How does a belief become well-grounded in the absence of actively manifesting language. — javra
The act of justification is when a speaker provides the ground for his/her belief statement to another person. — creativesoul
It is validly inferred from pre-existing true belief, actual events, the way things are, and/or some combination thereof. — creativesoul
The act of justification is when a speaker provides the ground for his/her belief statement to another person.
— creativesoul
In my previous post I addressed what I intended by the term "to justify" as process and "justification" as an instance of this process. The concept I have in mind and have described does not require language--thought it also applies to linguistic expressions. And, so far, I have no better term for it than that of "justify/justification". I won't rewrite it, but its there. — javra
Linguistically, when asked, "how do you justify X?" what is typically asked is, "what are your reasons for believing X to be true?"... ...if reasoning is provided among us linguistic beings and if the reasoning is found valid, then the believed truth is then deemed to be justified--or, as I previously addressed, is "evidenced to be just/correct/right". — javra
...if reasoning is provided among us linguistic beings and if the reasoning is found valid, the belief is then deemed to be justified--or, as I previously addressed, is "evidenced to be just/correct/right". — javra
Intelligent animals and toddlers don't provide the reasoning for their beliefs to themselves or to others; of course not; they have no language by which to do so. But they can infer, reason, all the same. And via their inference their beliefs can be well grounded or not.
I guess what I'm driving at is that well-grounded-ness is always itself fallible, never infallible/absolute.This is what makes surprises possible in intelligent beings. As well as learning by trial and error.
In due measure with intelligence there are reasons--inferences--held for certain beliefs being maintained. And it is this reasoning that I'm currently terming "justification"--again, the evidencing of being just/correct/right. — javra
How does a belief become well-grounded in the absence of actively manifesting language.
— javra
The same way it does within language use. It is validly inferred from pre-existing true belief, actual events, the way things are/were, and/or some combination thereof. — creativesoul
How then do you believe this non-linguistic valid inference is different from “[non-linguistically] evidencing [that concerned] to be just/correct/right”? — javra
If I’m not mistaken, seems like our primary disagreements are over the words that should be properly used. And that no proper words exist for the intended concepts. To me, however, this is not to say that the concepts are lacking or that they’re not well-grounded, to use your semantics. — javra
If they are well-grounded, then these currently ineffable (?) concepts do relate to the thread’s contents; this by illustrating how linguistic justification can be a more advanced, abstracted form of what occurs in pre-/non-linguistic intelligent beings so as to result in “well-grounded beliefs”. But it’s hard to debate most of this if the concepts are not understood via the words used. So, presently, I’m contingently planning on backing out of this discussion.
As to the criteria for “evidencing” … again, this would get deeper into interpretations of mind than I’d like. I’ll try though: that which evidences is that which suggests the truth of. One might object in that non-linguistic beings lack our linguistic concept of truth. Clearly they lack any account of what truth is; yet, again, for lack of better terms that are ready present, I uphold they do have understandings of that which conforms to reality, i.e. of that which is true.
I’ll provide an example (there are far better ones when it comes to lesser animals, such as those pertaining to great apes, but keeping this sufficiently common): a person’s petting a dog on the back typically evidences the person’s affection toward the dog to the dog. The dog’s memories of being petted will then evidence to the dog that the person who pets him holds affection for him. The data here non-linguistically justifies the given belief-that (haven’t yet come up with a novel term for the concept, though). — javra
I thoroughly enjoy critiquing others' and my own writings, and do appreciate valid objections. I seek them out, in fact, often. Unfortunately, they're few to be found hereabouts. That said, you didn't elaborate upon one, but hinted at it. I agree with the sentiment about some saying that valid inference requires language use. I could probably make that argument against my claim. Kudos. — creativesoul
Best advice I can offer follows from a translation technique I like to use when folk are using terms in a way unfamiliar to myself. We can replace the term with it's definition in every instance of use. If the overall writing still makes sense, then it's an acceptable manner of speaking. — creativesoul
The bit above regarding justification being a more advanced form of what occurs in pre-linguistic and/or non-linguistic creatures is not at all problematic for me. In fact, it would have to be that way, or similarly so, if my own position is right. — creativesoul
It seems that you're using this notion of 'evidencing' as a manner of talking about sufficient reason to believe... or warrant. It's commonly called "ground" for belief. Seems like nothing is lost if we swap "evidenced" and "justifies" with "grounded" and/or "warrants"... — creativesoul
What I was hinting at leads back to the way all languages I’m very familiar with (roughly, two: English and the other one being largely Latin based, Romanian) are structured. They very often presuppose linguistic capacity in the cognitive attributes they specify. In a way this makes a great deal of sense: we’re addressing these concepts to ourselves, not to non-linguistic creatures. In another way, to my mind, it handicaps philosophical enquiries into what is by predisposing our abstract thought to limit itself to that realm of linguistically-dependent cognitive givens. Add to this ego-centeredness and the anthropocentrism that naturally ensues in light of the problem of other minds and, to me, there’s something of a near universal cultural bias that obfuscates the way we, humans, contemplate all things pertaining to mind, most especially non-human minds. (And, for fairness, on the other side of the isle there’s the occasional character that believes lesser animals are just as aware of things as humans are, the anthropomorphizing crowd. Me, I’m stuck somewhere in the middle between what I deem to be these two, to me not very well-grounded, extremes.) — javra
For example, we deem that one must first understand what “validity” and “inference” point to as words prior to being capable of engaging in valid inferences—for how can one engage in valid inferences (further complicated by the sometimes very formal structures we associate with them) when one does not know what the language-demarcated concepts are? — javra
I too find myself between these two extremes:The one side denying any and all non linguistic thought and belief based upon an utterly inadequate framework that sorely neglects to draw and maintain a meaningful distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief; and the other side neglecting to draw and maintain the equally crucial distinctions necessary for taking proper account of the complexity of belief. — creativesoul
No, not a straw man: Why do you appraise it as nonsense—this if it is a believed truth that is justified to the satisfaction of its bearers? — javra
...if there’s something more specific that you’d like to address in terms of the capacity to reason among more intelligent non-linguistic beings, let me know what it is. Also, to the extent we differ in this just addressed outlook, I wouldn't mind finding out how. — javra
I’m currently interpreting the following to be in line with your outlook, and since it fits into the thread’s subject:
I’ve come to understand belief as the content to that which is trusted to be (including to have been and to will be). I’ve also come to find at least three categories for trust: trust-that (trusting that X in fact is; e.g. trusting that the earth beneath one’s feet is solid); trust-in (roughly, trusting that X can or will do Y; e.g. trusting in Ted’s capacity to do well in a marathon despite the uncertainty to this); and trust-between (roughly, trust existing between two or more agencies as pertains to implicitly maintained contractual obligations; e.g. Alice’s trust that Bill will not deceive her). “To believe” is to me then fully synonymous in all instances with “to trust”.
Curious to know what criticism of this overall proposition could be offered. (I’ve addressed one potential criticism below) — javra
Thus understood, though, to believe is other than to think—for the latter requires connections made between givens whereas the former a) does not and b) is a prerequisite to thought’s occurrence (each associated given must be trusted in some way prior to associations between them being made). — javra
I cannot be convinced that a language less creature is capable of believing/trusting that the earth beneath it's feet is solid, unless that belief can be formed by virtue of a language-less creature drawing correlations between different things(including but not limited to itself), and all of those things exist in their entirety prior to being part of the creature's correlation. — creativesoul
Here you've invoked the need for trust/belief prior to associations between things. I replace trust/belief with presupposing the existence thereof. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content regardless of subsequent further qualification(s). That would be the presupposition of correspondence to fact/reality inherent to all belief. — creativesoul
The way I’ve asked the question, “if it’s a believed truth that is justified (or warranted) to the satisfaction of its bearers”, then intends to get at more significant examples of knowledge. — javra
My reason for presenting it in the way that I did was, largely, to illustrate the difference between justified / well-grounded beliefs (in the latter example) and those that are not (in the first example). — javra
As I’ve indicated in my previous posts on this thread, all our held beliefs of what is true are—I argue—susceptible to error, hence to being wrong. Though this in no way entails that they are. Until they’re falsified in so being, there’s no reason to believe that they are wrong. — javra
Don't you have to torture the meaning of "justified" in order to maintain this position?" By saying to the satisfaction of its bearers" it seems to erase justification's implied rational characteristics. — Cheshire
And the result of this trespass is a new variable. The 'Grounding'; which feels nice intuitively, but have we solved a problem here or created one? What does a belief alone mean to us now? The answers given randomly to binary questions, but held without discern-able reason?
No sir, you put justification back where you found it and play with your own toys. — Cheshire
Why should you believe that in all the things you know at least one is a mistake? I would maintain you accept it based on the law of identity. — Cheshire
I think there's reason to be certain at least some of them are wrong and by trying to falsify our beliefs we eliminate our errors and our knowledge improves or specifically becomes a better approximation to ideal knowledge. Without this assumption of unknown error we are left guarding beliefs when we should be testing them. It's a subtle, but significant difference in positions. — Cheshire
Don’t know if you’ve been keeping track of the conversations on the thread; I added the “grounded” part due to them. For simplicity of argument, however, I’ve no issue with sticking to the concept of “justification” as traditionally understood. — javra
Can rational justification be infallible, i.e. perfectly secure form all possible error? I don’t believe it can. This does lead into a major quandary in philosophy, but, if its untrue, can anyone here supply evidence of an infallible justification (e.g., such that all premises and means of justifying are themselves evidenced to be perfectly secure from all possible error)? — javra
Otherwise, it seems to me that all justification will be deemed sufficient for its intended purposes when it satisfies those for which the justification is provided (be it one’s own self or others to which its expressed). — javra
So the issue of how and when knowledge is deemed to be, such as in relation to the examples previously provided, still remains. — javra
You’d have to explain this better for me to understand. Are you alluding to the law of noncontradiction? — javra
As stated, I can find this disposition warranted. Nevertheless, what I was attempting to emphasize is that there’s no need to become paranoid about being wrong about any particular upheld known—not until there’s some evidenced reason to start believing it is, or at least might be, wrong. But yes, remaining at least somewhat open to the possibility is part and parcel of the epistemological stance I maintain: fallibilism (or, a specific form of global skepticism that, unlike Cartesian skepticism, is not doubt-contingent). — javra
Rational justification doesn't imply infallibility, so falling short of infallibility does not leave a thing unjustified. — Cheshire
And here lies the issue I have and repeat. All justification can not be said to be sufficient based on the criteria of any given audience. Can it appear as such? certainly, but this is no fault of the concept of justification. An argument can't said to be justified because of who is judging it. — Cheshire
I don't find justification to be the best measuring stick for the quality of knowledge. So, I'm a bit indifferent to how well somethings been justified. I would rather know that it had been criticized and remained unfalsified. — Cheshire
No, I probably could try to; but I was alluding to the third law of thought. "What is, is." The fact you posses an unknown error in your knowledge is simply a matter of being human subject to error. — Cheshire
I'm really just skipping the middle man and suggesting our definition of knowledge falls short of reality. Because either our apprehension of what is true or our justification for what is true will be subject to error so long as we are human. I think we nearly agree. — Cheshire
Here's a crucial point in which we disagree: that our awareness of what is ontic is liable to error does not then entail that there is nothing ontic. — javra
I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability. — Cheshire
Simply put, objective truth may be possible, but knowing when it occurs might not be. — Cheshire
The wisest is who knows that he knows nothing. — Blue Lux
Once there was a man --
Oh, so wise!
In all drink
He detected the bitter,
And in all touch
He found the sting.
At last he cried thus:
"There is nothing --
No life,
No joy,
No pain --
There is nothing save opinion,
And opinion be damned." — Stephen Crane
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.