There are different interpretations on this point. — Corvus

Kant wrote that we cannot have knowledge of a Thing in Itself. From Wikipedia Thing-in-itself

And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.— Prolegomena, § 32

Do you have a reference that says that Kant believes that it is possible to have knowledge of Things in Themselves?
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Things-in-themselves are for the objects we have concepts, but not the matching physical objects in the empirical world. We can think about it via concepts, but we don't see them in the phenomena. They belong to Thing-in-itself. — Corvus

You are referring to (negative) noumena, not Things in Themselves.
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If you believe in the existence of invisible particles and forces in space and time, then why do you deny the existence of the physical objects such as the bent stick in the empirical world?
If you had a single particle of the bent stick, would you say that is a part of the bent stick, and it is a stick?
In the absence of humans, sounds a condition that you must clarify before progressing further.
Where does "if something cannot be judged" come from? — Corvus

The discussion goes back to the question of whether, when we perceive a stick in our sensibilities, are we also perceiving the same object external to us in the world. This is something that the Direct Realist would argue is the case. Kant's position is not that of the Direct Realist.

You are still seeing an object external to you when you see the bend stick in the water jug. — Corvus

Do objects such as "sticks" exist in the empirical world?

In the empirical world are simples.

In the presence of humans, humans may name one particular set of simples "stick". This creates the object "stick", meaning that objects such as "sticks" do exist in the empirical world, but they only begin to exist after being named.

In the absence of humans, as naming is not possible, objects such as "sticks" cannot be created, meaning that objects such as "sticks" cannot exist.

Do you have a reference that says that Kant believes that it is possible to have knowledge of Things in Themselves? — RussellA

Things-in-itself is something that you can think of, not knowable. There is a difference, and you seem to think they are the same. No one was claiming Kant said the Thing-in-itself, something that is knowable.

The discussion goes back to the question of whether, when we perceive a stick in our sensibilities, are we also perceiving the same object external to us in the world. This is something that the Direct Realist would argue is the case. Kant's position is not that of the Direct Realist.

You are still seeing an object external to you when you see the bend stick in the water jug.
— Corvus

Do objects such as "sticks" exist in the empirical world? — RussellA

Due to the above misunderstanding, the misunderstandings just keep going and extending to this.  Kant never denies the existence of physical objects in the empirical world.  The objects must cause / stimulate our sensibility for experience to begin, he said.  That is not denying the objects in the empirical world.

For you to suggest that we are unable to access anything in the external world, there must be reason for that, and it seems your definition of "conceiving" and "accessing" might be something different from the ordinary definition of them. — Corvus

I don't think this is a case, and to my mind, on a re-reading i did delineate out what i'm talking about.

In the most simple terms: Sensory perception is not access to the 'real' world. It is data mediated by the sense organs, and relayed to the brain/mind further mediating our access to it. We can only access our sensory data, via sensory perception. Therefore, we do not have any access to the external world. The 'thing-in-itself' is entirely, and necessarily inaccessible to human sensibility, and therefore, the human mind. My contention with Mww was around whether the thing-in-itself stimulates sensory perception, as an unavoidable inference - and i think this is correct, and your recent comments above this one outline that well imo.

In terms of my comment on 'conceiving', as we have literally no empirical indication of the thing-in-itself we can't conceive it. Where would you even start, to conceive of something you have literally no knowledge, and cannot have any knowledge? Assuming that that, per the above, is the case.

In terms of my comment on 'conceiving', as we have literally no empirical indication of the thing-in-itself we can't conceive it. Where would you even start, to conceive of something you have literally no knowledge, and cannot have any knowledge? Assuming that that, per the above, is the case. — AmadeusD

Thing-in-itself is something that you can think about. You can have concepts on the objects that comes up in your mind as the contents of your intuition such as God, souls etc. But you cannot see them in the empirical world. Therefore you cannot know them, but you can think about them.

In contrast to that, you can clearly know the daily objects such as cups and trees and books. You have the concepts, as well as the matching objects in the empirical world.

Saying that Kant said that you cannot know thing-in-itself, therefore you cannot know all the objects in the empirical world such as cups, trees and books, the bent sticks (claimed by RussellA) sounds not making sense.

When I see the book in front of me, I know the book. I know it is in blue colured cover, it is a paperback book, the title of the book is "CPR" by Kant. I cannot be wrong on that. It is the truths I know about the book in front of me. I don't need to worry anything about Thing-in-itself book of CPR. There is no such thing as Thing-in-itself CPR book, but there is a CPR book in front of me.

But God or Soul is different. I know in my intuition via their concepts. But they never appear in my visual perception, or I have never heard them saying or making any noise in real life. Therefore they must be belong to in Noumena and they must be Thing-in-Itself. I can think about God and Souls via the concepts, but I can never know them. This is what Kant meant, I understand.

A193 doesn’t relate to the paragraph title you gave, which is found at A538. And I couldn’t come up with a reasonable connection between A193, A538 and your hesitations for accepting the differences in things-in-themselves and the empirical representations which regulate human knowledge. — Mww

I am reading the Muller translation of the A version (which was a rookie's mistake) and that's the page it's on... My mistake.
You've got the right section, though, for sure.

hesitations for accepting the differences in things-in-themselves and the empirical representations which regulate human knowledge. — Mww

Unsure how you have figured this, but I am actually insisting on the opposite. They are clearly different and the only thing I am insisting on is that the thing-in-itself causes appearance (hence my dealing with an incorrect use of 'appear'. We can actually speak about hte thing-in-itself, despite Kant's insistence we can't by virtue of its necessity to phenomena.

https://ia800706.us.archive.org/13/items/immanuelkantscri032379mbp/immanuelkantscri032379mbp.pdf This (Kemp Smith) version has a very, very similarly-worded section to the Muller translation at the same place. A relevant passage, for full clarity:

"Now this acting subject would not, in its intelligible character, stand under any conditions of time; time is only a condition of appearances, not of things in themselves. In this subject no action would begin or cease, and it would not, therefore have to conform to the law of the determination of all that is alterable in time, namely, that everything which happens must have its cause in the appearances which precede it. In a word, its causality, so far as it is intelligible, would not have a place in the series of those empirical conditions through which the event is rendered necessary in the world of sense. This intelligible character can never, indeed, be immediately known, for nothing can be perceived except in so far as it appears. It would have to be thought in accordance with the empirical character just as we are constrained to think a transcendental object as underlying appearances, though we know nothing of what it is in itself."

And shortly after at A545...
"In this way the acting subject, as causal phenomenon would be bound up with nature through the indissoluble dependence of all its actions, and only as we ascend from the empirical object to the transcendental should we find that this subject, together with all its causality in the [field of] appearance, has in its noumenon certain conditions which must be regarded as purely intelligible."

things-in-themselves exist and from that we can infer the necessity of a causal lineage from such external existence, to appearance, through perception, sensation, intuition, ending in internal phenomenal representation. — Mww

This has been my insistence. It confirms my position rather than is 'for the record', to my mind.

The claim that the external world is caused by the internal world is wrong, but that has nothing to do with the capacity for conception. — Mww

I'm not convinced. We cannot conceive of things entirely askance from any empirical intuition. They must be derivative, in some sense, best i can tell. I cannot think of something other than as derived from empirical intuition thought under concepts, which, in themselves, are nothing.

Saying that Kant said that you cannot know thing-in-itself, therefore you cannot know all the objects in the empirical world such as cups, trees and books, the bent sticks (claimed by RussellA) sounds not making sense. — Corvus

No one, in any of these comments, has suggested this.

Thing-in-itself is something that you can think about. — Corvus

What are you thinking about when you do this?
Seems entirely incoherent to me.

No one, in any of these comments, has suggested this. — AmadeusD

Did you not say that you cannot conceive or access the empirical world because they are Thing-in-itself?

What are you thinking about when you do this?
Seems entirely incoherent to me. — AmadeusD

Your post below was clearly saying it. I read it again. Was it not?

I don't think this is a case, and to my mind, on a re-reading i did delineate out what i'm talking about.

In the most simple terms: Sensory perception is not access to the 'real' world. It is data mediated by the sense organs, and relayed to the brain/mind further mediating our access to it. We can only access our sensory data, via sensory perception. Therefore, we do not have any access to the external world. The 'thing-in-itself' is entirely, and necessarily inaccessible to human sensibility, and therefore, the human mind. My contention with Mww was around whether the thing-in-itself stimulates sensory perception, as an unavoidable inference - and i think this is correct, and your recent comments above this one outline that well imo.

In terms of my comment on 'conceiving', as we have literally no empirical indication of the thing-in-itself we can't conceive it. Where would you even start, to conceive of something you have literally no knowledge, and cannot have any knowledge? Assuming that that, per the above, is the case. — AmadeusD

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Deleted.

Did you not say that you cannot conceive or access the empirical world because they are Thing-in-itself? — Corvus

No, not at all. The empirical object is not the thing-in-itself. Not sure where that came from. The 'empirical' world is the world of phenomenal sense perception. The thing-in-itself is beyond this, and entirely unknowable.

TII(unknowable)->Noumenon(merely conceivable)->Phenomenon (actual, as it were)

as we have literally no empirical indication of the thing-in-itself we can't conceive it — AmadeusD

This comports exactly with the above specifically noting that the thing-in-itself is outside the empirical purview. Nowhere in your quote do i indicate a conflation of the empirical and 'thing in itself'.

No, not at all. The empirical object is not the thing-in-itself. Not sure where that came from. The 'empirical' world is the world of phenomenal sense perception. The thing-in-itself is beyond this, and entirely unknowable. — AmadeusD

Maybe from your previous quoted below, you were denying any knowledge of the external world due to the fact the perception happens via perceptual aggregates?

I don't think this is a case, and to my mind, on a re-reading i did delineate out what i'm talking about.

In the most simple terms: Sensory perception is not access to the 'real' world. It is data mediated by the sense organs, and relayed to the brain/mind further mediating our access to it. We can only access our sensory data, via sensory perception. Therefore, we do not have any access to the external world. The 'thing-in-itself' is entirely, and necessarily inaccessible to human sensibility, and therefore, the human mind. My contention with Mww was around whether the thing-in-itself stimulates sensory perception, as an unavoidable inference - and i think this is correct, and your recent comments above this one outline that well imo.

In terms of my comment on 'conceiving', as we have literally no empirical indication of the thing-in-itself we can't conceive it. Where would you even start, to conceive of something you have literally no knowledge, and cannot have any knowledge? Assuming that that, per the above, is the case. — AmadeusD

But then I thought you accepted that is not the case.

TII(unknowable)->Noumenon(merely conceivable)->Phenomenon (actual, as it were)

as we have literally no empirical indication of the thing-in-itself we can't conceive it
— AmadeusD

This comports exactly with the above specifically noting that the thing-in-itself is outside the empirical purview. Nowhere in your quote do i indicate a conflation of the empirical and 'thing in itself'. — AmadeusD

I thought you were saying the empirical world is unknowable, because it is all Thing-in-itself. But that was maybe the claim of @RussellA. I must have been confused between you and @RussellA.

Maybe from your previous quoted below, you were denying any knowledge of the external world due to the fact the perception happens via perceptual aggregates? — Corvus

I'm not able to read that into the passage quoted - but then, I wrote it with my intention so that makes sense :nerd:

I thought you were saying the empirical world is unknowable, because it is all Thing-in-itself. But that was maybe the claim of RussellA. I must have been confused between you and @RussellA. — Corvus

Ah okay, fair enough. It's also a fairly easy misreading of that passage. But i certainly meant to exclude them from each other, basically.

Meaning of "Empirical World"

Does the Empirical World exist within Appearances or does it exist the other side of these Appearances, whatever is causing these Appearances?

There are different "Worlds". One exists within the mind and the other exists outside the mind, independent of the mind.

There are two meanings of the word "empirical", i) a person's subjective experience and ii) exterior, objective data (Psychology Today – Gregg Henriques)

"Empirical Realism" is a term coined by Kant in the CPR. On the one hand "Empirical" because it gives the mind an active role in the cognition of empirical objects, an aspect of epistemology in establishing a subjective empirical reality. On the other hand, "Realism", endorsing the view that there is a world that exists outside and independent of the human mind. (Paul Abela Empirical Realism).

In his Theorem for the Refutation of Idealism in B276, Kant argues that objects exist in space outside the mind

The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.

The IEP article Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics differentiates between an "Empirical World" in the mind and a "Mind-independent World" outside the mind

Kant responded to his predecessors by arguing against the Empiricists that the mind is not a blank slate that is written upon by the empirical world, and by rejecting the Rationalists’ notion that pure, a priori knowledge of a mind-independent world was possible. Reason itself is structured with forms of experience and categories that give a phenomenal and logical structure to any possible object of empirical experience. These categories cannot be circumvented to get at a mind-independent world, but they are necessary for experience of spatio-temporal objects with their causal behaviour and logical properties. These two theses constitute Kant’s famous transcendental idealism and empirical realism.

In summary, there is an "Empirical World" inside the mind, within Phenomena, within Appearances, within the Sensibilities and within the Senses and there is also a "Mind-independent World" outside the mind.

The root of our discussion is here, from pg 12, with which I disagree:

I do recall passages in which it's essentially said that by inference, we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions of them — AmadeusD

Then, from pg. 16, in which I disagreed with #1:

All we know is that it is something with sufficient affect on our senses, a mere appearance.
— Mww

(…) I suppose the thing remaining is that thing between the two -

1. Thing-in-itself appears to us as an unknowable entity;
2. ????;
3. Something is presented to our sensuous organs; — AmadeusD

Now, because the second effectively repeats the errors in the first, re: the thing-in-itself appearing, I didn’t consider “the thing remaining”, the “????” you were apparently trying to account for, in this:

The transcendental object, i cannot find as distinguished from the thing-in-itself. If that's the case, then Kant seems to be fairly obviously connecting the two in a causal relationship - albeit, one with entirely unknowable properties. — AmadeusD

Then, from reference in A538, “Possibility of Causality…..”, which is an exposition on the dual nature of an object of the senses from the domain of pure reason alone, I wonder……what do you think all that really says, and, what exactly does it have to do with the fact things-in-themselves are not that which appears?

I’m just not sure what you’re trying to convey, as a way to fill in the “????” in #2 in your list. And, why there needs to even be a #2 anyway.

Help a brutha out, wodja?

The claim that the external world is caused by the internal world is wrong…..
— Mww

I'm not convinced. We cannot conceive of things entirely askance from any empirical intuition. — AmadeusD

While we cannot conceive of things entirely askance from any empirical intuition, these are merely representations belonging to the internal human system, hence have no concern with external causal conditions, which belong to Nature itself.

You know, like….round pegs/round holes; square pegs/square holes. Neither fits in the other.

No one was claiming Kant said the Thing-in-itself, something that is knowable. — Corvus

When I see the book in front of me, I know the book. I know it is in blue colured cover, it is a paperback book, the title of the book is "CPR" by Kant. I cannot be wrong on that. It is the truths I know about the book in front of me. I don't need to worry anything about Thing-in-itself book of CPR. There is no such thing as Thing-in-itself CPR book, but there is a CPR book in front of me. — Corvus

All this is true, in that you see the book in your Empirical World, the world that exists as Appearance in your Sensibilities. The world as Phenomena.

However, what you are not seeing is any world outside these Phenomena.

In a world outside these Phenomena are Things in Themselves, which are unknowable, and as unknowable, cannot even be thought about.

Even if books existed in a Mind-Independent world, as Things in Themselves they would be unknowable, and being unknowable, we couldn't even know whether they existed or not.

In Kant's Refutation of Idealism, he proposes the Theorem in B276: "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

Yes, Kant as a believer in Realism does believe that a Mind-Independent World exists outside us, and within this Mind-Independent World are objects in space, but we only know that there are objects as a generality, we don't know what these objects are in particular

B279 – Here it had to be proved only that inner experience in general is possible only through outer experience in general.

We may know in general that Things in Themselves exist in a Mind-Independent World, otherwise we couldn't be discussing them, but that does not mean we can know individual Things in Themselves.

We may know the book in front of me in my Empirical Word, but we cannot know if there is a Book in a Mind-Independent World, as that would be a Thing in Itself.

In a world outside these Phenomena are Things in Themselves, which are unknowable, and as unknowable, cannot even be thought about. — RussellA

But what is the point even bringing up a concept that you cannot even think about? Kant's point is that Thing-in-itself is not in the category of sensibility, so it cannot be known. But because of the fact that we have A priori concepts in the categories, we can think about it.

Even if books existed in a Mind-Independent world, as Things in Themselves they would be unknowable, and being unknowable, we couldn't even know whether they existed or not. — RussellA

Where is a Mind-independent world? Again what is the point even talking about something which is unknowable? If it was unknowable, then how did you know it was unknowable?

But what is the point even bringing up a concept that you cannot even think about? (…) If it was unknowable, then how did you know it was unknowable? — Corvus

Been the bone of contention since 1781, hasn’t it? Why have something necessary for this one thing, but about which nothing can be known? If nothing can be known about it, why conceive it in the first place? Why think about that of which our empirical knowledge isn’t even about?

Problem is…the answers for the plethora of why’s don’t help much, mostly because the line of reasoning for what they really imply is so long and convoluted, it’s just easier to pretend they don’t stand as the original intention for them demanded. Every decent thinker from Schopenhauer right on through Quinne took exception to that intent.

The proof for the conceptual validity of things-in-themselves manifests in the reality of the human type of cognitive system being representational. The long line of reasoning, then, merely outlines why and how the human cognitive system is in fact representational, and that, of course, in keeping with the general critical thesis from a transcendental prospectus.

Pretty simple, really. If one doesn’t hold with transcendental philosophy, he has no need for things-in-themselves as such. By the same token, though, one can’t hold with some principles of CPR while rejecting others, and at the same time deny the notion of things-in-themselves.

Where is a Mind-independent world? — Corvus

All around us. It existed before us and will exist after us.
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Again what is the point even talking about something which is unknowable? — Corvus

To show that Berkelian Idealism is incorrect.

In fact, for the day to day survival of humans, there is no necessity to know more than what is perceived in our Empirical World of Phenomena. Any transcendental thought about a Mind-Independent World is out of philosophical interest only.
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If it was unknowable, then how did you know it was unknowable? — Corvus

Kant wrote that Appearances are based on Things in Themselves, even though Things in Themselves are unknown.

And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. — Prolegomena, § 32 — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thing-in-itself

Kant uses a Transcendental Argument in the Refutation of Idealism to prove his Theorem that Things in Themselves exist, even though what they are is unknown.

"The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me." B276

Pretty simple, really. If one doesn’t hold with transcendental philosophy, he has no need for things-in-themselves as such. By the same token, though, one can’t hold with some principles of CPR while rejecting others, and at the same time deny the notion of things-in-themselves. — Mww

No one was denying the concept of Thing-in-themselves. But the point was that thing-in-itself is unknowable but thinkable. It is not both unknowable and unthinkable object. Claiming it is both unknowable and unthinkable comes from possible misunderstanding of CPR.

Where is a Mind-independent world?
— Corvus

All around us. It existed before us and will exist after us. — RussellA

I don't see it anywhere. Even with binoculars, telescope and magnifying glasses and microscopes, there is no such a thing as a Mind-independent world. There is just the empirical world with the daily objects I see, and interact with. That is the only world I see around me. Nothing else.

If you can see it, can you take a photo of a Mind-independent world, and upload here? :)

Even with a binoculars, telescope and magnifying glasses and microscopes, there is no such a thing as a Mind-independent world.............If you can see it, can you take a photo of a Mind-independent world, and upload here? — Corvus

Even if I uploaded a photo of a Mind-Independent World, the Solipsist wouldn't believe it.

Even if I uploaded a photo of a Mind-Independent World, the Solipsist wouldn't believe it. — RussellA

Seeing is believing. Upload it first. Will see it, and tell you what world you were looking at. :D

No one was denying the concept of Thing-in-themselves. — Corvus

Not here, no, but there are objections, which was what I actually implied. And it is true, if one doesn’t hold with transcendental philosophy and all its conditions, he has no need of things-in-themselves.

Not here, no, but there are objections, which was what I actually implied. And it is true, if one doesn’t hold with transcendental philosophy and all its conditions, he has no need of things-in-themselves. — Mww

Transcendental philosophy is the core of CPR. Without it, CPR has little meaning. But the point is that, Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality. Thing-in-itself has nothing to do with the physical objects in the empirical world.

Again what is the point even talking about something which is unknowable?
— Corvus

To show that Berkelian Idealism is incorrect. — RussellA

This thread is for reading Kant's CPR. Why try to show Berkeley's Idealism is incorrect?

In fact, for the day to day survival of humans, there is no necessity to know more than what is perceived in our Empirical World of Phenomena. Any transcendental thought about a Mind-Independent World is out of philosophical interest only. — RussellA

I am not sure if a philosophical topic which is totally severed from the Empirical world has a meaning. Are you?

The root of our discussion is here, from pg 12, with which I disagree: — Mww

I have not seen you disagree with this, really. You've helped me see where I was misusing words and concepts because I don't understand what I'm doing all that well (which i am extremely appreciative of. This isn't easy LOL) but I can't see that you've disagreed that Kant gives us an unavoidable causal relationship between thing-in-itself and our sensible intuitions. It appears your most recent response (prior to this) laid it out in explicit terms - that you agree with it?

1. Thing-in-itself appears to us as an unknowable entity;
2. ????;
3. Something is presented to our sensuous organs; — AmadeusD

The "?????" I think, is the Noumenon of whatever object. At the time, I had entirely misunderstood what the Noumenon is meant to represent, and where it fits in the relationships of thing-in-itself, conception, and intuition. I am now under the impression that 1. The thing-in-itself, somehow, in some unknowable fashion, instigates appearance - but that the Noumenon is that which, in some sense, exists between the two in a sort of semi-focus, as compared to the total blank of the thing-in-itself.

what do you think all that really says, — Mww

Well, I don't think anyone really knows - but its relevance here, is that Kant appears to very directly note that the thing-in-itself is in a causal relationship with our sensible intuitions. There is thing-in-itself, and the phenomenal appearance in intuition - and that there is, unavoidably, a causal relationship between the two - Otherwise, as noted, we are left with intuitions of nothing. Its just unsatisfying because we can never have any knowledge of that which 'causes' the appearance of any object of intuition.
The over-all thesis of that section, i'm yet to parse.

I'm about 90% of the way through this book, and i'd say i grok the overall thesis in a pale reflection, and about 15% of the actual content. Doing my best.

While we cannot conceive of things entirely askance from any empirical intuition, these are merely representations belonging to the internal human system, hence have no concern with external causal conditions, which belong to Nature itself. — Mww

I agree - but this goes to the previous thing we're trying to come to terms on.
That causal relationship is necessary, if unknowable and unconcerning to us in general. But if we have never been caused to undergo the experience of a phenomenon, we can't conceptualise it, i think.

Edited in later, so apologies if missed: It seems really, really clear that most thinkers consider the thing-in-itself noumenal. Can you help me understand how this is the case, with Noumena/on being different from the thing-in-itself? It is just Kant being annoying and confusing"?

Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality. — Corvus

Those existences….more accurately termed transcendental conceptions…..are listed under something very much other than the thing-in-itself. To be fair, I have an inkling of how you got here, but I’d be willing to bet, with closer examination, you might retract the statement. A CPR reference substantiating your claim would be nice, to determine if we’re on the same page.

Thing-in-itself has nothing to do with the physical objects in the empirical world. — Corvus

While the thing-in-itself may have nothing to do with our knowledge of representations of physical objects in the empirical world, they very much have to do with those objects. Unless, once again, you have a CPR reference substantiating your claim.

Its just unsatisfying because we can never have any knowledge of that which 'causes' the appearance of any object of intuition. — AmadeusD

Then why not let Nature be the causes the thing that appears. That way, we can get away with saying the appearance is caused by the thing. We don’t know, at the time of appearance, what the thing is anyway, so what does it really matter what causes it? As well, we can let there be a causal relation between the thing and the thing-in-itself without contradicting either Nature or ourselves, insofar as the the former we can only possibly know and the latter we never can.

We end up with a causal relation between the thing and the thing-in-itself, a relation between the thing and us, without the need of a relation between the thing-in-itself and us. Everybody goes home happy.

We end up with a causal relation between the thing and the thing-in-itself, a relation between the thing and us, without the need of a relation between the thing-in-itself and us. Everybody goes home happy. — Mww

This is what is expressly unsatisfying to me. But, I do think this is what the CPR is meant to be indicating. That we can't reason to satisfying explanations of our phenomena, despite the previous two millennia attempting it... that we are destined to be frustrated by efforts to understand what's really going on.
Having made some headway in sorting out how to think about these things, this seems to be the 'cosmic joke' at the base of attempts to "get into" Kant.