You made the following statement, and I tried to answer it:

I don't understand how it is that you do not agree with this, namely, that any language-game, which by definition is social, necessarily has rules (implicit and/or explicit). — Sam26

So let me try again. I disagree with this because I am not sure as to whether an individual must know a language-game in order to learn a rule, or whether one must learn rules in order to play a language-game. Wittgenstein has not yet made clear this relationship between language-games and rules. And, if the former is true, then a language-game does not necessarily have rules because we would need to learn a language-game before we could learn any rules. So I hope this explains to you, and you now understand how it is that I do not agree with you that a language-game necessarily has rules.

No, only that it can be - if that's it role in a particular language game. — StreetlightX

You're talking about whether a name (or its bearer) can be a standard, whereas my question and your original statement were about whether a name requires a standard. The latter is what I take Wittgenstein to be referring to at the end of section 55. This is unrelated to a name's (or its bearer's) role in the language game.

This is how "the rule" appears to us, as something general, vague and ill-defined, as "various possibilities". — Metaphysician Undercover

But there is no problem here to resolve. The rule only appears vague when we are looking for something 'hidden' behind it. Absent of that, it is not vague and ill-defined at all. Do you have any great trouble speaking to people in ordinary language?

Now the name itself, is used to signify a type of object "slab" for example signifies a type of object. And, the rule itself, is used to signify a type of action. Both are signifying "a type", so in each case what is signified is something general, as types are. However, we can point to the name, as something particular, "slab" etc., now let's move along and point to the particular rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand this at all. The name "slab" (in a certain language game) refers to a type of object. The chart of relations in 48 shows which types of action (in response to which utterances) are considered by the players to be in accordance with the rules. Why would we now look for the exact action that is of the specified type? I'm not sure what that would have to do with the investigation here.

The rule dictates a correspondence between the sign and the square. But how the rule does this is what appears to us in the form of various possibilities. This is what stymies our attempts to isolate the particular rule. We see the chart and we see the action of the people following the rule, but if we go to describe how the rule acts, we can describe it in a variety of different ways, despite the fact that it is one and the same rule which may be acting in a variety of different ways. How can we isolate the particular rule when it appears to exist in a variety of different ways at the same time? — Metaphysician Undercover

We can't. That's the point.

I suppose I do not know what you mean by 'generalizable rule". So I don't know what you mean when you say that Wittgenstein is claiming that the generalisable rule does not exist. I haven't yet seen him claim that any sort of rule does not exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure I'm doing anything more by repeating myself other than perhaps making my interpretation less clear, not more so.

Wittgenstein believes that philosophy has been misguided by our grammar. I cannot put it much more basically than to say that it has been misguided into thinking that because we can "say" something in one context, we can analyse it without context. His work here is trying to show the effect of context on the meaning of words. It is not trying to map those effects, or explain them, or find some unifying theory behind them.

But there is no problem here to resolve. The rule only appears vague when we are looking for something 'hidden' behind it. Absent of that, it is not vague and ill-defined at all. Do you have any great trouble speaking to people in ordinary language? — Isaac

I don't see the logic here. I have only a few problems speaking to people, but I don't see any rules here. I am not looking for something hidden behind the rules, I am looking for the rules themselves. But I see no rules, so I don't know what you're talking about. How could I be looking for something hidden behind the rules, when I do not even see any rules?

The chart of relations in 48 shows which types of action (in response to which utterances) are considered by the players to be in accordance with the rules. — Isaac

The chart does not show this though, that's the point. The chart is just an arrangement of coloured squares. Along with the chart there are instructions as to how to use the symbols, "R", "G" "W" "B". It is the instructions, whether the actions are according to the instructions, which determines whether the actions are according to the rules. So I have to associate "the rule" with the instructions, not with the chart.

Likewise, when the person calls "slab", the instructions are for the apprentice to bring a certain type of stone. It is the instructions which constitute "the rule", not the word "slab". The word "slab" is a representation of the instructions, for the apprentice, and the instructions are the rule. The word "slab" is a representation of the rule, which is what the apprentice is supposed to do upon hearing the word. What the apprentice is supposed to do, may also be described, and this description is another representation of the rule, which may be issued as instructions.

We can't. That's the point. — Isaac

I don't believe this. I think this is exactly what Wittgenstein is looking for the "particular rule". That is why he says we have to look up close, in detail, and he asks about the different cases in which a game is said to be played according to a particular rule. You might say that we cannot determine a particular rule, but that's not what Wittgenstein is saying. Consider, that the mouse comes out of the rags. Someone says, it's spontaneous generation. That's just like you, saying above, that the rules are there, in language, they must be or else we couldn't communicate. So we take it for granted, that the rules just come out of language, like the mouse just comes out of the rag, spontaneous generation. Now Wittgenstein says let's look into this language thing in detail, and see if we can determine exactly how these rules are coming into existence, just like examining the rags up close to see where the mouse is coming from. First off, we need to get a very clear idea of what a rule is, so we know exactly what we are looking for in there.

Wittgenstein believes that philosophy has been misguided by our grammar. I cannot put it much more basically than to say that it has been misguided into thinking that because we can "say" something in one context, we can analyse it without context. His work here is trying to show the effect of context on the meaning of words. It is not trying to map those effects, or explain them, or find some unifying theory behind them. — Isaac

I think it is a mistaken reduction to say that what Wittgenstein is trying to show in this book, is one single thing. What he is showing changes almost as quickly as the numbers change, and that's why reading this is such a long arduous process.

55. At 40, Wittgenstein told us that "the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word." Here he continues to try and undermine this common presumption that a word's meaning is its object.

He states that it must be possible to describe the state of affairs in which everything destructible is destroyed. He highlights the illicit presumption: "...this description will contain words; and what corresponds to these cannot then be destroyed, for otherwise the words would have no meaning." He repeats his earlier argument that the meaning of a person's name is not its bearer. He instructs the reader that what would be required for a name to lose its meaning is not the destruction of its signified object, but instead the destruction of the paradigm associated with the name's use.

First, I would like to compliment the participants for their courteous and respectful behavior.

As has been mentioned, Wittgenstein’s discussion should be viewed against the background of the Tractatus. The basic assumptions of the Tractatus is that there are simple objects and simple names that correspond to them. Underlying the relations between simple objects and simple names is a logical scaffolding that determines how they can be combined. In the PI he rejects each of these assumptions - simple objects, simple names, and the underlying logic of relations.

Instead of a transcendental, invariant logic that underlying both language and the world it pictures he is now investigating rules - rules of games and rules of language games. Rules do not exist independently of the game of which they are the rules. There are no rules for rules - that is, no rules that allow or disallow what can be a rule of a game, and no rules for how rules are to be followed. Games do not simply follow rules they can create rules as the game is being played. Language is not simply a rule following activity, it is also a rule making activity, an activity determined by the activities we are involved in.

Thanks for that post Andrew. I couldn't agree more.

56. Having rejected the illicit presumption that the meaning of a word is its (external) object at 55, Wittgenstein now attacks the equally illicit presumption that the meaning of a word is something internal/mental.

Following on from his remarks at 55, using the example of a colour, he asks whether we could proceed without a paradigm/sample if instead we were to "bear in mind" the colour that a word represents. He suggests that such memories could provide us with the "indestructible" element sought at 55. However, the problem with this consideration is one which will famously return later:

But what do we regard as the criterion for remembering it right?

So, it seems that we use objects (physical or abstract), memories, pictures (mental or otherwise) as tools to learn meaning, not that these things entail meaning for the reasons Wittgenstein has already shown. For example, I will teach a child how to use a word by pointing to an object. I say "cup," as I point to the object sitting on the table, and before the child learns to use the word correctly I may have pointed to many different cups in many different contexts. None of these objects entail the meaning of the word "cup," as much as I'm tempted to think so. As someone analyzing the word (as a philosopher might analyze the word nothing) I might think I'm discovering something special in the cup itself that gives meaning to the word.

Paragraph 58 I find very interesting. I'm interested in how some of you are going to interpret it.

However, meaning resides in a multitude of uses that may not have any one property that corresponds to that meaning. Hence, Wittgenstein's talk about games and family resemblances. This isn't the case though with all meanings (speaking in terms of properties). For example, part of what it means to be a triangle resides in the idea that a triangle has three sides. That said, the concept still gets its meaning in terms of how we use the word triangle, as opposed to pointing to some thing that is a triangle. — Sam26

Hi Sam

I'm not sure if I follow this. You say that "meaning...may not have any one property" corresponding to it, except in some cases such as a triangle. But you also say that a triangle's property of having three sides is only "part of" its meaning. You then go on to say that the concept of a triangle gets its meaning from its use anyway. So, I don't follow your point about meaning possibly having only one property.

But I see no rules, so I don't know what you're talking about. How could I be looking for something hidden behind the rules, when I do not even see any rules? — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you saying that you aren't able to respond when someone asks you to "fetch a red apple"? If not, then you know the rule to that language game to the extent that anyone else knows it (the extent to which it can be known). A rule is like a signpost. It is not meant to be exhaustive, it is only meant to be sufficient, that sufficiency being determined by use.

The chart does not show this though, that's the point. The chart is just an arrangement of coloured squares. Along with the chart there are instructions as to how to use the symbols, "R", "G" "W" "B". It is the instructions, whether the actions are according to the instructions, which determines whether the actions are according to the rules. So I have to associate "the rule" with the instructions, not with the chart. — Metaphysician Undercover

In this instance, yes. But not in every instance. That's the point of the example. No rule can exhaustively determine what do do next. Every rule requires interpretation at some level. So if we have a chart of colours with names to their right, how do we know to read off to the right? So we add some arrows. But how do we know to follow an arrow? So we add some instruction to that effect. But how do we know the meaning of the instruction?...

Eventually you have to arrive at simply what we have been instructed to understand by our existing within a social network, the near constant 'reverting to the mean' effect of each person trying to copy the other, which is what Sam has been trying to explain.


As to the subsequent general issue of what Wittgenstein is saying, I can only suggest reading the whole book, perhaps together with some of the Zettel. Or maybe, if you're not that into Wittgenstein, just the summaries of some of the academics who have already done so. I wouldn't read too much into what you think the metaphors could mean at this stage, afterall, being a metaphor, it could mean virtually anything when taken out of context.

If I may be so crass as to interject a favourite quote here, I think it's apposite to the difficulty some people have with the Philosophical Investigations, and so worth bearing in mind.

The chief danger of our philosophy, apart from laziness and wooliness, is scholasticism, the essence of which is treating that which is vague as if it were precise and trying to fit it into an exact logical category. — F. P. Ramsey

We don't really start to see Wittgenstein exploring this until 60 (where we get into analyticity), but the concept, I think, will help with the understanding of the the preceeding aphorisms.

Sorry Luke that wasn't clearly written so I erased it. It's 2:30 in the morning and I'm to lazy to re-write it. :gasp:

No problem Sam. I very much agreed with the rest of your post; just thought I might be missing something.

Are you saying that you aren't able to respond when someone asks you to "fetch a red apple"? If not, then you know the rule to that language game to the extent that anyone else knows it (the extent to which it can be known). A rule is like a signpost. It is not meant to be exhaustive, it is only meant to be sufficient, that sufficiency being determined by use. — Isaac

It's easy to say "if you respond when someone says 'fetch the apple' then you know the rule", but this claim needs to be justified. First, we would have to say that there is a correct response, one which is according to the rule, because simple response is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a rule. Further, it does not suffice to simply assume that any given response is the "correct" response. The judgement that any response is correct requires consulting the rule. Therefore, to justify "then you know the rule" requires that there is a rule available for consultation. Where do we find this rule, for consultation?

Eventually you have to arrive at simply what we have been instructed to understand by our existing within a social network, the near constant 'reverting to the mean' effect of each person trying to copy the other, which is what Sam has been trying to explain. — Isaac

The problem is, that you here, just like Sam26, refer to some vague "social network", as if the rules are just supposed to magically appear within this context, like the mouse which jumps from the dusty rags. I'm looking in detail, as Wittgenstein suggests, trying to determine the "particular rule", to validate this claim that there are rules within this social network.

Following on from his remarks at 55, using the example of a colour, he asks whether we could proceed without a paradigm/sample if instead we were to "bear in mind" the colour that a word represents. He suggests that such memories could provide us with the "indestructible" element sought at 55. However, the problem with this consideration is one which will famously return later: — Luke

Do you have a suggestion of how we ought to reconcile the following statements of 56 and 57:

56 ...This shews that we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal.

57 ...For suppose you cannot remember the colour any more?—When we forget which colour
this is the name of, it loses its meaning for us; that is, we are no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And the situation then is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language,
58. "I want to restrict the term 'name* to what cannot occur in the combination 'X exists'.

The statement of 56 seems clear, memory does not always have the final word in making such decisions. However, at 57 he seems to say that if we forget, then the meaning is gone. So in this sense, memory would be the "highest court" because it determines whether something has meaning or not. Also, it suggests that meaning is not indestructible as was earlier suggested, because when the memory is gone, so is the meaning.

First, we would have to say that there is a correct response, one which is according to the rule, because simple response is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you fetch a red apple whenever you are asked to then you know the rule. It is as simple as that. Fetching the apple is sufficient. What more do you think needs to be added? What is missing? Whether or not one is following the rule is determined by an action:

“We could imagine that the language of §2 was the whole language of A and B; even the whole language of a tribe. The children are brought up to perform these actions, to use these words as they do so, and to react in this way to the words of others.” (§6)

So in this sense, memory would be the "highest court" because it determines whether something has meaning or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

The paradigm is the highest court.

"An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game." (§55)

A physical example is in general a more reliable paradigm provided it does not change. In addition, we are able to compare the sample with the name. I do not need to consult a sample of the color red each time I fetch a red apple, but if you fetch a yellow apple and say that this is how you remember the color red, then we can consult the sample to settle the matter of what red means.

Also, it suggests that meaning is not indestructible as was earlier suggested, because when the memory is gone, so is the meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I may forget what red means, but there are still samples or examples that serve as the paradigm. The physical sample is not indestructible but more durable and reliable than a memory. It would only be the case that red had no meaning if there were no paradigm, either physical or mental, that connected the name to the color.

If you fetch a red apple whenever you are asked to then you know the rule. It is as simple as that. Fetching the apple is sufficient. What more do you think needs to be added? What is missing? Whether or not one is following the rule is determined by an action: — Fooloso4

It's not "as simple as that" though. Right now if someone said "fetch a red apple", I would not be in the least bit inclined to go to the store and get a red apple. However, if there is a rule involved with this phrase, I must still know the rule because I understand the phrase. However, I chose not to act according to the assumed rule. So despite the fact that acting in a certain way may indicate that I know the rule, if there is such a rule, it's not a reliable way of indicating whether I know that rule. And so it doesn't suffice as a premise, whereby we could conclude the existence of such a rule, because in each and every particular case when someone says "fetch a red apple", people behave differently.

“We could imagine that the language of §2 was the whole language of A and B; even the whole language of a tribe. The children are brought up to perform these actions, to use these words as they do so, and to react in this way to the words of others.” (§6) — Fooloso4

As Wittgenstein demonstrates, there are problems with this imaginary scenario of yours.

The paradigm is the highest court.

"An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game." (§55)

A physical example is in general a more reliable paradigm provided it does not change. In addition, we are able to compare the sample with the name. I do not need to consult a sample of the color red each time I fetch a red apple, but if you fetch a yellow apple and say that this is how you remember the color red, then we can consult the sample to settle the matter of what red means. — Fooloso4

You seem to missing the fact that it is made explicitly clear by Wittgenstein at 55, that this so-called "paradigm" cannot be a physical object, because the name must be allowed to have meaning after the physical object is destroyed. What the name signifies must be indestructible, a physical example is not. Therefore a physical example is not what Wittgenstein refers to here as "a paradigm".

Right now if someone said "fetch a red apple", I would not be in the least bit inclined to go to the store and get a red apple. — Metaphysician Undercover

Following a rule does not mean that one must follow it, but rather that one knows how to follow it.

So despite the fact that acting in a certain way may indicate that I know the rule, if there is such a rule, it's not a reliable way of indicating whether I know that rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

There may be cases where we cannot tell whether or not you know the rule, but if you consistently follow it that is a reliable way of indicating that you do know it.

And so it doesn't suffice as a premise, whereby we could conclude the existence of such a rule, because in each and every particular case when someone says "fetch a red apple", people behave differently. — Metaphysician Undercover

In this case it is not a matter of whether or not there is such a rule. “Fetch a red apple” is the rule. Those who consistently fetch a red apple understand the rule and how to follow it. Why some don’t follow it requires further investigation into the particulars of that case to determine whether they choose not to follow it or if there are circumstantial reasons that prevent them from following it or if the cannot follow it because they do not understand what to do.

As Wittgenstein demonstrates, there are problems with this imaginary scenario of yours. — Metaphysician Undercover

That was a direct quote from the text (§6). What problems are there?

You seem to missing the fact that it is made explicitly clear by Wittgenstein at 55, that this so-called "paradigm" cannot be a physical object, because the name must be allowed to have meaning after the physical object is destroyed. — Metaphysician Undercover

The object serves as a paradigm. It is something that serves as an example of what red means. If someone does not know what red means I cannot tell them to remember what it means or to look in my memory. The particular object I point to can be destroyed but there are others that can serve as the paradigm.

What the name signifies must be indestructible … — Metaphysician Undercover

What cannot be destroyed is what gives the words their meaning, it “is that without which they would have no meaning” (§55) A paradigm can be destroyed but then word would no longer mean anything . If you were the last remaining member of a tribe and everything owned by the tribe was destroyed a “rel” would mean something to you but not to anyone else. Since no “rels” exist there is nothing that can serve as a paradigm by which “rel” means anything for anyone else, and if you forget or die then it would no longer have any meaning. The paradigm would be destroyed.

Following a rule does not mean that one must follow it, but rather that one knows how to follow it. — Fooloso4

Do you not recognize that as blatantly contradictory?

In this case it is not a matter of whether or not there is such a rule. “Fetch a red apple” is the rule. — Fooloso4

How is that the rule? "Fetch a red apple" is the statement, what is said. If there is a corresponding rule, the rule would tell me what to do when I hear that statement. The rule cannot be the statement itself, because the rule must indicate what the correct action is when the statement is heard.

That was a direct quote from the text (§6). What problems are there? — Fooloso4

You should read the thread from the beginning, we covered that already.

The object serves as a paradigm. It is something that serves as an example of what red means. If someone does not know what red means I cannot tell them to remember what it means or to look in my memory. The particular object I point to can be destroyed but there are others that can serve as the paradigm. — Fooloso4

Wittgenstein explicitly states that the name must have meaning even if everything is destroyed. So it is clear that he is not thinking about a multitude of objects acting as the paradigm.

What cannot be destroyed is what gives the words their meaning, it “is that without which they would have no meaning” (§55) A paradigm can be destroyed but then word would no longer mean anything . If you were the last remaining member of a tribe and everything owned by the tribe was destroyed a “rel” would mean something to you but not to anyone else. Since no “rels” exist there is nothing that can serve as a paradigm by which “rel” means anything for anyone else, and if you forget or die then it would no longer have any meaning. The paradigm would be destroyed. — Fooloso4

You are misrepresenting what Wittgenstein says at 55. He explicitly says that the name would have meaning even if all the corresponding objects were destroyed. Then he says "An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game." So we can conclude that "a paradigm" does not refer to any object, or a multiplicity of objects.
.

It's easy to say "if you respond when someone says 'fetch the apple' then you know the rule", but this claim needs to be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that presumes that the definition of "rule" exists prior to our investigation and we are demonstrating that the thing we have identified belongs to that definition. That's not what's happening here. Wittgenstein is saying "let's call the paradigm that looks like it is needed to explain this broadly similar collection of behaviours a 'rule'", then look at some examples to see how it varies. You're starting from the premise that a 'rule' is a thing of universally fixed and agreed on definition and the game is to try and see if what Wittgenstein describes is such a thing. You may play that game with your definition of 'rule' but it's not a game I care to play.

First, we would have to say that there is a correct response, one which is according to the rule, because simple response is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, so I say that fetching an object I would call an apple of the colour I recall as red is the correct application of the rule here unless everyone around me told me that what I recall as red is actually the colour called blue, in which case I would be inclined to change my mind, otherwise my word 'red' is not going to do what I want it to do when spoken.

Therefore, to justify "then you know the rule" requires that there is a rule available for consultation. Where do we find this rule, for consultation? — Metaphysician Undercover

In different places depending on its role in the language game. It may be in the collective memory of the players, it might be an object, could be a rulebook, maybe a sample, several samples, a mathematical equation... could be anywhere.

I'm looking in detail, as Wittgenstein suggests, trying to determine the "particular rule", to validate this claim that there are rules within this social network. — Metaphysician Undercover

How would you know when you find such a thing?

Do you not recognize that as blatantly contradictory? — Metaphysician Undercover

Two different senses in which one can follow a rule. The first means to understand what the rule is. You have indicated that you can follow the rule to fetch a red apple but choose not to. Do you follow?

How is that the rule? "Fetch a red apple" is the statement, what is said. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is grammatically in the imperative mood. It is an order or command or request. If you understand the grammar (the rule) you know it is telling you to fetch an apple. It is part of the language game of giving orders, and obeying them. (§23)

You should read the thread from the beginning, we covered that already. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well then you should know that it is not my “imaginary scenario”. Others pointed to the centrality of action, you disagreed.

Wittgenstein explicitly states that the name must have meaning even if everything is destroyed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you referring to the statement in §55 in quotes? If so, that is not Wittgenstein's position, it is one that is said that he rejects.

Once the connection between the name and the thing named is made the paradigm is no longer needed, but without the paradigm the connection cannot be made. If we read in an ancient text that someone took the “x” and threw it, the object named would have no meaning unless we knew what it was. If no “x” exists and nothing else is said about it then the name no longer has any meaning.

So it is clear that he is not thinking about a multitude of objects acting as the paradigm. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is the paradigm of a horse or a cat or a table? Where do we find the paradigm?

So we can conclude that "a paradigm" does not refer to any object, or a multiplicity of objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then what do you think it refers to? What are the examples that correspond to the name? What serves as a paradigm depends on that is being named. The paradigm of a rule will not be an object but the paradigm of a table will be.

No, that presumes that the definition of "rule" exists prior to our investigation and we are demonstrating that the thing we have identified belongs to that definition. That's not what's happening here. Wittgenstein is saying "let's call the paradigm that looks like it is needed to explain this broadly similar collection of behaviours a 'rule'", then look at some examples to see how it varies. You're starting from the premise that a 'rule' is a thing of universally fixed and agreed on definition and the game is to try and see if what Wittgenstein describes is such a thing. You may play that game with your definition of 'rule' but it's not a game I care to play. — Isaac

I'm fine with this, but then it makes no sense to say, as you did, that if you are able to respond when someone asks you to "fetch a red apple" then you know the rule, because this also presumes a definition of "rule". You cannot exclude my definition of "rule" because it is presumptuous, and then proceed with your own presumed definition.

This is an important point demonstrated in Plato's Theaetetus, and it is evident that Wittgenstein is familiar with this work. The participants in the dialogue proceeded toward defining "knowledge". Each definition which they tried out, based on examples of how knowledge appeared to exist, proved to be faulty in their enquiry. So they failed. At the end, they realized that they had failed because they had a preconceived idea of knowledge, as excluding the possibility of falsity, or mistake, and this preconceived idea was wrong in comparison with how knowledge actually exists. So this presumption that knowledge had to exclude mistake or falsity prevented them from being able to say that any of the descriptions of knowledge, which they took from real examples, qualified as "knowledge" according to that preconceived notion. Knowledge in the existent examples didn't have the capacity to exclude the possibility of mistake or falsity.

So here we have a very similar issue. If we have a preconceived idea of what "following a rule" is, this will stymie our attempt to look at the real world instances and determine what "following a rule" really is. On this basis, I disagree that Wittgenstein is saying "let's call the paradigm that looks like it is needed to explain this broadly similar collection of behaviours a 'rule'", because this is to proceed with a preconceived idea as to what a rule is. What Wittgenstein did, in fact say at 53 is: "Let us recall the kinds of case where we say that a game is played according to a definite rule." Then he goes on at 54 to explain those kinds of cases.

Therefore he has not made the generalization which you claim. He has not claimed to call "this broadly similar collection of behaviours" is a "rule", he has only described a variety of different behaviours in which we say that a game is being played according to a rule.

How would you know when you find such a thing? — Isaac

I think that this is a very good point, and it is the question which came to my mind after reading Plato's Theaetetus. If we proceed to define "knowledge" by looking for instances of knowledge, and then producing a definition of knowledge from that, how would we know in the first place which of the things we are looking at, are knowledge. How can we find what we are looking for, if we proceed with no idea of how to identify it. But this is the Platonic method, it's called Platonic dialectics, and it bears a strong resemblance to Wittgenstein's method. The method is to examine the sorts of things which are referred to by a particular word (usage of that word) and produce a definition of the word from the way it is used. We know which of the things we look at are the ones we are looking for by the use of the word. If the thing is called "knowledge", then it is an example of the thing we are seeking to define. So in the example of the Theaetetus, we would approach "knowledge" without any preconceived notions of what "knowledge" ought to refer to, then examine all sorts of instances where the word is used, and develop an understanding of what "knowledge" means from that. So we do have a means of identifying the thing which we are trying to define, and that is the usage of the word. I think Wittgenstein is saying we ought to approach "rule" in this way. And soon he will demonstrate the profound difficulties with Platonic dialectics when he asks what sort of thing is a "game", and mentions a vast variety of different things referred to by that word. Now he has mentioned a variety of different things referred to as "playing a game according to a particular rule".

Two different senses in which one can follow a rule. The first means to understand what the rule is. You have indicated that you can follow the rule to fetch a red apple but choose not to. Do you follow? — Fooloso4

I follow, but clearly the point Wittgenstein is making at 54 is that there are different senses of "following a rule". On what basis would you choose one over the other as the correct sense?

Are you referring to the statement in §55 in quotes? If so, that is not Wittgenstein's position, it is one that is said that he rejects. — Fooloso4

All I see is that it is stated, I do not see him rejecting it.

Once the connection between the name and the thing named is made the paradigm is no longer needed, ... — Fooloso4

I do not see where Wittgenstein makes this claim. In fact, if this were the case, then we'd have to rely on memory. But he explicitly rejects a reliance on memory at 56.

Then what do you think it refers to? — Fooloso4

Don't ask me, I didn't write the book, and as far as I can tell he hasn't elucidated this yet. Maybe he likes Platonic realism in which the example (paradigm) exists in some eternal Platonic realm, or maybe he'll put forth some other platform. I don't know.

You cannot exclude my definition of "rule" because it is presumptuous, and then proceed with your own presumed definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's fair enough, it's kind of what I meant by not wanting to play that game. I'm fairly happy with what I think Wittgenstein actually means by 'rule' (which in my case is a fairly standard interpretation) and whilst I wouldn't rule out the possibility of your convincing me otherwise, its just not as interesting to me as some of the aspects about which I think there's more uncertainty (even among scholars).

I disagree that Wittgenstein is saying "let's call the paradigm that looks like it is needed to explain this broadly similar collection of behaviours a 'rule'", because this is to proceed with a preconceived idea as to what a rule is. What Wittgenstein did, in fact say at 53 is: "Let us recall the kinds of case where we say that a game is played according to a definite rule." Then he goes on at 54 to explain those kinds of cases.

Therefore he has not made the generalization which you claim. He has not claimed to call "this broadly similar collection of behaviours" is a "rule", he has only described a variety of different behaviours in which we say that a game is being played according to a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't disagree with this, I only mean to emphasise that Wittgenstein is not saying that 'rule' should mean something and then proceeding to see what meets this definition, but rather working the other way around.

I felt like your point was implying that some situation might exist where we say a game is being played according to a rule, but which, on investigation we find it is not (ie your comment about the assertion needing to be justified). I was trying to get across that Wittgenstein is simply accepting that whatever we say is being played according to a rule is part of the definition of 'rule' so he's not (at this stage) undertaking an analysis of whether people are right to say that a game is being played according to a rule.


I don't much disagree with your sketch of Wittgenstein's approach to definition, but this came out of your disagreement with the claim that the rules were somehow in 'the social context' and that a close examination did not reveal them to be. If you're accepting of Wittgenstein's approach to definition, then you're happy that what he's calling 'rules' are indeed rules. In that case, I'm hard pressed to see what is missing from the text by way of as strong an indication as possible that these 'rules' are indeed in the social context. It seems to me as if just about every example Wittgenstein has given thus far has indicated this conclusion.

I don't disagree with this, I only mean to emphasise that Wittgenstein is not saying that 'rule' should mean something and then proceeding to see what meets this definition, but rather working the other way around. — Isaac

So we're in good agreement here.

I felt like your point was implying that some situation might exist where we say a game is being played according to a rule, but which, on investigation we find it is not (ie your comment about the assertion needing to be justified). I was trying to get across that Wittgenstein is simply accepting that whatever we say is being played according to a rule is part of the definition of 'rule' so he's not (at this stage) undertaking an analysis of whether people are right to say that a game is being played according to a rule. — Isaac

This is where we may have a problem, and fall out of agreement. I really believe that there are difficulties with this method, Platonic dialectics, which Witty will expose with his discussion of what is a game. The same word will be used in a wide variety of ways with some sort of thread of relation. We, as human beings have an intuitive inclination to judge the "correct" way. But the method has no means of determining the correct way. According to the principles of this method, there is no such thing as the correct way, there is just a variety of different ways, somehow related, which all need to be examined. So the common notion of "a rule" turns out to be incompatible with this method. There is no rule as to what a game is. And even the word "rule" refers to many different things. This ought to leave us at a loss as to how to ground the idea of correct and incorrect, which is why Plato turned to "the good". Whatever form of grounding one chooses, it may appear to be an arbitrary choice. So we will likely fall out of agreement on this because I think that the method provides no principles for judging correct and incorrect .

I follow, but clearly the point Wittgenstein is making at 54 is that there are different senses of "following a rule". On what basis would you choose one over the other as the correct sense? — Metaphysician Undercover

§54 is about the different functions or ways in which a rule is used in a game. In each case there is no confusion as to what rule is to be followed.

All I see is that it is stated, I do not see him rejecting it. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a reason why it is in parentheses. The next paragraph begins -

“One might, of course, object at once …”

And concludes:

“An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game."

The example serves as a paradigm for something that corresponds to the name.

I do not see where Wittgenstein makes this claim. In fact, if this were the case, then we'd have to rely on memory. But he explicitly rejects a reliance on memory at 56. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we are not in agreement that something is red we must rely on a paradigm that can be pointed to rather than what each of us remembers. If you do not know what “greige” is you can look it up and find that it does have a meaning, that it is a color, but since there are many colors greige is still meaningless unless you are shown a sample - from a paint color card or the color of the foyer, for example. They serve as a paradigm. The sample can be destroyed, the foyer can be destroyed, but there must be something that you can be shown that is used as a paradigm. “An example of something corresponding to the name …” (§55)

Oh god, I just want to laugh when I read all of our work trying to get MU to understand. These disagreements with MU go back years. In the forum most of us belonged to before this one, I had a thread that went on for years, and MU has never given up this position. No serious student of Wittgenstein, if even they disagree with Wittgenstein, would deny many of these points being made about rule-following. There may be disagreements, but most of this is understood by those who study Wittgenstein in a serious way.

The one thing I can say about MU is that he keeps his cool about all of this. In that sense he is better than me. The Marine in me wants to take the person and kick them in the ass, which would solve nothing. I think it comes down to this, you either see it or you don't. If you don't see it, fine, just move on. Now, if I can take my own advice, I'd be doing well.

I have nothing against you MU, you may be the greatest guy in the world, I just don't have the patience with continually arguing or repeating myself over and over again. Luke seems to be able to do it. Luke has also been arguing some of these ideas for years.

What's interesting is that I'm going to be giving a class to some people on some of this material. I hope I can keep my cool. Just kidding, I'll be fine.

My point is that if you think you're going to get anywhere with your explanations you're living in a dream world. The only reason I see to answering some of his questions is to help others who may also be confused.

In some ways this is pretty funny, and frustrating, at least for me.

There is a reason why it is in parentheses. The next paragraph begins -

“One might, of course, object at once …”

And concludes:

“An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game."

The example serves as a paradigm for something that corresponds to the name. — Fooloso4

OK, I see that, but then he proceeds with "what if no such sample is a part of the language..." and proceeds from here. So it is still undetermined as to the criterion for "correct".

No serious student of Wittgenstein, if even they disagree with Wittgenstein, would deny many of these points being made about rule-following. There may be disagreements, but most of this is understood by those who study Wittgenstein in a serious way. — Sam26

I don't disagree with Wittgenstein on these points, but I disagree with your interpretation. So you have a specific interpretation, which may or may not, to some extent, be shared by other serious scholars. And so you might think that I disagree with Wittgenstein, simply because the interpretation I make, and which I agree with in principle, disagrees with yours.

The one thing I can say about MU is that he keeps his cool about all of this. In that sense he is better than me. The Marine in me wants to take the person and kick them in the ass, which would solve nothing. I think it comes down to this, you either see it or you don't. If you don't see it, fine, just move on. Now, if I can take my own advice, I'd be doing well. — Sam26

So why is it a case of "you must see it my way or else you don't see it at all"? It really does not come down to "I must see it your way, or else I don't see it". What makes your way the correct way?

My point is that if you think you're going to get anywhere with your explanations you're living in a dream world. The only reason I see to answering some of his questions is to help others who may also be confused. — Sam26

Hey Sam26, in case you haven't noticed, although I still have a lot of confusion, my perspective on this material has changed a lot since we first engaged years ago. Wouldn't that indicate that your explanations have helped me? Allow me to thank you for that. Thanks, sincerely. Now what about you? Do you steadfastly maintain the same interpretation you made on your first reading, or do you proceed with an open mind, hoping to learn something new every day?

So why is it a case of "you must see it my way or else you don't see it at all"? It really does not come down to "I must see it your way, or else I don't see it". What makes your way the correct way? — Metaphysician Undercover

One of the things I did MU was to read primary sources and make an interpretation based on what I understood the interpretation to be, then I compared that interpretation with other philosophers who knew the material. One of the ways I knew I was on track was that my interpretation was lining up with what others were saying. If my interpretation was not in line with what others were interpreting, at least generally, then I would have good reason to suspect that something was wrong. So it's not a matter of seeing it my way, or having an open mind, it's about understanding the material.

My first challenge to you would be to find other philosophers who see it the way you do, no interpretation is a matter one person's view, as if you can simply choose any interpretation you want. So why don't you find other philosophers who view rule-following the way you do, and present the argument.

One of the things you seem to have a hard time with, is that rule-following is intrinsic to the actions associated with linguistic activities. This is just basic stuff. It's fine if you disagree with it, but all I'm saying is that I don't follow your arguments. I've read your responses, and I can't make any sense of some of what your saying. It's not personal, it's just that I can't see how anything anyone can say will change your mind, or make you understand.

Whenever I'm arguing with someone in person, and I suspect that they're not understanding my argument, I'll ask them to explain my argument as they see it. In this way, I'll know that either I'm not explaining the argument well enough, or that they don't understand the argument.

My second challenge to you is to explain Wittgenstein's rule-following argument as you understand it, whether you disagree with it or not. Explain it like you were explaining it to someone who never read Wittgenstein, and use supporting paragraphs.

OK, I see that, but then he proceeds with "what if no such sample is a part of the language..." and proceeds from here. So it is still undetermined as to the criterion for "correct". — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, if there were no sample that could be used as a paradigm then there is no way to settle whether one remembers the color correctly. It is possible that the sample has darkened but it is also possible that one does not remember the color correctly.
Such indeterminacy or uncertainty is not something Wittgenstein is attempting to overcome. See below regarding rules.

One of the things you seem to have a hard time with, is that rule-following is intrinsic to the actions associated with linguistic activities. — Sam26

Indeed, language requires being able to follow the rules/logic/grammar of the language game. This is not something that is grasped all at once as a whole in a moment of insight. It often involves some form of correction and mimicry as the language game is learned. This applies to other rules as well. When, for example, one is learning the rules of chess, the pieces are identified and how they move is shown. When the player who is learning makes a move that violates the rules how the piece is allowed to move she is shown again. A more astute learner may learn simply by watching others play.

But not all games are played by rules that are set and clearly defined. Sometimes the rules are made as we go along by some kind of consent and agreement. There are no rules that stand as the rules for making rules. In addition, the existing rules may no longer be adequate when something new is learned, as in the case of quantum mechanics, where the Newtonian rules do not apply.

My first challenge to you would be to find other philosophers who see it the way you do, no interpretation is a matter one person's view, as if you can simply choose any interpretation you want. So why don't you find other philosophers who view rule-following the way you do, and present the argument. — Sam26

So far I am in complete agreement with StreetlightX's interpretation, and I seem to be in agreement with Isaac. I have been pretty much in agreement with Luke up until now, but this particular section we're on now appears to be difficult.

One of the things you seem to have a hard time with, is that rule-following is intrinsic to the actions associated with linguistic activities. — Sam26

You keep asserting this, but I've followed the text quite closely and Wittgenstein has yet to make such a claim. Whether this is what you or I believe is irrelevant, we are interpreting the text for what it says.

My second challenge to you is to explain Wittgenstein's rule-following argument as you understand it, whether you disagree with it or not. Explain it like you were explaining it to someone who never read Wittgenstein, and use supporting paragraphs. — Sam26

At this point in the text, where we're at, Wittgenstein has not yet produced a "rule-following argument". It actually doesn't seem to be the type of book which proceeds by arguments, more like he makes various points through multiple examples. If you could point me to such an argument, I will offer an interpretation of the passage. Otherwise you might just follow the thread and when this so-called rule-following argument comes up I'm sure we will discuss it.

Right, if there were no sample that could be used as a paradigm then there is no way to settle whether one remembers the color correctly. It is possible that the sample has darkened but it is also possible that one does not remember the color correctly.
Such indeterminacy or uncertainty is not something Wittgenstein is attempting to overcome. See below regarding rules. — Fooloso4

OK, so I think we agree on that, but how would you interpret this passage at the end of 57:

When we forget which colour this is the name of, it loses its meaning for us; that is, we are no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And the situation then is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language, ...

Is he saying that what was referred to as a paradigm, in 55, "something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning", actually exists in memory? Or what does he mean by "comparable" with a paradigm? He seems to say at 55 that an object cannot be such a paradigm because the name can still have meaning without the object, but now he says that the name cannot have meaning without the memory. So isn't it the memory which fulfills the conditions of "a paradigm" as stated at 55, something corresponding to the name, without which the name would have no meaning?

If the paradigm is within the memory, and the memory is unreliable, then how could we ever know the correct use of the word?