It seems really, really clear that most thinkers consider the thing-in-itself noumenal. Can you help me understand how this is the case, with Noumena/on being different from the thing-in-itself? It is just Kant being annoying and confusing"? — AmadeusD
The Greek word νοούμενoν, nooúmenon (plural νοούμενα, nooúmena) is the neuter middle-passive present participle of νοεῖν, noeîn, 'to think, to mean', which in turn originates from the word νοῦς, noûs, an Attic contracted form of νόος, nóos, 'perception, understanding, mind'. A rough equivalent in English would be "that which is thought", or "the object of an act of thought".
The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant entirely overlooks, was the very one that ancient philosophers indicated as φαινόμενα [phainomena] and νοούμενα [nooumena]; the opposition and incommensurability between these terms proved very productive in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, in Plato's doctrine of Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarics, and later in the scholastics, in the conflict between nominalism and realism. This latter conflict was the late development of a seed already present in the opposed tendencies of Plato and Aristotle. But Kant, who completely and irresponsibly neglected the issue for which the terms φαινομένα and νοούμενα were already in use, then took possession of the terms as if they were stray and ownerless, and used them as designations of things in themselves and their appearances.
general view is that it's not synonmous, but that Kant was rather inconsistent with his usage — Wayfarer
'the object of nous' was explicitly not a sensible object, but the Idea, Form, or Principle of an object (that which makes the particular what it is). — Wayfarer
But in the earlier philosophies, what was 'an object of thought' was not some unknown thing, but an Idea or Form which could only be grasped intellectually (or 'noetically') but which didn't exist on the plane of sensible (or sense-able) objects. — Wayfarer
Does this rely on that Platonic conception of the 'real' though? If so, I can see why Schop is considered wrong there, given that particular version of things doesn't really work for anything beyond Platonic discussion specifically (i.e Platonic forms tend to only be used as an exemplar or metaphor, rather than an example of anything actually being discussed - in my experience./reading). — AmadeusD
That we can't reason to satisfying explanations of our phenomena — AmadeusD
letting the transcendental side be merely of some relative interest, as in God, freedom and immortality and such, but not much else. — Mww
CPR B xx, A30 / b45, B xxvi, B 325, B327A CPR reference substantiating your claim would be nice, to determine if we’re on the same page. — Mww
It just sounds meaningless to say Thing-in-itself is a concept, but it is totally unknowable, and even unthinkable. It just exists outside of mind, but no one knows what it is, and it covers all the physical objects outside the mind. Therefore for example, we don't know what the books in front of us are like. Even if we see the books in front for us, but we don't know what they are??? That just sounds like a needless scepticism.While the thing-in-itself may have nothing to do with our knowledge of representations of physical objects in the empirical world, they very much have to do with those objects. Unless, once again, you have a CPR reference substantiating your claim. — Mww
There is only one world called the empirical world, and it is outside the mind. Appearance is from the empirical world, and it is only in visual form i.e. the lights which are reflected from the objects in the empirical world.Meaning of "Empirical World"
Does the Empirical World exist within Appearances or does it exist the other side of these Appearances, whatever is causing these Appearances?
There are different "Worlds". One exists within the mind and the other exists outside the mind, independent of the mind. — RussellA
In summary how did you manage to cram in the whole universe into inside your mind? :chin:In summary, there is an "Empirical World" inside the mind, within Phenomena, within Appearances, within the Sensibilities and within the Senses and there is also a "Mind-independent World" outside the mind. — RussellA
It just sounds meaningless to say Thing-in-itself is a concept, but it is totally unknowable, and even unthinkable. — Corvus
Claiming it is both unknowable and unthinkable comes from possible misunderstanding of CPR. — Corvus
It is not both unknowable and unthinkable object. — Corvus
Thing-in-itselft must be the existences for us to think about, but not knowable. The concepts such as God, Souls, Freedom and Immortality fit in there, — Corvus
But the point is that, Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality. — Corvus
Even if we see the books in front for us, but we don't know what they are??? That just sounds like a needless scepticism. — Corvus
According to Kant, it requires your faith, not reasoning.But this exchanges the concept for an object. Now it is the case the thing-in-itself can neither be thought as an real object nor knowable as a real object. But it still can be thought as having a real existence. — Mww
Your reason for the claim is? (preferably with the CPR source)But the point is that, Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality.
— Corvus
….which just is not the case. — Mww
If you can see it, can you take a photo of a Mind-independent world, and upload here? — Corvus
This thread is for reading Kant's CPR. Why try to show Berkeley's Idealism is incorrect? — Corvus
===============================================================================Idealism (I mean material idealism) is the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be either merely doubtful and indemonstrable, or else false and impossible; the former is the problematic idealism of Descartes, who declares only one empirical assertion (assertio), namely I am, to be indubitable; the latter is the dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley, who declares space, together with all the things to which it is attached as an inseparable condition, to be something that is impossible in itself, and who therefore also declares things in space to be merely imaginary.
In summary how did you manage to cram in the whole universe into inside your mind? — Corvus
I am not sure if a philosophical topic which is totally severed from the Empirical world has a meaning. Are you? — Corvus
In Kantian philosophy, the noumenon is often associated with the unknowable "thing-in-itself" (German: Ding an sich). However, the nature of the relationship between the two is not made explicit in Kant's work, and remains a subject of debate among Kant scholars as a result.
There is only one world called the empirical world, and it is outside the mind. Appearance is from the empirical world....................When I see a book in front of me, it is via the appearance or phenomenon from the object (the book) in the empirical world (outside of the mind).................. The physical objects in the empirical world also continue to exist through time.................There is no such thing as an internal world. In your mind, there are only perceptions. — Corvus
The dispute between rationalism and empiricism takes place primarily within epistemology, the branch of philosophy devoted to studying the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge. Knowledge itself can be of many different things and is usually divided among three main categories: knowledge of the external world, knowledge of the internal world or self-knowledge, and knowledge of moral and/or aesthetical values.
Could you please specify and explain which sentences in the CPR pages warrant or relate to your claim? Thanks.But the point is that, Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality.
— Corvus
….which just is not the case.
— Mww
Your reason for the claim is?
— Corvus
See A333-338/B390-396, plus the footnote in B. — Mww
In that case, would it be the case that you have been mistaken Kant's refutation of Idealism as Kant's TI?Kant refers to Berkelian Idealism in B275, which is part of his purpose in the Refutation of Idealism. — RussellA
In that case, should it not be a representation of the empirical world in your mind, rather than an internal world inside you? It sounds too far-fetched for you to carry an internal world weighing one billion tonnes in your head.Because a "mountain" as a representation in the Empirical World within the mind is different in kind to a "mountain" weighing one billion tonnes in a Mind-Independent World outside the mind. — RussellA
I have read the pages in CPR, but couldn't find any part which back your claim that my proposition (regarding to Thing-in-itself and the concepts i.e. God, Souls and Freedom) is not the case. Therefore I can only conclude that your claim was groundless and unfounded.Nope, not gonna do that. You asked for a reference, you got it, do with it as you will. — Mww
A photograph is to show visual image, not the form of reason. It is nonsense to say that a photo can only show the form of reason. — Corvus
In that case, would it be the case that you have been mistaken Kant's refutation of Idealism as Kant's TI? — Corvus
Transcendental idealism is a philosophical system founded by German philosopher Immanuel Kant in the 18th century. Kant's epistemological program is found throughout his Critique of Pure Reason (1781). By transcendental, Kant means that his philosophical approach to knowledge transcends mere consideration of sensory evidence and requires an understanding of the mind's innate modes of processing that sensory evidence.
In that case, should it not be a representation of the empirical world in your mind, rather than an internal world inside you? — Corvus
For your claim to be correct, you need the argument and valid conclusion backed by the original source. But you failed to produce that, and when re-asked for it, you refused to do so. Hence the conclusion. :wink:Therefore I can only conclude that your claim was groundless and unfounded.
— Corvus
Suit yourself. Hell, you might even be correct. — Mww
1. You didn't need to take a photo of the whole MI World. Just a part of it would have done. No one can take a photo of the whole world in a single shot anyway.This is why a single photograph cannot show a Mind-Independent World, as knowledge about a Mind-Independent World requires Transcendental Reason, and reason in order to have content requires a complete logical form. — RussellA
You cannot prove the existence of the objects in space outside of you by simply saying you are conscious of your own existence. You could be conscious of your existence in your dream or hallucination. Does that prove any existence of the objects in space outside of you?In his Refutation of Idealism is his Theorem "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me" B276. — RussellA
Not contradictory, but not making sense either.These are not contradictory positions. — RussellA
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