Reel back 5-6 pages and look? I cannot help if people ignore what I propose. I said to discuss the intro and 1-7 and you started jumping ahead. — I like sushi
This isn’t a classroom so you don’t have to follow what I propose. — I like sushi
W then goes on to mention something of symbolism and categories (yet I don’t think he explicitly says “categories”?) when talking of colour, shape and number (23 - ref. to language/words as “tools”, 28, 29 to 35 - talk about numbers, colours and shapes). Here he mentions that pointing out a group of items and announcing something doesn’t make explicit what the word announced means (could be “group,” could be “five,” could be “circular,” could be “yellow,” etc.,.) it is from here that categories are formed by cross referencing what is said in reference to what items. — I like sushi
The central idea throughout the PI is the idea of the language-game, and under this rubric is the idea of rules of use (or logic of use), and also Wittgenstein's idea of grammar which falls under the role of the rules. Although the role of rules is probably more expansive than just the rules of grammar.
Whether we are referring to Wittgenstein's grammatical rules (which are important), or the more general idea of rule-following, as seen in the application of rules across a wider swath of language usage, rule-following is central.
Grammar is what makes the moves in language possible, just like the rules of chess make the game of chess possible. And just as the rules of chess permit some moves and disallow others, so also does grammar permit and disallow certain linguistic moves. This should be seen under the logic of use, but again keep in mind that the logic of use is broader than just grammar. It includes the various acts that occur in a language-game. For instance, the act of bringing the slab in Wittgenstein's primitive language-game, is also seen as part of the logic of use. Just as the rules of chess bring about the various moves in chess as part of the logic within the game.
It's also part of the nature of the rules of grammar to adjudicate certain moves as correct or incorrect. Again the parallel with chess rules. One can think of the rules of grammar and the rules of chess as more akin to commands to follow in order to play the game correctly. The rules are conventions, but they necessitate certain moves, i.e., if you want to play the game correctly within the social structure.
I will just make general remarks here and there. — Sam26
The rules are simply conventions. Conventions aren't correct or incorrect. It's not incorrect to be unconventional. If you're too unconventional in this case, people will have a difficult time understanding you, at least initially. What makes something count as a particular language or not is simply the conceptual boundaries that individuals have in mind for that language. In other words, simply "what they'll assent to call 'English' (or whatever language)" — Terrapin Station
Some conventions are correct or incorrect. — Sam26
One cannot simply use a word any way one likes, i.e., if you want to be understood. — Sam26
So there is a sense where we can say you are using the word cup incorrectly even though the word cup is a matter of convention. — Sam26
Some conventions are correct or incorrect.
— Sam26
No, they are not.
One cannot simply use a word any way one likes, i.e., if you want to be understood.
— Sam26
Sure, it will be more difficult to understand someone if they're very unconventional. I mention that in the post you're responding to.
So there is a sense where we can say you are using the word cup incorrectly even though the word cup is a matter of convention.
— Sam26
Yeah, in the sense where you endorse argumentum ad populums, conformity, etc, and you mistake your opinion for a fact. — Terrapin Station
So let's see if I understand you correctly. The rules of chess are a matter of convention, i.e., they could have been otherwise. But according to you it's not incorrect for me to move the bishop like a queen. The problem is that your use of incorrect and correct is out of the norm, as such, one has a difficult time understanding what you're saying, because by implication even in the use of these words (correct and incorrect) has no correct or incorrect use. If that's true why are you arguing that I'm incorrect? Your argument, if you follow it to its conclusion leads to an absurdity. — Sam26
Attention to this aspect of the work will clear up alot of what is going on in §31, which MU is struggling with. — StreetlightX
It is in this and more or less similar ways that a name means and is
given to a thing.—It will often prove useful in philosophy to say to
ourselves: naming something is like attaching a label to a thing.
I simply meant that to point out “red” you need to collect objects that are red. — I like sushi
You can point out the number of items and an understanding of “four” or “five” will come. Once these terms are established then, and only then, can the term “number” be applied. In this sense the “category” of number is set out after the use of them (ostensively.) — I like sushi
We certainly don’t arrive at the term “number” before we have the terms “one,” “two,” “three,” etc.,. — I like sushi
We certainly don’t arrive at the term “number” before we have the terms “one,” “two,” “three,” etc.,. — I like sushi
3. Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication;
only not everything that we call language is this system. And one
has to say this in many cases where the question arises "Is this an
appropriate description or not?" The answer is: "Yes, it is appropriate,
but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of
what you were claiming to describe."
It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects
about on a surface according to certain rules . . ."—and we replied:
You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You
can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those
games.
First, because there is no way of resolving what would count as being incorrect about such knowledge. — Sam26
Second, and this is closely related to the first point, rules cannot be privately established, i.e., totally isolated from social contexts. It's just not possible. Every notion of correct or incorrect, knowing and not knowing is part of a social construct, viz., a linguistic construct. There is no meaning to be had privately. Again, because it's logically impossible. — Sam26
But, there is something very wrong with Kripke's skeptical argument, i.e., it assumes the very thing it's arguing against. It's circular. Here's the crux of the problem. In order for Kripke's argument to work, he has to be able to compare Mary's understanding of addition up to 1000, with that of Mary's understanding of addition after 1000. However, if there is no way to know, according to Kripke's skeptical argument that we are following a rule in terms of any concept (addition in the e.g.), then there is no way for Kripke to know if he is following the rules of sameness correctly. When he compares what Mary did at point X, with what Mary did at point Y along the time line, how does he know that he is applying the rule of sameness in the correct way? — Sam26
In all three cases here, what is 'prepared' and what is explained 'before' the actual ostensive definition is the 'category' - as you said - of the thing that is being pointed out. The 'category'' is not set out after the pointing out, but before. It must be 'prepared' before one understands that it is 'two' things that are being pointed out. — StreetlightX
It is “conventional” to breath. Is it also “correct”? — I like sushi
One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without
ever learning or formulating rules. He might have learnt quite simple
board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more and
more complicated ones. He too might be given the explanation "This
is the king",—if, for instance, he were being shewn chessmen of a shape
he was not used to. This explanation again only tells him the use
of the piece because, as we might say, the place for it was already
prepared. Or even: we shall only say that it tells him the use, if
the place is already prepared. And in this case it is so, not because the
person to whom we give the explanation already knows rules, but
because in another sense he is already master of a game.
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