But not all games are played by rules that are set and clearly defined. Sometimes the rules are made as we go along by some kind of consent and agreement. There are no rules that stand as the rules for making rules. In addition, the existing rules may no longer be adequate when something new is learned, as in the case of quantum mechanics, where the Newtonian rules do not apply. — Fooloso4
I think that the method provides no principles for judging correct and incorrect . — Metaphysician Undercover
There are a couple of issues with this; firstly, why would you be so concerned that a method provide principles for strictly judging correct from incorrect? I mean, what's the goal here. Is it just so that we can enjoy policing language users who've 'got it wrong'? What use would we put such a rule to if we found one? — Isaac
That is the full description of their 'learning a rule'. — Isaac
3. Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system. And one has to say this in many cases where the question arises "Is this an appropriate description or not?" The answer is: "Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe." — Wittgenstein
Which leads me to the third point. The reason why Wittgenstein writes the way he does is widely considered to be his solution to this very problem. He's trying to get us to see something which actually cannot be said, it can only be shown. He's not constructing a watertight argument in logic, because there is no such thing. He's pointing out things which should lead us to 'see' what he's trying to show. Rather like someone trying to point out the beauty of a sunset by gesture alone, it's not going to work unless you're looking where he's looking. — Isaac
Is he saying that what was referred to as a paradigm, in 55, "something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning", actually exists in memory? — Metaphysician Undercover
Or what does he mean by "comparable" with a paradigm? — Metaphysician Undercover
He seems to say at 55 that an object cannot be such a paradigm because the name can still have meaning without the object … — Metaphysician Undercover
He starts the quoted phrase by saying: “When we forget which colour this is the name of …”. What is not remembered is what the color “greige” means, that is, what color it is. We might remember the color of the foyer but not remember that the color is called greige. — Fooloso4
So if someone asked you to paint the bedroom greige it would have no meaning. — Fooloso4
It is the situation that is comparable. Suppose the person who wanted you to paint the room found a color swatch and wanted the room painted that color, but could not find the swatch to show you. The paradigm, in this case the swatch, is lost. It would be meaningless to ask that the room be painted the color of the swatch if there is no swatch. — Fooloso4
This does not mean that the object cannot be a paradigm but that a paradigm is not necessary when the connection between the name and the thing named has been made. When the name would have no meaning for someone without an example, a paradigm is used, an example. That example might be an object, but if one already knows that this thing is called “xyz” then “xyz” still has meaning even without the presence of an object. — Fooloso4
In general, the meaning of a word is determined by its use: — Fooloso4
No, "we forget which colour this is the name of" says that we forget the colour, not that we forget the name. — Metaphysician Undercover
Not necessarily, because you might still remember that "greige" refers to a colour, but just not remember what colour it is. In this case, the loss of meaning of "greige" would not be complete, or absolute. The word would still have some meaning, it is understood to refer to a colour. — Metaphysician Undercover
OK, but notice that when the colour swatch is lost, the name of the colour still has some meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
The existence of a paradigm (physical or remembered example) is not necessary for a name to have meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
Right, the meaning of a word is determined by its use. Is this something distinct from "a paradigm"? — Metaphysician Undercover
If so, then this would mean that the idea that the meaning of a word is determined by a paradigm can't be right. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you don’t know what color to paint then the name greige is meaningless. — Fooloso4
Knowing that it is a color is meaningless for the purpose of painting or picking out a fabric or whatever else you might do with a specific color if you don’t know what color it is. — Fooloso4
All I can do is repeat. If you do not know which colour "greige" refers to, but you know that it refers to a colour, then the name is not meaningless to you. — Metaphysician Undercover
But it doesn't make sense to say that if a word is useless for some particular purpose it is therefore meaningless. — Metaphysician Undercover
When in reality the word does have meaning to that person because the person knows that it refers to a colour. — Metaphysician Undercover
56 ...This shews that we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal.
57 ...For suppose you cannot remember the colour any more?—When we forget which colour
this is the name of, it loses its meaning for us; that is, we are no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And the situation then is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language,
58. "I want to restrict the term 'name* to what cannot occur in the combination 'X exists'.
The statement of 56 seems clear, memory does not always have the final word in making such decisions. However, at 57 he seems to say that if we forget, then the meaning is gone. So in this sense, memory would be the "highest court" because it determines whether something has meaning or not. Also, it suggests that meaning is not indestructible as was earlier suggested, because when the memory is gone, so is the meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
If the full description of "learning a rule" requires that one already knows a rule, and this produces an infinite regress, then obviously this description is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover
Not an infinite regress, no. — Isaac
It's not that "learning a rule requires that one already know a rule" it's that all the rules Wittgenstein is interested in here, are of that sort. The description of our first acquisition of rules, our first tentative steps, is a matter of of child psychology, not philosophy of language. — Isaac
It is sufficient for this investigation, that Wittgenstein's "close examination" has shown no 'rule of rules', his examples have pointed fairly conclusively to the rule-following being situated firmly (and complexly) within the social context. Somewhere in the millions of interactions emerges the rule, just like somehow in the millions of interactions between air molecules emerges the weather patterns. — Isaac
§58
If the meaning of a word is not tied to an object, paradigm, sample, memory, or any other object (mental or otherwise), then it seems to follow that the meaning of "X exists," is derived in another way. In particular, meaning is derived how it is used in social contexts. So, "X exists," if it is to mean anything, means, there is such-and-such a use for the word. Although as Wittgenstein points out this is senseless.
We could extend this to the proposition that "God exists," which does not derive meaning from whether or not the thing associated with the concept has an instance in reality, but how we use the concept in a variety of social contexts. We should not think that a name is only meant to be some element of reality (PI 59). — Sam26
Wittgenstein states that we want to take "Red exists" as "'Red' has a meaning", and "Red does not exist" as "'Red' has no meaning". — Luke
How do you relate #59 in this way? It appears to me like "meaning is use" has met the paradox of 58. We want to say "red exists" means that the word red has meaning, rather than that there is an existing thing called "red". However, since meaning is use, and we use "red exists" to say that there is something, a colour called "red", we cannot do what we want to do, the attempt contradicts itself. So it appears to me, like he has met this dead end, this paradox at 58, so he goes all the way back to the proposition "A name signifies only what is an element of reality" at 59, to get a fresh start, from a new perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover
For naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for description. Naming is so far not a move in the language-game—any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess ... — PI §49
What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither being nor non-being to elements?—One might say: if everything that we call "being" and "non-being" consists in the existence and non-existence of connexions between elements, it makes no sense to speak of an element's being (non-being) … — PI §50
"A name signifies only what is an element of reality [the interlocutor, or his former self] (PI 59)," is not him going back because he is at some "dead end." He is continuing with his analysis of the idea that a name signifies some thing in reality. — Sam26
The seeming paradox disappears when the elemental analysis into simples and composites is rejected. — Fooloso4
I don't see how you can say that. The problem, and apparent paradox, is with the supposition "meaning is use". We use the name "red" as if there is something, an element of reality or something like that, which is named as "red". Unless we reject "meaning is use", we cannot reject the "elemental analysis" unless we find some other thing, something other than an element of reality, which "red" refers to. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don’t see that as paradoxical. As I understand it, what he is rejecting is the idea of “an element of reality”. — Fooloso4
Red refers to a color, that is how we use the name. We do not need the metaphysical framework of elements and complexes to use the word ‘red’ to name something that is red. — Fooloso4
We do not use "red" to name something that is red, we use it to name the colour of that thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Red refers to a color, that is how we use the name. — Fooloso4
Now we have the metaphysical problem of accounting for the existence of this thing — Metaphysician Undercover
The same idea—that this is a metaphysical statement about red—finds expression again when we say such a thing as that red is timeless, and perhaps still more strongly in the word "indestructible". — PI §58
Isn't the point that they are necessary for the language-game to work? But this is precisely the point: they are necessary, without which the language-game which employs the name in the capacity of a paradigm would not be intelligible. — StreetlightX
"An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which
it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game."
In §55, Witty examined two roles that names could play in a language-game. One in which the name was associated with a paradigm — StreetlightX
he's beginning his attempt to undermine any necessary role of 'memory-images' in the use of a name. — StreetlightX
if a name is employed in its capacity of standing for a paradigm, then it is necessary that such a paradigm exist ('out there' or 'in the mind'), in order for the language-game to work. — StreetlightX
A quick interpretive note on the last two sections I wrote about: it's often noted that Witty is targeting the idea that the use of names must correspond to images in our head. The open question is whether this entails the opposite position, namely, that words (or names, to be more specific) must then correspond to things 'out there' in the world instead. But, given the equivalence established between 'out there' and 'in here', one ought to instead read Wittgenstein as rejecting the inside/outside dichotomy altogether. — StreetlightX
A name does not stand for a paradigm, a paradigm stands for, shows the meaning of, a name. — Fooloso4
if a name is employed in its capacity of standing for a paradigm, then it is necessary that such a paradigm exist ('out there' or 'in the mind'), in order for the language-game to work.
— StreetlightX
I think this is backwards. A name does not stand for a paradigm, a paradigm stands for, shows the meaning of, a name. — Fooloso4
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