So he's accepting the logical possibility that any "falsification" is mistaken, just as the realist might accept the logical possibility of solipsism or skepticism, but it doesn't then follow that he rejects falsification, just as it doesn't then follow that the realist rejects the veracity of our everyday perceptions and beliefs. — Michael
Again, provide the full context: — Michael
I admit, a conventionalist might say [your emphasis], that the theoretical systems of the natural sciences are not verifiable, but I assert [my emphasis] that they are not falsifiable either. — Popper
But if your expertise in Popper matched your expertise in physics, then you would know that, according to Popper, it is logically impossible to falsify any theory. — tom
"If you insist on strict proof (or strict disproof) in the empirical sciences, you will never benefit from experience, and never learn how wrong you are." — tom
It is not the 'local' (here, now) claims of hypotheses and/or theories which are not verifiable in principle; it is global or universal (everywhere, always) claims that are not verifiable. The 'local' claims may be either verified or falsified, but the global claims may only be falsified. — John
As I tried to make clear in 1934 (L.Sc.D., p34 ; and sections 10 and 11), I do not regard methodology as an empirical discipline, to be tested, perhaps, by the facts of the history of science. It is, rather, a philosophical - a metaphysical - discipline, perhaps partly even a normative proposal. It is largely based on metaphysical realism and the logic of the situation: the situation of a scientist probing into the unknown reality behind the appearances, and anxious to learn from mistakes
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.