did a triceratops have three horns? — Banno

Probably, but what relevance does that have? If we say it is true that the triceratops had three horns that is because we have evidence to support that contention. Perhaps it would help if you explained what you think the relevance of this question to the argument is.

Again, knowing that some proposition is true is not the same as that proposition's being true. — Banno

Again, that's irrelevant. The question was about how you can claim that an axiom is a truth (as opposed to an assumption or stipulation we work with) if you cannot demonstrate that it is true, and/ or have no actual evidence that it is true.

What could it mean for a proposition to be true completely independent of any good reason that anyone might have to think it is true? If something were true completely independently of us knowing it is true or justifiably thinking it is true, what could that even mean?

What would make it true, in other words? Perhaps you are going to say that actuality would make it true, but then how would its truth differ from its actuality? And how would this differ from the correspondence theory of the naive realist?

And you have still failed to answer the most salient question, which is: Could there be true propositions if there were no one to think them? You keep evading this, I suspect because you know it is fatal to your absolutist position. The long and short of it is that for your position to be coherent and consistent you need God, and I suspect from past experience that is not acceptable to you.

You still haven't attempted to answer my question as to whether there were true propositions before the advent of humanity, or whether there will be after humanity is extinct.
— Janus

SO did a triceratops have three horns? — Banno

Probably, but what relevance does that have? — Janus

:grimace:

Probably — Janus

Failure to commit is a common symptom of antirealism. Do you suffer that affliction?

Again, knowing that some proposition is true is not the same as that proposition's being true.
— Banno

Again, that's irrelevant. — Janus

But that's the very point on which we disagree.

DO you agree that some proposition's being true is not the same as Janus knowing that the proposition is true?

If you don't, then this would be a basic disagreement between us, and further discussion would be pointless. You would simply be using words incorrectly.

If you do, then your contention that propositions can only be true if verified fails.

The only out I could see for you is to go back to something like Meta's position:

The group of words can be interpreted in different ways, and can be true or false depending on the interpretation. The proposition is, as you say, always already an interpretation. So this interpretation, which comprises the proposition, must be always already verified as the correct interpretation. Therefore there cannot be an unverified true proposition. The proposition is by its very nature already verified, and it is only by means of this "verified correct interpretation" that it may be true or false. — Metaphysician Undercover

But do you really want to do that?

Failure to commit is a common symptom of antirealism. Do you suffer that affliction? — Banno

You appear to be arguing in bad faith, now. The above ad hominem coupled with your continued attempts to distort my arguments, and your failure to attempt to address telling questions against your position convinces me that you are not serious. So we'll leave it there.

You appear to be arguing in bad faith, now. — Janus

If you like.

But did you answer the question

DO you agree that some proposition's being true is not the same as Janus knowing that the proposition is true? — Banno

I've asked it a few times, and I don't recall seeing your answer. SO that sort of comment cuts both ways.

Let's go back a few steps:

...a proposition is only true if it would be verified as true after exhaustive inquiry. — Janus

...knowing that some proposition is true is not the same as that proposition's being true. — Banno

The question is, how could these two proposals be compatible?

The only out I could see for you is to go back to something like Meta's position: — Banno

See, my position avoids the problems of yours (the need for a true interpretation), and the problems of Janus' as well (the disrespected distinction between being true and being judged as true). It really is the only out.

Is some one arguing that verifying an idea makes the idea true? Wouldn't that be called truthing? I submit that truthing is not a word.

Verification: the processor instance of establishing the truth or validity of something.

The question is whether something can be true without this verification process which establishes that it is true. It is very similar to the question of justification. Some argue that a belief can be justified without a process of justification. It is not the same question though, because "true" is not the same as "justified". So the process which establishes "truth" is not necessarily the same process as the process which establishes "justified". Since "verification" can refer to one or the other, the process which establishes truth, or the process which establishes justification, the Banno and Janus discussion reflects a failure to separate these two.

Janus seems to confuse justified with true, and Banno argues that a proposition can be true without any act of verification which would justify the proposition. But Banno doesn't seem to recognize that an act of verification, perhaps a different sort of verification, is required in order that a proposition may be true.

Perhaps. I find your position incomprehensible.

But Banno doesn't seem to recognize that an act of verification, perhaps a different sort of verification, is required in order that a proposition may be true. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here you appear to be using "verification" for some form of interpretation - so are you saying that in order to be true a proposition must be understood? How would that be different from saying that in order to be true a proposition must be a proposition?

Hence, I do not understand your point.

Apparently there is:
The action of speaking or acting in accordance with the truth.

Janus seems to confuse justified with true — Metaphysician Undercover

Not at all; I have explained many times now to apparently little avail, considering Banno's responses (only Michael seems to have understood) that I consider being justified as equivalent to being counted as true. Would it makes sense to say that we count anything as true without justification?

[

Here you appear to be using "verification" for some form of interpretation - so are you saying that in order to be true a proposition must be understood? How would that be different from saying that in order to be true a proposition must be a proposition?

Hence, I do not understand your point. — Banno

Yes, in order to be true a proposition must be understood. Under your definition of "proposition" though, a proposition must have a special type of understanding, a shared understanding. But this is impossible because understanding is not the type of thing which a person shares with another. My understanding is mine, and yours is yours. So propositions as they exist, are not "propositions" according to your definition.

So we're right back to the same place we were. And I think you really do understand my point or else you wouldn't have demonstrated it so succinctly with your post.

Here's an issue relative to the "history of metaphysics" . There is a trend in modern metaphysics to define words in unorthodox ways. So for example we have earlier in the thread Collingwood's definition of "presupposition" which allows for an "absolute presupposition", and here, your definition of "proposition". Then the unorthodox definition is use to support a metaphysical position. The problem is that the definition doesn't reflect the real use of the word, so the "presuppositions", or in this case "propositions", which are described are articles of fiction, they are not the presuppositions or propositions which are talked about in normal discourse. So the metaphysics supported by the arguments which utilize the fictional definitions are simply illusions, they do not reflect reality. That's bad metaphysics.

Not at all; I have explained many times now to apparently little avail, considering Banno's responses (only Michael seems to have understood) that I count being justified as equivalent to being counted as true. — Janus

That's exactly what I said, you confuse justified with true. Here you just admitted so much by saying that you count being justified as equivalent to being true. Therefore you see no difference between being justified and being true.

Would it makes sense to say that we count anything as true without justification? — Janus

Yes, it does make sense to say that. I think we often say that we believe something is true without being able to justify why we believe it is true. This is the case with intuition, it inclines one to believe in the truth of something without justification for that belief.

But this is impossible because understanding is not the type of thing which a person shares with another. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not so. As everyday conversation demonstrates, we do share such understandings.

That's exactly what I said, you confuse justified with true. Here you just admitted so much by saying that you count being justified as equivalent to being true. Therefore you see no difference between being justified and being true. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not unless you think "counted as true" is equivalent to 'true'; which I don't.

Yes, it does make sense to say that. I think we often say that we believe something is true without being able to justify why we believe it is true. This is the case with intuition, it inclines one to believe in the truth of something without justification for that belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you think it's OK to believe things without having any rational justification for doing so? If that's true, then why bother trying to practice philosophy at all? You can just believe whatever you feel like, without worrying about whether those beliefs are justified at all.

So you think it's OK to believe things without having any rational justification for doing so — Janus

If every truth must have a justification, which will you choose - infinite regress or circularity?

You seem to be taking an atomistic, rather than a holistic, view of justification. As Quine points out particular beliefs are justified within the context of our whole current web of beliefs. Looking at justification holistically avoids the atomistic chains of regress or circularity.

And again you seem to have failed to notice (just like MU) that I did not say that every truth requires a justification, but that everything we count as being true requires justification. Can you not understand that distinction?