But as I've been explaining to unenlightened, there is a fundamental inconsistency between probabilities and impossible. Any impossibility created through probability is not a true impossibility, as the principle of plenitude indicates. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m in agreement with this.

So maybe you can explain to me what the others have not been able to. Why must there be an underlying psychological certainty? Take your example. I've lost my cup. — Metaphysician Undercover

The leading implicit (psychological) certainty in this hypothetical is that “I’ve lost my cup”. Devoid of this certainty, how would doubts as to where it might be begin manifesting?

I’ll do my best to summarize my position. Both certainty and uncertainty (but not doubt) can be linguistically applied to either a) ontology or b) epistemology. Emotive reasons for such statements aside, when it is said, “It is certain that the planet Earth is not flat,” one here affirms, what I’ll term, an ontic certainty: a determinate state of affairs that thereby holds no alternative possibilities. In contrast, when one says that, “I’m certain that planet Earth is not flat,” one here affirms, what I’ll term, a subjective certainty: a determinate state of mind pertaining to an awareness wherein this awareness deems that which its certain of to be the sole credible possibility, notably, regarding what is in fact ontically certain. Conversely, there are statements such as, “the future’s uncertain,” which can specify an ontic uncertainty: the indeterminate state of affairs that is found in the timespan we term the future. And: “I’m uncertain about the future,” which specifies a subjective uncertainty: an indeterminate state of mind wherein multiple credible alternatives compete for what in fact is the ontically certain (or determinate) state of affairs as it pertains to the future.

I’m hoping that the intelligibility of these four sentences here suffices in substantiating the validity of these two distinct categories of certainty and uncertainty: those which are ontic and those which are subjective.

Ontic certainties and uncertainties are not taken by us to be possibilities but, instead, to be factual states of being. These to me are fancy ways of re-expressing the concept of “is”—which isn’t a possibility but, in our cognition, an absolute. “The cup is on the table” doesn’t express a probability but a fact, which, as facts go, are taken by us to be absolute/total/complete actualities (in so far as they are not mere possibility, or mere potential regarding being). Extreme scenario: the stance that there are no ontic certainties is itself cognized, however implicitly, as depicting that which is ontically certain, thereby resulting in contradiction (hence, an error of reasoning). We think in terms of ontic certainties. A tangential: all ontic uncertainties (i.e., indeterminate states of affairs), if they factually hold presence, shall themselves be ontically certain; e.g. that the future is uncertain, if it is factually so, will itself be a(n ontic) certainty. Otherwise, we couldn’t claim that ontic uncertainties / indeterminate states of affairs factually occur/are.

All subjective certainties (including both psychological and epistemic) will hold some ontic certainty as referent. E.g., if one is certain that planet Earth is not flat one will hold this affirmation to adequately depict that which is ontically certain (or, that which is a determinate state of affairs). The clincher is that no known subjective certainty can be infallible in what it upholds to be ontically certain—but this here seems to be an aside.

With this as general background:

All subjective uncertainties (of which doubt is a type) will likewise be about some given state of affairs, about something which in fact is. This given or set of gives one is uncertain or doubtful about, however, shall itself be subordinate to a subjective certainty (which upholds a referenced ontic certainty): namely, that there is a determinate state of affairs (an ontic certainty) to the subject matter one is uncertain or doubtful about. Devoid of our subjective certainty that there is a relevant, underlying ontic certainty to be discovered, states of uncertainty and doubt become meaningless. This last sentence might be the hardest point to convey given your stances so far, but, as an example: if I am uncertainty/doubtful about whether or not the cup is on the table (or anything else), I already hold a certainty that some cognitive possibility that is conceivable adequately depicts that which is ontically certain regarding this matter. It’s just that I can’t figure out which of the multiple cognitive possibilities I’m pondering this one cognitive possibility is (this for as long as I remain uncertainty/doubtful). Devoid of this underlying subjective certainty that some relevant ontic certainty holds presence, uncertainty and doubt would again not be possible—the multiple alternatives that go through my mind would then not be competing for what in fact is (each, instead, then being its own stable reality, even if they are contradictory to each other).

More briefly, one must first be certain that something is in fact the case in order to be uncertain or in doubt about what the case might in fact be.

Going by the aforementioned, the conclusion is that no subjective uncertainty (including that of doubt) is possible in the complete absence of all subjective certainty. (To me related: also, no ontic uncertainty is possible where it’s presence to not be ontically certain—and, thus, and ontic certainty). Hence, the presence of uncertainty is always subordinate to the presence of certainty.

I’ve condensed my views a lot in this post. Won’t be surprised if there happens to be lack of clarity in what I’ve written. But, if so, point out the pertinent areas where I’ve been less than sufficiently clear.

I think it is no longer worth my time and effort trying to help you see more than your myopic vision allows. It is one thing to discuss the texts but quite another when you resort to personal insult.

The leading implicit (psychological) certainty in this hypothetical is that “I’ve lost my cup”. Devoid of this certainty, how would doubts as to where it might be begin manifesting? — javra

I don't see how you can make a valid argument here. I'm doubting the location of my cup. But at the same time I might also be doubting if I even had a cup. I'm thinking where's my cup, and start looking, then right away, I realize that I might not have even gotten a cup in the first place. Now I'm wondering where is my cup, and looking for it, but I'm at the very same time wondering if I even have a cup. So I don't see how you can claim any necessary, underlying certainty. It's simply not there. We may proceed into action without certainty of what we are doing. Perhaps it's a function of habit. I want my coffee, so I proceed into looking for where I set it down, before I properly consider whether or not I even got a coffee yet. Proceeding into an habitual action is not a function of certainty.

Aristotle developed the position that knowledge always must lead from the more certain toward the less certain. This means that something with a higher degree of certainty always underlies and supports the thing with the lower degree of certainty. But now we're talking about doubt, and there is nothing to indicate that there must be certainty underlying doubt. We naturally doubt the less certain things first, but this may lead us to doubt the underlying things which are more certain. I doubt where the cup is, but this might lead me to doubt whether I even have a cup. And, when we find, as Wittgenstein demonstrates to us, that the meanings of the words which express our knowledge, are themselves dubitable, this justifies doubting the entire structure of knowledge.

Emotive reasons for such statements aside, when it is said, “It is certain that the planet Earth is not flat,” one here affirms, what I’ll term, an ontic certainty: a determinate state of affairs that thereby holds no alternative possibilities. — javra

What is at question in the context of this thread, is the understanding of the phrase "the planet earth is not flat". There is no point to saying "I am certain that ...", until I am certain that I understand what "..." means. Certainty that the statement is true can only be supported by certainty that the statement is not misunderstood. If there are "alternative possibilities" to the meanings of these terms, "planet", "earth", "flat", as Wittgenstein explains that there are possibilities for meaning, then we need to assess the certainty we have with respect to the meaning of the phrase. If I cannot say with certainty, that I know what "the planet earth is not flat" means, then I cannot proceed to have any certainty about whether the statement is true or false.

Devoid of our subjective certainty that there is a relevant, underlying ontic certainty to be discovered, states of uncertainty and doubt become meaningless. — javra

This appears to be fundamentally untrue. We can proceed with doubt as to whether or not such certainty is possible to obtain. This doubt does not prevent us from proceeding. I do not need certainty that I will win the game, before I proceed into playing the game. I do not even need to be certain that winning is possible before I proceed. And, we might never know until after we proceed, whether or not such certainty is possible. Perhaps certainty is impossible, but we do not know that it is impossible, we might never know whether it's possible or not until we attempt to obtain it.

“The cup is on the table” doesn’t express a probability but a fact, which, as facts go, are taken by us to be absolute/total/complete actualities (in so far as they are not mere possibility, or mere potential regarding being). — javra

So what is at issue here is what is meant by "the cup is on the table". We cannot proceed to discuss whether it is certain or not, that this is true, until we are certain of the meaning of the phrase. Since there are a number of possibilities for meaning, then any determination of the meaning of this phrase, whether it is the intended meaning, really is a matter of probability.

More briefly, one must first be certain that something is in fact the case in order to be uncertain or in doubt about what the case might in fact be. — javra

This is a fundamental misrepresentation. One can be uncertain, and in doubt, without even knowing "what the case is" means. So you are assuming that one must know what "what the case is" means, prior to having doubt about what is the case. But that's irrelevant, because the person can still be uncertain and doubtful about what is going on, without even knowing what "what the case is" means. Sure, the person would not be doubting what "is in fact the case", but the person would still be doubting and uncertain. Therefore one does not need to be "certain that something is in fact the case", in order to be doubtful of one's knowledge of the situation.

I think it is no longer worth my time and effort trying to help you see more than your myopic vision allows. It is one thing to discuss the texts but quite another when you resort to personal insult. — Fooloso4

I apologize for classing you with Luke, or any other thing which you may have apprehended as an insult. Insult was not my intention. But it's very frustrating for me, with a sincere desire to discuss the text, to have people showing no indication that they have even read the section in question, insinuating that I have misunderstood what Wittgenstein has said. Only unenlightened has actually engaged me on the basis of the terms in the text. The issue was whether or not Wittgenstein's appeal to "ordinary circumstances" (87), is sufficient to "leave no room for doubt" (85).

insinuating that I have misunderstood what Wittgenstein has said. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me make it clear: you have misunderstood Wittgenstein.

The issue was whether or not Wittgenstein's appeal to "ordinary circumstances" (87), is sufficient to "leave no room for doubt" (85). — Metaphysician Undercover

The third edition has it as "leave no room for doubt", but the fourth edition has it as "leave room for doubt" (at §85).

In TS 227(a), one of the two surviving typescripts, Wittgenstein crossed out the ‘k’ in ‘keinen’ in §85(b), thus changing the sentence from ‘der Wegweiser lässt doch keinen Zweifel offen’ (‘the signpost does after all leave no room for doubt’) to ‘der Wegweiser lässt doch einen Zweifel offen’ (‘the signpost does after all leave room for doubt’). This, in the context, makes much better sense. — Editorial Preface to the Fourth Edition

But what would I know, since I didn't participate in a part of the discussion. :roll:

The issue was whether or not Wittgenstein's appeal to "ordinary circumstances" (87), is sufficient to "leave no room for doubt" (85). — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll have one more go with you Meta, as all my other threads are full of trolls at the moment. if you ask a non philosopher to look out of my window and say what they see, they will tell you, "A tree".
'Are you sure?'
"Of course I'm sure, I know what a tree looks like."
"But are you absolutely certain?"
"Do you think I''m daft or something"

Traditionally, philosophers have decided that this man is wrong, and have pointed out to him that in a desert the might be mirages of trees, that someone might have painted an image of a tree on the glass or projected an image onto a cloth, or indeed, that he might be daft. Let's call these 'special circumstances'.

And why cannot one reply, that all these things might be, but happen not to be?

Look at what the philosopher is doing. How has he discovered that these special circumstances exist at all? How has he discovered that one can be deceived? It is not by some complex argument or power of reason, but in exactly the same way as the non-philosopher, by going about the world, and coming across these special circumstances, and learning to recognise them in exactly the same way that he learns to recognise a tree. There is no other way. Are you sure there can be special circumstances? Are you sure these illusions are illusions? Perhaps a painted tree is a real tree, perhaps a mirage is a real oasis, why is this more sure than anything else? Perhaps daft people see reality. The apparent sophistication of doubt turns out to have no firmer foundation than the naive certainty it replaces. The non philosopher was right in the first place:

"Do you think I'm daft or something? Nay lad, It's you that's got in a muddle from too much thinking."

Let me make it clear: you have misunderstood Wittgenstein. — Fooloso4

To justify this assertion, you ought to address this section of the text, and show me where I've been mislead by Wittgenstein's words.

The third edition has it as "leave no room for doubt", but the fourth edition has it as "leave room for doubt" (at §85). — Luke

Good, this supports my claim that "leaves no room for doubt", is inconsistent with what Wittgenstein was trying to say. And, if he goes on to introduce epistemological principles in "On Certainty", where doubt may be excluded, that would be inconsistent with what he is saying here in PI.

Since you agree with me that he is saying that the rules, as sign-posts, leave room for doubt, then for what reasons do you not agree that his position is consistent with what I've described, what you've called "radical doubt"? This so-called "radical doubt" is the consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology of rules.

I'll have one more go with you Meta, as all my other threads are full of trolls at the moment. — unenlightened

Thanks for the reassurance, I get the impression that the other two here have placed me in the troll category.

It is not by some complex argument or power of reason, but in exactly the same way as the non-philosopher, by going about the world, and coming across these special circumstances, and learning to recognise them in exactly the same way that he learns to recognise a tree. — unenlightened

I would not agree with this statement. I think that the "special circumstances" are brought to light by the power of reason, and complex arguments. Suppose your example goes another way, suppose the person who is asking, differs from the person answering, and says "no that's not a tree, it's a shrub", and then produces of argument for that point of view. The person who claimed that it was a tree, and insisted on certainty, did not know of the special circumstances, without the power of reason and argument.

Remember the knights who are the keepers of the sacred word Ni? Living in a forest of trees, they want a shrubbery.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MYSMPjMVnAU

Each person gets set in one's own habits of seeing the world in a particular way, but the way that each of us sees it, is slightly different from each other. The "special circumstance" which is conducive to doubt, is the situation where we disagree. It's not by going out in the world, that we learn to recognize the special circumstances, it's by having them pointed out to us. Imagine people thousands of years ago. One person points out a rock to another and says look at this rock, I can put it in the fire and separate an element (gold) out from this rock. Until that point, the other person doesn't even see the rock as a special rock. Metaphysicians seek those special circumstances at the foundational level.

I think that this is what the capacity to understand language consists of, seeing every instance as a special instance. This is a fundamental reversal from the perspective of relating the sameness of the use of words, to say that each word has "a meaning". Meaning is related to context, and every instance of usage has its own special context and therefore its own special meaning. The view that each word has "a meaning" is a mistaken view, because the meaning is peculiar to the context. This means that in the context of language usage, every instance is a special circumstance.

Consider what might happen when the context gets old, written material has aged for hundreds of years. Living in a different era now, we have great difficulty determining the meaning of old texts, because this requires putting ourselves in that context. This for example, is always a problem in interpreting religious texts, and has become a notable issue in the interpretation of the 2nd amendment of the USA.

The apparent sophistication of doubt turns out to have no firmer foundation than the naive certainty it replaces. — unenlightened

The point is that there is no firm foundation. The shifting sands of time are what supports the theory of social collapse spoken of by Dr. Bendell in your other thread. Whether a "collapse" or a "shift" is unknown, but change is inevitable. Are you familiar with Kuhn's concept of paradigm shift? The paradigm shift is only made possible by a foundation which is not firm. Wittgenstein was no stranger to Kuhn.

Suppose your example goes another way, suppose the person who is asking, differs from the person answering, and says "no that's not a tree, it's a shrub", and then produces of argument for that point of view. The person who claimed that it was a tree, and insisted on certainty, did not know of the special circumstances, without the power of reason and argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

We can argue about nomenclature, but it is a different kind of uncertainty entirely, and one that W. also goes into exhaustively. Why muddy the waters instead of dealing with the example given, and the special circumstances given?

Consider what might happen when the context gets old, written material has aged for hundreds of years. Living in a different era now, we have great difficulty determining the meaning of old texts, because this requires putting ourselves in that context. This for example, is always a problem in interpreting religious texts, and has become a notable issue in the interpretation of the 2nd amendment of the USA. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah language can become divorced from context and so meaning can become less clear and certain.
But again you are not dealing with the challenge but posing a different language problem. Deal with the tree, or the shrub if you want to call it a shrub. Deal with the source of the uncertainty of its being, not the uncertainty of its name. You seem to me to want to run to a linguistic confusion in order to avoid dealing with the argument.

The point is that there is no firm foundation. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that's not the point. You missed the point by blowing linguistic smoke. Foundations are set into the ground and so they are grounded. The green thing growing outside my window is a green thing growing outside my window and there is no uncertainty, no doubt about it, whatever language we speak. Any uncertainty one might suggest requires the same certainty that is being undermined - the special circumstances that don't, as it happens, apply.

To justify this assertion, you ought to address this section of the text, and show me where I've been mislead by Wittgenstein's words. — Metaphysician Undercover

I could but what would be the point? Despite your talk of uncertainly you seem certain that you have understood Wittgenstein, and that his epistemology is incoherent, and that those who do not agree with you have not been paying sufficient attention.

Has it not occurred to you that Wittgenstein only appears to be incoherent to you because you have not understood him?

The irony is that you have not "been mislead by Wittgenstein's words". It is not the words that are misleading. Like the signpost, someone can always interpret it in the wrong way, but that is not the fault of the signpost.

When I come to stop sign I do not wait for a go sign to appear before proceeding. There is no room for doubt, but someone who does not know what a stop sign is might never go any further once he has seen "stop".

Good, this supports my claim that "leaves no room for doubt", is inconsistent with what Wittgenstein was trying to say. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not really, because in the very next sentence of §85 - which is unchanged in both the third and fourth editions - W says: "Or rather, it sometimes leaves room for doubt, and sometimes not." You've willfully ignored this sentence for the last few pages of this discussion, and built your 'incoherent epistemology' thesis around the claim that W says "leaves no room for doubt" (only).

Since you agree with me that he is saying that the rules, as sign-posts, leave room for doubt, then for what reasons do you not agree that his position is consistent with what I've described, what you've called "radical doubt"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, he says at §85 that "it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not". At §84, he states:

But that is not to say that we are in doubt because it is possible for us to imagine a doubt. — PI 84

This is Wittgenstein's view, which is what everyone here has been trying to tell you.

§85 is a prelude to the later passages on rule following, including §201 ("there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation").

I don't see how you can make a valid argument here. I'm doubting the location of my cup. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

Doubt (as we are addressing it) is a conscious activity. Do we agree?

So, when doubting the location of the cup, can one simultaneously doubt that one is doubting, and furthermore doubt that one is in doubt about one's doubting of where the cup is, and this in infinite regress, at a level of momentary conscious awareness? If not, one will be psychologically certain that one is in doubt at the moment one is in doubt. Thereby making global doubt a psychological impossibility.

That one can doubt everything more or less sequentially if one wants (fist doubting this then doubting that) does not imply a global doubt (one that is fully devoid of any momentary certainty) ... unless one equivocates between infallible/absolute/indubitable subjective certainty and regular subjective certainty as it is commonly understood. But, then, if by "global doubt" one intends to express the held psychological certainty that there are no infallible certainties, this would in itself be a position one is certain about - and this, of itself, contradicts the position of global doubt.

I'm trying to address extremes since less extreme examples don't appear to be convincing to you.

As to the rest of your arguments, I noticed that they revolve around the issues of what words mean. As I previously mentioned, I have not read much of Wittgenstein. Started reading On Certainty but then lost interest. So I'll abstain from arguing these issues in general. I will make the observation that we cannot help from being momentarily certain of what we mean by the words we express to convey our meaning. Otherwise, why would any words be expressed by us?

∮88

Isn't the engine idling?

Wittgenstien was an engineer. This mechanical metaphor is worth paying attention to. The engine only does work when the clutch is engaged; language only does work when it engages with the other stuff we are doing; when it is part of our lives.

The doubt posited by @Metaphysician Undercover does not engage with the world; indeed it serves to sever that connection. So it makes it impossible to discuss @unenlightened's tree.

Notice that engaging the clutch does not stop the engine; it just sits there spinning away - not unlike @Metaphysician Undercover, with whom I and others have had this discussion many times over the years.

In the end one must re-engage the clutch and move on.

 §89 - if you will permit me to take my own advice...

My favourite reply to the recurrent thread "What is time?" is "I'll tell you later".

Sometimes this is the only way to answer a question. The specific gravity of hydrogen is 0.0696. The answer can be said. That's not the way one can answer a question such as "What is time?"; one knows what time is, but it cannot be said, it can only be shown.

Rabbits and ducks. But they're further on up the road.

§85 is a prelude to the later passages on rule following, including §201 ("there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation"). — Luke

It's also the source of a game I sometimes play here, in which a thread is built by players taking it in turns to add a rule.

A game I take to have profound philosophical significance, but which is usually shuffled off to the social sections of the forum.

 §90. Grammar.

Here he is setting out the core of his new philosophical method, in which philosophical discussion is "taken apart"; Philosophy treats "Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language."

A game I take to have profound philosophical significance, but which is usually shuffled off to the social sections of the forum. — Banno

Yes. It does nicely show that a (system of) rule( s ) can be followed regardless of whatever mutations they may later develop. Though playing the game is mostly disregarding others' stated rules just to posit your own, which is where the fun is in the game when no one is taking it so seriously.

Though saying that some things can only be shown is still saying things, gesturing towards them is still saying things - as if words could not show -, 'going out to look', so to speak, can still inspire good writing and precise description.

Relegating things to the background isn't a universal acid for philosophical problems; if anything the widespread application of the strategy displays a deaf ear for the 'grammar' of the problems thus consigned to the dustbin. There's no need to throw away the well posed questions and relevant/topical analysis of them along with the mistakes.

Edit: though, this would derail the thread if we pursued it. If you can be bothered the discussion might be worth another thread.

90. We feel as if we had to see right into phenomena: yet our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein replaces Kant's transcendental conditions of the possibility of phenomena, that is, mental representation, with the transcendental conditions of logic and ethics/aesthetics. Here he drops all talk of transcendental conditions.

By way of explanation he says:

What that means is that we call to mind the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena.

And:

Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one. And this inquiry sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away.

§91 And now comes a critique of the Tractatus...

It feels like we need to be exact; and this underpinned the approach of the older text. But keep in mind the previous discussion of exactitude.

(edit: I'm reading the voice here as of a protagonist, not the main thread. He is setting up being exact about our language in order to show that it would be an error..)

§92

The Ontology of Linguistic Meaning

"The essence is hidden from us"

:grin:

§97

Just so I don't have to look it up again...

5.5563 In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order.—That utterly simple thing, which we have to formulate here, is not a likeness of the truth, but the truth itself in its entirety. (Our problems are not abstract, but perhaps the most concrete that there are.)

§93 Puzzling over the illusion of a proposition being something remarkable.

§94 The temptation is to see logic as showing us how what is the case joins to what is said... But it ain't so.

§95 We think we talk as if what we think is what is true... but we can also think about what is false!

SO it can't be the thinking that makes it so; nor the being so that makes us think...

§96 More errors pile on; until we have a chain from thing through world to picture to truth to belief, and whatever else you want to add - fact goes int here somewhere, and some folk press perception and idea into service. All being the next step, and yet the very same thing.

§97 And the depth of the problem expands, so that logic is a crystal; yet the crystal is what is real (concrete). We think to grasp the essence of language in the chain introduced in §96 and extended here...

But all we have are ordinary words. Our desire for profundity is undone by the banality of language...

§98 ...our everyday language suits us just fine; putting the lie to the notion of a perfectly ordered language...

§99 ...and we find that we do not need such a perfect order; bringing us back tot he argument in §88: "Stand roughy there".

§100 A game does not need set rules. We can make them up as we go, or change them as we see fit. Language is, if you like, the ultimate game. There need be no perfect analysis, no crystal core.

§101

I'm reading the "we" in these texts as Wittgenstein's interlocutor, the chap to whom he is explaining an error. "We" comes close to being the early Wittgenstein, but is a bit more general.

We want logic to be perfect; but we can't see how, nor why.

§102 Logic appears to be a part of the background within which language takes place...

§103 ...and we cannot do language without it...

§104 ...we try to talk about it, and find ourselves using words (we predicate what lies in our method of representation)...

§105 ...and in using words about words we find ourselves trapped...

§106 ...and the solution is not to be more subtle but to keep to the everyday...

§107 ...to keep our words in contact (friction) with their everyday use (compare keeping the clutch engaged on an engine) because...

§108 ...language does not have the formal unity that was imagined.

We must keep ourselves using our ordinary words. But perhaps what philosophers do is ask about how the game is set up (chess).

I understand all this as saying that logic does not set out the rules of language, but that rather we choose a logic that suits what we are doing with language. That's the "...turning our whole examination around..." in §108.

And hence to the method described in §109, in which an examination of language leads to the recognition of philosophical problems as a "bewitchment" by language.

I understand all this as saying that logic does not set out the rules of language, but that rather we choose a logic that suits what we are doing with language. That's the "...turning our whole examination around..." in §108. — Banno

It is not that we choose a logic, as if it is out there existing on its own. The rules of a language game, like the rules of other games, is determined, so to speak, by playing it. The grammar does not come first, to be followed by application or use. The grammar develops and changes as the game is played.

We can argue about nomenclature, but it is a different kind of uncertainty entirely, and one that W. also goes into exhaustively. Why muddy the waters instead of dealing with the example given, and the special circumstances given? — unenlightened

I am not the one muddying the waters, nomenclature is what is at issue here. The rule stands like a sign-post. The words, as sign-posts, are themselves, the "rules" for understanding themselves. The question is whether we can remove the possibility of misunderstanding the words, and thereby remove doubt.

Yeah language can become divorced from context and so meaning can become less clear and certain.
But again you are not dealing with the challenge but posing a different language problem. Deal with the tree, or the shrub if you want to call it a shrub. Deal with the source of the uncertainty of its being, not the uncertainty of its name. You seem to me to want to run to a linguistic confusion in order to avoid dealing with the argument. — unenlightened

The problem is this. One cannot proceed to judge the certainty of the truth or falsity of the statement "that is a tree", until one has certainty with respect to the meaning of the word "tree". Certainty of meaning underlies certainty of truth or falsity. If there is no certainty of the meaning, there can be no certainty as to truth or falsity of the statement. Wittgenstein is questioning the certainty we have in relation to what the words mean, at 87 specifically, whether or not an explanation is needed to avoid misunderstanding the words (sign-post). The doubt we are concerned with is doubt in relation to understanding or misunderstanding the sign-posts. The foundation of certainty is certainty of meaning, and there cannot be any certainty with respect to truth or falsity without certainty of meaning.

Wittgenstein's ontology removes the certainty of meaning, which is granted to us in an ontology like platonic realism, which asserts an objective, and independent meaning to the words as independent Forms. Assuming independent Forms can give us certainty that there is "the meaning" to the words, and we can base certainty that we understand 'the meaning" on this certainty. But if we deny that there is such as thing as "the meaning", which Wittgenstein does, then where do we base any certainty that we have understood, and not misunderstood the words?

Despite your talk of uncertainly you seem certain that you have understood Wittgenstein, and that his epistemology is incoherent, and that those who do not agree with you have not been paying sufficient attention. — Fooloso4

I wouldn't be inviting people to explain to me where I've gone wrong, if I was certain that I hadn't gone wrong. That's nonsense. I put that out there as a topic to be discussed, to see if someone else could provide the foundation which I believe Wittgenstein has not provided. Or, to show me where I've misunderstood the words which are supposed to provide the foundation, which I have not found.

The irony is that you have not "been mislead by Wittgenstein's words". It is not the words that are misleading. Like the signpost, someone can always interpret it in the wrong way, but that is not the fault of the signpost. — Fooloso4

Right, that's my point isn't it? If there is the possibility that I might be interpreting the words in the wrong way, how do I remove the doubt I have in relation to my understanding?

When I come to stop sign I do not wait for a go sign to appear before proceeding. There is no room for doubt, but someone who does not know what a stop sign is might never go any further once he has seen "stop". — Fooloso4

Another person might not even stop at the stop sign. So, when you proceed from the stop sign, after stopping, you ought to proceed with doubt, being aware of the possibility that another person may not stop. Being certain, I understand, and the other person misunderstands, doesn't protect you from the other person's folly of misunderstanding. Therefore the form of certainty which you are pushing for, is an unjustified certainty.

Not really, because in the very next sentence of §85 - which is unchanged in both the third and fourth editions - W says: "Or rather, it sometimes leaves room for doubt, and sometimes not." You've willfully ignored this sentence for the last few pages of this discussion, and built your 'incoherent epistemology' thesis around the claim that W says "leaves no room for doubt" (only). — Luke

I haven't ignored this statement, that is the very quote I referred to when I started this discussion. My argument was, that according to Wittgenstein's ontology of rules, every situation leaves some degree of uncertainty, and therefore some room for doubt. He does not provide the premises required for the conclusion "sometimes there is no room for doubt".

This is Wittgenstein's view, which is what everyone here has been trying to tell you. — Luke

I fully realize that this is "Wittgenstein's view". The question is whether his stated "view" is consistent with his description. His description is what I have called his ontology of rules, rules exist like sign-posts. His stated "view" is the foundation of his epistemology. If there is inconsistency between these two, as I have argued, then his epistemology is incoherent. So the question is whether we can proceed logically from his ontology, the description of rules existing as sign-posts, to his epistemology, his "view" that sometimes there is no room for doubt.

At 86 - 87 he proceeds to describe the need for explanation in order to exclude the possibility of misunderstanding the sign-post, the rule. It doesn't make sense to him, that we would always need an explanation to avoid doubt, because this would mean that the explanation would need an explanation, etc., resulting in infinite regress, then doubt could not be avoided. So his claim is that we only need an explanation if an explanation is necessary to avoid misunderstanding. And, therefore, the sign-post requires no further explanation if under "normal circumstances" it fulfills its purpose.

My argument is that to exclude doubt, to leave no room for doubt, requires that the possibility of misunderstanding be removed. So I can say that what is stated here, at 87 is insufficient for removing doubt.

"Whereas an explanation may indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none stands in need of another—unless we require it to prevent a misunderstanding."

What is needed to remove doubt, is to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding. Wittgenstein's statement here really makes no sense, because we often do not know whether or not there is a misunderstanding. In these cases we do not know whether misunderstanding has been prevented. So we do not know whether an explanation is needed or not. Therefore doubt is justified. But if Wittgenstein had made the necessary statement, "an explanation is needed when required to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding", this would not support his epistemological principle, that sometimes doubt can be removed. An explanation would always be needed to remove the possibility of misunderstanding, and an explanation of the explanation, etc.. If there is a possibility of misunderstanding, then doubt cannot be removed, no matter how low the probability of misunderstanding is.

The appropriate way for Wittgenstein to deal with the infinite regress of explanation which is required to remove the possibility of misunderstanding, is to accept the fact that doubt cannot be excluded. This simply means that we proceed in our activities without certainty. And, this thing which he attempts to do, establish the foundations for an epistemology in which doubt has been removed, and there is certainty, is impossible. His description of rules, as sign-posts, does not provide what is needed to remove doubt and provide certainty in any circumstances.

Doubt (as we are addressing it) is a conscious activity. Do we agree? — javra

No, I don't agree with that. I am closer to unenlightened's characterisation which has doubt and certainty as a frame of mind. It's an attitude, the way we approach things, which affects our conscious activities. Either way, the attitude of doubt, or the attitude of certainty, is cultured into our habitual ways of acting and thinking, such that it is not necessary to consciously choose to be certain or doubtful. However, I do agree that there are levels of certainty and doubt which are properly conscious certainties and doubts.

I did not understand you division between uncertainty, and doubt, but now I think I see it. You seem to be positioning uncertainty and certainty as frames of mind, attitudes, and then placing doubt as a conscious activity. Your argument appears to be that we cannot proceed into any activity without certainty, therefore the activity of doubting requires certainty. My argument is that we can and do proceed into activities without certainty, and this is evident in other animals which do not have the rational capacity to produce certainty, but still act.

But let me take your premise, that doubting is an activity, and see where it leads. Let's start with the assumption that animals may act (and this includes mental acts), without certainty. Do you agree that certainty comes into existence from rational activity? If so, wouldn't this rational activity which creates certainty be going on when the animal is uncertain. And wouldn't this be a form of doubt? Or, do you place certainty as some underlying attitude, which even animals without rational capacity have?

So, when doubting the location of the cup, can one simultaneously doubt that one is doubting, and furthermore doubt that one is in doubt about one's doubting of where the cup is, and this in infinite regress, at a level of momentary conscious awareness? If not, one will be psychologically certain that one is in doubt at the moment one is in doubt. Thereby making global doubt a psychological impossibility. — javra

As I said already, I see no inconsistency between doubt and infinite regress. Doubt is a feature of infinite regress. Doubt is inherent within infinite regress because infinite regress is a lack of resolution. So when one considers the possibility of infinite regress, that person is doubtful, and this does not mean that the person is actively thinking about an infinite number of different thoughts. This argument, that certainty must underlie doubt, or else there would be an infinite regress of doubt, is fundamentally flawed, because infinite regress is consistent with doubt. It is only certainty which requires the removal of infinite regress. If we cannot find the principles to remove the infinite regress, then doubt is what we have, as doubt is consistent with infinite regress, and therefore certainty is lost.

But, then, if by "global doubt" one intends to express the held psychological certainty that there are no infallible certainties, this would in itself be a position one is certain about - and this, of itself, contradicts the position of global doubt. — javra

This is just not true. One can hold a belief without being certain that what is believed is true. Faith and religion are based in this fact. We believe without certainty. So to believe that there are no infallible certainties does not require that one is certain about this. The opposite, what you've described, is blatant misrepresentation produced for the purpose of supporting your untenable epistemological position.

Notice that engaging the clutch does not stop the engine; it just sits there spinning away - not unlike Metaphysician Undercover, with whom I and others have had this discussion many times over the years. — Banno

You mean disengaging the clutch don't you? If it is true that we need certainty with respect to our understanding of the sign-post before we proceed, as some here seem to be arguing, we'll sit here spinning away, forever. And, if we proceed on the premise that certainty can be produced without removing doubt, we proceed on a false premise. Equally false is the premise that doubt can be removed without removing the possibility of misunderstanding the sign-post. So, do we or do we not proceed on the premise that doubt cannot be removed from our interpretation of the sign-post, and therefore we are uncertain as to whether or not we are proceeding in the right direction?

I am not the one muddying the waters, — Metaphysician Undercover

So you agree that there is no uncertainty about there being a green growing thing that I can see through the window? Then my work here is done.