What I mean, is a more general question:

Do you think that anything (may it be actions,wardrobes,whatever you name) could be categorized as moral or immoral in an objective way?

So "people of other races shouldn't be devalued on that basis" means "don't devalue people of other races on that basis"? — Michael

No, that isn't what it means, but that is what it conveys, or at least something similar. It's difficult to explain, and its use is fairly unique. I don't know why you think it necessary to attempt to equate it with something similar and related in meaning but distinct and nonidentical. These are words, phrases and statements that you use all the time in common parlance, so you must surely have some understanding of their meaning, and be able to spot the difference.

Then when you say "we shouldn't believe that racism is acceptable ... because people of other races shouldn't be devalued on that basis" you're saying "we shouldn't believe that racism is acceptable ... because don't devalue people of other races on that basis", which doesn't make sense. — Michael

Yes, they obviously don't mean the same thing and can't be interchanged without altering the meaning. I never claimed otherwise, I just said that that sort of statement is prescriptive, or has a prescriptive element. Do you disagree? If so, how about you explain to me the meaning of that sort of statement.

I'm double-checking that I've interpreted you correctly. — Michael

Ok, but it wasn't so much a reiteration as a repetition, and seemed unnecessary, with the exception of the last one you addressed.

I see, so you're saying that a false moral belief is immoral if we wouldn't want others to have this same false moral belief about us? — Michael

It can be. I'm not going to rule out the possibility of exceptions, but that is one reason that can be used to justify the claim that a particular false moral belief is immoral.

I wouldn't say something like "people are just their skin color," but I think that's part of what a person is. In other words, I think that people are just their bodies, and nothing else. Skin color is a part of the properties of bodies.

I don't buy (logical) identity through time (or identity in the indiscernibles sense) as anything other than an abstract way of thinking about things. Me at time T1 is not identical to me at time T2. The "two mes" are causally and contiguously etc. connected, but not identical.

That you rightly qualify with "some" and "most" and "in my experience" and "I think" is telling, and flies in the face of your first sentence. It can, in some situations, be morally wrong. — Sapientia

Seems like kind of a side-issue to me. Analytical philosophers stipulate. Phenomenologists refer to their own experiences. If we-none-of-us thought there might be room for improvement in our calculations, we wouldn't bother seeking out discussion, would we?

Just based on what I understand about the nature of assertion and morality, beliefs aren't virtue-apt.

I just made that up. Virtue-apt.

and because of the detrimental consequences it would likely bring about — Sapientia

If we're talking about consequences that are "brought about," we're no longer talking about mere beliefs or speech. We're talking about actions. Definitely I morally judge some actions. — Terrapin Station

But we weren't talking about that until you changed the subject. As can be seen, although you have taken my quote out of its context, I was talking about the consequences which would (likely) be brought about as a result of beliefs.

I don't buy (logical) identity through time (or identity in the indiscernibles sense) as anything other than an abstract way of thinking about things. Me at time T1 is not identical to me at time T2. The "two mes" are causally and contiguously etc. connected, but not identical. — Terrapin Station

Sure. I'm familiar with that view. My question about it would be whether it runs aground in the face of something like GE Moore's thoughts about common sense. You may say you don't recognize contiguity past to future, but don't your actions contradict that sentiment?

No, that isn't what it means, but that is what it conveys, or at least something similar. It's difficult to explain, and its use is fairly unique. I don't know why you think it necessary to attempt to equate it with something similar and related in meaning but distinct and nonidentical. These are words, phrases and statements that you use all the time in common parlance, so you must surely have some understanding of their meaning, and be able to spot the difference. — Sapientia

Sentences of the sort "you shouldn't X" are only coherent if they mean either "don't X" or "X is against the rules" – otherwise they're simply vacuous.

Yes, they obviously don't mean the same thing and can't be interchanged without altering the meaning. I never claimed otherwise, I just said that that sort of statement is prescriptive, or has a prescriptive element. Do you disagree? If so, how about you explain to me the meaning of that sort of statement.

It means either "don't be racist" or "racism is against the rules".

It can be. I'm not going to rule out the possibility of exceptions, but that is one reason that can be used to justify the claim that a particular false moral belief is immoral.

If there can be false moral beliefs that are not immoral even though we wouldn't want others to hold such beliefs about us then that we wouldn't want others to hold such beliefs about us isn't a condition that makes a belief immoral.

We've all been offended at one time or another because of something that someone has said or because of someones expressed belief which we find objectionable. Conversely, we've all found something that someone has said praiseworthy, or some belief that someone has expressed to be admirable. The simple explanation, which also happens to be the one that I find the most plausible, is that this is because some beliefs are wrong, and ought to be eschewed and condemned, and others are right, and ought to be accepted and promoted. — Sapientia

The only reason I can see for this, though, is because we fear the ramifications of a poor belief or desire the functionality of a good belief. Beliefs, in my opinion, are simply latent actions, or actions that have been repressed because of more dominating actions. They are desires and judgments that inherently have a motivational component to them - unrestrained, all beliefs lead to action.

Indeed if you're going to have a belief and yet not do anything, I would question your honesty or your will. Beliefs without actions are useless. What is scary about bad beliefs is that we can imagine what will happen if these beliefs are put into practice.

I don't refrain from morally judging beliefs or statements BECAUSE they're beliefs or statements. I refrain from morally judging them because I don't feel that mere beliefs or expressions have anything to do with morality/ethics. — Terrapin Station

But I don't understand why you feel that way, in spite of your explanation. They do have to do with ethics, despite your personal feelings. Personal feelings can't invalidate the notable relationship between one and the other.

"I believe that such-and-such is immoral for this, that, and the other."

"I object! You're wrong, such-and-such is perfectly acceptable because of x and y."

That is an uncontroversial example of ethical discourse.

You're an emotivist. We tend to feel strongly about certain ethical beliefs, like the belief that abortion is wrong, and we naturally react emotionally with approval or disapproval to those statements we are either strongly in favour of or against: your "Yay!" and "Boo!". So, the relevance of beliefs, and statements of belief, and their relationship with morality, can be accounted for according to your own meta-ethical framework.

Sentences of the sort "you shouldn't X" are only coherent if they mean either "don't X" or "X is against the rules" – otherwise they're simply vacuous. — Michael

Interesting. So, if we apply that interpretation, and go back to where we were beforehand, then... What was your query, again? What was it that you were objecting to?

You wanted to know the reasoning behind my belief that the belief that "racism is acceptable" is immoral, rather than just false. I then provided several reasons. You then focused on one of them and attempted to reduce it to "Racism is unacceptable because racism is unacceptable", and then, after a little prodding, proceeded to "look at" the rest. Then you questioned the meaning of "you shouldn't X", to which I replied that it's prescriptive, which you accept, given that your own interpretation is prescriptive.

So, where do we disagree?

If there can be false moral beliefs that are not immoral even though we wouldn't want others to hold such beliefs about us then that we wouldn't want others to hold such beliefs about us isn't a condition that makes a belief immoral. — Michael

Yes, that's logically valid. However, the premise is arguable. But the Golden Rule isn't essential to my reasoning. I was merely citing it as an example of a possible justification for why a belief is immoral.

But I don't understand why you feel that way, in spite of your explanation. They do have to do with ethics, despite your personal feelings. Personal feelings can't invalidate the notable relationship between one and the other. — Sapientia

Did you catch where I explained that in my view, ethics IS about one's feelings (or "feelings") about interpersonal behavior? So yeah, if one doesn't feel that something is an ethical issue, then it's not a ethical issue for that person. It's not as if anything is objectively an ethical issue or not--when we're talking about ethical issues, we're talking about how individuals think about things.

we naturally react emotionally with approval or disapproval to those statements we are either strongly in favour of or against: — Sapientia

I react emotionally with approval or disapproval to certain interpersonal behavior, in the sense of "physical" actions between people, not merely beliefs or expression. I care about how people act towards others, including me. What they believe or say isn't sufficient for me to care about in any moral sense.

So, the relevance of beliefs, and statements of belief, and their relationship with morality, can be accounted for according to your own meta-ethical framework. — Sapientia

Sure, IF you care about beliefs and expression morally, and you consider that behavior in the relevant sense, so that you morally "yay" or "boo" some beliefs. It's relative to individuals.

But we weren't talking about that until you changed the subject. As can be seen, although you have taken my quote out of its context, I was talking about the consequences which would (likely) be brought about as a result of beliefs. — Sapientia

I merely stated a conditional and gave my opinion on it.

Re quoting, I only quote the sentence(s), or even just the phrase(s), that I'm commenting on, so it's clear what I'm commenting on.

I care about behavior/action morally. Not beliefs/expression. So I care about something morally when it gets to the point that we're talking about behavior/action. Not prior to that.

You may say you don't recognize contiguity past to future, — Mongrel

Actually I said the opposite of that. (Not to be patronizing, but just in case this is needed for anyone reading: contiguity is different than continuity.)

Re Moore's comments, I'd have to review them.

Interesting. So, if we apply that interpretation, and go back to where we were beforehand, then... What was your query, again? What was it that you were objecting to?

You wanted to know the reasoning behind my belief that the belief that "racism is acceptable" is immoral, rather than just false. I then provided several reasons. You then focused on one of them and attempted to reduce it to "Racism is unacceptable because racism is unacceptable", and then, after a little prodding, proceeded to "look at" the rest. Then you questioned the meaning of "you shouldn't X", to which I replied that it's prescriptive, which you accept, given that your own interpretation is prescriptive.

So, where do we disagree? — Sapientia

I asked what is required for a false moral belief to be immoral. One of your reasons was (paraphrased) "because we shouldn't be racist". But given that I'm saying "we shouldn't be racist" means "don't be racist" this amounts to "the belief is immoral because don't be racist", which isn't a coherent sentence. So we can cross off this proposed reason.

Yes, that's logically valid.

Then the claim "the belief is immoral because we wouldn't want others to have such a belief" doesn't work, given that the former doesn't follow from the latter. So we can cross off this proposed reason.

Sentences of the sort "you shouldn't X" are only coherent if they mean either "don't X" or "X is against the rules" – otherwise they're simply vacuous. — Michael

When I say "You shouldn't x" what I mean is "I'd prefer that people do not do x, or I'd prefer a world where people do not do x, either because (a) I simply do not care for x, (b) I do not care for y, where I believe that y is an upshot of x, or (c) I believe that you'll end up preferring the consequences of not doing x, and I care about you in a way that I want you to end up in a situation you prefer." I don't think that's incoherent or vacuous.

Alright, I'll add that one my list of meanings.

Re it being "right" to do so, if you mean "correct," or something like "It is true that one should morally judge beliefs," that is what would be a category error, as I pointed out in another post above. — Terrapin Station

I meant that it can be the right thing to do. In other words, that it can be warranted, or that one would be justified in doing so. And I stand by that.

Actually, I explicitly pointed out that I do not morally judge others for judging beliefs. I judge them in other ways--I make judgments about character, for example, about whether that person is comfortable with difference and so on. — Terrapin Station

I know what you said. I was taking about what you do, in spite of what you say. I could similarly "point out" that I don't ever get emotional or that I never judge anyone for anything, ever... but that would be poppycock.

I couldn't disagree more with the metaphysics of that. Meaning is subjective first off. "X (term) is an F issue" is a semantic statement (it's a statement about the meaning of x). Well, that simply depends on how someone thinks about x. There aren't right or wrong ways to think about it. — Terrapin Station

Language is communal. It makes a lot more sense for someone to appeal to common usage than to think up an idiosyncratic meaning. There are appropriate and inappropriate ways to think about it, and one can, if one so chooses, use that as a means of determining correctness.

Now, you can disagree as strongly as you like with my claim that offence is, by its nature, a moral issue, but this is common sense, and can be backed up by linguistic analysis and empirical observation.

If you think about it that way. I do not. — Terrapin Station

Relativism is sensible up to a point, but beyond that point, it becomes unreasonable and can be frankly ridiculous.

"Well, you might think about Earth as being spherical, and you're entitled to your opinion, but I think of it as being flat".

However you characterize it, I think it's the offended who has a problem that needs to be worked on, for the reasons I explained, not the offended. You characterizing it one way or another wouldn't affect my feelings on that.

Certainly some people feel that way. I do not. — Terrapin Station

For someone who talks about feelings quite a lot, you aren't very sympathetic. Nor do you have a particularly attuned sense of injustice.

Sure, people do not have "full control" over their emotions. But one can work on oneself so that one is no longer offended. That's worth doing in my opinion. If you prefer to be offendable, and you are offendable, then don't work on yourself in that way. — Terrapin Station

Sure, one can work on oneself to be less susceptible to taking offence; and where that can do good, I'm all in favour of it. Although it is practically impossible to be unoffendable, indefinitely. But I was objecting to your lack of empathy and your unqualified endorsement of a rash, harsh, and potentially counterproductive "pull-yourself-together!" sort of reaction in that situation.

Alright, I'll add that one my list of meanings — Michael

Haha--if only I could make it snappier.

Do you think that anything (may it be actions, wardrobes, whatever you name) could be categorized as moral or immoral in an objective way? — hunterkf5732

No, since that depends on us. Removing us from that equation results in nonsense. But it doesn't depend on whatever a single individual just happens to conjure up in their mind, either. Nor is any one categorisation as valid as the next. It's about what's appropriate, given how we - particularly as a community of language users and moral agents - commonly categorise what is and is not moral. It's about inter-subjectivity and convention.

I meant that it can be the right thing to do. In other words, that it can be warranted, or that one would be justified in doing so. And I stand by that. — Sapientia

I'm a subjectivist on justification by the way. So yeah, some people certainly feel they're justified in morally judging beliefs and expression, and they can't be (factually) wrong--or right--in that.

I know what you said. I was taking about what you do, in spite of what you say. — Sapientia

And your evidence for that is?

Language is communal. — Sapientia

There are communal aspects to it, but meaning only occurs in individuals' minds.

It makes a lot more sense for someone to appeal to common usage than to think up an idiosyncratic meaning. — Sapientia

First, note that we can't literally make meanings public. But aside from that, why does it make sense in your view to appeal to common usage, because you're a fan of argumentum ad populums?

There are appropriate and inappropriate ways to think about it, and one can, if one so chooses, use that as a means of determining correctness. — Sapientia

Again, you could only be appealing to an argumentum ad populum there. Argumentum ad populums are fallacious.

this is common sense, and can be backed up by linguistic analysis and empirical observation. — Sapientia

In other words, "that's how most people use the term." So what? That doesn't make it correct.

Relativism is sensible up to a point, but beyond that point, it becomes unreasonable and can be frankly ridiculous. — Sapientia

Yeah, that's a real quality argument against it in my opinion

"Well, you might think about Earth as being spherical, and you're entitled to your opinion, but I think of it as being flat". — Sapientia

Yay, you're trying to argue about this and you don't even have a grasp of the distinction whether we're talking about something that's only mental or something that exists extramentally. This should be fun.

For someone who talks about feelings quite a lot, you aren't very sympathetic. — Sapientia

Just how sympathetic are you with the offendors?

Nor do you have a particularly attuned sense of injustice. — Sapientia

Right, having an "attuned sense of injustice" amounts to having the same opinions that you do.

Although it is practically impossible to be unoffendable, indefinitely. — Sapientia

It actually isn't, but okay. I know that's your belief and it won't change.

But I was objecting to your lack of empathy — Sapientia

Again, if not having the same views as you do implies a lack of empathy, then you have an equal lack of empathy in not having the same views that I do.

your unqualified endorsement of a rash, harsh, and potentially counterproductive "pull-yourself-together!" sort of reaction in that situation. — Sapientia

Haha re pulling that one out of your ass. ;-) (Especially after I had systematically gone through part of how one would work through avoiding being offended if one is offendable.)

No, since that depends on us. Otherwise that would be nonsense. But it doesn't depend on whatever a single individual just happens to conjure up in their mind either. It's about what's appropriate, given how we - particularly as a community of language users and moral agents - commonly categorise what is and is not moral. It's about inter subjectivity and convention. — Sapientia

That's an argumentum ad populum.

I asked what is required for a false moral belief to be immoral. One of your reasons was (paraphrased) "because we shouldn't be racist". But given that I'm saying "we shouldn't be racist" means "don't be racist" this amounts to "the belief is immoral because don't be racist", which isn't a coherent sentence. So we can cross off this proposed reason. — Michael

I like that: the belief is immoral because - don't be racist! :D

But no, that isn't a fair representation of my position, and your attempted reductio ad absurdum has failed to hit its target.

Better luck next time?

Then the claim "the belief is immoral because we wouldn't want others to have such a belief" doesn't work, given that the former doesn't follow from the latter. — Michael

What? You've lost me. Your prior reasoning is indeed valid, as I said, but the above doesn't follow from it, or from its validity. Furthermore, regarding the claim that "the belief is immoral because we wouldn't want others to have such a belief": the former does follow from the latter, given the right additional premises.

But like I said, the Golden Rule logic isn't essential, so I don't really mind if we cross it off.

It's about what's appropriate, given how we - particularly as a community of language users and moral agents - commonly categorise what is and is not moral. — Sapientia

Supposing that in a community of 100 people, 50 endorse one side of a moral issue and the other 50 endorse the contrary, how would you decide what is "appropriate" through "common categorization"?

But no, that isn't a fair representation of my position, and your attempted reductio ad absurdum has failed to hit its target.

Better luck next time? — Sapientia

Then what does "you shouldn't be racist" mean if not "don't be racist"?

Furthermore, regarding the claim that "the belief is immoral because we wouldn't want others to have such a belief": the former does follow from the latter, given the right additional premises.

That's like saying regarding the claim "I am immortal because my name is Michael": the former does follow from the latter, given the right additional premises. Strictly speaking that's true, but it isn't at all helpful – and as it currently stands the former doesn't follow.

Unless I can provide the additional premises it's wrong to say that I am immortal because my name is Michael, and so unless you can provide the additional premises it's wrong to say that the belief is immoral because we wouldn't want others to believe the same way about us.

"In a war of ideas, better ideas win." -- Mubin Shaikh

It doesn't make any sense to say it doesn't make any sense. "It's correct to morally judge beliefs or expression" IS a statement (what the heck else would it be?) — Terrapin Station

Yes, it does. It was a very minor point about your your erroneous wording. And that wasn't the statement that I was addressing in my criticism; that was just a part of it. So that's a strawman. If you go back and read your own quote and my response to it, you can see for yourself. I was actually addressing the following:

What I believe is a category error is whether it's correct to morally judge beliefs or expression. — Terrapin Station

To use "whether" there doesn't make sense, but "that" would. Or you could lose "whether" and add a colon after the second "is".

But it's not correct or incorrect to morally judge beliefs. That's because there are no facts to that effect. — Terrapin Station

Doesn't follow, since correctness doesn't need to be based on a standard of whether there are facts to that effect.

You're assuming that it's a factual matter when it is not. — Terrapin Station

My argument takes into account facts, yes. But your crude understanding isn't quite what I have in mind.

It's simply a matter of whether you're yaying judging beliefs and expression. — Terrapin Station

That's just one theory among many. You're begging the question.

It would only refute "It is correct to morally judge beliefs and/or expression." — Terrapin Station

No, it wouldn't, because, as I pointed out above, there's a missing premise which is false. There are many various standards of correctness, and you're assuming just one, which it needn't be.

Maybe you're simply saying that you're using "correct" in a looser sense, so that all you're doing by using "correct" is "yaying"? — Terrapin Station

No, that would be a misunderstanding, and is quite ridiculous and patronising.

So how could something be correct or incorrect in your view aside from matching or failing to match facts? P is correct just in case _____? (And then fill in the blank.) — Terrapin Station

There are countless possible criteria, so I'm not going to attempt to list them all. But as for the set of criteria that I am relying on, I'd say that taking into account facts is definitely a sensible approach - even if they're not "moral facts" as such, but facts which are nevertheless relevant in meta-ethical queries such as this one. And another important thing to take into consideration are the sorts of things that we actually do consider applicable with regards to moral judgement or what is right or wrong. How we usually do categorise. What is customary or conventional. And if your opinion stands out like a sore thumb, in a similar way to how the opinion that red should be excluded from the category of colour does, then I think that the greater burden is on you.

In other words, you're forwarding an argumentum ad populum. — Terrapin Station

No, not in other words, in your mistaken analysis.

Just based on what I understand about the nature of assertion and morality, beliefs aren't virtue-apt. — Mongrel

Then I think that your understanding either overlooks or fails to account for some important aspects of human behaviour, psychology and morality. Some beliefs can be corrosive and corrupting and immoral and indicative of vice. You name a vice, and I'll give you an example of a belief indicative of it.

Is belief, or the linguistic expression thereof, the sort of thing that can be moral or immoral, or would that be a category error? — Sapientia

Sorry I've been away on holiday, I hope I may interject this late on. I'm coming from an Aristotelian angle, where belief in itself doesn't count as moral or immoral because it isn't choice.

...[choice] cannot be opinion; for opinion is thought to relate to all kinds of things, no less to eternal things and impossible things than to things in our own power; and it is distinguished by its falsity or truth, not by its badness or goodness, while choice is distinguished rather by these. — Aristotle

Virtue or vice or (lack of) self-control each can only show itself through action, including a speech-act. Our fantasies aren't moral or immoral in themselves. I can't help the thoughts that fly into the windows of my soul, only what my soul gets the body to do once those thoughts have had their sway in deliberation.

Nevertheless once an action is undertaken or under way, our judgment of the state of mind of the perpetrator then matters to us, counts as 'moral', otherwise an unintentional killing with an accidental knife would count the same as murder aforethought. So the inferred belief with which an act is committed counts as moral or immoral, even though belief qua belief does not.

Can I ask you to clarify something?

If it is sensible to say that an act is good or bad, 'eating babies is morally wrong', say, then beliefs that lead to eating babies are on the face of it also morally wrong. This seems inescapable, and hardly worth a long discussion.

So the question you seem to be asking is not that? Is it rather a question of culpability? Am I culpable for my morally wrong beliefs and the morally wrong acts that flow from them?

If that is the question, one needs to consider that beliefs are formed socially, and accepted more or less uncritically. So the poor benighted cannibal is minimally culpable for his beliefs (and for the eating of babies that he indulges in), until the missionaries turn up and explain that God has written this book and says not to. And once those ideas have gained currency, then the cannibal ought to know better.

So I think it goes, that one is more responsible (for good or ill), for one's beliefs the more they are at variance with social norms.