What I said, or at least meant to say is that my certainty of whether or not there is "a green growing thing that I can see through my window", is dependent on the certainty that I have an unmistakably correct understanding of what that phrase means. — Metaphysician Undercover
Philosophy treats "Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language." — Banno
When you say 'phrase', I assume you mean 'tasty sausage', is that right? — unenlightened
The appropriate way for Wittgenstein to deal with the infinite regress of explanation which is required to remove the possibility of misunderstanding, is to accept the fact that doubt cannot be excluded. This simply means that we proceed in our activities without certainty. And, this thing which he attempts to do, establish the foundations for an epistemology in which doubt has been removed, and there is certainty, is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
...an explanation may indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none stands in need of another - unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding. One might say: an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding —– one, that is, that would arise if not for the explanation, but not every misunderstanding that I can imagine. — PI 87
Wittgenstein in no way attempts to "establish the foundations for an epistemology in which doubt has been removed". This type of foundational philosophical thinking is rejected by Wittgenstein, and is a way of thought he is attempting to subvert via his therapeutic writing. The next 40-50 passages in the text seek to disabuse the reader of thinking in these ideal terms. Most of us - philosophers and non-philosophers alike - proceed in many of our daily activities with certainty without the need for any perfect epistemological foundation. — Luke
Most of us - philosophers and non-philosophers alike - proceed in many of our daily activities with certainty without the need for any perfect epistemological foundation. — Luke
Reply in messages. — Banno
PI points out how taking one way of using words and applying it in another situation leads to misunderstanding.
Your thread is an excellent example, in that you are misled by an analogy with things - oranges and potatoes - into treating meaning as if it were also a thing.
It isn't. But you showed Wittgenstein's point so clearly, I had to make use of it. — Banno
It is all philosophical thinking, regardless of whether Wittgenstein says otherwise. — Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't say it wasn't philosophical thinking; I said it wasn't foundational philosophical thinking. See Foundationalism. — Luke
But, of course, you should follow Wittgenstein. :grin: — Luke
In relation to what is said at 87, this statement is questionable. — Metaphysician Undercover
So he offers as a resolution, to eliminate that doubt, and secure the foundation, "The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose." But this principle is completely impotent. for its intended purpose,It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an existing gap
in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we
first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these
doubts. — 87
understand all this as saying that logic does not set out the rules of language, but that rather we choose a logic that suits what we are doing with language. — Banno
But then the explanation requires an explanation, — Metaphysician Undercover
You added the word possible....any time misunderstanding is possible — Metaphysician Undercover
Damn, I didn't want to get drawn in to this. — Banno
You added the word possible. — Banno
Following the rule, or not, is shown in the doing. If the actions are in accord with the rules, that will suffice; if the signpost leads us in the right direction, that is all that we require of it. There is no need to dig further; but moreover, digging further would be an error. — Banno
it's as if you were asking why the bishop only move diagonally, and wanting not an explanation from the history of the game, but a further rule within the game. — Banno
Again I'd suggest moving on, since there is no further way to convince Meta that it's a rabbit and a duck if he only sees the duck. The point must be taken as moot. As the conversation moves on, other points of disagreement will arise. — Banno
To remove doubt, we seek an explanation. But then the explanation requires an explanation, and unless it's the final one, it's as if the explanation is hung in the air. Wittgenstein prevents this possibility of infinite regress of doubt and explanation, by asserting that an explanation is only needed, "if required to prevent a misunderstanding". — Metaphysician Undercover
But similar doubts to those about the name “Moses” are possible about the words of this explanation (what are you calling “Egypt”, whom the “Israelites”, and so forth?). These questions would not even come to an end when we got down to words like “red”, “dark”, “sweet”. - “But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if, after all, it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don’t understand what he means, and never shall!” - As though an explanation, as it were, hung in the air unless supported by another one. — PI 87
Whereas an explanation may indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none stands in need of another - unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding. One might say: an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding —– one, that is, that would arise if not for the explanation, but not every misunderstanding that I can imagine. — PI 87
It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed a gap in the foundations; so that secure understanding is possible only if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these doubts. — PI 87
The signpost is in order - if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose. — PI 87
it's as if you were asking why the bishop only move diagonally, and wanting not an explanation from the history of the game, but a further rule within the game.
— Banno
I don't see what you are saying. — Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein's solution is to provide a circuit breaker to the regress. We don't need to justify every word or statement, as the regress problem would have it; we only need to provide an explanation in order to avoid a misunderstanding. Wittgenstein cuts off the regress near the surface level of language use, rather than at the foundation. — Luke
It is hard to see why you think that this is a foundationalist philosophy. There is no chain of justification ending at basic beliefs here: "none stands in need of another - unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding". — Luke
That is, the signpost is in order if, under normal circumstances, no further explanation is required to avoid a misunderstanding. Conversely, we avoid a misunderstanding if, under normal circumstances, the signpost (or words used) fulfils its purpose. — Luke
Indeed. — Banno
You simply repeat the interlocutor's concern at §87: "But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if, after all, it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don’t understand what he means, and never shall!”
Yet you fail to acknowledge or be satisfied by Wittgenstein's response.
I have no further interest in attempting to explain it. — Luke
...there is always a possibility of misunderstanding. Therefore an explanation would always be required to avoid the doubt incurred by the possibility of misunderstanding. So, Wittgenstein's attempt to avoid the infinite regress fails. — Metaphysician Undercover
No single ideal of exactness has been envisaged; we do not know what we are to make of this idea - unless you yourself stipulate what is to be so called. But you’ll find it difficult to make such a stipulation - one that satisfies you. — PI 88
You complain that doubt can always remain; that we can always fall short of an exact understanding, but these are merely imagined possibilities. The logical result of this claim is that understanding (or exact understanding) is impossible. — Luke
Can you honestly state that there has never been an occasion on which you have understood a signpost or what someone tells you? Understanding signposts and what people say is both possible and actual - it happens every day. — Luke
Yes. The so-called interlocutor's concern is a concern which Wittgenstein had about his description of rules, or else he would not have brought it up as a concern. — Metaphysician Undercover
All this, however, can appear in the right light only when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning something, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what may mislead us (and did mislead me) into thinking that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it, he is thereby operating a calculus according to definite rules.
“But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if, after all, it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don’t understand what he means, and never shall!”
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.