tI's putting knowledge of elemental constituents to good use.
— creativesoul

What are elemental constituents? — Wallows

Parts that a thing is made of, all of which are necessary for that thing to exist, and none of which are existentially dependent upon being a part of that thing.

Hydrogen and oxygen are elemental constituents of water.

Parts that a thing is made of, all of which are necessary for that thing to exist, and none of which are existentially dependent upon being a part of that thing. — creativesoul

I see. So, the simplest atomic constituent is self-evident? Isn't this logical atomism or Leibnizian monadology rehashed?

The tool is to look at a sentence that presents an erroneous description, and notice that nevertheless, it is about the thing misdescribed. — Banno

How is the fact that an erroneous description is about the thing described determined? Can you explain that?

When is a theory undone.

At what point is it unreasonable to keep believing in a theory.

It's commonly understood that any theory can be kept from rejection by the addition of suitable hypotheses, ad hoc. And that at some point one ought just drop this process and say "yeah, that theory is buggered".

The theory at hand is that for any given proper name there is always some definite description that picks out one individual, that individual being the referent of the proper name.

Look at the question "Who is Hitler?". Ask yourself "who is this question about?" Isn't there something quite infelicitous about claiming it is about anything other than Hitler? — Banno

Firstly, I am not proposing any theory, but aiming to describe what we do when we talk about things, and to determine what is necessary in order that we may know what we are talking about. I asked you earlier to answer a question, and you avoided answering it. I was asking you how you know when you speak about Aristotle, that you are referring to the historical figure Aristotle, as opposed to any other Aristotle.You will probably say that you just stipulate " I am referring to the historical figure Aristotle". What you are missing is that "The historical figure Aristotle" is already a definite description.

So, trying to paint me as someone who is clinging to a theory and coming up with "ad hoc hypotheses" to support that clinging is a strawman and an ad hominem strategy you seem to be trying to use to evade answering the hard questions.

Also, I am not proposing that there is a definite description "that picks out one individual", but a web of descriptions that enable us to have an idea of who it is that is being referred to, and that this is not infallible, mistakes may certainly be made.

Hopefully you'll be able to understand what I am saying and be able to respond to that, rather than responding to a convenient (for your assertions) caricature of what I am saying; a strategy of misreading which can only lead this discussion nowhere.

Here's a great example of the latter:

Now if you don't see that, so be it. You can add whatever auxiliary hypotheses you wish in order to save your theory. Go ahead and make the question reliant on the other's knowledge of Hitler, but all you are saying is that language occurs in a community.

I haven't been "making the question reliant on the other's knowledge of Hitler", unless you mean the general "other" which is the culture itself. If I hear people talking about someone named Hitler. how do I know they are referring to the Adolph Hitler, the one and only Führer, if I have never heard of him before and know nothing about the events in Europe during the period of his rise to power, reign and demise? They might be referring to Rudi Hitler,the garbageman who died when the draughthorse who pulled his garbage cart collapsed in 1903 in the Friedrichstrasse in Berlin and fell on top of him.

If I ask and they explain it to me how will that be achieved? By descriptions of the time, the figures and the events, how else? If I do know who they are referring to how do I know that? On account of descriptions I have heard or read before of the time, the figures and the events, how else?

All this is not theory but phenomenological description of how we know, and come to know things about people and events; if you can't provide any alternative account, why should I take you seriously?

Parts that a thing is made of, all of which are necessary for that thing to exist, and none of which are existentially dependent upon being a part of that thing.
— creativesoul

I see. So, the simplest atomic constituent is self-evident? Isn't this logical atomism or Leibnizian monadology rehashed? — Wallows

I do not call them "atomic constituents", and no, they are not self-evident. If they were, there would be no need for first focusing upon the composite in order to acquire knowledge that they are - in fact - a composite.

I do not call them "atomic constituents", and no, they are not self-evident. — creativesoul

You may not call them that; but, that is what they are called in analytic philosophy to the best of my knowledge.

If they were, there would be no need for first focusing upon the composite in order to acquire knowledge that they are - in fact - a composite. — creativesoul

I don't understand this, please expand.

All this is not theory but phenomenological description of how we know, and come to know things about people and events; if you can't provide any alternative account, why should I take you seriously? — Janus

Kripke does provide an alternative account of the referential function of proper names. Their being rigid designators isn't a theory but rather a feature (a phenomenological datum, if you will) of the way we ordinarily use them. Kripke's "causal theory of reference", together with his remarks about the famous people convention, and the social character of meaning, accounts (purportedly, at least) for the way in which we can use the proper name "Hitler" to refer to Hitler in a information insensitive way (and thus without relying on a definite descriptions to fix the reference of the name), and therefore accounts for the empirical fact of "Hitler" and other proper names being rigid designators.

How is the fact that an erroneous description is about the thing described determined? Can you explain that? — Janus

What if I can't. Does that make the question "Who is Hitler?" not about Hitler? I say no.

And of course you are presenting a theory.

Kripke shows that the theory is wrong. It does no good to reply "well, show me a theory that is right"; the absence of an alternative does not show that your theory must be correct.

If you were reading the book with care, you would have seen how Kripke argued against your suggestion of a web of descriptions. In the end, your proposal becomes much the same as Kripke's causal chain.

Prior to acquiring knowledge that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen, we first focus upon the thing we're calling water.

Prior to acquiring knowledge that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen, we first focus upon the thing we're calling water. — creativesoul

I don't understand. What's the point being made about this? It is a fact that H2O is water and that it is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. Yes?

When we refer to historical figures we don't do so in a vacuum do we? Sure we can just talk about the person 'What if Joan (of Arc) had not been burned alive'? How do know i am referring to Joan of Arc, if I don't say the 'of Arc'? The 'of Arc' is a definite description. You might guess without the 'of Arc', because of the question about not being burned alive; but the implication is that she was burend alive. Now this may not be a strictly definite description (other Joans may have been burned alive) but it is certainly a definite description if you add the date 14th May 1431 (since that is the 'official' date even if that date is not correct).

Prior to acquiring knowledge that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen, we first focus upon the thing we're calling water.
— creativesoul

I don't understand. What's the point being made about this? — Wallows

I'm just trying to answer your questions, which seem irrelevant by my lights. I'm trying anyway...

Prior to these questions...

The point is that a definite description does not necessarily pick out a unique individual. It can pick out a unique group of individuals, all of which are picked out by the description when nothing else is. The group can share the same name as other things that are not described by the particular description.

What if I can't. Does that make the question "Who is Hitler?" not about Hitler? I say no. — Banno

Well, of course it is about some Hitler, but so what? That is not the point in question.

And of course you are presenting a theory.

Kripke shows that the theory is wrong. It does no good to reply "well, show me a theory that is right"; the absence of an alternative does not show that your theory must be correct. — Banno

I believe I am presenting an account of what happens when we tell stories to each other about famous figures and events, and, on a smaller scale, about locally known figures and events. these stories are webs of description. It is on account of these socially entrenched webs of description that we know who we are talking about. I ask again, how else?

Kripke shows that the theory is wrong. It does no good to reply "well, show me a theory that is right"; the absence of an alternative does not show that your theory must be correct.

If you were reading the book with care, you would have seen how Kripke argued against your suggestion of a web of descriptions. In the end, your proposal becomes much the same as Kripke's causal chain. — Banno

I haven't seen any argument from you or (by proxy) from Kripke that shows that my account is incorrect. If Kripke argues against "my web of descriptions" and it is much the same as his "causal chain" (which I take it that he promotes) then how has he argued against my account, much less "proved it wrong". You keep making assertions but you are not backing them up with any account.

.

I'm just trying to answer your questions, which seem irrelevant by my lights. — creativesoul

My question was in regards to counterfactuals and their existential dependency, as you call it. Is it not important that the world we can stipulate is existentially dependent on the one from where the stipulation originates from? Therefore, I am confused about how can anything be called necessary in another possible world if they are unequivocally contingent on our own. A sine qua non if you will.

I think I can't express this any more clearly than the above.

Well, of course it is about some Hitler, but so what? That is not the point in question. — Janus

:roll:

How is the fact that an erroneous description is about the thing described determined? Can you explain that? — Janus

A description is determined to be about the thing because it is something said about the thing. An erroneous description does not successfully describe the thing, but it does successfully refer to it.

When we refer to historical figures we don't do so in a vacuum do we? — Janus

Indeed. Kripke would agree since it's a core feature of his externalist account of proper names that many (and oftentimes most) individuals who participate in a specific naming practice only are able to do so because the social practice is already up and running thanks to some of the earlier participants being acquainted with the named individual.

Sure we can just talk about the person 'What if Joan (of Arc) had not been burned alive'? How do know i am referring to Joan of Arc, if I don't say the 'of Arc'? The 'of Arc' is a definite description. You might guess without the 'of Arc', because of the question about not being burned alive; but the implication is that she was burend alive. Now this may not be a strictly definite description (other Joans may have been burned alive) but it is certainly a definite description if you add the date 14th May 1431 (since that is the 'official' date even if that date is not correct).

Kripke doesn't discount the function of definite descriptions for fixing the reference of a proper name, either initially while instituting the naming practice, or subsequently for the purpose of initiating new member into the already instituted naming practice. He insists on distinguishing reference fixing from reference determination. The latter is that in virtue of which the proper name has (or comes to acquire) its actual referent, while the former only is a means by which participants are enabled to hook up into the practice.

Yeah, sterling response Banno! Is that all yer got? :yawn:

Kripke doesn't discount the function of definite descriptions for fixing the reference of a proper name, either initially while initiating the naming practice, or subsequently for the purpose of initiating new member into the naming practice. He insists on distinguishing reference fixing from reference determination. The latter is that in virtue of which the proper name has (or comes to acquire) its actual referent, while the former only is a means by which participants are enabled to hook up into the practice. — Pierre-Normand

Actually I would kind of agree with this. Say there have been causal chains of events that have determined reference in relation to historical figures; the question then would seem to be as to what those causal chains of events have consisted in. I would say they would have consisted, mostly, in people telling stories to others about those historical figures (oral and written histories). But what are stories if they are not descriptions, both definite and otherwise?

So, determination and fixing would seem to amount to the same thing in the final analysis, except for the exceptions to the "mostly" which would have been actual, local events involving direct obersvation of the historical figures in question. I have been saying from the start that reference is fixed either by description or observation. Is there really a cogent difference between fixing reference and detemining reference?

Anyhow, there is this book, by a guy called Kripke, about names and necessity and stuff.

And around page 102 he starts to talk about Hesperus and Phosphorus. These are apparently Greek names for the evening and morning stars. That is, for Venus.

Now it is undeniable that the discovery that Hesperus is the very same thing as Phosphorus was made by looking, by plotting the position of the two bodies, and reaching the conclusion "hey, they are the same thing!"

(My having said that it is undeniable, someone here will doubtless take it upon themselves to deny it. Such is life.)

Kripke wants us to understand that nevertheless, it is a necessary fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus.

Now at the time of publication this was thought rather odd.

SO how does his argument go?

Great! But you haven't answered the question. Take another look.

Actually I would kind of agree with this. Say there have been causal chains of events that have determined reference in relation to historical figures; the question then would seem to be as to what those causal chains of events have consisted in. I would say they would have consisted in people telling stories to others about those historical figures (oral and written histories). But what are stories if they are not descriptions, both definite and otherwise? — Janus

Yes, they are. But even in the case where an individual who gets initiated into the practice of naming a historical figure NN only is being told false stories about NN, she can still successfully refer to NN and have entirely false beliefs about NN when she thinks about her as NN.

My question was in regards to counterfactuals and their existential dependency, as you call it. Is it not important that the world we can stipulate is existentially dependent on the one from where the stipulation originates from? Therefore, I am confused about how can anything be called necessary in another possible world if they are contingent on our own.

I think I can't express this any more clearly than the above. — Wallows

Well, I've no use for classic notions of necessity/contingency. Understanding my position will not help you to make sense of their use.

All possible world semantics are existentially dependent upon the actual world.

Yes, they are. But even in the case where an individual who gets initiated in the practice of naming a historical figure NN, only is being told false stories about NN, she can still successfully refer to NN and have entirely false beliefs about NN when she thinks about her as NN. — Pierre-Normand

Yes, I would agree that that is certainly possible, and again, in this discussion I have allowed that definite descriptions may not be accurate. I have only been arguing that it is on account of them that we have any idea about who we are referring to (unless we have met the person, of course).

The tool is to look at a sentence that presents an erroneous description, and notice that nevertheless, it is about the thing misdescribed.
— Banno

How is the fact that an erroneous description is about the thing described determined? Can you explain that? — Janus

A description is determined to be about the thing because it is something said about the thing.... — creativesoul

Great! But you haven't answered the question. Take another look. — Janus

Facts aren't determined on my view. That makes no sense to me. Facts are events; states of affairs; what has happened. So, I took the question to be about how we determine that a description is about something in particular. Cause we say so... how else?

We cannot successfully describe something with falsehood. We can say false things about something though. We can successfully refer to Hitler even when we say things that are clearly not true, and we all know it.

How?

Because description does not equal reference.

how can we assert something as necessarily true in all possible worlds? — Wallows

My two cents' worth:

It depends on how we constrain the set of possible worlds. If the constraints include that that they must obey our laws of logic, say First Order Predicate Logic, then any tautology, such as "If Ben is a boy then Ben is a boy" is necessarily true in all possible worlds. I don't think anything other than tautologies would be necessarily true.

If logical consistency is not a constraint then I can't think of anything that would be necessarily true. Say the constraint is instead the limits of our imagination. I am not sure whether it is possible to imagine an illogical world, but if it is possible then tautology will not guarantee necessity. Perhaps what is necessarily true is that which is unimaginable. If something is unimaginable then it cannot happen in any of our possible worlds, as they are imagined, so it is necessarily not the case. But I then wonder whether in order for something to be unimaginable it must also be unexpressable, and if so we cannot formulate the existential proposition whose negation we say would be necessarily true.

Facts are nothing if no one knows them, and in order to know them they must be determined.

Cause we say so... how else? — creativesoul

What I was asking for is an explanation of how we are able to (without being nonsensically arbitrary) "say so". I say it is on account of our socially shared and more or less entrenched stories (histories) which consist in descriptions.

What I was asking for is an explanation of how we are able to (without being nonsensically arbitrary) "say so". I say it is on account of our socially shared and more or less entrenched stories (histories) which consist in descriptions. — Janus

Yeah, you and I largely agree on that much. It seems that it is only as a result of that that we can later talk about setting descriptions aside. We've already identified the particular by virtue of using descriptions.

Yes, I would agree that that is certainly possible, and again, in this discussion I have allowed that definite descriptions may not be accurate. I have only been arguing that it is on account of them that we have any idea about who we are referring to (unless we have met the person, of course). — Janus

Kripke purports to distinguish his account from descriptivist theories of proper names and also from Frege's account of the sense ('Sinn') of a proper name. He therefore sets up the contrast between his account and the accounts that he criticizes in terms of a distinction between causal and informational links. The trouble with this is that he is running onto the problem of deviant causal chains. His account of the complementary functions of (informational and normative) reference fixing and (causal and non-normative) reference determination seeks to deal with the problem of deviant causal chains.

Kripke fails to see that Frege's account, although informational and normative, isn't descriptive. It doesn't run into the problem of deviant causal chains, neither does it constitute a decriptivist theory of proper names. It doesn't, therefore, is a target for Kripke's arguments against descriptivism. I think Frege's account is the account Kripke would have needed to develop. Gareth Evans and Hillary Putnam have developed such a pragmatized neo-Fregean account, taking Kripke's main insights about externalism, rigidity, and the social character of meaning, into account.

It depends on how we constrain the set of possible worlds. — andrewk

Thanks. I'm just confused because what is necessarily true in one world may not be accountable in another possible world. One world constrains the other or at least what can be said about the other legitimately.

So, just to provide an example. Let's say I played the lotto in this world; but, didn't win. In some possible world I actually won the lotto; but, this can only be fathomed by the actions undertaken in this world.