Wittgenstein’s crucial difficulty was that “our grammar lacks surveyability.” (PI, 122) In order to appreciate that thought we must understand that “grammar” is meant to be in this context not merely a system of abstract grammatical rules but the organized pattern of linguistic uses and practices. Wittgenstein’s claim is that the actual structure or order of our language game proves to be unsurveyable. He is thinking, in fact, not only about language in the narrow sense. It is the “grammar” of the human form of life, which includes society, culture, and history, that lacks surveyability. Wittgenstein draws our attention, in fact, to this broad phenomenon when he writes in section 122 of the Philosophical Investigations (in my translation) that “we do not survey the use of our words” and that “our grammar lacks surveyability.” Since he considers language central to the entire human form of life, it follows that our form of life must also be unsurveyable. No wonder then that unsurveyable wholes raise for him issues “of fundamental importance.” That we do not survey the use of our words, our grammar, language, and form of life he declares to be, indeed, “a main source of our lack of understanding.” He goes on to suggest in PI 122 that we need “a surveyable representation” that can generate “the comprehension that consists in ‘seeing connections’.” The concept of a surveyable representation, he adds, “signifies our form of representation, how we see things.” And he closes the section with the somewhat puzzling question: “Is this a ‘worldview’?”
Thanks Luke. Always nice to see that someone agrees with you. — Fooloso4
If one is entangled in the rules and the rules prevent one from saying what he means, then the meaning is not the rules. — Fooloso4
I trust that you are using the generic "you" here, as I was only trying to get a better handle on the section. I thought the article might be helpful to anyone else who might have had difficulty with the section. — Luke
Just to return to this, would you agree that meaning can be found in the rules (perhaps even typically)? — Luke
I can certainly imagine a "perfect circle", an "infinite extension", an "ideal body" and so on. — sime
126. The name “philosophy” might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.
… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.
Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one. And this inquiry sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. (90)
... call[ing] to mind the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena. (90)
Sow a seed in my soil and it will grow differently than it would in any other soil. (CV42)
Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) (CV 16)
Seeing comes before words. The child looks and recognizes before it can speak.
But there is also another sense in which seeing conies before words. It is seeing which establishes our place in the surrounding world; we explain that world with words, but words can never undo the fact that we are surrounded by it. The relation between what we see and what we know is never settled. Each evening we see the sun set. We know that the earth is turning away from it. Yet the knowledge, the explanation, never quite fits the sight. The Surrealist painter Magritte commented on this always-present gap between words and seeing in a painting called The Key of Dreams.
If one understands the rules then one knows what to do, but a set of rules is meaningless if one does not understand them. The meaning is not in the rules but in some larger activity. If, for example, the rules for how a knight or bishop moves in chess cannot be understood without knowing what these pieces are, that they are moved on a chess board, etc. — Fooloso4
The meaning of a word is found in its use. Rules or grammar determine proper and improper use. — Fooloso4
doesn't this indicate that meaning can be found in the rules? — Luke
There might be a rule for signposts that a pointed end is used for direction indicators, and a flat end for boundary markers (along with the rule about how the point works). Equivalent to '<' = 'this way to' & '|' = 'This is". — unenlightened
and neither would mean anything much without the writing. — unenlightened
Sorry if I'm being dense, but it appears that the rule for the signposts is also what the signposts mean. For example, 'England>' means 'this way to England'. — Luke
This is the rule: '<' = 'this way to' & '|' = 'This is". — unenlightened
In particular, §99 tries to head-off the objection that an 'indeterminate' sense - one without a strict boundary, like 'stay roughly there', is not 'good enough' to have, as it were, its own measure of perfection. In terms of §98, one can say that 'stay roughly here' 'is in order as it is'. It needs no further specification to be 'perfect' ... but not ideal. — StreetlightX
This leaves me to question the idea of a rule that you appear to be referring to which is somehow removed from this "larger activity". — Luke
Therefore, rules or grammar determine proper and improper meaning. — Luke
That might be the case when someone who is unfamiliar with the larger activity comes across the rule, an anthropologist, for example, studying a tribe. — Fooloso4
The syntactical rules determine word order or structure of a sentence but the understanding of the those rules do not tell us what it means to put the cat on the mat. — Fooloso4
The meaning of a word is found in its use. Rules or grammar determine proper and improper use. — Fooloso4
If I do not know the grammar I might say: "Put you out the cat". You may understand each of the words but not the combination. — Fooloso4
If, on the other hand, the direction was grammatical you will not understand what you are to do unless you understand the meaning of each of the words. — Fooloso4
Then again, you might understand the words but still not understand what you are to do. — Fooloso4
grammar is extracted by pedants from pre-existing communication. It starts as description and becomes prescription - we convene, and from there comes convention. — unenlightened
That might be the case when someone who is unfamiliar with the larger activity comes across the rule, an anthropologist, for example, studying a tribe.
— Fooloso4
What sort of rule might this be? — Luke
If the meaning of a word is found in its (proper?) use, and if the rules determine proper use, then understanding the rules should lead to proper use/meaning...? — Luke
I would also like to repeat unenlightened's insight which (I think) assists my claim, by blurring the distinction between the rules/grammar and "the larger activity" in which they find their home:
grammar is extracted by pedants from pre-existing communication. It starts as description and becomes prescription - we convene, and from there comes convention.
— unenlightened — Luke
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