You are different from the physical object observed, so... why should anyone assume you got something to do with it? — Heiko
Of course! This is a tautology. It's like saying, "As long as I continue to will my goal, I continue to will my goal." So what is will? — Noah Te Stroete
So the will is uncaused. How did you refute Strawson again? I'm genuinely confused here. Could you clarify how the will is not accidentally necessarily and sufficiently caused? — Noah Te Stroete
Could you clarify how the will is not accidentally necessarily and sufficiently caused? — Noah Te Stroete
Because you felt compelled to put me in my place. — Noah Te Stroete
I'm saying it's necessary AND sufficient. Not just sufficient. Where am I going wrong? I'm confused. — Noah Te Stroete
If I had a frontal lobotomy (which I'm considering after this exchange), then I couldn't speak coherently no matter how much I willed it. So, is not the will dependent on the physical-natural brain which operates according to necessary AND sufficient causes? — Noah Te Stroete
I'm not sure I can not follow you. Are you sure you answered the question? Your "intelligibility" for example either is something I could not care about less or something that science would only be concerned about as far as you pose as an object. Not even Kant would have made the mistake to call his deductions as describing a thing in itself.1. The intelligibility of the object and the capacity of the subject to be informed are both actualized by the identical act, viz. the subject's awareness of the object, and — Dfpolis
I don't ask if you could prove that statement. I stick with the phenomenological account that you put forth the identity of subject and object on the one hand while implying a sharp distinction on the other.2. The object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object. — Dfpolis
I used the words "we are free to choose either L1 or L2." You used the words "L1 and L2 are equally in our power." Your words and mine mean exactly the same. So in my (b) I could have written "it seems to us that L1 and L2 are equally in our power", and that would have meant the same as what I actually wrote (and would also be true).This isn't true. All that experience tells us is that:
a) approaching a choice, we are aware of more than one new line of action (let's call these lines L1 and L2)
(b) it seems to us that we are free to choose either L1 or L2
(c) after we have chosen (say) L1, it seems to us that we could have chosen L2 instead.
— Herg
I experience tells us more than this. It additionally tells us, in many cases, that L1 and L2 are equally in our power. — Dfpolis
What feature(s) of your past experience do you believe give you this knowledge? I don't believe there are any such features.It is equally in my power, for example, to go to the store to buy an ingredient for dinner or to stay home a while longer to discuss philosophy. I know both are equally in my power on the basis of my past experience.
You are not entitled to describe your state of mind as "awareness of alternatives being equally in my power" until it is established that these alternatives actually are equally in your power; and since this is precisely the issue between us, you are begging the question.This awareness of alternatives being equally in my power, and not "I could have chosen otherwise," is what I mean by free will.
This is almost certainly not true of our universe. Nature is probabilistic rather than deterministic at the quantum level, and quantum superposition means that there is usually more than one line of action leading from the present state.Purely physical systems (as opposed to physical systems with intellect and will) have only one immanent line of action -- that determined by its present state and the laws of nature.
Since, as I have just stated, our universe is almost certainly not deterministic, and there are multiple lines of action in purely physical systems, humans having multiple lines of action does not imply that humans are not purely physical systems. But even if the universe is deterministic, and purely physical systems only have one line of action leading from the present state, while humans see multiple lines of action before them, you still have not shown that we are free to choose between those multiple lines of action.Intentional systems, such as humans, are essentially different in that we can have multiple lines of actions immanent before we commit to one. The difference in the number of immanent lines of action is critical, for it means that we differ from purely physical systems. So any analogy to their deterministic nature fails.
Your premise 1 begs the question by describing our state of mind as "we are aware that...", as I have already noted.My argument is:
1. Approaching the choice, we are aware that incompatible lines of action, L1, L2, ..., are equally in our power.
2. To have free will means that we have incompatible lines of action equally in our power.
3. Therefore, we have free will.
You could deny premise 1, but only dogmatically. — Dfpolis
The sense of "in my power" that you use here will not deliver what you need to establish free will. What you mean here is that there are facts about the physical world - such as the gravitational attraction between your body and the earth, and the lack of any surface between the earth and moon on which you could walk - that prevent you walking to the moon, but that do not prevent you walking to the store. That sense of "in my power" is all about the limitations physical laws place upon a body like yours; it has nothing at all to do with free will.First, I know what is and what is not in my power from my experience as a human in the world. It is in my power to walk to the store it is not in my power to walk to the moon.
The truth conditions are that you should be free to choose between alternatives; but you are not entitled to say that this is a real state unless we have established that those truth conditions obtain, and since this is precisely the issue between us, you are once again begging the question.Second, being in my power is a real state, with well-defined truth conditions.
Of course. But you cannot validly infer from this that staying home was in your power before you set off to the store.Staying home ceases to be in my power once I am on my way to the store.
Conclusion: Therefore the choice between L1 and L2 was not pre-determined, and we could have chosen L2.
— Herg
I don't think he was saying this conclusion. "Experience tells us" is another way of saying "per experience," or "phenomenally, if we're to go by experience," etc.
Your conclusion is written from a perspective outside of experience per se. But the sentence is "experience tells us," The sentence isn't presented as a perspective from outside of experience. — Terrapin Station
I think this makes it clear that Dfpolis is making the categorical claim, not the hypothetical claim.I experience tells us more than this. It additionally tells us, in many cases, that L1 and L2 are equally in our power. It is equally in my power, for example, to go to the store to buy an ingredient for dinner or to stay home a while longer to discuss philosophy. I know both are equally in my power on the basis of my past experience. — Dfpolis
I'm not sure I can not follow you. Are you sure you answered the question? — Heiko
Your "intelligibility" for example either is something I could not care about less or something that science would only be concerned about as far as you pose as an object. Not even Kant would have made the mistake to call his deductions as describing a thing in itself. — Heiko
I stick with the phenomenological account that you put forth the identity of subject and object on the one hand while implying a sharp distinction on the other. — Heiko
I thought, I was. For example we know even the most basic ontological basis' have been put into question numerous times with more or less impact on contemporary philosophy. We know the history and conceptual origins of the words as we use them today to a great extend. Such things weren't proven, they were said. A-priori deductions conclude from certain foundations more or less like mathematics deduces from axioms. Adorno and Horkheimer put this to a point saying at the end of enlightenment even the subject itself is no more than a substrate of the right to set itself as such. Modern society, educated as it is, recognizes this - at least when things get serious.As I was talking about knowing, I assumed that you were as well. — Dfpolis
Well, when talking about concepts mixing things (read: perspectives) up is pretty contra-productive. It may well be that a natural number is always a real number as well but that doesn't make the natural numbers the real numbers or vice versa. So, to put this to a point, if the sciences of nature managed to say what you were up to do without even asking, what importance would the insistence of being "a deciding subject" make? "You" do what you do, right? This is about perspectives only, we are talking reasons. Reasons may seem compelling or void - who should judge that? Is it enough that someone felt compelled to do something to make the reason sufficient? Is there a higher-than-individual (divine) reason that could judge? We are far away from any "knowing" if we even can argue about such things.The partial identity of subject and object in the act of knowing is an ontological fact. Distinction belongs to the logical order. Ideas of the identical reality can be distinct if they consider that reality from different perspectives. — Dfpolis
I used the words "we are free to choose either L1 or L2." You used the words "L1 and L2 are equally in our power." Your words and mine mean exactly the same. — Herg
So in my (b) I could have written "it seems to us that L1 and L2 are equally in our power", and that would have meant the same as what I actually wrote (and would also be true). — Herg
What feature(s) of your past experience do you believe give you this knowledge? I don't believe there are any such features. — Herg
You are not entitled to describe your state of mind as "awareness of alternatives being equally in my power" until it is established that these alternatives actually are equally in your power; and since this is precisely the issue between us, you are begging the question. — Herg
This is almost certainly not true of our universe. Nature is probabilistic rather than deterministic at the quantum level, and quantum superposition means that there is usually more than one line of action leading from the present state. — Herg
Since, as I have just stated, our universe is almost certainly not deterministic, and there are multiple lines of action in purely physical systems, humans having multiple lines of action does not imply that humans are not purely physical systems. — Herg
But even if the universe is deterministic, and purely physical systems only have one line of action leading from the present state, while humans see multiple lines of action before them, you still have not shown that we are free to choose between those multiple lines of action. — Herg
Your premise 1 begs the question by describing our state of mind as "we are aware that...", as I have already noted. — Herg
The sense of "in my power" that you use here will not deliver what you need to establish free will. What you mean here is that there are facts about the physical world - such as the gravitational attraction between your body and the earth, and the lack of any surface between the earth and moon on which you could walk - that prevent you walking to the moon, but that do not prevent you walking to the store. That sense of "in my power" is all about the limitations physical laws place upon a body like yours; it has nothing at all to do with free will. — Herg
Second, being in my power is a real state, with well-defined truth conditions.
The truth conditions are that you should be free to choose between alternatives; but you are not entitled to say that this is a real state unless we have established that those truth conditions obtain, and since this is precisely the issue between us, you are once again begging the question. — Herg
Staying home ceases to be in my power once I am on my way to the store.
Of course. But you cannot validly infer from this that staying home was in your power before you set off to the store. — Herg
If we chose L1 instead of L2, then the only way we could have grounds for thinking that we had the power to choose L2 would be to have actually chosen L2, and of course that was prevented by our choosing L1. — Herg
The first is that we do not need it to explain anything that happens in the world; and the second is that the notion of free will is incoherent, because it requires there to be a third possibility between determinism and indeterminism (which is mere randomness), and there is no such third possibility. — Herg
I think this makes it clear that Dfpolis is making the categorical claim, not the hypothetical claim. — Herg
It may well be that a natural number is always a real number as well but that doesn't make the natural numbers the real numbers or vice versa. — Heiko
if the sciences of nature managed to say what you were up to do without even asking, what importance would the insistence of being "a deciding subject" make? "You" do what you do, right? This is about perspectives only, we are talking reasons. Reasons may seem compelling or void - who should judge that? Is it enough that someone felt compelled to do something to make the reason sufficient? Is there a higher-than-individual (divine) reason that could judge? We are far away from any "knowing" if we even can argue about such things. — Heiko
the hypothetical "if we're to go by experience", or the categorical "experience gives us good reason to believe that". Dfpolis has now said this: — Herg
Maybe that is part of the problem: You do not even recognize the process you are part of. How could you? It is about intentionality, as you pointed out. To someone like me the resulting contradiction is obvious. Not that there would be anything to discuss - questions are only the beginning. We are beyond this point, aren't we?I read your response. I am unsure what point your first paragraph is making other than many people question human knowledge. I give no weight to group opinions without rational grounds. — Dfpolis
the hypothetical "if we're to go by experience", or the categorical "experience gives us good reason to believe that". Dfpolis has now said this:
— Herg
I don't agree that it's at all clear that there's a difference there. — Terrapin Station
If you can't buy the Maserati, what sense does it make to say that you are choosing it? You must be choosing it for something, or you can't truthfully be said to be choosing it at all. 'I choose the Maserati, but not for anything in particular,' doesn't make sense. In the context of our discussion, choosing L1 means choosing L1 in order to execute L1, and the presumption is that you have the power to execute L1, because if you don't, you cannot truthfully be said to be choosing L1 at all.I used the words "we are free to choose either L1 or L2." You used the words "L1 and L2 are equally in our power." Your words and mine mean exactly the same.
— Herg
No, they mean something quite different. I can choose a Maserati over a Fiat, but that does not mean it is in my power to buy a Maserati. — Dfpolis
We agree that it seems that executing L1 rather than L2 is in your power; the burden of proof is on you, not on me, to prove that both L1 and L2 actually are in your power. As for 'unargued', what do you imagine I have been doing since we started this conversation?The relevant point is not what seems to be true, but your unargued claim that it only seems to be true. — Dfpolis
What an odd argument. Science is able to make reliable predictions precisely because, in cases such as the vinegar and baking soda case, there is no free will; the vinegar and the baking soda, when mixed together, have to make carbon dioxide because they have no choice in the matter. That is how we know that making carbon dioxide in such a situation is possible. So what would be the parallel situation when you are contemplating whether to stay at home or go to the store? It would have to be that we can only predict that you will go to the store, and therefore know that going to the store is possible for you, if you, like the vinegar and the baking soda, have no free will. So your parallel with science is apposite only if you take my side of the argument and hold that humans, like vinegar and baking soda, have no free will.So, the question is: how do we know what is possible? There are two ways. First, whatever actually happens must be possible, or it could not happen. The second way is knowledge by analogy, which is how science makes its predictions. For example, in previous cases, mixing vinegar and baking soda has produced carbon dioxide. Even though the present case differs slightly from previous cases, I know, by analogy that, if I have vinegar and baking soda I have the potential to produce carbon dioxide. I know this for a fact, whether or not I actually mix them to produce carbon dioxide.
So, you can choose to say that we only "seem" to have potentials that are not actualised, but in doing so, you reject the structure of science, and specifically, its ability to make reliable predictions. — Dfpolis
I rather thought you might say this, but of course I did not want to presume that you would, because no philosopher should ever put words into another philosopher's mouth.What feature(s) of your past experience do you believe give you this knowledge? I don't believe there are any such features.
— Herg
The fact that I have gone to the store and stayed at home previously, and have not suffered any relevant disability since. — Dfpolis
I do maintain that what applies to mixing vinegar and baking soda also applies to humans, in that given a certain potential for human action, it is simply a matter of physical law whether the potential is actualised.But, that has been established by previous analogous cases. There is no question begging, as I have shown how we know unrealised potentials, and that schema applies here. The ball is in your court to show why it applies to mixing vinegar and baking soda, but not to going to the store. — Dfpolis
Since this directly contradicts everything I have ever read about quantum physics, I have no comment to make, and I shall not raise quantum physics with you in the future.Actually, quantum theory says that all unobserved physical processes are fully deterministic. Unpredictability enters only when quantum systems are observed. — Dfpolis
This appears to be compatibilism, and if that is your position, then we have been arguing at cross purposes. I am not a compatibilist. My understanding of free will is that it requires the ability to do otherwise than one actually does.We are free if we are not constrained. We are constrained when we want to do A, but are prevented. This happens many times, so we know how to recognise constraints when we see them. For example, yesterday I wanted to go 70mph or more on the I-15, but traffic constrained me from going more than 0-20 mph. When I decide whether or not to go to the store, I experience no such constraint. So, I am free to choose either. — Dfpolis
No, they don't know this. They believe it, but belief is not knowledge, and therefore there is nothing requiring explanation.Free will is necessary to explain the reality of moral responsibility -- which happens in the world. People know that they are responsible for actions they freely choose, — Dfpolis
This is just speculation, because you have not established grounds for believing that minds complete the determination of actions.Determinism means that choices are fully immanent in the state of the world before the agent exists. For there to be no middle ground, the Principle of Excluded Middle requires indeterminism to be the strict contradiction of determinism: that choices are not fully immanent in the state of the world before the agent exists. That differs from "mere randomness," which is mindless, for it does not consider the determining operation of the agent's mind.
So, there is a middle ground between fully determined and mindlessly random, viz. the result of mindful action on the part of a free agent. — Dfpolis
The second interpretation asserts that there is good reason to believe what experience is telling us; the first does not. — Herg
If you can't buy the Maserati, what sense does it make to say that you are choosing it? You must be choosing it for something, or you can't truthfully be said to be choosing it at all. — Herg
In the context of our discussion, choosing L1 means choosing L1 in order to execute L1, and the presumption is that you have the power to execute L1, because if you don't, you cannot truthfully be said to be choosing L1 at all. — Herg
The relevant point is not what seems to be true, but your unargued claim that it only seems to be true. — Dfpolis
We agree that it seems that executing L1 rather than L2 is in your power; the burden of proof is on you, not on me, to prove that both L1 and L2 actually are in your power. As for 'unargued', what do you imagine I have been doing since we started this conversation? — Herg
What an odd argument. Science is able to make reliable predictions precisely because, in cases such as the vinegar and baking soda case, there is no free will; the vinegar and the baking soda, when mixed together, have to make carbon dioxide because they have no choice in the matter. — Herg
That is how we know that making carbon dioxide in such a situation is possible. — Herg
So what would be the parallel situation when you are contemplating whether to stay at home or go to the store? It would have to be that we can only predict that you will go to the store, and therefore know that going to the store is possible for you, if you, like the vinegar and the baking soda, have no free will. — Herg
Premiss: On some previous occasions I have gone to the store, and on other previous occasions I have stayed at home.
Conclusion: Therefore on this occasion I have it in my power to either go to the store or stay at home.
This is an invalid argument. In order to have free will it is not sufficient for there to be some occasions when a potential action (e.g. going to the store) is actualised; it has to be the case that you have the power to realise the potential action in some particular case. In effect, you are confusing a type of action (going to the store) with a token action (going to the store on this occasion). — Herg
I do maintain that what applies to mixing vinegar and baking soda also applies to humans, in that given a certain potential for human action, it is simply a matter of physical law whether the potential is actualised. — Herg
Actually, quantum theory says that all unobserved physical processes are fully deterministic. Unpredictability enters only when quantum systems are observed. — Dfpolis
Since this directly contradicts everything I have ever read about quantum physics, I have no comment to make, and I shall not raise quantum physics with you in the future. — Herg
We are free if we are not constrained. We are constrained when we want to do A, but are prevented. This happens many times, so we know how to recognise constraints when we see them. For example, yesterday I wanted to go 70mph or more on the I-15, but traffic constrained me from going more than 0-20 mph. When I decide whether or not to go to the store, I experience no such constraint. So, I am free to choose either. — Dfpolis
This appears to be compatibilism, and if that is your position, then we have been arguing at cross purposes. I am not a compatibilist. My understanding of free will is that it requires the ability to do otherwise than one actually does. — Herg
Free will is necessary to explain the reality of moral responsibility -- which happens in the world. People know that they are responsible for actions they freely choose, — Dfpolis
No, they don't know this. They believe it, but belief is not knowledge, and therefore there is nothing requiring explanation. — Herg
So, there is a middle ground between fully determined and mindlessly random, viz. the result of mindful action on the part of a free agent. — Dfpolis
This is just speculation, because you have not established grounds for believing that minds complete the determination of actions. — Herg
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