"consistency" is something other than simple use. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you shout 'banana', when there is a wolf, it is no use, no one will come to your aid to fight a banana; you have to shout 'wolf'. On the other hand, if you make a habit of shouting 'wolf' when there is no wolf to fight because you like to see folks running, then that consistency will be learned, and when there is a wolf and you shout, no one will come. Every wolf is unique, and every wolf attack is unique, but every wolf attack demands the same call, and every non wolf attack demands the same call not be made (where 'same' is roughly but recognisably - 'Woolve' would probably be near enough, and it is the near enough ness that allows language to be mutual. And being mutual (and thus consistent) is necessary to language being useful, rather than decorative.

what two things are being compared? (1) The thing and (2) The mode of representation? — StreetlightX

The way I read it, is that one compares, maybe, red and green and becomes (overly) impressed with the significance of 'colour', as if does some work as the generality of how things can look, as opposed to marking out another possible look of things as 'colourless'.

I think 'we predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it' is fleshing out how we 'find' the ideal in language in the sense of 101: — fdrake

I agree, but as with much of Wittgenstein, this is one aspect of a larger issue. Note, for example:

78. Compare knowing and saying:
how many metres high Mont Blanc is a
how the word “game” is used a
how a clarinet sounds.
Someone who is surprised that one can know something and not be able to say it is perhaps thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not of one like the third.

It seems problematic to say that one knows something but cannot say it when thinking of the first example, but not the third.

Going back a bit further:

66. Compare chess with noughts and crosses.

Note how frequently in the passages between 66 and 78 (and elsewhere as well) he not only says "compare" but makes comparisons. It is this method of comparison that is of central importance. There is a clear connection with questions of language, but if one is looking for an übersichtlichen Darstellung, a representative overview or surveyable representation or perspicuous representation, then limiting the comparison to linguistic matters foreshortens one view. The Tractarian distinction between seeing and saying is still at work here, although it functions differently.

Note how frequently in the passages between 66 and 78 (and elsewhere as well) he not only says "compare" but makes comparisons. It is this method of comparison that is of central importance. There is a clear connection with questions of language, but if one is looking for an übersichtlichen Darstellung, a representative overview or surveyable representation or perspicuous representation, then limiting the comparison to linguistic matters foreshortens one view. The Tractarian distinction between seeing and saying is still at work here, although it functions differently. — Fooloso4

I did not mean to suggest otherwise, to the bolded statement. Wittgenstein's analysis of language in the PI always has a certain context (behavioural, social, game-inspired, later perspectival) in mind, and the context varies over the examples he uses. He uses the examples to reveal general features of language use, and portraying the commonalities between them is as much his 'method' of analysis as it is the bulk of our exegesis of the text. His emphasis on examples is what I was trying to ape by using the example of propositional logic - to highlight what it leaves out, and what a view from it looks like.

I did not mean to suggest otherwise, to the bolded statement. — fdrake

And I did not mean to imply that you did. It is a common misconception though, so I wanted to address it.

I also used it as an opportunity to continue the development of the theme of a surveyable representation.

I am showing my pupils details of an immense landscape which they cannot possibly know their way around. — Culture and Value 7

So, at any point in the text he might be talking about something very specific but it is the landscape he wants us to see.

If you shout 'banana', when there is a wolf, it is no use, no one will come to your aid to fight a banana; you have to shout 'wolf' — unenlightened

But we're talking about meaning, "use", and when I shout "banana" it has meaning regardless of whether anyone understands my use,and comes to my aid, or not. That "banana" is not the best thing to shout in that situation is the reason why I argue that we ought to always be seeking the ideal when choosing our words.

Every wolf is unique, and every wolf attack is unique, but every wolf attack demands the same call, and every non wolf attack demands the same call not be made (where 'same' is roughly but recognisably - 'Woolve' would probably be near enough, and it is the near enough ness that allows language to be mutual. And being mutual (and thus consistent) is necessary to language being useful, rather than decorative. — unenlightened

This is the matter of "serving the purpose". If shouting "banana" does not serve the purpose, then I have a problem. I am using "banana" in a certain way, but it is proving to be not a very useful way, like hitting a nail with the screwdriver is not very useful. It would be incorrect to say that I am not using the screwdriver to hit the nail, when I actually am, but still that particular use is turning out to be not very useful. A word like "woolve" might serve the purpose, but then again, it might not, so it is clearly less than ideal. A hammer might appear to be the ideal tool for banging nails, until someone shows up with an air-nailer. Then we have a distinction to make between "serving the purpose" and "ideal".

Exactly. So the satisfaction of some other objective is what truly governs play. If the rules no longer suit it, they are changed. The rules are a convenience, an aide memoir for what worked last time. — Isaac

Google dictionary defines a rule as: "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity."

Rules govern procedure. What "other objective" do you have in mind that "truly governs play"? You seem to assume that when I speak of a rule, that it must be something permanent and immutable. If we alter the rules as we go along, this doesn't mean that there are no longer any rules.

The question is whether such 'governance' - another word that appears nowhere in the PI with respect to rules - exhaustively characterizes language, on Witty's view. — StreetlightX

Why is that the question? Nobody has made such a claim.

I mean seriously, if the PI amounted to 'language is a rule governed activity', one wouldn't need to read a jot of it. One would just need to listen to your grade school teacher. — StreetlightX

So you're saying that "rule" is an empty concept and that "the rule is dead", but also that "obviously there are rules in language - just ask your grade school teacher"?

You are right, but you cited unenlightened saying: "grammar is extracted by pedants from pre-existing communication. It starts as description and becomes prescription - we convene, and from there comes convention." He is not referring to Wittgenstein's idea of grammar and I was responding to this. — Fooloso4

Perhaps, but this was before I realised what sort of "grammar" you had in mind and before the topic changed, while I was arguing that meaning can be found in the rules. I was trying to find some support that meaning, grammar and form of life were more closely interwoven and less distinct than you appeared to allow. I was referring in particular to unenlightened's statement that "grammar is extracted...from pre-existing communication". I think this is close to Wittgenstein's view - perhaps not so much that it is "extracted", but that we should look to pre-existing communication to determine what it is.

It is the practice that governs the language. — Fooloso4

Therefore, the practice is the rule?

When we do as others do it might be said that we are following a rule, but we are simply following along. — Fooloso4

What's the difference?

Paraphrasing §199: To follow a rule...is a custom (usage, institution).

Good discussion, all very helpful! I was looking at Baker and Hacker for a bit of insight, and it turns out that §104 was originally located elsewhere in the text, before being placed where it ended up. Which maybe helps explain why it feels so out of place to me. Also, much of what's been said had me turning back to §50, which also deals with the issue of representation, even employing the same vocabulary of 'mode of representation' (from the discussion of the meter rule and samples):

§50: "This sample is an instrument of the language, by means of which we make colour statements. In this game, it is not something that is represented, but is a means of representation ... : if this thing did not exist, we could not use it in our language-game. a What looks as if it had to exist is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our game; something with which comparisons are made. And this may be an important observation; but it is none the less an observation about our language-game - our mode of representation".

In this light, I read §104 something like this: insofar as a great deal of our grammar involves 'fixing' our samples around which our language-games are built ("this is a meter. Now we can talk measurement") it is a mistake to project this fixing of grammar into nature itself, as it were. That we measure like so and not otherwise is a function of our grammar (itself a function of our forms of life), and is an index of human involvement.

This index, the fact that it is we who fix the terms of our grammar, marks our use of language as irreducibly 'specific', rather than (a) 'general' (state of affairs): our use of language does not reflect some underlying, eternal structure of the world (qua the Tractatus), but only our specific, human, purpose-bound use of language. So that's the 'general' bit, and how §104 fits in with the rest of the sections around it.

Last, the comparisons we make (this is one meter, that is two), seem, after the fact of fixing, to be a natural, fixed (read: general) state of affairs. Somehow, everything can be measured in meters and bits thereof! How wonderful! We are 'impressed' by this. And our being impressed leads us, once again, to generalise and see language as reflecting an underlying essence of the world, effacing the specifically human contingencies and necessities that govern our use of language.

There's a vignette, either in the PI or the Remarks on Mathematics - I can't remember - where Witty speaks of teaching someone how to count by adding n+1, which he does perfectly fine up to 200, at which point he starts adding 2; then adding 3 at 300, and so on, all the while insisting that he is adding n+1. Witty insists that at this point, this is 'just what that person does': here is where 'reasons give out': this way of counting is nor more or less 'correct' than ours, and is as 'specific' and 'not general' as our own way of counting. The mistake once again is to project our 'mode of representation' into the thing itself: to imagine that counting must be this way and not that, reflective of some underlying essence of counting.

Ok, I can move on now :D

So you're saying that "rule" is an empty concept and that "the rule is dead", but also that "obviously there are rules in language - just ask your grade school teacher"? — Luke

Why do you think these are somehow incompatible? Maybe that might throw light on where, if anywhere, we disagree.

§105-§107

These sections seem to elaborate on the metaphorics of 'depth' first mentioned in §89. The rough idea seems to be that we want to look 'beneath' language (in all its messiness) to find the ideal. "What we ordinarily call 'sentences', 'words', and 'signs'" (§105), when measured against this (fantasy) of ideality, seem to come up short, as though they were not good enough. The "real sign" (Platonic?) must be found amid (beneath?) the jungle of appearances.

So there's a divergence, a splitting of paths, between the ideal and the actual, as it were: "the greater becomes the conflict between it [actual language] and our requirement" (§107). Witty emphasizes, importantly, that the ideal is, in fact, a 'requirement': it is not something found or 'discovered', but rather posited, or projected from without.

And so §107 ends with the famous exhortation to go "back to rough ground!", to give up the requirement that language meet our (unreasonable?) expectations of ideality. Pay attention to the actual, not the ideal: 'from close up' (§51). We must stop measuring the actual by the standard of the ideal. The glasses must come off (§103).

§108

§108 can be partly read as a rejoinder to §93/95/96 where Witty was making fun of those who - like his previous self - insisted on the 'uniqueness' of the proposition. Here, Witty makes the complimentary claim that "propositions" and "language" are, instead, "a family of structures" - there is no 'formal unity' that underlies them.

It then goes asks to ask after the consequences of this shift for logic, and concludes that once again, it's simply a 'preconception' that must be removed, a preconception that does not make logic lose any of it's rigor. I'm reminded of dumbo, who can fly without his feather. Also, randomly, the last remark about 'real need' reminds me of Marx. Maybe @fdrake might be able to make a more substantive conceptual connection.

Why do you think these are somehow incompatible? Maybe that might throw light on where, if anywhere, we disagree. — StreetlightX

I'm not going to play a guessing game regarding your views, particularly since you provided only a very brief reply to my previous post on the matter. I have already provided a response to your claims regarding the "differential nature of rules" and Wittgenstein's alleged ridicule of the notion that "using words in speech is a rule-governed activity", as per the quote from Baker and Hacker.

OK. Perhaps some of this will come out later in the exegesis. And apologies if I don't want to spend too long on your previous post. It was too large for me and would, I feel, take away from the reading to do in this thread.

I think there's an important relation between 107 and 108 which should not be overlooked. The seeking of the ideal is finally determined as fruitless at 107. Logic does not have the solid grounding which we keep telling ourselves that it must have in order that it be useful (the requirement). This requirement is for once and for all, found to be void. But now there is nothing under our feet for traction. So at 108 he turns to "our real need", to put something solid underfoot.

There's a bit of a problem here philosophically though, because "our real need" is just another ideal. You'll find this ideal if you study Christian moralists. You'll see a distinction between the apparent good, and the real good (wants and needs). I believe this distinction dates back to Aristotle, more fully developed by Aquinas. The "real good", here "our real need", is an ideal, despite the material basis of this idea. The chimeric characteristic of "our real need" is a product of the uniqueness of material beings, evident in the concept of life forms.

So as much as it may appear like Wittgenstein has removed "the ideal" from the description, as a false requirement, he has really just superseded the ideal which is required for sound logic (epistemological ideal) with the ideal which is required for sound moral principles (ontological ideal). This is completely consistent with his description of language as a human activity rather than as a system of symbols for representation. Now meaning is based in fundamental, material human needs (the Marxist social structure) rather than relations between symbols and what is represented.

133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself
in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples;
and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
... — Philosophical investigations

"The ideal" is right back in the picture in a different guise. One ideal has been replaced by another as the philosopher moves from epistemological problems to moral problems. The former being unresolvable due to the existence of the latter.

It is the practice that governs the language.
— Fooloso4

Therefore, the practice is the rule? — Luke

Suppose I ask: "What are they doing?" and you answer "Following the rule". "What is the rule?" "What they are doing".

When we do as others do it might be said that we are following a rule, but we are simply following along.
— Fooloso4

What's the difference? — Luke

If I see a group of people walking and decide to follow them what rule am I following? Is the rule: 'follow these people'? You point to 199, but it asks:

Is what we call “following a rule” something that it would be possible for only one person, only once in a lifetime, to do?

And his answer is that it is not possible.

Are they following a rule by going wherever it is that they are going? Am I also following this rule even though I do not know where they are going? What if they are just wandering about. Is the rule to wander? How does one know in which direction to wander? Is there a rule for wandering?

Paraphrasing §199: To follow a rule...is a custom (usage, institution). — Luke

But this is not what it says. He does not say simply to follow a rule is a custom but:

To follow a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess are customs (usages, institutions).

To play a game of chess is not follow a rule or set of rules. There is no rule that says I must move this piece rather than that. The game is played in accord with the rules.

To follow a rule may be a custom but a custom is not simply following a rule. Here's a quick story to illustrate, something I heard on the radio. A cookbook author was talking about her mother's recipe for brisket. Following what her mother always did, before putting the roast in the pan she would cut off a piece at the end. After doing it this way for years one day she asked her mother why she did it that way. Her mother answered: "Because otherwise it would not fit in the pan". The daughter was not following a rule that one must cut off the end. If her mother had a larger pan or a smaller brisket she would not have had to cut off the end. But the daughter thought she was following a rule by doing what her mother always did.

Also, much of what's been said had me turning back to §50, which also deals with the issue of representation, even employing the same vocabulary of 'mode of representation' (from the discussion of the meter rule and samples) — StreetlightX

Wittgenstein often circles back in this way. There is so much going on that it is easy to forget the connections.

More on the theme of a surveyable representation:

Our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses. — PI 18

Suppose I ask: "What are they doing?" and you answer "Following the rule". "What is the rule?" "What they are doing". — Fooloso4

Suppose I ask: "What are they doing?" and you answer ''Following the practice", "What is the practice?" "What they are doing". No less clear, but no different.

Are they following a rule by going wherever it is that they are going? Am I also following this rule even though I do not know where they are going? What if they are just wandering about. Is the rule to wander? How does one know in which direction to wander? Is there a rule for wandering? — Fooloso4

What is the practice supposed to be here?

To play a game of chess is not follow a rule or set of rules. There is no rule that says I must move this piece rather than that. The game is played in accord with the rules. — Fooloso4

To play a game of chess is to follow a set of rules. The set of rules, or the practice, constrains the possible moves, determining what move is allowed and what isn't. In other games, they might determine what makes sense and what doesn't. The rules or the practice of playing chess does not involve the millions of permutations that the game can be played out.

To follow a rule may be a custom but a custom is not simply following a rule. Here's a quick story to illustrate, something I heard on the radio. A cookbook author was talking about her mother's recipe for brisket. Following what her mother always did, before putting the roast in the pan she would cut off a piece at the end. After doing it this way for years one day she asked her mother why she did it that way. Her mother answered: "Because otherwise it would not fit in the pan". The daughter was not following a rule that one must cut off the end. If her mother had a larger pan or a smaller brisket she would not have had to cut off the end. But the daughter thought she was following a rule by doing what her mother always did. — Fooloso4

What does this example have to do with a custom? It's not really the kind of communal custom that I think Wittgenstein had in mind.

We are approaching an extensive section (approximately 135-200) in which Wittgenstein makes an examination of the concept of "understanding". I believe this section to contain significant insight, numerous distinctions, differentiations between various mental activities. So I plan to read through this section numerous times and see if I can reproduce and elucidate some of these distinctions here in this thread.

As a preamble to this endeavour, let me say that the concept of "understanding" seems to have fallen through the cracks in modern philosophy. It's neglected by epistemology which deals with the difference between knowing and not knowing, and neglected by philosophy of mind which deals with the thing which is supposed to know. "Understanding" may be characterized as the process whereby a mind moves from not knowing something, to knowing that thing.

In the classical Aristotle-Aquinas tradition this would be a process of habituation. Knowledge, as what a mind has, can be described as a habit of the living active human being. It's the tendency to think in a particular way. Aristotle first described "habit" in this way, as a property of a living being, the propensity for a certain type of potential to be actualized in a particular way. Aquinas developed theory concerning all sorts of habits, including the habits of the intellect. "Habit" was a very important concept in philosophy, being used to explain the properties of living beings, until the arrival of evolutionary theory. A great rift developed, between Lamarckian evolutionary theory which grounded evolutionary changes in habit, and Darwinian theory which grounded changes in chance variations. It appears that as a result of this great divide, and the western world's adoption of Darwinism, "habit" has been relegated to the furthest limits of respectable science.

I believe we will find a resurgence of the concept of "habit" (though not under that name), in this section of the Philosophical Investigations. We might find that Wittgenstein seeks to replace the notion of learning a principle, with the idea of developing a particular habit.

§109

§109 makes good on the distinction - first drawn in §89 - between facts and understanding. Recall:

§89: "Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, essential to our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view".

It's in this sense, that 'our considerations' do not uncover new facts, that they "must not be scientific ones" (§109). They bear, that is, upon what Witty in §89 referred to as 'logic', rather than 'the facts of nature' or 'causal connections'. §109: "Philosophical problems... [are] not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language"

And as far as what should happen to that 'logic', or the 'workings of our language' its a case of removing any normative content from it: of getting rid of any 'requirement' (§107) or expectation to which logic ought to aspire to (§101: "The idea now absorbs us that the ideal ‘must’ occur in reality. ... [one] doesn’t understand the nature of this “must”. We think the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there). In removing any aspirations to normativity (to an ideal which logic 'ought to' or 'must' conform to) we are left with only description:

§109: " All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place".

This is why "we may not advance any kind of theory": the 'method' of the investigations is to 'look from close up' at the 'actual' workings of language, and not advance ideas about how it should (the ideal) (Recall the distinction in §107 between the actual and the ideal: "the greater becomes the conflict between it [actual language] and our requirement [the ideal]").

This helps explain the otherwise perhaps enigmatic comments about how "The feeling ‘that it is possible, contrary to our preconceived ideas, to think this or that’ - whatever that may mean - could be of no interest to us": I read this saying that it's not a case of replacing one theory by another, but as displacing 'theory' altogether. Ending, of course, on the (in?)famous definition of philosophy as "a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language." ('Understanding' here being a more 'technical' term for Witty than might often be supposed).

---

Pneuma

Lastly, as a note of interest, I did some quick research on the strange and parenthetical remark about the 'The pneumatic conception of thinking': Witty's understanding of pneuma here seems to be less about 'air', as our modern understanding of it tends to be (Anscombe's translation runs: 'The conception of thought as a gaseous medium') than it has to do with an older meaning related to pneuma as a kind of body, or rather spiritual body: in the ancient understanding, the pneuma was understood to be the medium that allowed communication between body and soul, as might be glimpsed in the cognate phantasm, as a kind of 'substance'.

There's alot more to it, but the 'pneumatic conception of thinking' seems to relate to the idea of thought as being 'substantial', of having a body or scaffolding which is structured as such. Joachim Schulte puts it as such: "The central idea is that the core of language contains a scaffolding of rules whose ("pneumatic") substance is the same as that of our thought." Elsewhere (I lost the link and cbf to find it again), Witty is said to have preferred the word 'ephemeral' to translate 'pneumatische'). In any case, this also links this idea to what Witty elsewhere in the PI criticises as 'spirit' and 'illusion' (again, 'phantasm').

36. And we do here what we do in a host of similar cases: because we cannot specify any one bodily action which we call pointing at the shape (as opposed to the colour, for example), we say that a mental, spiritual activity corresponds to these words.
Where our language suggests a body and there is none: there, we should like to say, is a spirit.

Edit: perhaps another good analogy is this:

p∧(p→q)⊢qp∧(p→q)⊢q

show that to someone who hasn't learned to process propositions in logical syntax and it wouldn't mean a damn thing. We have to 'learn to see' the connections between natural language argument forms and the modus ponens. The 'representation' of our argument forms (in terms of validity, soundness, truth functionality and so on) consists in fabricating rules for propositional calculi spurned on by real argument patterns, and then we may say that the above formula is modus ponens. Even someone who understood how to argue using the modus ponens syllogism would not necessarily immediately 'map' it to the representation of it in the theory. — fdrake

Brilliant account.

Yeah, that's the passage I had in mind :grin:

What is the practice supposed to be here? — Luke

The question of practice comes from my comment:

It is the practice that governs the language. — Luke

My example of following was intended to get at the distinction between following along and following a rule. There may have been no practice of following along and it is not clear whether what they are doing is part of a practice. It may have simply been what they all did on that one occasion.

To play a game of chess is to follow a set of rules. — Luke

Let's play. I have white and go first. d2-d4 (King's pawn advanced two spaces). What does the rules tell you about what move you must make?

The set of rules, or the practice, constrains the possible moves, determining what move is allowed and what isn't. — Luke

Right, but knowing what moves are allowed and not allowed do not determine which of the many possible moves are made when one plays the game.

The rules or the practice of playing chess does not involve the millions of permutations that the game can be played out. — Luke

The practice of playing chess means playing chess. This is not the same thing as the rules of chess. The rules in accord with which one plays chess is not to play chess.

What does this example have to do with a custom? — Luke

She thought that this was part of her family's Jewish customs. If she had not asked it may indeed have become a custom. Imaginative explanations would be invented to explain the meaning. But there was no rule that the end must be cut off, and thus no meaning in her following along and doing what her mother did.

From page 34 of this discussion:

What he means by the pneumatic conception of thinking? Pneuma means breath, and by extension, soul, life, spirit (spirit is Latin for breath). In other words, the pneumatic conception of thinking is one that presupposes some condition that makes thought possible in the way that breath or soul makes life possible. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein though that logic was this condition. Invoking Kant, he called it "transcendental" (it differed significantly from Kant's conception but that is another story).

In 108 he says:

The preconception of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole inquiry around. (One might say: the inquiry must be turned around, but on the pivot of our real need).

This too reminds us of Kant, the Copernican Revolution. Rather than the turn to transcendental conditions, however,he turns to language in practice, language in its role in a form of life.

And we may not advance any kind of theory.There must not be anything hypothetical
in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place.

He draws our attention to what we say and do with language. If we attend to how language is actually used rather than trying to discover something yet unknown about it, something still hidden from us, then we can untangle the tangles philosophy has become entangled in through the bewitchment of language. To be clear, it is not language that causes the entanglement but the misguided activity of philosophy generated by a misuse of language.[/quote]

My example of following was intended to get at the distinction between following along and following a rule. There may have been no practice of following along and it is not clear whether what they are doing is part of a practice. It may have simply been what they all did on that one occasion. — Fooloso4

Perhaps I was not clear enough, but when I asked "What's the difference?" in response to your distinction between following a rule and following along, I assumed we were both speaking within the context of rule following. This is why my question was accompanied by the paraphrase of §199 that to follow a rule is a custom. I agree that there is obviously a distinction between following a rule and merely following along outside of this context.

The practice of playing chess means playing chess. This is not the same thing as the rules of chess. — Fooloso4

Perhaps if you take "the practice" to mean the application, exercise, action or rehearsal, but not if you take "the practice" to mean the method, way, procedure or convention. Which did you intend when you stated "It is the practice that governs the language"? I had assumed it was the latter, given our discussion of rule following.

This is some of what I extract from PI 109, 110, 111.

We get in a muddle due to our need to be precise, that is, we want to turn our philosophical ideas (expressed in language) into a kind of science, as if we’re doing a kind of mathematics. This kind of philosophy, which Wittgenstein fell prey to in the Tractatus, is very attractive, and can hold us within its power. We think we’re doing something empirical, that is, we think we’re extracting something from language that must be dug out through a logical investigation - as if the meaning is something hidden. Language has a kind of mystical quality due to the inner workings of the mind, but much of the confusion is simply “grammatical illusions.” Why? Because we tend to misinterpret the forms of our language, as if there is something deep within, but it’s simply (at least some or much of the time) a chimera, we tend to chase shadows. Wittgenstein’s method helps dispel these shadows, not all, but much of what passes as philosophical problems. Understanding the method is the medicine that dissolves some of the problems that hold us captive.

This doesn’t mean that there aren’t genuine philosophical problems, it just means that we should be careful of our analysis, which takes hold of us as if we’re doing an empirical investigation. And even when we’re doing an empirical investigation these philosophical problems, some of which are chimeras, can invade and confuse the investigation.

We have to be careful, which I fell prey to in some of my analysis of On Certainty, that we don't turn the exegesis of the PI into the kind of analysis Wittgenstein is fighting. I believe that if we understand the general ideas of Wittgenstein's methods this will go a long way to help clear some of the confusions that arise in philosophical discussions; and it will go a long way in helping to understand his general points. We have to be careful not to stress this or that point to the exclusion of the overall picture.

This is why my question was accompanied by the paraphrase of §199 — Luke

I will hold off saying more about §199 for now.

Perhaps if you take "the practice" to mean the application, exercise, action or rehearsal, but not if you take "the practice" to mean the method, way, procedure or convention. Which did you intend when you stated "It is the practice that governs the language"? I had assumed it was the latter, given our discussion of rule following. — Luke

I mean the activity. To practice is to do. In this case, to play.

What is at issue is your claim:

Therefore, rules or grammar determine proper and improper meaning. — Luke

It is my contention that it in not the rules that determine meaning, it is the practice or activity, that is, how words are actually used that does.

It is the practice that governs the language.
— Fooloso4

Therefore, the practice is the rule?
— Luke — Fooloso4

The practice is not the rule, the rule is part of the practice, part of what we do, part of how the language game is played. In chess the rules put constraints on what moves are possible, but do not determine what moves will be made. In the same way, in language games the rules do not determine what will be said. But unlike the rules of chess, the rules of a language game are not fixed. Words can be used in new ways, the constraint on usage is looser. If the usage is novel then it cannot by determined by the rules for previous usage. Rules that cover the novel usage come after the fact.

From page 34 of this discussion: — Fooloso4

Ah, I missed this. Still alot of catching up to do!

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Also, to chime in on the post above: the very idea of 'proper and improper' meaning is, I think, a very unfortunate category mistake. There either 'is' meaning or there is not: either what is said has some significance that can be cottoned on to, or there is not. 'Improper meaning' is not a thing.

Ah, I missed this. Still alot of catching up to do! — StreetlightX

I have decided not to push ahead for that reason.

There either 'is' meaning or there is not: either what is said has some significance that can be cottoned on to, or there is not. 'Improper meaning' is not a thing. — StreetlightX

Improper meaning would not be the absence of meaning but a meaning that was not what was meant:

125. This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand: that is, to survey.
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those cases, things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: “That’s not the way I meant it.”

You've littered your understanding with caveats and constraints which are not there in most of Wittgenstein's writing, particularly the PI. I just wonder why you feel the need arises. Through these five or six related aphorisms, there is no such restraint. Wittgenstein does not claim that explanation must be mostly replaced with descriptions. He does not say that philosophy discovers some new facts, just not that many. He is exhaustive and yet you hold back from being. Are you sure you're not just clinging to the rudder, not realising that the rest of the boat has gone down?