It seems to me, that if you permit the existence of real causal abstractions - like instructions, knowledge, reason - then the future can't be determined by the laws of physics alone. — Inis

I don't believe in the existence of abstractions, only in the existence of concrete particulars.

The conept of rationality simply does not apply to computers. Rationality requires understanding, and computers don't understand, they merely obey.
— Herg

This is the claim that an artificial general intelligence is impossible. And it is just a claim. — Inis

And the opposite claim is also just a claim.
I think what we are really talking about here is consciousness. An entity which is not conscious cannot be said to understand anything, because to understand is to have the subjective experience of understanding. And since we don't know what it is about brains that produces consciousness, we don't know whether a machine can be conscious, and therefore whether a machine can understand.

What is the constraint that allows certain abstractions to exist e.g. rational agents, but prevents others from existing, e.g. rational agents with free will? — Inis

As I said, I don't believe in the existence of abstractions.

As I said, I don't believe in the existence of abstractions. — Herg

All if them? Including "rationality", "consciousness", "understanding", "subjective experience"?

As I said, I don't believe in the existence of abstractions.
— Herg

All if them? Including "rationality", "consciousness", "understanding", "subjective experience"? — Inis

I think these are just properties of concrete objects. It's the objects of which they are the properties that are involved in causation, not the properties themselves.

I think these are just properties of concrete objects. It's the objects of which they are the properties that are involved in causation, not the properties themselves. — Herg

None of these properties, that you claim concrete objects can possess, is mentioned in the laws of physics. In fact, "causality" itself isn't mentioned in the laws of physics either.

What I am curious about is whether these properties such as consciousness are real, or whether they are just epiphenomena, or convenient names we give to collections of atoms?

What I am curious about is whether these properties such as consciousness are real, or whether they are just epiphenomena, or convenient names we give to collections of atoms? — Inis

My suspicion is that these properties are now epiphenomenal, but were not always so. Consider the pain you feel when you burn your finger. Scientists tell us that you snatch your finger away before you feel the pain, suggesting that the pain is epiphenomenal; but why have we evolved to feel the pain, if it serves no causal function? I think perhaps pain was causal millions of years ago, but then animals evolved a faster response system that by-passes the pain, leaving it as an epiphenomenon.

Even if these properties are epiphenomena, that doesn't make them unreal. We don't imagine that we feel pain when we burn ourselves, we really do feel pain.

My suspicion is that these properties are now epiphenomenal, but were not always so. Consider the pain you feel when you burn your finger. Scientists tell us that you snatch your finger away before you feel the pain, suggesting that the pain is epiphenomenal; but why have we evolved to feel the pain, if it serves no causal function? I think perhaps pain was causal millions of years ago, but then animals evolved a faster response system that by-passes the pain, leaving it as an epiphenomenon. — Herg

So suppose, as you say, that in our evolutionary past pain (qua mental state) served a causal function. Does that mean then that the neurophysiological states that realized this mental state were epiphenomenal? How would that work?

So suppose, as you say, that in our evolutionary past pain (qua mental state) served a causal function. Does that mean then that the neurophysiological states that realized this mental state were epiphenomenal? How would that work? — SophistiCat

Wiktionary gives two definitions of 'epiphenomenon':
"1. Being of secondary consequence to a causal chain of processes, but playing no causal role in the process of interest.
2. (philosophy, psychology) Of or pertaining to a mental process that occurs only as an incidental effect of electrical or chemical activity in the brain or nervous system."

I've been using 'epiphenomenal' in the first sense, not the second, which I suppose is unusual in a philosophy discussion; I probably should have made this clear. I'm suggesting that pain originally was not epiphenomenal in the first sense, but now is. My conjecture assumes no particular view of the mind-brain relation, it's merely a suggestion about how one brain process may have supplanted another because it offered a selective advantage.

If pain has never been causal throughout evolution, then I can see no reason (i) why it should have evolved at all, or (ii) why it should be so unpleasant (if the subjective sensation is not what causes us to withdraw the finger and never has been, the sensation could just as well have been extremely pleasant, since pleasant or unpleasant, it would have made no difference).

The rarity of congenital analgesia shows that (a) it is possible to be injured without feeling pain, and (b) being injured without feeling pain has been largely selected against in evolution. Consequently there is a need to explain how evolution has been able to select in favour of pain, and if pain has always been epiphenomenal, this selection seems impossible.

If anyone with a greater knowledge of evolutionary physiology than I possess can give reasons to doubt my conjecture, I would be very interested.

Well, the argument doesn't explicitly assume any metaphysical stance on the nature of reason; it seeks to challenge determinists (in this context: those who maintain that our actions and thought processes are due only to physical causes) on their own ground — SophistiCat

How does that challenge work?

I believe thinking is unique but is it so in reality or is it simply our inability to explain it (in physical terms) that makes it so?

If pain has never been causal throughout evolution, then I can see no reason (i) why it should have evolved at all, or (ii) why it should be so unpleasant (if the subjective sensation is not what causes us to withdraw the finger and never has been, the sensation could just as well have been extremely pleasant, since pleasant or unpleasant, it would have made no difference). — Herg

At best, pain signals us about some adverse environmental circumstances or a bodily disorder, so that we attend to this situation and deal with it. But of such situations those in which unconscious reflexes (like yanking a finger out of a fire) are adequate and sufficient are relatively few.

Why is it so damn unpleasant? And why do we feel it, even when there is nothing we can reasonably do about its cause (without the amenities provided by our modern civilization, which evolution could not have anticipated)? Well, evolution is primarily a satisficing process, rather than an optimizing one: it often settles on a good-enough solution. It must be that occasional bouts of misery did not impose as high a cost on reproductive success as the alternatives that were available at the time.

Besides, though I am no more an expert in this area than you are, surely unconscious reactions would have evolved much earlier than anything like pain? Even organisms without any central nervous system have those.

How does that challenge work? — TheMadFool

Well, different people have posed it somewhat differently, and you'll have to read their arguments to understand. Though sometimes simply, even flippantly stated (like Sir Eccles' quote in the OP), it's not so simple really. In my opinion, James Jordan's statement that I quoted in this post is one of the most cogent.

the base (if you haven't gotten it my now) is that in modern determism is that we're made of atoms so so we're just taking in information and reactions are a result of that. All actions can be traced back. However was for this untill I learned about quantum macanics so I'm now looking to see wich is true with these discoverys in the field so it may be a wile before I have my answer and argument.