Reel back 5-6 pages and look? I cannot help if people ignore what I propose. I said to discuss the intro and 1-7 and you started jumping ahead. — I like sushi

If you started leading us and suggested that, I missed it and apologize for that.

This isn’t a classroom so you don’t have to follow what I propose. — I like sushi

Yeah, people dont have to, but that's how these sorts of threads work best, and in my experience participating in a lot of them, people will play along if they are really interested. Some of the music threads I've participated in where we systematically went through an entire discography stayed structured and focused for over two years, as we went through large discographies song by song or album by album. If those hadn't been run like a "classroom" more or less they wouldn't have worked.

The only thing that I'd suggest is that only doing through section 60 by New Year's is a pace that would make this thread last a few years to see it through to the end of the book, so we might want to go a bit more quickly than that. PI is about 250 pages. So if we try to average a page per day we can get through it in a little over eight months.

Hopefully I didn't distract your thread too much. I'll stop by from time-to-time to make a comment or two. Good luck with your discussion.

Just to circle back to this:

W then goes on to mention something of symbolism and categories (yet I don’t think he explicitly says “categories”?) when talking of colour, shape and number (23 - ref. to language/words as “tools”, 28, 29 to 35 - talk about numbers, colours and shapes). Here he mentions that pointing out a group of items and announcing something doesn’t make explicit what the word announced means (could be “group,” could be “five,” could be “circular,” could be “yellow,” etc.,.) it is from here that categories are formed by cross referencing what is said in reference to what items. — I like sushi

What you call 'categories' here, and what Witty variously refers to as the 'place' that is 'prepared' for a word prior to the ostensive defintion of something, or 'kinds of word', is pretty much, imo, the most important thing that is being set-up in these early sections. It begins to lay the groundwork for what is maybe the most important concept developed in the book: that of grammar. In fact §29 marks one of the first appearances of Wittgenstein's use of the term 'grammar' in the PI (the second appearance, in fact - the first was back in §20, but it was not used there in the quasi-technical sense that it first has here in §29):

"For the word “number” here shows what place in language, in grammar, we assign to the word. But this means that the word “number” must be explained before that ostensive definition can be understood. The word “number” in the definition does indeed indicate this place - the post at which we station the word." (my bolding).

The 'place' of a word is its place 'in grammar' - which is used almost as a synonym for 'in language'. That language and grammar are here co-eval and essentially equivalent indicates the importance that grammar plays in Wittgenstein's conception of language as a whole. This theme will only get more important as we continue. In any case, I will simply reiterate again the importance of thinking in terms of 'kinds of words' and the 'place(s) prepared' for the use of a word, which you capture here in your talk of 'categories'. Attention to this aspect of the work will clear up alot of what is going on in §31, which MU is struggling with.

I simply meant that to point out “red” you need to collect objects that are red. Thus you’ve developed a set of items that are red. The same goes for shape, size and other adjectives. Items can be pointed out as belonging to different “categories” in that sense.

The issue is true of “numbers.” You can point out the number of items and an understanding of “four” or “five” will come. Once these terms are established then, and only then, can the term “number” be applied. In this sense the “category” of number is set out after the use of them (ostensively.)

The central idea throughout the PI is the idea of the language-game, and under this rubric is the idea of rules of use (or logic of use), and also Wittgenstein's idea of grammar which falls under the role of the rules. Although the role of rules is probably more expansive than just the rules of grammar.

Whether we are referring to Wittgenstein's grammatical rules (which are important), or the more general idea of rule-following, as seen in the application of rules across a wider swath of language usage, rule-following is central.

Grammar is what makes the moves in language possible, just like the rules of chess make the game of chess possible. And just as the rules of chess permit some moves and disallow others, so also does grammar permit and disallow certain linguistic moves. This should be seen under the logic of use, but again keep in mind that the logic of use is broader than just grammar. It includes the various acts that occur in a language-game. For instance, the act of bringing the slab in Wittgenstein's primitive language-game, is also seen as part of the logic of use. Just as the rules of chess bring about the various moves in chess as part of the logic within the game.

It's also part of the nature of the rules of grammar to adjudicate certain moves as correct or incorrect. Again the parallel with chess rules. One can think of the rules of grammar and the rules of chess as more akin to commands to follow in order to play the game correctly. The rules are conventions, but they necessitate certain moves, i.e., if you want to play the game correctly within the social structure.

I will just make general remarks here and there.

Note: I was thinking of it in terms of a foreigner trying to communicate the colour “red” to someone with no inkling of the language they were speaking; because W talks of foreigners mistaking a phrase as a singular word.

I’ve always liked the view of language as a game. What is magical about it to me is how play and language correspond.

If you think back to childhood when you played with a group of children you’d all establish certain vague “rules” to whatever game you were playing (or rather role playing.) Language is pretty much the same affair. We have to have some loose agreement about the “rules” yet leave enough room to accommodate new interpretations. None of us develop language by sets of dictated rules, it is a natural function. In this sense “grammar” happens naturally and it is only after it is established that we can spot the patterns and commonalities of the “game” we’re “playing.”

Yes, I agree. There are both implicit rules and explicit rules, as in comparing some children's games where the rules are not spelled out, and some board games where the rules are spelled out. Both kinds of rules can change over time, and both are developed over time.

The central idea throughout the PI is the idea of the language-game, and under this rubric is the idea of rules of use (or logic of use), and also Wittgenstein's idea of grammar which falls under the role of the rules. Although the role of rules is probably more expansive than just the rules of grammar.

Whether we are referring to Wittgenstein's grammatical rules (which are important), or the more general idea of rule-following, as seen in the application of rules across a wider swath of language usage, rule-following is central.

Grammar is what makes the moves in language possible, just like the rules of chess make the game of chess possible. And just as the rules of chess permit some moves and disallow others, so also does grammar permit and disallow certain linguistic moves. This should be seen under the logic of use, but again keep in mind that the logic of use is broader than just grammar. It includes the various acts that occur in a language-game. For instance, the act of bringing the slab in Wittgenstein's primitive language-game, is also seen as part of the logic of use. Just as the rules of chess bring about the various moves in chess as part of the logic within the game.

It's also part of the nature of the rules of grammar to adjudicate certain moves as correct or incorrect. Again the parallel with chess rules. One can think of the rules of grammar and the rules of chess as more akin to commands to follow in order to play the game correctly. The rules are conventions, but they necessitate certain moves, i.e., if you want to play the game correctly within the social structure.

I will just make general remarks here and there. — Sam26

The rules are simply conventions. Conventions aren't correct or incorrect. It's not incorrect to be unconventional. If you're too unconventional in this case, people will have a difficult time understanding you, at least initially. What makes something count as a particular language or not is simply the conceptual boundaries that individuals have in mind for that language. In other words, simply "what they'll assent to call 'English' (or whatever language)"

The rules are simply conventions. Conventions aren't correct or incorrect. It's not incorrect to be unconventional. If you're too unconventional in this case, people will have a difficult time understanding you, at least initially. What makes something count as a particular language or not is simply the conceptual boundaries that individuals have in mind for that language. In other words, simply "what they'll assent to call 'English' (or whatever language)" — Terrapin Station

Some conventions are correct or incorrect. One cannot simply use a word any way one likes, i.e., if you want to be understood. So there is a sense where we can say you are using the word cup incorrectly even though the word cup is a matter of convention.

Some conventions are correct or incorrect. — Sam26

No, they are not.

One cannot simply use a word any way one likes, i.e., if you want to be understood. — Sam26

Sure, it will be more difficult to understand someone if they're very unconventional. I mention that in the post you're responding to.

So there is a sense where we can say you are using the word cup incorrectly even though the word cup is a matter of convention. — Sam26

Yeah, in the sense where you endorse argumentum ad populums, conformity, etc, and you mistake your opinion for a fact.

Some conventions are correct or incorrect.
— Sam26

No, they are not.

One cannot simply use a word any way one likes, i.e., if you want to be understood.
— Sam26

Sure, it will be more difficult to understand someone if they're very unconventional. I mention that in the post you're responding to.

So there is a sense where we can say you are using the word cup incorrectly even though the word cup is a matter of convention.
— Sam26

Yeah, in the sense where you endorse argumentum ad populums, conformity, etc, and you mistake your opinion for a fact. — Terrapin Station

So let's see if I understand you correctly. The rules of chess are a matter of convention, i.e., they could have been otherwise. But according to you it's not incorrect for me to move the bishop like a queen. The problem is that your use of incorrect and correct is out of the norm, as such, one has a difficult time understanding what you're saying, because by implication even in the use of these words (correct and incorrect) has no correct or incorrect use. If that's true why are you arguing that I'm incorrect? Your argument, if you follow it to its conclusion leads to an absurdity.

So let's see if I understand you correctly. The rules of chess are a matter of convention, i.e., they could have been otherwise. But according to you it's not incorrect for me to move the bishop like a queen. The problem is that your use of incorrect and correct is out of the norm, as such, one has a difficult time understanding what you're saying, because by implication even in the use of these words (correct and incorrect) has no correct or incorrect use. If that's true why are you arguing that I'm incorrect? Your argument, if you follow it to its conclusion leads to an absurdity. — Sam26

I'm not arguing that you're using any words incorrectly first off. I'm not saying anything about words per se.

And yes, most people use "correct"/"incorrect" in a manner where they say that some word usage is correct or incorrect.

The whole point is that there's no normative force, in the sense of some overarching, nonconditional "should," in the mere fact that something is a convention. Yes, x is a convention. Well so what? You don't have to care about the convention. You're not getting anything wrong by not following a convention. You're not getting factual matters wrong when you use language unconventionally. You're simply not following the convention. We can name that whatever we like, but all it amounts to is people trying to pressure others into following a convention, trying to apply normative force to encounrage conforming, and seeing conforming as something like a "trump card," just because there's such a drive toward it for some folks.

We could say that someone is using "incorrect" to simply refer to "you're not following the convention." However, "incorrect" almost always has a connotation of "you should (be following the convention)." Well, why? Why should anyone follow the convention? You could say, "If you want to be understood more easily" or something like that. They could say, "I don't care about being understood more easily--I'm understood just fine; it's to my liking." (and maybe the example was something like, "Ain't no big deal should I take Bobby with" or something like that--something that tons of folks will understand just fine). Still, people get bent out of shape about that. They want the person to want to follow the convention. They usually think less of people who don't follow the convention, as if everyone would ideally follow it, as if it indicates something about intelligence and education level and so on whether it's followed or not, etc. Why?.

I'll leave it at that Terrapin.

Attention to this aspect of the work will clear up alot of what is going on in §31, which MU is struggling with. — StreetlightX

I'd say "struggling with" is an understatement. I cannot find the coherency in the passage, how the different imaginary scenarios are supposed to relate to each other, and where the expression "Settle the name yourself" is drawn from.

I see how he moves in the earlier parts of the book, from describing different ways of using the same word (senses) at the beginning of the book, to the more general different ways of using language, after the reference to Frege at 22. At this point, he establishes that "language" as a type of activity, still consists of a multitude of distinct ways of using words (according to different purposes) Then, he returns to the very specific and very important part of language "naming". For reference, this is how "naming" was described at 15:

It is in this and more or less similar ways that a name means and is
given to a thing.—It will often prove useful in philosophy to say to
ourselves: naming something is like attaching a label to a thing.

So at 29 it appears like it is implied that naming is a matter of placing a word into a role which has been prepared for it within language. Perhaps there is a thing and language provides the means by which a particular word would be required to label that thing. However, we can't lose track of what has just been painstakingly described, that "language" if analogous to "game", actually consists of a multitude of different language-games, different ways of using words. Language is a classification of a type of activity with a whole slew of sub-classifications. So there is a matter of positioning the word within the appropriate language-game. Therefore naming must not be just a simple matter of finding a word's place within "language" as a whole, but the more complex matter of determining the appropriate language-game, and the word's role within that particular game.

Now we get the complex problem of 31. At the beginning of the section, a word is a physical object, analogous to a specific chessman. At the end of the passage, the word appears to be a name. What is not obvious is the transition, how the word becomes a name. There is a number of different scenarios we are asked to imagine. 1. A person who has learnt the rules of chess but has never been shown an actual piece. That person is shown "this is the king". 2. A person who has learnt how to play the game without learning the rules. That person is shown "this is the king", assuming he is unfamiliar with the particular style of piece. 3. Someone is explaining the game, points to the chessman and says "this is the king, it can move like this...". That is my understanding of the scenarios we are asked to imagine, 2 appears to be a bit odd, but in each case I assume that the piece, the chessman being shown as "the king", is analogous to a particular word being shown in ostensive definition.

I simply meant that to point out “red” you need to collect objects that are red. — I like sushi

In the context of the sections we're talking about, the point to be made is something like: in order to point out red, we need to understand that it is a color - and not a shape, texture, or name (for example) - that is instead being pointed out. It can be put like this: to understand what is being pointed out by ostentation, one needs to understand two things, not one, and always both together: first, the 'actual' thing that is being pointed out - red, say - and second, the kind of thing that is being pointed out - in this case, the color (and not the shape, texture, name, etc). All these early sections are basically at pains to point this 'double understanding' out.

§30: "One has already to know (or be able to do) something before one can ask what something is called."

You can point out the number of items and an understanding of “four” or “five” will come. Once these terms are established then, and only then, can the term “number” be applied. In this sense the “category” of number is set out after the use of them (ostensively.) — I like sushi

This is true as far as it goes, but it doesn't quite capture what is at stake in these sections. Notice, to begin with, that Witty insists on the reverse order of what you've said: to understand ostension we first need to understand the kind of thing it is (say, number), then we grasp what actual thing it is (the number 3, say):

§29: "Perhaps someone will say, “two” can be ostensively defined only in this way: “This number is called ‘two’.” For the word “number” here shows what place in language, in grammar, we assign to the word. But this means that the word “number” must be explained before that ostensive definition can be understood."
§30: "One has already to know (or be able to do) something before one can ask what something is called."
§31: "This [ostensive] explanation again informs him of the use of the piece only because, as we might say, the place for it was already prepared."

In all three cases here, what is 'prepared' and what is explained 'before' the actual ostensive definition is the 'category' - as you said - of the thing that is being pointed out. The 'category'' is not set out after the pointing out, but before. It must be 'prepared' before one understands that it is 'two' things that are being pointed out.

We certainly don’t arrive at the term “number” before we have the terms “one,” “two,” “three,” etc.,.

To make this as clear as possible:

If I point at three balls on the floor one red, one blue, and one green then say “pollydumdum” what is it you think I am saying?

You have no idea. You would have to observe me continue to play my “language game” and figure out whether I meant “balls,” “coloured balls,” “primary colours,” or any other possibility of which there are too many to list.

Of course if I used English and said “That is number pollydumdum,” I imagine you’d grasp my meaning easily enough. My, and I believe W’s opint being that words come into play in a necessary order because it is impossible for you to know what “pollydumdum” meant without first being equipped with the understanding of the word as a “number,” yet you could come to understand “pollydumdum” as a number once I persisted and gave other examples of numbers; where from I can then correspond to you my parsing of your word “number” only after the fact of presenting a select of numbers and likely some basic arithmetic too with use of writte symbols for complete clarity.

Of course “pollydumdum” could simply have meant “ostensive” or “pointing.”

I don’t see W’s purpose to be anything than to reveal problems. He certainly doesn’t offer up solutions merely pointing out some easily looked over issues of common parse and the use of language in philosophy (which I personally see as the mainstay of “philosophy” - the exploration of the possible limits of language.)

It is “conventional” to breath. Is it also “correct”? This is certainly deep, deep down underneath the Investigation. I don’t think we’re anywhere near going there just yet in any reasonable manner.

The “game” only works if people are willing to play it with you. If not then I’d say whether you believe you are “correct” or not no one will ever know nor care to - you can see where that goes.

We certainly don’t arrive at the term “number” before we have the terms “one,” “two,” “three,” etc.,. — I like sushi

Yes, but that's not what's being discussed. It's not about the term 'number', but the term 'two', in the example discussed:

§29: "Perhaps someone will say, “two” can be ostensively defined only in this way: “This number is called ‘two’."

And in this example, the understanding of number comes prior to the understanding of the ostensive definition of two. Witty is explicit about this:

§29: "But this means that the word “number” must be explained before that ostensive definition can be understood."

To be clear, we don't have a disagreement here. We're simply talking about two very different things. My point is only that the specificity of the example that Witty gives here is important, and that there's a reason he gives this example, and not the kind you offer (even though your example and the point it illustrates is perfectly correct). And that reason is because Witty is setting up the importance of kinds of words - of grammar, of the 'place' of a word in language, what you referred to as 'categories' - that your example, fine as it is on its own, does not capture.

We certainly don’t arrive at the term “number” before we have the terms “one,” “two,” “three,” etc.,. — I like sushi

I'll offer an explanation, but just to be clear, this is outside of the reading, it's based in personal opinion. There is a very peculiar relationship between universals and particulars which the human mind develops, that has the mind reciprocating back and forth from one to the other, in order to understand each of them. The understanding of any particular thing progresses by relating it to types, categories, and the understanding of the universals, types, categories, progresses through an understanding of the particulars. In your example here, "number" refers to a universal, a category of things. while "one", "two", "three" refer to particulars.

What I believe Wittgenstein is arguing is that in order to learn how to name a particular, this requires that one already has some understanding of the different types, universals, and the capacity to distinguish types. This is not to say that the person knows how to name types or universals, just to recognize them. So the temporal order of learning which W would be arguing, is that one first learns that there are different types of things, and actually learns how to distinguish different types, as necessary for, and therefore prior to learning how to name particulars. But this does not mean that the person knows how to name types, because this would come after learning how to name particulars.

This analogy might be useful. The conscious part of learning could be like the visible spectrum of wavelength. There is much learning which occurs outside the boundaries of consciousness, just like there is much electro-magnetic activity occurring outside the boundaries of sight.. When the conscious mind looks at "learn" it sees the #1 definition, "gain knowledge of or skill in by study, experience, or being taught", because that is the part it is actively involved in. However, there is a second definition, a broader definition which is simply "acquire or develop a particular ability", and this better captures the entirety of "learn". The conscious mind, in its bias, wants to narrow the definition of "learn", restrict what it means to "learn" in order to exclude that part which is outside of its domain.

3. Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication;
only not everything that we call language is this system. And one
has to say this in many cases where the question arises "Is this an
appropriate description or not?" The answer is: "Yes, it is appropriate,
but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of
what you were claiming to describe."
It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects
about on a surface according to certain rules . . ."—and we replied:
You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You
can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those
games.

Some general remarks:

Another important part of Wittgenstein's analysis in the PI that is not carried forward from the Tractatus, is the idea of a final analysis. I spoke earlier of the continuity of his thinking, but there are clearly ideas from the Tractatus that he rejects. And it's the idea of some final analysis, as if we can boil down philosophical ideas (generally speaking) to their constituent parts, which will reveal in very precise terms what we mean. This is seen in his example of the broom, as if seeing the parts of the broom will give us more insight into what a broom is (PI 47). The broom example is similar to what Wittgenstein was doing in the Tractatus as he analyzed language. He was trying to give a final analysis that explained how language worked in very absolute terms, and thus solve all philosophical problems. He did this in the Tractatus by giving us a method of seeing language in terms of what has sense, what is senseless, and what is nonsense. He supposedly gave us a way of seeing proposition is very absolute terms, with very specific boundaries.

However, the PI turns this analysis on it head, by showing us that much of what philosophers do in terms of an analysis is just the chasing after shadows. Shadows isn't the correct word, because shadows exist, a better phrase is, chasing after ghosts.

I do think we can take Wittgenstein's methods too far, as if clarity isn't possible, but clarity should be seen in a context. What's clear in one context, isn't clear in another. How we use the word reality in our everyday lives will not do in physics. Neither context of how the word reality is used, is THE correct use, both have their uses, and both can be correct given specific language-games. There is no final analysis of reality that give us perfectly clarity on every use of that word.

Many people, scientists included, do this with what we mean by knowledge, i.e., as if scientific knowledge is superior to every other kind of knowledge. It may be in many instances, but what it means to know is much broader than scientific knowledge. This misunderstanding tends to put science up as some kind of god when it comes to having knowledge. Don't get me wrong I think scientific knowledge has a rigor that we don't use in many other areas, but even this rigor is subject to sensory experience, as is much of our knowledge.

Given what Wittgenstein is doing in the PI, it cannot be fit into the kind of analysis that is seen in the Tractatus, and thus Wittgenstein cannot be seen as an analytic philosopher (in his later years) in the traditional sense. Wittgenstein is not giving some final analysis in the PI, or some dogmatic theory, but giving us a way of looking at language from a multitude of perspectives and contexts. He opens our minds wide, as opposed to looking at things from a very narrow perspective.

Not everything Wittgenstein said is correct, but this isn't the point. The point is the method, which is seen in OC as culmination of his methods in the PI, viz., a sustained treatment of what it means to know.

Since I'm currently working on a theory of knowledge involving Wittgenstein's thinking, I thought it appropriate to include some of these ideas as they apply to language-games and rule-following. This is central to understanding the implications of the PI.

It's very important to juxtapose private rule-following with language-games, because one or more people can participate in a language-game, that has as its basis for meaning a privately held meaning. This of course goes against Wittgenstein's notion that it's logically impossible to have such a meaning, i.e., it has no foothold in terms of what it means to be correct or incorrect. This is also Wittgenstein's stance in On Certainty as he responds to Moore's propositions, viz., "I know this is a hand." The point is that people can establish language-games that reflect a lack of understanding in terms of what gives meaning to words. It follows from this that not all language-games reflect the correct use of words. So if you think that all uses in terms of language-games, are correct uses, then you would be wrong. The correct notion of rule-following must be linked to the language-game, or you will miss an important part of what Wittgenstein is telling you.

For example, some people use the word know in a way that reflects some private access, which then allows them to assert that X is true, or that X is justified. People do this all the time, even philosophers do it based on particular theories of knowledge. To further illustrate the point, I'll use a religious example. If I say that "I know X," and you ask, "What is your justification for knowing X," and I reply, "The Holy Spirit revealed it to me," then you would be falling prey to the private notion of meaning. However, if Wittgenstein is correct, and it seems obvious (at least to me and others) that he is, then this way of giving meaning to a word, be it knowledge or some other concept, is faulty, to say the least. Why? First, because there is no way of resolving what would count as being incorrect about such knowledge. Second, and this is closely related to the first point, rules cannot be privately established, i.e., totally isolated from social contexts. It's just not possible. Every notion of correct or incorrect, knowing and not knowing is part of a social construct, viz., a linguistic construct. There is no meaning to be had privately. Again, because it's logically impossible.

Finally, Kripke's skeptical argument about rule-following, which in some ways reminds me of the Gettier dilemma. Basically it's the idea that there is no way to know if Mary understands addition beyond a certain point, i.e., there is no way to know if she understand the rules as they are acted upon in public over time. Let' say that Mary has been doing addition as we understand addition up to 1000, but that after 1000 Mary does something much different, viz., she randomly adds 5 to every answer above 1000. It would seem to follow from this that there is no way for us to know that anyone is following any rule correctly, because at some point their actions may reveal something very different than what we normally mean by a word/concept.

So the skeptical rejoinder is that we can never be sure that anyone is following a rule correctly, since at a given point in the future, a person's actions may reveal that what they understand as addition, doesn't conform to what we publicly understand as addition. Thus, the notion of rule-following collapses as an essential part of our understanding of concepts. Why? Again, because there is no way to know if someone really understand a rule or not.

But, there is something very wrong with Kripke's skeptical argument, i.e., it assumes the very thing it's arguing against. It's circular. Here's the crux of the problem. In order for Kripke's argument to work, he has to be able to compare Mary's understanding of addition up to 1000, with that of Mary's understanding of addition after 1000. However, if there is no way to know, according to Kripke's skeptical argument that we are following a rule in terms of any concept (addition in the e.g.), then there is no way for Kripke to know if he is following the rules of sameness correctly. When he compares what Mary did at point X, with what Mary did at point Y along the time line, how does he know that he is applying the rule of sameness in the correct way? If what his argument is claiming is true, then it would apply to all concepts, even the very words used to express his argument. This is what Wittgenstein meant when he said that a doubt that doubts everything, is not a doubt, which is what Kripke's argument boils down to.

Why was Kripke's argument circular, because it assumes an understanding over time of the concept sameness. So it assumes the very thing he is arguing against. However, it's more than circular, it's contradictory.

First, because there is no way of resolving what would count as being incorrect about such knowledge. — Sam26

That would require an additional step a la "and there must be a way of resolving what would count as being incorrect about such knowledge because . . . "

Second, and this is closely related to the first point, rules cannot be privately established, i.e., totally isolated from social contexts. It's just not possible. Every notion of correct or incorrect, knowing and not knowing is part of a social construct, viz., a linguistic construct. There is no meaning to be had privately. Again, because it's logically impossible. — Sam26

That seems like a claim sans an argument for the claim.

My alternate claim is that there is no meaning to be had publicly. It's just not possible. The idea of public meaning is a category error.

But, there is something very wrong with Kripke's skeptical argument, i.e., it assumes the very thing it's arguing against. It's circular. Here's the crux of the problem. In order for Kripke's argument to work, he has to be able to compare Mary's understanding of addition up to 1000, with that of Mary's understanding of addition after 1000. However, if there is no way to know, according to Kripke's skeptical argument that we are following a rule in terms of any concept (addition in the e.g.), then there is no way for Kripke to know if he is following the rules of sameness correctly. When he compares what Mary did at point X, with what Mary did at point Y along the time line, how does he know that he is applying the rule of sameness in the correct way? — Sam26

I'd have to reread Kripke's arguments about this--it's been awhile since I read it, so I'm not saying that I agree with him or anything like that, but simply based on what you said here, all you have to do is appeal to the phenomenal data--Mary simply seems to be doing something different than what one (and others) are doing, per one's understanding. That doesn't require anything like "following the rules of 'sameness' correctly." And then you either can figure out what Mary is doing differently or you can not.

At any rate, as a "reading group" shouldn't we actually be reading along in the text together rather than making very general comments about the text as a whole?

In all three cases here, what is 'prepared' and what is explained 'before' the actual ostensive definition is the 'category' - as you said - of the thing that is being pointed out. The 'category'' is not set out after the pointing out, but before. It must be 'prepared' before one understands that it is 'two' things that are being pointed out. — StreetlightX

Again, the way that you can (and that people sometimes do) this (and red, etc.) ostensively is like this:

Let's say that someone points at a pair of shoes and says "two."

The student might think that "Two" is a proper name of the pair of shoes, or the term for what sort of thing it is a la "Ah, those things I put on my feet are 'two'," etc. (I'm not saying they do this linguistically, knowing terms like "proper name" etc.--but I have to this out in words for you to understand what I'm saying on a message board).

So they think whatever--maybe one of the things I explained above.

Next, the teacher points to two apples and says "two."

No, the student might think that "Two" is a proper name for the apples, too, or think that they're also called "two" instead of "apples," etc.

But the teacher goes on and points to two drumsticks and says "two," and two coins and says "two," and so on.

The student will eventually wonder what the things might have in common that's relating to the "two" sound. And most will eventually form a conceptual abstraction a la the number "two" to explain the sound being applied to all of those different things.

You don't have to know the word "number" for that. You figure out the concept of (a) number for yourself as you create your own conceptual abstraction for it.

You'd have the more overarching concept of "number" later, as you're shown 1, 3, 4, etc. and then you learn the sound "number" for 1, 2, 3, 4 etc.

It is “conventional” to breath. Is it also “correct”? — I like sushi

I wouldn't say either. Breathing is not a convention (conventions are basically arbitrary behavior, things we make up, that people follow because others are doing it), and I wouldn't say it's correct/incorrect.

Since you're lurking around this thread Sam26, maybe you could give me your opinion on #31 of PI. It appears like Wittgenstein is suggesting that there is a way that one can learn how to play a particular game, or even a multitude of games, without learning rules. What do you think about this?

One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without
ever learning or formulating rules. He might have learnt quite simple
board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more and
more complicated ones. He too might be given the explanation "This
is the king",—if, for instance, he were being shewn chessmen of a shape
he was not used to. This explanation again only tells him the use
of the piece because, as we might say, the place for it was already
prepared. Or even: we shall only say that it tells him the use, if
the place is already prepared. And in this case it is so, not because the
person to whom we give the explanation already knows rules, but
because in another sense he is already master of a game.

This is all well and good, until, of course, one pays attention to the specificity of Wittgenstein's example, which for reminders' sake, runs like this:

§29: "Perhaps someone will say, “two” can be ostensively defined only in this way: “This number is called ‘two’." (emphasis in the original)

The discussion that follows is in reference to understanding this utterance, where 'number' is a word specifically employed in the use of language to be understood.

In what way would you say that comment has any implication for my explanation of how we can teach particular numbers and the general concept of number ostensively?