You are different from the physical object observed, so... why should anyone assume you got something to do with it? — Heiko

Because:
1. The intelligibility of the object and the capacity of the subject to be informed are both actualized by the identical act, viz. the subject's awareness of the object, and
2. The object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object.

Of course! This is a tautology. It's like saying, "As long as I continue to will my goal, I continue to will my goal." So what is will? — Noah Te Stroete

It is not a tautology as the intention is mental and the working is often physical, so they are not identical.

Will is a power, not a thing. Humans are ostensible unities, one aspect of which is the power to chose and commit. It is that power that we call "will."

So the will is uncaused. How did you refute Strawson again? I'm genuinely confused here. Could you clarify how the will is not accidentally necessarily and sufficiently caused? — Noah Te Stroete

The will is not determined by accidental causality, which is probably what you mean by "causality." It is, however, caused -- by whatever actualizes its potential to continue in operation, which leads ultimately to an uncaused concurrent cause some call "God." Just as the builder being sufficient to build this house does not mean that he or she is insufficient to build other houses, so the fact that my will is sufficient to instantiate this line of action does not mean that it is insufficient to instantiate other lines of action. So, the principle of sufficient causality is not violated. All that is "violated" is the idea that accidental causes involve necessity -- which was never true to begin with (as Hume showed).

Could you clarify how the will is not accidentally necessarily and sufficiently caused? — Noah Te Stroete

I just discussed this. As Hume showed, accidental causality is not intrinsically necessary. It derives whatever necessity it has from the essential or concurrent causality of the laws of nature. When we integrate their concurrent operation over time, we find initial states are transformed into determinate final states. This requires that the guiding intentionality (the laws of nature) remain constant over the course of the integration. In the case of humans (excluded from physics by the fundamental abstraction), intentionality changes over time in an unpredictable way, and so the required integration cannot be carried out. Thus, we are not subject to determination by accidental causality.

Because you felt compelled to put me in my place. — Noah Te Stroete

I see no reason to put anyone "in their place." We are discussing what is, and hopefully we will each teach the other something new. I am quite sure you know things I do not.

I'm saying it's necessary AND sufficient. Not just sufficient. Where am I going wrong? I'm confused. — Noah Te Stroete

It is necessary that every phenomenon have a sufficient cause. It is not necessary that every cause operate to a predetermined end. Houses necessarily have builders, but builders are not predetermined to build particular houses. Their sufficiency as causes does not necessitate a specific effect.

If I had a frontal lobotomy (which I'm considering after this exchange), then I couldn't speak coherently no matter how much I willed it. So, is not the will dependent on the physical-natural brain which operates according to necessary AND sufficient causes? — Noah Te Stroete

Of course the mind has interdependent data processing and intentional subsystems. If the data processing subsystem is compromised, the data we are aware of may be defective, we may lack the means of effecting our intentions,

1. The intelligibility of the object and the capacity of the subject to be informed are both actualized by the identical act, viz. the subject's awareness of the object, and — Dfpolis

I'm not sure I can not follow you. Are you sure you answered the question? Your "intelligibility" for example either is something I could not care about less or something that science would only be concerned about as far as you pose as an object. Not even Kant would have made the mistake to call his deductions as describing a thing in itself.

2. The object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object. — Dfpolis

I don't ask if you could prove that statement. I stick with the phenomenological account that you put forth the identity of subject and object on the one hand while implying a sharp distinction on the other.

This isn't true. All that experience tells us is that:
a) approaching a choice, we are aware of more than one new line of action (let's call these lines L1 and L2)
(b) it seems to us that we are free to choose either L1 or L2
(c) after we have chosen (say) L1, it seems to us that we could have chosen L2 instead.
— Herg

I experience tells us more than this. It additionally tells us, in many cases, that L1 and L2 are equally in our power. — Dfpolis

I used the words "we are free to choose either L1 or L2." You used the words "L1 and L2 are equally in our power." Your words and mine mean exactly the same. So in my (b) I could have written "it seems to us that L1 and L2 are equally in our power", and that would have meant the same as what I actually wrote (and would also be true).

It is equally in my power, for example, to go to the store to buy an ingredient for dinner or to stay home a while longer to discuss philosophy. I know both are equally in my power on the basis of my past experience.

What feature(s) of your past experience do you believe give you this knowledge? I don't believe there are any such features.

This awareness of alternatives being equally in my power, and not "I could have chosen otherwise," is what I mean by free will.

You are not entitled to describe your state of mind as "awareness of alternatives being equally in my power" until it is established that these alternatives actually are equally in your power; and since this is precisely the issue between us, you are begging the question.

Purely physical systems (as opposed to physical systems with intellect and will) have only one immanent line of action -- that determined by its present state and the laws of nature.

This is almost certainly not true of our universe. Nature is probabilistic rather than deterministic at the quantum level, and quantum superposition means that there is usually more than one line of action leading from the present state.

Intentional systems, such as humans, are essentially different in that we can have multiple lines of actions immanent before we commit to one. The difference in the number of immanent lines of action is critical, for it means that we differ from purely physical systems. So any analogy to their deterministic nature fails.

Since, as I have just stated, our universe is almost certainly not deterministic, and there are multiple lines of action in purely physical systems, humans having multiple lines of action does not imply that humans are not purely physical systems. But even if the universe is deterministic, and purely physical systems only have one line of action leading from the present state, while humans see multiple lines of action before them, you still have not shown that we are free to choose between those multiple lines of action.

My argument is:

1. Approaching the choice, we are aware that incompatible lines of action, L1, L2, ..., are equally in our power.
2. To have free will means that we have incompatible lines of action equally in our power.
3. Therefore, we have free will.

You could deny premise 1, but only dogmatically. — Dfpolis

Your premise 1 begs the question by describing our state of mind as "we are aware that...", as I have already noted.

First, I know what is and what is not in my power from my experience as a human in the world. It is in my power to walk to the store it is not in my power to walk to the moon.

The sense of "in my power" that you use here will not deliver what you need to establish free will. What you mean here is that there are facts about the physical world - such as the gravitational attraction between your body and the earth, and the lack of any surface between the earth and moon on which you could walk - that prevent you walking to the moon, but that do not prevent you walking to the store. That sense of "in my power" is all about the limitations physical laws place upon a body like yours; it has nothing at all to do with free will.

Second, being in my power is a real state, with well-defined truth conditions.

The truth conditions are that you should be free to choose between alternatives; but you are not entitled to say that this is a real state unless we have established that those truth conditions obtain, and since this is precisely the issue between us, you are once again begging the question.

Staying home ceases to be in my power once I am on my way to the store.

Of course. But you cannot validly infer from this that staying home was in your power before you set off to the store.

There is, in fact, not the slightest reason to think that we have free will. We can always only make one choice, and there are never any grounds for thinking that we could have made a different one. If we chose L1 instead of L2, then the only way we could have grounds for thinking that we had the power to choose L2 would be to have actually chosen L2, and of course that was prevented by our choosing L1.

There are two other reasons for denying free will. The first is that we do not need it to explain anything that happens in the world; and the second is that the notion of free will is incoherent, because it requires there to be a third possibility between determinism and indeterminism (which is mere randomness), and there is no such third possibility.

Conclusion: Therefore the choice between L1 and L2 was not pre-determined, and we could have chosen L2.
— Herg

I don't think he was saying this conclusion. "Experience tells us" is another way of saying "per experience," or "phenomenally, if we're to go by experience," etc.

Your conclusion is written from a perspective outside of experience per se. But the sentence is "experience tells us," The sentence isn't presented as a perspective from outside of experience. — Terrapin Station

I think Dfpolis' sentence was ambiguous. "Experience tells us" could be taken either as the hypothetical "if we're to go by experience", or the categorical "experience gives us good reason to believe that". Dfpolis has now said this:

I experience tells us more than this. It additionally tells us, in many cases, that L1 and L2 are equally in our power. It is equally in my power, for example, to go to the store to buy an ingredient for dinner or to stay home a while longer to discuss philosophy. I know both are equally in my power on the basis of my past experience. — Dfpolis

I think this makes it clear that Dfpolis is making the categorical claim, not the hypothetical claim.

I'm not sure I can not follow you. Are you sure you answered the question? — Heiko

No, I'm not sure I answered your question, "You are different from the physical object observed, so... why should anyone assume you got something to do with it?" The reason is that "something to do with it" is rather vague. As I was talking about knowing, I assumed that you were as well. If you had something else in mind, please explain what.

Your "intelligibility" for example either is something I could not care about less or something that science would only be concerned about as far as you pose as an object. Not even Kant would have made the mistake to call his deductions as describing a thing in itself. — Heiko

None of this rebuts what I said. Whether or not you or science care about intelligibility is irrelevant to the truth of my claim. The same applies to what Kant may or may not have done. If you have a factual objection, please give it.

I stick with the phenomenological account that you put forth the identity of subject and object on the one hand while implying a sharp distinction on the other. — Heiko

The partial identity of subject and object in the act of knowing is an ontological fact. Distinction belongs to the logical order. Ideas of the identical reality can be distinct if they consider that reality from different perspectives. A change of perspective does not entail a change in what is perceived.

As I was talking about knowing, I assumed that you were as well. — Dfpolis

I thought, I was. For example we know even the most basic ontological basis' have been put into question numerous times with more or less impact on contemporary philosophy. We know the history and conceptual origins of the words as we use them today to a great extend. Such things weren't proven, they were said. A-priori deductions conclude from certain foundations more or less like mathematics deduces from axioms. Adorno and Horkheimer put this to a point saying at the end of enlightenment even the subject itself is no more than a substrate of the right to set itself as such. Modern society, educated as it is, recognizes this - at least when things get serious.

The partial identity of subject and object in the act of knowing is an ontological fact. Distinction belongs to the logical order. Ideas of the identical reality can be distinct if they consider that reality from different perspectives. — Dfpolis

Well, when talking about concepts mixing things (read: perspectives) up is pretty contra-productive. It may well be that a natural number is always a real number as well but that doesn't make the natural numbers the real numbers or vice versa. So, to put this to a point, if the sciences of nature managed to say what you were up to do without even asking, what importance would the insistence of being "a deciding subject" make? "You" do what you do, right? This is about perspectives only, we are talking reasons. Reasons may seem compelling or void - who should judge that? Is it enough that someone felt compelled to do something to make the reason sufficient? Is there a higher-than-individual (divine) reason that could judge? We are far away from any "knowing" if we even can argue about such things.

I used the words "we are free to choose either L1 or L2." You used the words "L1 and L2 are equally in our power." Your words and mine mean exactly the same. — Herg

No, they mean something quite different. I can choose a Maserati over a Fiat, but that does not mean it is in my power to buy a Maserati. Choosing is selecting an intentional state, but if we cannot effect that intentionality, if what we choose is not in our power, then it cannot result in the corresponding new line of action.

Considering this from a different perspective, an epiphenomenalist or a physical determinist might be willing to grant that I can make a number of choices as long as they remain purely intentional, as he or she might hold that only one line of physical action is possible.

So in my (b) I could have written "it seems to us that L1 and L2 are equally in our power", and that would have meant the same as what I actually wrote (and would also be true). — Herg

The relevant point is not what seems to be true, but your unargued claim that it only seems to be true. A great many things that seem to be true are also known to be true.

So, the question is: how do we know what is possible? There are two ways. First, whatever actually happens must be possible, or it could not happen. The second way is knowledge by analogy, which is how science makes its predictions. For example, in previous cases, mixing vinegar and baking soda has produced carbon dioxide. Even though the present case differs slightly from previous cases, I know, by analogy that, if I have vinegar and baking soda I have the potential to produce carbon dioxide. I know this for a fact, whether or not I actually mix them to produce carbon dioxide.

So, you can choose to say that we only "seem" to have potentials that are not actualized, but in doing so, you reject the structure of science, and specifically, its ability to make reliable predictions.

What feature(s) of your past experience do you believe give you this knowledge? I don't believe there are any such features. — Herg

The fact that I have gone to the store and stayed at home previously, and have not suffered any relevant disability since.

You are not entitled to describe your state of mind as "awareness of alternatives being equally in my power" until it is established that these alternatives actually are equally in your power; and since this is precisely the issue between us, you are begging the question. — Herg

But, that has been established by previous analogous cases. There is no question begging, as I have shown how we know unrealized potentials, and that schema applies here. The ball is in your court to show why it applies to mixing vinegar and baking soda, but not to going to the store.

This is almost certainly not true of our universe. Nature is probabilistic rather than deterministic at the quantum level, and quantum superposition means that there is usually more than one line of action leading from the present state. — Herg

This is a common misunderstanding among non-physicists. Actually, quantum theory says that all unobserved physical processes are fully deterministic. Unpredictability enters only when quantum systems are observed.

Superposition does not mean that there are many states present but that the one state present is can be analyzed into a sum of mathematically independent function. Further, superposition only applies when the dynamics is linear to a good approximation. As electron-electron interactions bind bulk matter and are intrinsically nonlinear, the concept of superposition breaks down for bulk matter.

Since, as I have just stated, our universe is almost certainly not deterministic, and there are multiple lines of action in purely physical systems, humans having multiple lines of action does not imply that humans are not purely physical systems. — Herg

As I explained, this is based on a misunderstanding of physics. Since there were no quantum observations before the advent of intelligent observers, and even now they are quite rare, no matter what interpretation of quantum measurement you subscribe to, the physical universe is almost completely deterministic.

Further, whether or not you believe in collapse on awareness (I do not), measurement, as the one possible exception to determinism, involves intelligent observers. This undermines your argument, as the possible indeterminism you cite only occurs when intelligent observers become involved.

Finally, if you believe that the universe is not deterministic, how can you object to the reality of incompatible possibilities?

But even if the universe is deterministic, and purely physical systems only have one line of action leading from the present state, while humans see multiple lines of action before them, you still have not shown that we are free to choose between those multiple lines of action. — Herg

We are free if we are not constrained. We are constrained when we want to do A, but are prevented. This happens many times, so we know how to recognize constraints when we see them. For example, yesterday I wanted to go 70mph or more on the I-15, but traffic constrained me from going more than 0-20 mph. When I decide whether or not to go to the store, I experience no such constraint. So, I am free to choose either.

Your premise 1 begs the question by describing our state of mind as "we are aware that...", as I have already noted. — Herg

I do not understand what you're claiming. We have to begin any sound line of reasoning with experiential facts -- things we are aware of. I have explained how we know what is possible. So, what, exactly is your objection?

The sense of "in my power" that you use here will not deliver what you need to establish free will. What you mean here is that there are facts about the physical world - such as the gravitational attraction between your body and the earth, and the lack of any surface between the earth and moon on which you could walk - that prevent you walking to the moon, but that do not prevent you walking to the store. That sense of "in my power" is all about the limitations physical laws place upon a body like yours; it has nothing at all to do with free will. — Herg

It has much to do with free will, but not everything. Mechanistic determinists claim that the laws of nature preclude free will. You have pointed out some of the things the laws of nature prevent, and going to the store is not among them. Let's suppose that the laws of physical nature prevented me, at some micro-level, from going to the store. That would not prevent me from forming and committing to the intention to go to the store. Then I could commit to going to the store, only to find that I was physically unable to do so, as I was physically unable to go over 20 mph on the I-15 yesterday.

Of course, there are other kinds of determinism. For example, motivational determinists claim that we are determined to do whatever will be the most emotionally rewarding, or some variation on that. As you claim that the physical world is not determined, I am not sure what kind of constraint you think prevents us from being free.

Second, being in my power is a real state, with well-defined truth conditions.

The truth conditions are that you should be free to choose between alternatives; but you are not entitled to say that this is a real state unless we have established that those truth conditions obtain, and since this is precisely the issue between us, you are once again begging the question. — Herg

I have explained how we know unrealized possibilities. I await your response.

Staying home ceases to be in my power once I am on my way to the store.

Of course. But you cannot validly infer from this that staying home was in your power before you set off to the store. — Herg

No, but it shows that there are well-defined truth conditions for being able to do something that we do not do.

If we chose L1 instead of L2, then the only way we could have grounds for thinking that we had the power to choose L2 would be to have actually chosen L2, and of course that was prevented by our choosing L1. — Herg

Then, if we do not pour the vinegar on the backing soda, the possibility of producing carbon dioxide never existed? Where does this leave chemistry?

The first is that we do not need it to explain anything that happens in the world; and the second is that the notion of free will is incoherent, because it requires there to be a third possibility between determinism and indeterminism (which is mere randomness), and there is no such third possibility. — Herg

Free will is necessary to explain the reality of moral responsibility -- which happens in the world. People know that they are responsible for actions they freely choose, and are not responsible for actions when they had no choice. This knowledge has physical consequences -- which also happen in the world.

Your second argument is fallacious. Determinism means that choices are fully immanent in the state of the world before the agent exists. For there to be no middle ground, the Principle of Excluded Middle requires indeterminism to be the strict contradiction of determinism: that choices are not fully immanent in the state of the world before the agent exists. That differs from "mere randomness," which is mindless, for it does not consider the determining operation of the agent's mind.

So, there is a middle ground between fully determined and mindlessly random, viz. the result of mindful action on the part of a free agent.

I think this makes it clear that Dfpolis is making the categorical claim, not the hypothetical claim. — Herg

Exactly right.

I read your response. I am unsure what point your first paragraph is making other than many people question human knowledge. I give no weight to group opinions without rational grounds.

It may well be that a natural number is always a real number as well but that doesn't make the natural numbers the real numbers or vice versa. — Heiko

I never implied that it did, but it remains the case that while 1 is both natural and real, natural and real are distinct concepts.

if the sciences of nature managed to say what you were up to do without even asking, what importance would the insistence of being "a deciding subject" make? "You" do what you do, right? This is about perspectives only, we are talking reasons. Reasons may seem compelling or void - who should judge that? Is it enough that someone felt compelled to do something to make the reason sufficient? Is there a higher-than-individual (divine) reason that could judge? We are far away from any "knowing" if we even can argue about such things. — Heiko

As with many questions, the answers depend on details not given. If I decide to do x, physical changes will result before I actually do x. It is theoretically possible to detect these, and predict that I will do x, but that does not imply that there was no prior intentional operation.

We each have to decide what reasons we find compelling in light of our experience and background knowledge.

Different reasons may be sufficient to different acts. A feeling of compulsion my be sufficient for some.

We can show, rationally, that there is a God who is the source of intentionality. I do not pretend to know if God makes moral judgements as we think of them. It seems more likely to me that any rewards and punishments are built into the structure of reality.

the hypothetical "if we're to go by experience", or the categorical "experience gives us good reason to believe that". Dfpolis has now said this: — Herg

I don't agree that it's at all clear that there's a difference there.

I read your response. I am unsure what point your first paragraph is making other than many people question human knowledge. I give no weight to group opinions without rational grounds. — Dfpolis

Maybe that is part of the problem: You do not even recognize the process you are part of. How could you? It is about intentionality, as you pointed out. To someone like me the resulting contradiction is obvious. Not that there would be anything to discuss - questions are only the beginning. We are beyond this point, aren't we?

As the argument is countenanced at the OP, it sounds like petitio principii at [3] (using as a premise the very point he was to demonstrate).

the hypothetical "if we're to go by experience", or the categorical "experience gives us good reason to believe that". Dfpolis has now said this:
— Herg

I don't agree that it's at all clear that there's a difference there. — Terrapin Station

The second interpretation asserts that there is good reason to believe what experience is telling us; the first does not.

I used the words "we are free to choose either L1 or L2." You used the words "L1 and L2 are equally in our power." Your words and mine mean exactly the same.
— Herg

No, they mean something quite different. I can choose a Maserati over a Fiat, but that does not mean it is in my power to buy a Maserati. — Dfpolis

If you can't buy the Maserati, what sense does it make to say that you are choosing it? You must be choosing it for something, or you can't truthfully be said to be choosing it at all. 'I choose the Maserati, but not for anything in particular,' doesn't make sense. In the context of our discussion, choosing L1 means choosing L1 in order to execute L1, and the presumption is that you have the power to execute L1, because if you don't, you cannot truthfully be said to be choosing L1 at all.

The relevant point is not what seems to be true, but your unargued claim that it only seems to be true. — Dfpolis

We agree that it seems that executing L1 rather than L2 is in your power; the burden of proof is on you, not on me, to prove that both L1 and L2 actually are in your power. As for 'unargued', what do you imagine I have been doing since we started this conversation?

So, the question is: how do we know what is possible? There are two ways. First, whatever actually happens must be possible, or it could not happen. The second way is knowledge by analogy, which is how science makes its predictions. For example, in previous cases, mixing vinegar and baking soda has produced carbon dioxide. Even though the present case differs slightly from previous cases, I know, by analogy that, if I have vinegar and baking soda I have the potential to produce carbon dioxide. I know this for a fact, whether or not I actually mix them to produce carbon dioxide.

So, you can choose to say that we only "seem" to have potentials that are not actualised, but in doing so, you reject the structure of science, and specifically, its ability to make reliable predictions. — Dfpolis

What an odd argument. Science is able to make reliable predictions precisely because, in cases such as the vinegar and baking soda case, there is no free will; the vinegar and the baking soda, when mixed together, have to make carbon dioxide because they have no choice in the matter. That is how we know that making carbon dioxide in such a situation is possible. So what would be the parallel situation when you are contemplating whether to stay at home or go to the store? It would have to be that we can only predict that you will go to the store, and therefore know that going to the store is possible for you, if you, like the vinegar and the baking soda, have no free will. So your parallel with science is apposite only if you take my side of the argument and hold that humans, like vinegar and baking soda, have no free will.

What feature(s) of your past experience do you believe give you this knowledge? I don't believe there are any such features.
— Herg

The fact that I have gone to the store and stayed at home previously, and have not suffered any relevant disability since. — Dfpolis

I rather thought you might say this, but of course I did not want to presume that you would, because no philosopher should ever put words into another philosopher's mouth.
You are in effect arguing like this:
Premiss: On some previous occasions I have gone to the store, and on other previous occasions I have stayed at home.
Conclusion: Therefore on this occasion I have it in my power to either go to the store or stay at home.
This is an invalid argument. In order to have free will it is not sufficient for there to be some occasions when a potential action (e.g. going to the store) is actualised; it has to be the case that you have the power to realise the potential action in some particular case. In effect, you are confusing a type of action (going to the store) with a token action (going to the store on this occasion).

But, that has been established by previous analogous cases. There is no question begging, as I have shown how we know unrealised potentials, and that schema applies here. The ball is in your court to show why it applies to mixing vinegar and baking soda, but not to going to the store. — Dfpolis

I do maintain that what applies to mixing vinegar and baking soda also applies to humans, in that given a certain potential for human action, it is simply a matter of physical law whether the potential is actualised.

Actually, quantum theory says that all unobserved physical processes are fully deterministic. Unpredictability enters only when quantum systems are observed. — Dfpolis

Since this directly contradicts everything I have ever read about quantum physics, I have no comment to make, and I shall not raise quantum physics with you in the future.

We are free if we are not constrained. We are constrained when we want to do A, but are prevented. This happens many times, so we know how to recognise constraints when we see them. For example, yesterday I wanted to go 70mph or more on the I-15, but traffic constrained me from going more than 0-20 mph. When I decide whether or not to go to the store, I experience no such constraint. So, I am free to choose either. — Dfpolis

This appears to be compatibilism, and if that is your position, then we have been arguing at cross purposes. I am not a compatibilist. My understanding of free will is that it requires the ability to do otherwise than one actually does.

Free will is necessary to explain the reality of moral responsibility -- which happens in the world. People know that they are responsible for actions they freely choose, — Dfpolis

No, they don't know this. They believe it, but belief is not knowledge, and therefore there is nothing requiring explanation.

Determinism means that choices are fully immanent in the state of the world before the agent exists. For there to be no middle ground, the Principle of Excluded Middle requires indeterminism to be the strict contradiction of determinism: that choices are not fully immanent in the state of the world before the agent exists. That differs from "mere randomness," which is mindless, for it does not consider the determining operation of the agent's mind.

So, there is a middle ground between fully determined and mindlessly random, viz. the result of mindful action on the part of a free agent. — Dfpolis

This is just speculation, because you have not established grounds for believing that minds complete the determination of actions.
The point is that to the extent that any event is undetermined, it is random.

The second interpretation asserts that there is good reason to believe what experience is telling us; the first does not. — Herg

I was talking about a clear difference a la the notion that one claim is about experience per se and the other isn't.

You do not even recognize the process you are part of. — Heiko

I am sorry you think I am so unreflective. As I see it, it is better to light small candles than lament the darkness.

No problem. You are the way you are... ;)

If you can't buy the Maserati, what sense does it make to say that you are choosing it? You must be choosing it for something, or you can't truthfully be said to be choosing it at all. — Herg

Whenever I select or prefer one thing over another, I'm choosing it. Even though I can't implement my choice now, it is still a choice. If I were to win the lottery tomorrow, I would not go through the selection process again, I would simply implement my pre-existing choice. What am I choosing it for? The car I aspire to own.

In the context of our discussion, choosing L1 means choosing L1 in order to execute L1, and the presumption is that you have the power to execute L1, because if you don't, you cannot truthfully be said to be choosing L1 at all. — Herg

Choosing is an intentional act. It creates a disposition that will be physically implemented if possible, but even if the implementation isn't now possible, the state of the world has changed because I now have a disposition to act that I lacked before my choice. It is a common thing for people to first choose, and then await their chance.

The relevant point is not what seems to be true, but your unargued claim that it only seems to be true. — Dfpolis

We agree that it seems that executing L1 rather than L2 is in your power; the burden of proof is on you, not on me, to prove that both L1 and L2 actually are in your power. As for 'unargued', what do you imagine I have been doing since we started this conversation? — Herg

I've already shown how we know potentials. As for what you have been doing, as I recall, you have been criticizing the notion of free will, but have offered no reason to believe in determinism.

What an odd argument. Science is able to make reliable predictions precisely because, in cases such as the vinegar and baking soda case, there is no free will; the vinegar and the baking soda, when mixed together, have to make carbon dioxide because they have no choice in the matter. — Herg

Not quite. There is free will here. I may choose to mix them or not. Still, even if I choose not to mix them, the potential to produce carbon dioxide remains. This is just like choosing not to go to the store. Even though I choose to stay home, the potential to go remains.

Yes, free will does not enter into the reaction, but that's equally true of many choices once implementation begins. Once I step out of the plane door to begin a skydive, there is no going back.

That is how we know that making carbon dioxide in such a situation is possible. — Herg

No, that is not how we know that producing carbon dioxide is possible. We know acetic acid and sodium bicarbonate will react as they do because previous investigators have have freely chosen to investigate analogous cases. We have never examined, and no one could ever examine, the exact case before us, contextualized as it is. We must rely on reasoning by analogy.

Chemistry is the result of a long history of experiment and analysis in which we find analogies to the case at hand. The same is true of our knowledge of having incompatible options equally in our power.

So what would be the parallel situation when you are contemplating whether to stay at home or go to the store? It would have to be that we can only predict that you will go to the store, and therefore know that going to the store is possible for you, if you, like the vinegar and the baking soda, have no free will. — Herg

Let's look at the relation between prediction and potential. As I said earlier, the first way of knowing what is possible is to observe what is actual, for it could not be actual if it were not possible. Prediction is just a slight variation on this, in that a reliable prediction tells us what will become actual. Still, to make the prediction, we do not rely on the actuality of the predicted event, but on our knowledge, by analogy, of the determinate potential for that event. The question is, are all potentials determinate (determined to be actualized)? You seem to think that they are. I do not.

Consider our vinegar and baking soda. Do they always have the potential to produce carbon dioxide? I, and most chemists, would say they do. On you theory, they do not unless this vinegar and this baking soda are actually mixed to produce carbon dioxide at some point in the future. I say this because you seem to deny the second way of knowing potential -- by analogy with other cases. A potential that is never realized is, by definition, not a determinate potential -- it is not a potential that can be verified by a confirmed prediction, for ex hypothesis, the mixing will never happen.

Premiss: On some previous occasions I have gone to the store, and on other previous occasions I have stayed at home.
Conclusion: Therefore on this occasion I have it in my power to either go to the store or stay at home.

This is an invalid argument. In order to have free will it is not sufficient for there to be some occasions when a potential action (e.g. going to the store) is actualised; it has to be the case that you have the power to realise the potential action in some particular case. In effect, you are confusing a type of action (going to the store) with a token action (going to the store on this occasion). — Herg

There are two questions here. First, do you or do you not think that potencies can be known by analogy? If you do, how strong does the evidentiary basis need to be before you are willing to rely on the analogy?

Clearly, if I only went to the store once, and it was a harrowing experience, it might not actually be in my power to go to store now. Perhaps I might freeze on the way, be eaten by a lion or be struck by a car. I am happy to concede that analogical reasoning lacks the reliability of deductive reasoning. I also stipulate that one case is a narrow basis for an analogical conclusion. Having said all that, few of us doubt it is in our power to go the store -- even if we have only gone once, and probably if we'd never gone before.

As Aristotle points out, we must not expect the same certitude in ethics as we do in other sciences. The subject matter is simply too complex. So, I grant that my argument is not deductively sound, but reasoning by analogy never is.

I do maintain that what applies to mixing vinegar and baking soda also applies to humans, in that given a certain potential for human action, it is simply a matter of physical law whether the potential is actualised. — Herg

This does not cut it. No law of nature precludes the mixing of vinegar and soda that will never in fact be mixed, and no physical law prevents me from going to the store even if I decide to stay home. In both cases, it is the decision of the agent that determines whether or not the potential is actualized.

There appears to be a physicalist subtext here, viz. the assumption that intentions are physically determined. No rational model supports this hypothesis, and reflection on the fundamental abstraction of natural science tells us that there cannot be a reduction of subjective intentional operations to objective physicality for the simple reason that natural science lacks the requisite concepts.

There is no reason to think that human intentions are determined by physics, and sound experimental studies to show that they are not. That being so, we can form intentions that are physically unrealizable, as my example of wanting to go 70 mph when traffic conditions prevented me from going more than 20 mph. When our choices physically constrained (unable to be implemented because of physical conditions), we can recognize it. Since there is no conflict between intentionality and realizability in deciding whether or not to go to the store, I have no reason to believe I am physically constrained.

Of course, one can engage in magical thinking or paranoia, believing that even though we do not see them, there are forces arrayed against us, but such conjectures are hardly parsimonious. It is more rational to say that when we are constrained by physical reality, we are generally aware of it and that when we are unaware of constraints, we are free to act as we will.

Actually, quantum theory says that all unobserved physical processes are fully deterministic. Unpredictability enters only when quantum systems are observed. — Dfpolis

Since this directly contradicts everything I have ever read about quantum physics, I have no comment to make, and I shall not raise quantum physics with you in the future. — Herg

In the course of acquiring my doctorate in theoretical physics I have probably studied quantum theory more deeply than you. If you like, I can supply you with references to standard texts.

We are free if we are not constrained. We are constrained when we want to do A, but are prevented. This happens many times, so we know how to recognise constraints when we see them. For example, yesterday I wanted to go 70mph or more on the I-15, but traffic constrained me from going more than 0-20 mph. When I decide whether or not to go to the store, I experience no such constraint. So, I am free to choose either. — Dfpolis

This appears to be compatibilism, and if that is your position, then we have been arguing at cross purposes. I am not a compatibilist. My understanding of free will is that it requires the ability to do otherwise than one actually does. — Herg

I'm not a standard compatibilist. I deny that free decisions are fully immanent in the state of the world before the existence of the agent. At the same time, I affirm that human decisions are adequately caused and mindful, not random. In other words, agents resolve prior indeterminism to fully determine their free decisions. So, before the agent acts, L1 and L2 are equally possible, but after the decision, only one is possible.

I reject the "I could have done otherwise" formulation because I could not have done otherwise and be the person I am. Every decision we make forms who we are. I am the person formed, in part, by the history of my decisions.

Free will is necessary to explain the reality of moral responsibility -- which happens in the world. People know that they are responsible for actions they freely choose, — Dfpolis

No, they don't know this. They believe it, but belief is not knowledge, and therefore there is nothing requiring explanation. — Herg

I understand that you must say this to be consistent, but it makes no sense. How could we evolve to feel remorseful for what was, in fact, unavoidable? What a waste of biological resources that would be! If I am predetermined to do L1, how could any moral intuitions change this?

Intuitions of responsibility and remorse are actual phenomena -- "something requiring explanation," as you say. You may claim that free will is not the proper explanation, but that is not enough. The phenomena remain. You dislike the standard explanation, but offer nothing better.

So, there is a middle ground between fully determined and mindlessly random, viz. the result of mindful action on the part of a free agent. — Dfpolis

This is just speculation, because you have not established grounds for believing that minds complete the determination of actions. — Herg

It is a matter of experience and philosophic reflection since Aristotle's discussion of proairesis that humans reflect to determine which of various possible means best reflect their values in effecting their ends. Are you denying that you have weighted, perhaps iteratively, various means of advancing your life? And doesn't such reflection reduce many possible means to the one plan you actually choose to implement?

My psychiatrist says my filter, or my left prefrontal cortex, is broken or damaged (I have schizoaffective disorder), so do I have free will? (He wasn’t clear if that has to do with my mental illness diagnosis or if that is something extra.) I almost always if not always feel compelled to do the things I do.

I have no reason to doubt that you have free will. You may have trouble executing some decisions because of your disorder, but not being a psychiatrist, I'm not really qualified to speak to that. I do know that in the case of OCD, it has been proven (at UCLA, if memory serves) that cognitive therapy can rewire the brain. You may want to read about it, and see if it might help you. If you are interested, I can look up the citation(s).

I have to see a therapist starting in the near future because I am using the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation to get training to return to work. I believe they will be using CBT on me.

The best of luck to you. You might ask your therapist about the UCLA results.

Thanks! Will do

If I am correct, then one of your objections to determinism was that there would be no evolutionary advantage to perceiving competing options or choices. I believe the evolutionary advantage is just to be able to learn and make more successful choices in the future. I believe the universe compels me to make a particular decision, but the mental exercise is stored in memory so I can determine better decisions in the future. Based on this memory, I can learn to be more successful. However, any particular decision is compelled by my previous memories, my current mood, and whatever basic need I have to satisfy.

I understand your argument. The question is: how can evolution determine that an unimplemented decision is better than an implemented one? All it can do is select survivors based on the decisions they actually make.

Trial and error. If you were somehow “punished” by your peers for posting on this forum, you might decide next time that it is better to go to the store first and let your thoughts percolate. If you were “rewarded” by your peers, then you might learn to post first and delay going to the store. However, your hunger or mood might override your desire to be “rewarded” for your thoughtful posts, and you would go to the store first.

I was being called to dinner when I last responded, so had little time. Let me start again.

Evolution works by selecting successful variant genotypes. It does so by means of "reproductive success," which is a very brutal means, viz. it lets their young live, and kills the deselected variant and/or its young. Let's assume that, suddenly, an individual emerges who is able to think of more than one possible action, but is constrained (on your hypothesis) by the laws of nature to execute only one.

First, one may wonder in what sense the other options are "possible" as opposed to imaginary. Perhaps in some other world I might have gone 70 mph on the I-15, but in this world, it was impossible to do so. What I could have done in some imaginary world is completely irrelevant to what I can do in the real world.

Second, you suggest that the advantage of being able to think of the other option is that we remember it, and make better decisions next time as a result. In the abstract, I find this an interesting observation, and one that may well be true. The question is, does it make sense in the narrow context of evolution? What is "better" in the evolutionary sense is what gives us more viable offspring. What is "worse" is what kills us, or at least gives us fewer viable offspring.

When we come to the second occasion, the one in which we remember the alternative, how does remembering an alternative that was never tested by evolution equip us to make a "better" decision in the evolutionary sense? I do not see that it does. I grant that the knowledge of past alternatives can change what is chosen on the second occasion, because any variation can, but I do not see why it will increase as oppose to decrease the number of viable offspring we have.

Third, it is unclear how you are thinking of decision making. I see it as an intentional process, supported by physical processing, that terminates in an attempt at physical action. Is that how you see it, or do you see it as a purely physical process with an epiphenominal conscious overlay? In other words, does what we think really matter?

I can understand, given that you suffer from a compulsive disorder, you have a hard time seeing yourself as free. Still, I see you as acting freely. Why? Because even though you feel compelled to do x, you have freely decided that you do not want to do x and are seeking the means (via CBT) to avoid doing x. We know that we are committed to a goal when we are actively engaged in means to attain that goal. It seems from what you have said that even though you are compelled to do x, you are working on the means of ceasing to do x.

That brings me back to the case of the UCLA OCD patients. Even though they had their various compulsions, they were committed to breaking those compulsions, sought and found means of doing so, an were able to incarnate their intentionality in new neural pathways.

Yes, reward and punishment can affect behavior. I see no evidence that it can change the goal to which one is committed.

So having a goal is a sign of free will? That’s interesting and something I hadn’t thought before. I will have to give it more thought. Thanks.

You are welcome.

I’m still not SURE I agree that a long-term goal is a sign of free will. It is still a choice but a choice that constantly and repeatedly has to be made. I gave my reasons for believing why I think decisions or choices are determined.

As for evolution, the mental exercise of weighing choices is a mechanism nature has chosen that has made humans successful. It is a mischaracterization of what I believe to say that evolution decides which is better, viz. the decision made or the option not taken. The mechanism is what evolution selected for.

As for whether I believe consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon, I don’t know how to put it. I believe consciousness is just as real as matter as I am a spiritual person. I believe consciousness is a manifestation of the life force which can be conceived as spirit or soul. I believe this spirit is dwelling within us as a taking part of the greater Spirit which is dwelling within the matter of the greater universe itself. You seem to believe that this “spirit” has causal efficacy. I believe it is just the force that animates us. Our differences as individuals is due to the structure of the matter of our bodies and brains, but our commonality is that we all take part in the Spirit.