Possible worlds are stipulated. All possible world scenarios pick out something in this world and stipulate that something in a different set of circumstances. We begin with an object and then we ask what might have happened to it. We do not begin with worlds whose qualities, but not whose objects, are perceptible to us and then ask about trans-world identity. Kripke writes on page 44...

A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it...

...There is no reason why we cannot stipulate that, in talking about what would have happened to Nixon in a certain counterfactual situation, we are talking about what would have happened to him...

Kripke on page 48 writes...

Let's use some terms quasi-technically. Let's call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object, a nonrigid or accidental designator if that is not the case. Of course we don't require that the objects exist in all possible worlds. Certainly Nixon might not have existed if his parents had not gotten married, in the normal course of things. When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.

So while it is certainly possible that Nixon may not have been president, no one other than Nixon may have been Nixon. Thus, proper names are rigid designators, but are not necessarily strongly rigid. Strongly rigid designators are of necessary existents. Necessary existents exist in all possible worlds.

It seems that Kripke wants to say that being an essential property of an object does not require that that object necessarily exist(in all possible worlds). I think that this is him continuing to drive a wedge between the historical notions of a priori and necessary. Just because something is known a priori, it does not follow that what is known is necessary...

Kripke re-visits what he wrote earlier on page 49...

Those who have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identi­fications' are unproblematic in such cases.

Because possible worlds are stipulated, and some properties are results of circumstances, and we can stipulate different sets of circumstances...

...whether an object has the same property in all possible worlds depends not just on the object itself, but on how it is described...

What does Kripke mean when he says that objects and their names are "stipulated" in possible world's? Kind of confused about what he means by that.

Kripke mentions early on that some problems of trans-world identity come from conflating epistemological issues with ontological ones. There are starkly different criteria here. What our knowledge of something requires is not the same as what that something's existence requires. Kripke does not claim to have solved all trans-world identity issues. Wallows' earlier quotes elucidate upon some of those.

When an object's elemental constituents are necessary for the object to exist, then when and if we attempt to stipulate that that object does not include it's elemental constituents, we are stipulating a possible world without that object. Kripke acknowledges these sorts of issues, while simultaneously allowing us to continue to sensibly discuss possible worlds scenarios regarding these objects, by virtue of talking about these objects without needing to discuss their essential parts.

We can talk about a table in another possible world without needing to talk about it in terms of it's molecules. I think he goes farther by implying that if talk of it's molecules does not or cannot effectively exhaust talk of it in terms of it's being a table, then something is clearly missing from the account. Molecules alone, specific kinds of wood alone... these things may be essential 'properties' of this table, but they are most certainly not sufficient for being a table, nor are they necessary. Not all wood molecules are tables. Not all tables consist of that type of wood.

There is something inherent to the identity of that table such that part of it's being that table is the fact that we call it such...

What does Kripke mean when he says that objects and their names are "stipulated" in possible world's? Kind of confused about what he means by that. — Wallows

I'm not sure he says that. Objects, as far as I understand, according to Kripke are picked out of this world - by virtue of naming them - and posited in another set of circumstances. The other circumstances are stipulated. The other circumstances are possible worlds.

Still confused. Thanks anyway.

What makes a good chess player is subjective? Nuh.

What does Kripke mean when he says that objects and their names are "stipulated" in possible world's? Kind of confused about what he means by that.
— Wallows

I'm not sure he says that. Objects, as far as I understand, according to Kripke are picked out of this world - by virtue of naming them - and posited in another set of circumstances. The other circumstances are stipulated. The other circumstances are possible worlds. — creativesoul

Still confused. Thanks anyway — Wallows

What's confusing to you?

AH! You got it. Cool!

↪creativesoul AH! You got it. Cool! — Banno

:wink:

Maybe.

So, to stipulate something according to Kripke is to name something or give it a description?

Reading-wise, i am at the start of Lecture 2. But I am happy (?) to move back and forward as topics are of interest.

Much more could be said of K's view on Wittgenstein, for example, but first we ought be clear about what it is he is saying about metre rules and such.

We also skipped the mention of Certainty, which is of particular interest to me.

So, to stipulate something according to Kripke is to name something or give it a description? — Wallows

I don't think that that's quite right. I'm thinking that his use of "stipulate" is very specific here. It's being used as a means to isolate the different content of possible worlds, with the rigid designator(the name) being one component and the alternative circumstances being the other. The former remains across all possible worlds, whereas the latter does not.

What makes a good or bad anything is subjective.

To name and posit a variation.

Kripke's view of possible worlds is pretty minimalist. So simple "what if..." sentences like "What if I had eggs instead of cornflakes..." are to be understood as setting out a possible world in which I had eggs instead of cornflakes.

It might sound like an attempt to do something metaphysically awesome - to bring whole worlds into existence just to talk about cornflakes and eggs. It's not. the term "possible world" is a hang over from his formal logic, and are just differing interpretations.

So we can seek out the consequences that might have ensued if I had eggs instead of cornflakes. I wouldn't have opened the milk, and the pan would need cleaning.

What we do not have to do is to work out if the person eating the eggs in that possible world is the same as the person eating cornflakes in the actual world. That they are the same is set in the specification: "What if I had eggs instead of cornflakes..."

And that's where those who think there is a problem of transworld identity (@frank ?) get it wrong, setting the cart before the horse.

Rubbish. A good knife is sharp. A good chess player at least knows how to move the pieces, and preferably a few decent openings.

Saying "rubbish" and then listing subjective criteria doesn't really work as an argument.

This is not the place for it ...

Yes. Banno just elaborated nicely upon my response to you...

Excuse me?

You are off topic.

As well as being wrong.

Lol, could you be any more transparent about not being able to defend your view?

This topic is about Kripke's paper/lectures. It is not about the archaic and utterly useless notion of subjective that you've invoked here...

You're excused.

I see you don't understand how discussions work.

I think that prior to getting into the second lecture, we ought offer a summary of the first. This summary ought set out the important distinctions that he set the groundwork for. The last twenty or so pages are important to understand. I'm still working through them. They seem to be explanations of earlier distinctions, but the notion of "fixing a referent" as compared to giving a synonym ought be understood...

If I have it right, you are saying that the difference between a neo who moves pieces around at random, and a grandmaster, is purely subjective.

Well, you are using subjective in an odd way. Since the FIDE sets out clearly the requirements for a grand master, that status is not "based on feelings".

And, a grandmaster would be a far better protagonist than a neo, whether the difference is subjective or not.

The only thing more annoying than someone coming into a thread about a book and posting without having read the book would be someone coming into a thread about a book and posting a bunch of stuff that is simply not related to the book.

:lol:

off you go then.

If I have it right, you are saying that the difference between a neo who moves pieces around at random, and a grandmaster, is purely subjective. — Banno

It's not that the difference in how they're moving the pieces is subjective. It's that one set of moves versus another counting as "good at chess" is subjective .

I'm not using "subjective" in an unusual manner. The subjective/objective distinction has nothing to do with agreement, and subjective phenomena are not limited to "feelings." Re the requirements being codified and agreed upon, that doesn't make them obtain objectively. Again, the distinction isn't about agreement, and argumentum ad populums are fallacies.

You could be more ignorantly and arrogantly patronizing than assuming I haven't read Naming and Necessity, but I'll have to get back to you re how.

you must already know who Nixon is. — frank

Yes that's right and you only know that by ostention and/ or description which has been my point.

What we do not have to do is to work out if the person eating the eggs in that possible world is the same as the person eating cornflakes in the actual world. That they are the same is set in the specification: "What if I had eggs instead of cornflakes..."

And that's where those who think there is a problem of transworld identity (@frank ?) get it wrong, setting the cart before the horse. — Banno

I think, I get it. So, stipulative terms are those which we can specify; but, don't necessarily obtain in the actual world. Is that right?