It's just an indirect way of complaining about how hard life is and its difficult sometimes to raise any more nuanced an argument than, "get over it!". — Isaac

Well and/or a philosopher's way to get relatives and friends to stop moaning about them not having kids.

Likewise if Peter Singer is wrong, then we will have given to charity more than we need have and the economy may suffer. — Isaac

I get the rhetorical point but I don't know about this. I've always thought Peter Singer is the perfect foil for Heidegger's take on what pure nihilism-in-action would look like. An entire world of Singer taken to the extreme would be, in my opinion, less desirable than extinction. Seems relevant because Singer et al are every bit as nihilistic as the pessimists but without the refreshing transparency of aim and purpose.

Yes, absolutely. Bad example of mine. I was only referring to his utilitarian view of eleemosynary duties for, as you say, rhetorical purposes. His views on infanticide (which I presume you're referring to) are indeed pretty miserable. The difference I would like to wedge between Singer and Benetar though (I'm no fan of either) is that infanticide as an ethical principle is at least predicated on actual human beings, not on presumed ones. It's not much, but it at least gives something to bite on to in ethical decision-making. Singer is (even if wrongly) considering the actual fate of living humans in either case. Thus he could make the argument that matters might well prove worse for actual living humans by the birth of more living humans. His is not much more than a trolley problem, but, in my opinion, with rather too much uncertainty to apply consequentialist ethics to.

This is your favourite subject, isn't it? You're the antinatalism guy, much like the nuclear weapons guy and the animal rights guy. :grin: — S

Absolutely it is. I just don't like being taunted and provoked. Also when it gets to a level where I have to look four strings back to get to he heart of the argument, it loses its focus. I will keep making posts as well, all from different angles on this subject. However, the one thing this forum lacks is a formality to the debate. Thus it would be better if at some point both parties would just decide to make a closing argument as happens in certain debate formats. Otherwise, it is about who gets the last word and it endlessly provokes and taunts rather than elucidates and allows for reflection or for onlookers to have time to consider the two sides. This is especially so if the debate is contentious rather than a dialogue.

It's not spurious at all. I could keep going with what the two have in common, but I don't mind letting it go. I'm impartial enough to accept that there are similarities with your position and both that of the incels and that of the vegans. But you don't like the former, hence you've put forward an alternative. — S

You can find similarities with any two positions, but by purposely pairing it with this insidious philosophy you want antinatalism to have the same guilt by association. It is a good rhetorical trick. As far as I know incels are essentially a hate group and are violent, and they have little philosophical reflection behind their arguments. None of this applies to antinatalism. Antinatalism doesn't hate a certain group of people. There is no condemnation or calls for crazy actions. Now, if some individuals do have hatred, this is just like individuals in the animal rights or vegan communities who spew hatred etc. That is not representative of the philosophy, just the actions or character of those individuals.

Whereas my justification isn't even deontological, it's consequentialist. — S

Well, I did say it is a difference in value. Agreeing by using "where as" and then naming some of the differences doesn't make sense except to be contentious for its own sake. However, I would say Benatar is mostly negative utilitarianism due to his focus on preventing harm in the unique case of birth. In my own formulation, there is a deontological aspect of not using someone for another cause, or in other words, not creating someone on their behalf who will experience harm for X agenda reason. This of course tying into the idea that no one needs to be given an obstacle course in the first place, in order to find solace through "strength-through-adversity" or finding the good despite the obstacles, or even the fact that good experiences exist so ergo it is a parents job to be messiah-figures delivering people who are expected to find the good life. This isn't even to mention that some people don't think they live worthwhile lives. What is your threshold for collateral damage of those people? That isn't even the main argument though, though it can be bolstered using the empirical evidence, that even a small amount of collateral damage or unintended consequences is not a good outcome. I don't see people as small bits to be used in a big "good life" aggregator machine. That makes no sense to me.

Compassion for the individual who will experience harm is countered by empathy for the individual who will have worthwhile experiences, and the alleged injustice of forcing someone into adversity is countered by the unjustified opposition to the opportunity of someone having inevitable worthwhile experiences and most likely a good enough life, the latter of which most people attest to.

Your objections to my counters typically involve a double standard, so they don't count and your problem lingers unresolved. — S

No, my objections typically involve a nuance that you don't seem to compute. That is to say, while it may be worthwhile continuing a life once born, there is an asymmetry when we are dealing with the unique situation of whether to procreate a new person into the world. Since there is no loss to an actual person of "the good life", it is not bad that it was never incurred. However, all harm was prevented, which is good. Combine this further, with the notion that no one needs to be given an obstacle course on their behalf, that is no one needs to be given adversity and harmful experiences in the first place, if they didn't need it. This is a messianic complex, to think that one is delivering another person into the world as arbiters of "good life" for others when the collateral damage to is harm. No one needs to experience the good life, unless they were already created in the first place. No person, no need for it.

Yes, that's a big difference. I think that it can. And I also think that you're like most people in that you wouldn't even hesitate to apply this reasoning in many other contexts. You reject it here because it doesn't lead to your desired conclusion. In other words, you put the cart before the horse. — S

Again, different contexts may require different thinking. The context of birth is different than the context of already being born, thus a different standard can be applied.

It should indeed be avoided, but not unconditionally, not at any cost. It should be avoided, setting aside the exceptions, and this is one of them. Your principles here are far too simplistic, and they lead to your adoption of ridiculously disproportionate "solutions" (using a sledgehammer to crack a nut). — S

But that's the point. There is always another nut to crack. There are always more problems to solve. There is always more adversity to overcome. Putting post-facto reasons that are often culturally necessary for people to have the strength to get through, no one needs to have more nuts to crack in the first place. No one needs to be given the "chance" to solve these problems for X teoleological purpose, or because one is an recognized Nietzschean who likes the idea of "strength through perseverance", and beyond good and evil. Why create these situations for someone else? Oh right, because there is an agenda that they have to carry out "the good life", that people have to deliver themselves from the adversity and harms to find the good from the adversity, or good despite the adversity. But why did they need to go through this in the first place? Oh right, it's just good for them to go through it.

Yeah, that's another difference. I think it can, and I think that your arguments just don't work. Sure, you can piece something together for yourself and the relatively tiny number of people who share your views, but they have very little wider appeal. They're largely unconvincing. You're not too bad at this debate thing, but you don't stand a chance against someone of equal or superior skill (and I obviously fall under the latter category :strong: ) because your position suffers from a much weaker foundation. You're bringing a knife to a gun fight, mate. :wink: — S

Oh yes, if I declare myself King of the Universe, that must mean it is so. You can declare your argument to be stronger, but doesn't make it so. As for not having wide appeal, this doesn't hurt the argument. Being the right position and being the popular one are not necessarily/ nor should necessarily be the same thing. The knife to a gunfight is a nice little rhetorical gimmick though.

Yeah, I think I'm done with these analogies. It's a weak tactic in my assessment, because I can just as easily come up with analogies of my own to counter yours effectively, as I've demonstrated at least a couple of times already. — S

Analogies are just another tool in these arguments and can help illustrate a point.

Although actually, this one's not anywhere near as bad your Buddhist analogy, which formed the basis of your argument in the opening post. I can work with this set up at least, and I already have. I've said my piece about the "obstacle course", the people who go through it, and why I disagree with your take on it. — S

Yes, and we differ on whether it is good to create someone on their behalf, that has to go through an obstacle course to find the good, or find the good despite it. See above paragraphs for more detail.

You are aware, I presume, that there are different meta-ethical positions, yes?

You are aware that the anti-natalist stance relies on a particular meta-ethical position, yes?

You are aware, presumably, that David Benetar is not God, he's just a man of the same epistemic status as any of the other philosophers who've arrived at different meta-ethical theories, yes?

Considering that these meta-ethical theories cannot all be true/right, it follows that all but one of them must be wrong.

Given that the philosophers who derived them are of the same epistemic level as David Benetar, it follows that it must be possible, no matter how clear it seems, for someone of David Benetar's epistemic level to be wrong, yes?

If Phillipa Foot is wrong, then decisions made by virtue may mislead us, where they should have been made by consequence. Likewise if Peter Singer is wrong, then we will have given to charity more than we need have and the economy may suffer.

If David Benetar is wrong we will have exterminated the entire human race needlessly.

Do you see why people are lumping you in with extremists? — Isaac

Exterminated is not the correct word though. Preventing people from coming into existence is passive. No one is forcefully doing anything to actual people. That is a big difference, though the outcome might be the same, that no people will exist if taken to its logical conclusion. I can see why at first, it seems unintuitive to most folks. They are used to the idea that life is good in and of itself, and people need to be born to experience this. They never question this notion. As I've said before, the idea of nothingness scares people. This also goes into the idea that people think that they are messianic-deliverers, bringing more X (put whatever you want, experience, good, technology, civilization) into the world by bringing more people into it. As if the individual who will be harmed, is being used for the cause of advancing some other agenda. Harms can be prevented, and goods will not be missed by any actual person in the case of birth. Again, these are non-intuitive ideas for most people, but just because something has never been questioned before, or thought about in a certain way, doesn't mean it is not correct.

I would also say these are at the level of normative theories and normative-as-they-are-applied scenarios. Meta-ethics goes one stop beyond normative ethics to understand how ethics obtains at all (is it subjective, objective, "in the world", in our species, intuition-based, logic-based, etc. etc.). So just wanted to clarify that you are discussing at the level of normative ethics (i.e. virtue theory, deontological, utilitarian, etc.), not meta-ethics.

So in the market place of ideas, you can decide which ideas make sense based on the arguments. As long as no one is forcing their ethical views on you, I see no problem following or not following Benatar. The individual may hold a view, but they shouldn't force the view. So I'm not sure where the problem is. Just because there are so many points of views, doesn't mean one shouldn't hold any view.

So, agree to disagree, and you shouldn't really have anymore questions that haven't been answered. Although I predict that you'll be going back over the same well trodden ground before long.

Exterminated is not the correct word though. Preventing people from coming into existence is passive. No one is forcefully doing anything to actual people. That is a big difference, though the outcome might be the same, that no people will exist if taken to its logical conclusion. — schopenhauer1

I don't agree that it is a big difference. That the human race will cease to exist is a big deal, the manner in which their extinction comes about is minor in comparison.

. I can see why at first, it seems unintuitive to most folks. They are used to the idea that life is good in and of itself, and people need to be born to experience this. They never question this notion. — schopenhauer1

I think several thousand years of ethical debate rather contradicts this notion. Have you read Moore, for example, who seems to me to be pretty resoundingly questioning this notion, he just doesn't come up with the same answer Benetar has.

So just wanted to clarify that you are discussing at the level of normative ethics (i.e. virtue theory, deontological, utilitarian, etc.), not meta-ethics. — schopenhauer1

I'm saying that different meta-ethical positions have different normative implications, and whilst meta-ethical positions are not derived consequentially, some humility is warranted about the fallibility of our rational capabilities when they lead us to conclusions which carry an enormous and irreversible normative consequence.

I don't agree that it is a big difference. That the human race will cease to exist is a big deal, the manner in which their extinction comes about is minor in comparison. — Isaac

That is the consequence yes. Your assumption is that there is somehow value to the perpetuity at the species level. Unlike other animals which we are making extinct through no fault of their own, we are self-aware. We can understand what harm is for a future person. We can choose to not expose future people to harm by procreating them. It is as simple as that. The universe itself doesn't cry over our absence. Either would any actual person, if it actually came down to no one having children. But remember, antinatalists don't force their views, so de facto, other views being at least neutral to mildly pro-natalist, it doesn't seem like the end consequence of antinatalism is going to happen any time soon, just like everyone accepting veganism won't happen any time soon.

I think several thousand years of ethical debate rather contradicts this notion. Have you read Moore, for example, who seems to me to be pretty resoundingly questioning this notion, he just doesn't come up with the same answer Benetar has. — Isaac

I never said that people weren't pessimists. Indeed pessimists can be seen through literature going back millennia. But would you say this would be MOST people? A small sub-set are pessimist, an even smaller sub-set are antinatalists. Also, most people don't really question procreation, and would rarely think of the specific idea of preventing harm without causing any deprivation of good to an actual person. It is non-intuitive because life is almost always assumed to just be good in and of itself, and must be carried out no matter what. The agenda of the procreative agent is always one that is assumed to override harm to the future person.

I'm saying that different meta-ethical positions have different normative implications, and whilst meta-ethical positions are not derived consequentially, some humility is warranted about the fallibility of our rational capabilities when they lead us to conclusions which carry an enormous and irreversible normative consequence. — Isaac

I think again you mean, normative positions that have enormous applicable consequences. But I don't want to parse terms. Again, this delves into the idea I said before- just because there are a multitude of positions, doesn't mean one shouldn't hold a position. Lucky for you then, the marketplace has other ideas that counter the antinatalist. The humility is baked into the fact that no one is forcing this position on anyone else nor is it incumbent to condemn those who do hold different views.