I don't believe in the existence of abstractions, only in the existence of concrete particulars.It seems to me, that if you permit the existence of real causal abstractions - like instructions, knowledge, reason - then the future can't be determined by the laws of physics alone. — Inis
And the opposite claim is also just a claim.The conept of rationality simply does not apply to computers. Rationality requires understanding, and computers don't understand, they merely obey.
— Herg
This is the claim that an artificial general intelligence is impossible. And it is just a claim. — Inis
As I said, I don't believe in the existence of abstractions.What is the constraint that allows certain abstractions to exist e.g. rational agents, but prevents others from existing, e.g. rational agents with free will? — Inis
I think these are just properties of concrete objects. It's the objects of which they are the properties that are involved in causation, not the properties themselves.As I said, I don't believe in the existence of abstractions.
— Herg
All if them? Including "rationality", "consciousness", "understanding", "subjective experience"? — Inis
I think these are just properties of concrete objects. It's the objects of which they are the properties that are involved in causation, not the properties themselves. — Herg
My suspicion is that these properties are now epiphenomenal, but were not always so. Consider the pain you feel when you burn your finger. Scientists tell us that you snatch your finger away before you feel the pain, suggesting that the pain is epiphenomenal; but why have we evolved to feel the pain, if it serves no causal function? I think perhaps pain was causal millions of years ago, but then animals evolved a faster response system that by-passes the pain, leaving it as an epiphenomenon.What I am curious about is whether these properties such as consciousness are real, or whether they are just epiphenomena, or convenient names we give to collections of atoms? — Inis
My suspicion is that these properties are now epiphenomenal, but were not always so. Consider the pain you feel when you burn your finger. Scientists tell us that you snatch your finger away before you feel the pain, suggesting that the pain is epiphenomenal; but why have we evolved to feel the pain, if it serves no causal function? I think perhaps pain was causal millions of years ago, but then animals evolved a faster response system that by-passes the pain, leaving it as an epiphenomenon. — Herg
Wiktionary gives two definitions of 'epiphenomenon':So suppose, as you say, that in our evolutionary past pain (qua mental state) served a causal function. Does that mean then that the neurophysiological states that realized this mental state were epiphenomenal? How would that work? — SophistiCat
Well, the argument doesn't explicitly assume any metaphysical stance on the nature of reason; it seeks to challenge determinists (in this context: those who maintain that our actions and thought processes are due only to physical causes) on their own ground — SophistiCat
If pain has never been causal throughout evolution, then I can see no reason (i) why it should have evolved at all, or (ii) why it should be so unpleasant (if the subjective sensation is not what causes us to withdraw the finger and never has been, the sensation could just as well have been extremely pleasant, since pleasant or unpleasant, it would have made no difference). — Herg
How does that challenge work? — TheMadFool
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