So, counterfactuals have existential dependency?

Of course.

How so?

Do they just pop into existence all by themselves?

No.

The translation you provide of the sentence isn't one available to the Russellian, though — Snakes Alive

I disagree. It is not only available, but the precise one that the Russellian approach leads us to.

They are existentially dependent on our own world, I think. They have accessibility relation to our world. Yes?

I'm pointing out that it is the case that some things are composites. That is, they consist of other things. We can state otherwise. According to possible world semantics, it would follow that none of the elemental constituents are necessary for the existence of the composite, simply because we can state otherwise.

I'm also pointing out that there is an issue with the notion of "particular" being used within the notion of definitive descriptions. A definitive description can pick out a particular group and nothing else. It does not follow from the fact that that definitive description cannot single out an individual within that group that it does not successfully refer to and identify a particular kind of thing(all things in that group and nothing else).

Water.

But what your saying is tantamount to asserting the existential onus on a form of Platonic essentialism or "forms"? Yes?

No.

Then we can only "measure" counterfactuals by an accessibility relation to own own world. Therefore how can we assert something as necessarily true in all possible world's? @andrewk, @Banno?

If a thing consists of other things, then it is only by virtue of definite description that we can know that. Our knowledge of composites requires descriptions. In such cases the definite description does not single out a particular unique member of the group. Rather, it picks out a particular kind of group, and nothing else.

Any notion of definite description which requires that it pick out a unique particular individual thing(a single entity) and nothing else is inherently incapable of taking proper account of composites.

So, to answer my own question @creativesoul, quantification of counterfactuals actually is a large and growing body of science or philosophy. What are your thoughts, you, and others?

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/#QuaModLog

This seems relevant to the discussion we're having:

A final complication in the semantics for quantified modal logic is worth mentioning. It arises when non-rigid expressions such as ‘the inventor of bifocals’ are introduced to the language. A term is non-rigid when it picks out different objects in different possible worlds. The semantical value of such a term can be given by what Carnap (1947) called an individual concept, a function that picks out the denotation of the term for each possible world. One approach to dealing with non-rigid terms is to employ Russell’s theory of descriptions. However, in a language that treats non rigid expressions as genuine terms, it turns out that neither the classical nor the free logic rules for the quantifiers are acceptable. (The problem can not be resolved by weakening the rule of substitution for identity.) A solution to this problem is to employ a more general treatment of the quantifiers, where the domain of quantification contains individual concepts rather than objects. This more general interpretation provides a better match between the treatment of terms and the treatment of quantifiers and results in systems that are adequate for classical or free logic rules (depending on whether the fixed domains or world-relative domains are chosen). It also provides a language with strong and much needed expressive powers (Bressan, 1973, Belnap and Müller, 2013a, 2013b). — SEP

What do you think accessibility is?

What do you think accessibility is? — Banno

To parrot your style although I think there's much more that can be said here than what I am able to, stipulation.

Although it seems to me, very circular, to say that accessibility is granted through stipulation.

Thoughts?

Ah. Good.

Then we can only "measure" counterfactuals by an accessibility relation to own own world. Therefore how can we assert something as necessarily true in all possible world's? andrewk, @Banno? — Wallows

I suspect that something misleading has happened in Creative's writing.

If you are going to include accessibility in your thinking, then you really must distinguish between what is necessary in all possible worlds and what is necessary in only those worlds that are accessible because of our stipulations.

If you are going to include accessibility in your thinking, then you really must distinguish between what is necessary in all possible worlds and what is necessary in only those worlds that are accessible because of our stipulations. — Banno

But, you can't stipulate (quantify) without referring back to our own world (instantiation, I think). Can you satisfy accessibility without adherence to our own world?

Yeah. That just doesn't make sense.

So, if you want to go off on a tangent and learn modal logic, this is not the place. It's a formal discipline; you will need a good text and pencil and paper, and preferably access to an adequate tutor to help you out when you make mistakes. It's like learning to integrate in calculus - you have to do the work.

Now I do not think that you need to do that to get a grasp on N&N. @Snakes Alive says otherwise.

I think Snakes and I would agree that the worst approach wold be to proceed down both the formal and the informal paths at the same time - that's a recipe for misunderstanding.

Why the interest in accessibility, anyway?

Yeah. That just doesn't make sense. — Banno

It does because quantification of modality is a thorny issue in logic. Don't you think? The SEP entry on it would illustrate that.

I've already tried to separate this discussion in other threads but curiosity gets the better of me.

Why the interest in accessibility, anyway? — Banno

It just stood out as something pertinent. I am also interested in satisfying accessibility for modal operators, in other words or worlds(?), to be able to determine what is possible from necessary.

But, you can't stipulate (quantify) without referring back to our own world (instantiation, I think). Can you satisfy accessibility without adherence to our own world? — Wallows

It does not make sense. Stipulation and quantification are not the same thing. Instantiation is not just referring to things in the actual world. These are formally defined terms, and if you want to understand them, do a modal logic course or read a good text.

But if you must ask, think of it as working out what the possibilities might be, as viewed from some given possible world. So in the world mentioned earlier in which the Germans invade the United States, one might suppose that Truman could not have been President in 1945. I haven't read the book, so i might have that wrong, depending how the counterfactual is set up. OR a simpler case, in a possible world in which Wallows never joined PF, this thread could not have been addressed to you. Accessibility is about which possible worlds can be stipulated, given other possible world stipulations.

For our purposes here, accessibility is not relevant. I don't intend to comment further on them.

Accessibility is about which possible worlds can be stipulated, given other possible world stipulations. — Banno

You're being obstinate for no good reason. Accessibility is what enables one to stipulate. Yes, they aren't the same, I agree.

I will refrain from posting about accessibility since, if I correctly recall, you're still the leader of this reading group, Banno.

There are these two threads where this can be explored further:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4712/existential-quantification-and-counterfactuals
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4718/accessibility-relations-across-possible-worlds

If a thing consists of other things, then it is only by virtue of definite description that we can know that. Our knowledge of composites requires descriptions. In such cases the definite description does not single out a particular unique member of the group. Rather, it picks out a particular kind of group, and nothing else.

Any notion of definite description which requires that it pick out a unique particular individual thing(a single entity) and nothing else is inherently incapable of taking proper account of composites. — creativesoul

So...

What happens when we put this knowledge to good use?

We know that A consists of B and C. We know that no other thing consists of B and C. We know that without either B and/or C, there can be no A. We know that without definitive description we could not know any of this. When we use this knowledge in reference to A, we are talking about the composite of B and C. The combination of B and C always results, and only results, in A's.

Given that we know all that...

What do we make of the fact that we've used "A" while denying B and C? It shows that we can refer to something by virtue of using a name and false description. It shows that knowledge of elemental parts is not necessary for naming a composite. Descriptions need not be true in order to successfully refer to some thing. They most certainly need to be true in order to successfully describe that thing.

There's a difference between successful reference and successful description. The former picks out the thing, and the latter describes the thing picked out. Saying something false about a thing does not describe the thing even if it successfully picks out the thing. Successfully description requires correspondence to this world(the actual world).

There are no false definitive descriptions. If description is both necessary and sufficient for identification, then we could successfully pick out an individual by virtue of description alone, and nothing other than that individual would be picked out by the description. Knowledge regarding the actual composition of water would be acquired via definitive description. That description is both necessary and sufficient for picking out a particular group of things that we call "water" from the other things we call "water".

It(successful description) would do this(pick out this particular group of elemental constituents) even if we had called the composite thing and/or it's elemental constituents by other names.

This brings up something pivotal...

Some things exist in their entirety prior to our account of them. Some things that exist in their entirety prior to our account of them consist of elemental constituents. None of these things nor their elemental constituents are existentially dependent upon our names. All of these things are existentially dependent upon their elemental constituents.

All of these things are existentially dependent upon their elemental constituents. — creativesoul

So, it's logical atomism again.

Fuck. What a mess.

No. It's putting knowledge of elemental constituents to good use. It's about existential dependency.

It's putting knowledge of elemental constituents to good use. — creativesoul

What are elemental constituents?

It's about existential dependency. — creativesoul

Yes, via accessibility.

Fuck. What a mess. — Banno

Ah now...

Do me a favor, and begin with the last post of mine prior to this one of yours...

Start at the top and explain to me where it goes wrong. What is claimed that is false?