It might be a problem for predicate logic. But that already presumes the existence of definite particulars as part of its axiomatisation. That is what the principle of identity is about. Starting off with that as the assumption already granted. — apokrisis
Should ontology limit itself to that kind of atomistic or nominalistic reasoning? Why would you think so? — apokrisis
The thing identified by the law of identity is not necessarily particular, but when we apply that law to the sense world, — Metaphysician Undercover
But if it were the case that all things were united as one, "the universe" this would falsify relativity theories because it would mean that there is an absolute frame of reference. — Metaphysician Undercover
But identity is necessary for any logic to proceed — Metaphysician Undercover
I emphasize the unknown and say this implies we should be agnostic about those points. — Relativist
OK. But I am talking physicalism. There is no room for a Platonic world where forms exist as universals. Universality would be what emerges from the inevitability of certain overarching structures ... the structures that can bring stable formal constraint to material uncertainty, per the OP. — apokrisis
No. It just says spacetime ain't absolute. And we already know that. The container is shaped by its contents. So the next step for physical theory has to be one that includes energy and gravity into the fundamental level description. — apokrisis
Structural realism says that the absoluteness, the unity, is to be found in that relation, somehow.
Spacetime doesn't have some inherent fixed order. That organisation emerges in reciprocal fashion from a relation that exists between energy density and spacetime curvature. So it is about the absoluteness of the three fundamental Planck constants, and the essentially dimensionless web of relations they then weave. — apokrisis
Even if this were the case, the issue would be how do you produce that identity - the particularity that is what it is to be individuated in a physicalist realm of spacetime and energy? If you are concerned with ontology, you can't simply just claim identity as a brute fact of existence. And so OSR - piggybacking on condensed matter physics - can offer a theory of how identity can arise as localised acts of individuation. — apokrisis
.”Materialists think that all of Reality consists of the physical world.” — Michael Ossipoff
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Structuralists would take an expanded view of physicalism - one in which information becomes part of the picture. A context or history is the information that bears down to constrain the possibilities of what might happen at some locale.
.So it is Wheeler's "it from bit". Materialism believes that substantial, already in-formed, matter sits at the bottom of physical existence. An informational or constraints-based ontology flips it around so that the material is whatever is left as a concrete possibility after a context has restricted its variety.
.”It recognizes that there’s no reason to believe that experience isn’t the fundamental reality of the describable world.” — Michael Ossipoff
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If your idealism rejects physicalism,…
.…then you won't have any interest in OSR as a species of physicalism.
.As I say, I don't take idealism seriously. It's a joke.
.And It has nothing to do with the OP. So it is off topic.
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