What instantiates a stipulative term in a possible world is my next question. Do they obtain through the laws of nature, logic, and such?

But, then the question arises, what if possible worlds are so profoundly different from our own (let's say they have a different logical space than our own), that we could not effectively stipulate their contents from our own, then does that make the stipulative term of a 'possible worlds' moot?

Yes.

Alright. But the next two questions are still pertinent... What's your take on them?

No.

Look again at "What if Banno had eggs instead of cornflakes this morning?"

The stipulation is "Banno had eggs"; this, not a law of nature or a puff of logic, is what sets up the possible world.

It does not "bring the possible world into existence for us to investigate" or some such metaphysical miracle. Perhaps it is best just to think of the stipulation as having set up a possible conversation.

Give me time! I'm only doing this in order to procrastinate.

Okay, but then without the metaphysics we're kind of left with an empty referent as to you having eggs instead of cornflakes this morning

So, saying that Banno could of had eggs instead cornflakes this morning is cool and all; but, leaves us with nothing of any import or a senseless proposition, which might be revealed later on in the book if I am assuming it has import on meaning.

But, then the question arises, what if possible worlds are so profoundly different from our own (let's say they have a different logical space than our own), that we could not effectively stipulate their contents from our own, then does that make the stipulative term of a 'possible worlds' moot? — Wallows

Calling it a world seems to cause so much grief. It comes from the practice in formal logic of calling a given set of objects used in an interpretation, a world, and hence a possible world in interpreting modal statements.

Let's play with calling it a "possible discussion", which, while problematic in other ways, might help explain away the mistake of thinking of possible worlds as metaphysical entities.

So we could have a chat about the consequences that might have ensued had I cooked eggs instead of the lazy option of cornflakes; or we could have a conversation about what might have occurred had Nixon not been elected. and so on. These conversations do not bring whole worlds into existence.

I'm only doing this in order to procrastinate. — Banno

Oh, a fellow wallower. Nice to meet you. :)

a senseless proposition, — Wallows

In what way is the proposed conversation without a sense? It is about me, my cornflakes, and the eggs I didn't eat. The meaning seems to me to be pretty clear.

Well there's nothing to attach the predicate of you eating cornflakes or eggs with bacon this morning. It has no referant that obtains in this world, or an empty referent. So, I figure we're committed to talking about a possible world where you ate eggs and bacon this morning. So, hurray metaphysics.

But hang on - the referent is Banno. that's what is referred to by the rigid designator "Banno".

I find myself asking at what stage I conclude that you are being obtuse for the sake of it? Knocking stuff off the table just to watch Banno pick it up again?

But hang on - the referent is Banno. that's what is referred to by the rigid designator "Banno". — Banno

But you eating eggs and bacon this morning never happened. It doesn't obtain in our world; but, in some possible one where that may have happened. The referant exists in that possible world and not this one. So, again hurray metaphysics!

Knocking stuff off the table just to watch Banno pick it up again? — Banno

As a fellow wallower, you must understand that this is simply a thing we do.

SO I'm going to invite you to re-think that post, and get back to me.

Then, is Banno a rigid designator?

Yes.

Then, had you eaten cornflakes and eggs with bacon this morning because you wanted a hearty meal also refer to that rigid designator in our world? What's happening to the referential component? Where is it instantiated?

What's happening to the referential component? Where is it instantiated? — Wallows

What? The sentence is about Banno and eggs and cornflakes. What referential component has a problem?

The referential, "Banno" in "Banno ate cornflakes and eggs with bacon this morning" denotes the Banno in this world or in a stipulated possible world or is that irrelevant?

See, this fills me with dread.

If "Banno" is a rigid designator - which it is - then it refers to Banno in any possible world in which Banno exists.

So yes, it denotes Banno in the actual world and in any possible world in which I exist - including the one where I ate eggs.

So yes, it denotes Banno in the actual world and in any possible world in which I exist - including the one where I ate eggs. — Banno

But, it doesn't obtain in this world only a possible stipulated one.

So? What do you mean by "obtain"?

What do you mean by "obtain"? — Banno

I simply believe that the fact that it doesnt obtain in our world gives the possible discussion a different meaning. Be it epistemic, ontological, and even in some sense metaphysical.

If you are saying that chats involving modality are different to chats that do not involve modality, then, yes, they are.

They are modal.

Okay, so since I got that straightened out, what's next?

If you are saying that chats involving modality are different to chats that do not involve modality, then, yes, they are. — Banno

So, do modal chats differ substantially from talk about what obtains? Do some philosophers restrict talk to things that only obtain. Is modal talk metaphysics?

Is modal talk metaphysics? — Wallows

Nuh. Epistemology.

But arguing in this way is misguided since there is considerable (understatement) overlap.

Next comes Creative's summation of Lecture One.