I might even be wrong in my own appraisal of myself (I'm not, but it's possible) — TheWillowOfDarkness
You are limited to your nature for the simple reason that you cannot be more than you are (and just in case you misunderstand this, that does not mean that you cannot in the future be more than you are now). — John
This is a downright contradiction; if you might be wrong about yourself then you have no warrant to say that you are not wrong about yourself. — John
My mistake, I must have misunderstood. Can something be intuitive and falsifiable?It's not really apt to say that I have "admitted that maths is intuitive" since I never claimed otherwise. — John
but that it is, within the limits of our definitions, (and what else do we have to work with?) verifiable as I described. — John
Ought from is:
She is a firefighter.
Therefore she ought to do whatever a firefighter ought to do.
This works because a firefighter is defined functionally. There is a function characteristic of a firefighter, and this is what it is to be a firefighter (telos and nature are one).
Or does it work? Discuss... — jamalrob
How you describing "verifiable" in that case? It looks like you must mean, "it agrees with my intuition."
I think the swan analogy does work.
Q: How do you know all swans are white? A:We checked them all.
Q: How do you know that 2+2=4? A:Every time I perform the calculation, I get the same answer. — anonymous66
She is a firefighter.
Therefore she ought to do whatever a firefighter ought to do.
This works because a firefighter is defined functionally. There is a function characteristic of a firefighter, and this is what it is to be a firefighter (telos and nature are one). — Unenlightened
And your example seems to have force because we do not define firefighters functionally. I have fought a fire, but I have never been a firefighter, because that is a matter of uniform, training, qualification, etc. And because one can wear the uniform and ride on the fire-engine and not do what one ought to do, the conclusion has moral force and does not follow from the premise. — unenlightened
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings on observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason shou'd be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the reader; and am perswaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar system of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.
Ought from is:
She is a firefighter.
Therefore she ought to do whatever a firefighter ought to do.
This works because a firefighter is defined functionally. There is a function characteristic of a firefighter, and this is what it is to be a firefighter (telos and nature are one).
Or does it work? Discuss... — jamalrob
Saying that I would also say that moral realism could still be argued for using your approach. But I think that by pursuing the ought/is distinction you'd also be handicapping your account. Working from memory here I thought that was exactly what was so strong about After Virtue; he was calling into question the whole distinction by means of going back to Aristotle and pointing out that our concepts don't need to have this distinction, that it is, after all, a distinction (as opposed to a reality).
One could almost say that we understand "fact" in relation to our understanding of "value" -- that the latter defines the former, and the former the latter. So to speak of moral facts is to smash these together, but by using the language of the very distinction which is being put into question. — Moliere
Anyway. Facts are true statements. Moral statements are treated as if they are truth apt.
For all practical purposes, true moral statements are facts. — Mongrel
She is a firefighter.
Therefore she ought to do whatever a firefighter ought to do.
This works because a firefighter is defined functionally. There is a function characteristic of a firefighter, and this is what it is to be a firefighter (telos and nature are one).
Or does it work? Discuss... — jamalrob
I'm saying that I'm not so sure that moral facts are too weird to be true. — anonymous66
I bet you cannot come up with any hypothetical scenario that could falsify it. — John
Hmmm. I don't know. Aren't you put in the position of just saying, "every time we test it, it works?" But, I haven't read anything by Imre Lakatos.I also want to add that, as I think I already said, mathematical theorems can certainly be falsified. — John
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