What I believe is a category error is whether it's correct to morally judge beliefs or expression.
— Terrapin Station

To use the "whether" there doesn't make sense, but "that" would. Or you could lose "whether" and add a colon after the second "is". — Sapientia

I'm just going to do one thing at a time with you, otherwise this will keep getting longer and longer with no resolution to anything. So I'll start with this.

Someone could consider whether it's correct or incorrect to morally judge beliefs and expression.

That's what "whether it's correct to morally judge beliefs or expression" refers to, just a bit less verbosely. The term "whether" implies "whether x or not x," without having to type that whole thing out.

I believe that the idea of it being correct or incorrect to judge beliefs and expression is a category error. Morally judging beliefs and expression, as with ALL moral judgments, is not the sort of thing that can be correct or incorrect. Hence, "What I believe is a category error is whether it's correct to morally judge beliefs or expression." If I were to change the word "whether" to the word "that," it wouldn't work the same way, because I'm not only saying that it's a category error to say that it's correct to morally judge beliefs and expression. It's a category error to say that it's incorrect to morally judge beliefs and expression, too.

No, not in other words, in your mistaken analysis. — Sapientia

As a moderator, aren't you supposed to care more about the quality of philosophical dialogue than basically devolving into "Is too/is not" and barely-veiled "ad hominems"?

I'll help things along as I can, though: okay, so you're not saying that something is correct because of what people have agreed upon or how they've agreed or followed suit with each other to do something (which would indeed be an argumentum ad populum), but . . . . what? What, exactly, is the alternative you're presenting?

Morality is commonly defined as ideals of behaviour or conduct.

Do you know of an exception?

The only reason I can see for this, though, is because we fear the ramifications of a poor belief or desire the functionality of a good belief. Beliefs, in my opinion, are simply latent actions, or actions that have been repressed because of more dominating actions. They are desires and judgments that inherently have a motivational component to them - unrestrained, all beliefs lead to action.

Indeed if you're going to have a belief and yet not do anything, I would question your honesty or your will. Beliefs without actions are useless. What is scary about bad beliefs is that we can imagine what will happen if these beliefs are put into practice. — darthbarracuda

The only reason? I see more than that. I spoke about beliefs we find objectionable, and we find some beliefs inherently objectionable, i.e. prior to or irrespective of a consideration of the consequences. Consequentialist reasoning is very common, but it isn't the only sort of ethical reasoning that we engage in. In fact, before any reasoning even takes place, there's usually a sort of instinctive or emotional reaction about the nature of an ethical belief. That consequentialism isn't taken to be primary in everyones judgement can be put to the test by asking people whether or not they still think that an ethical belief would be wrong, even if there were no bad consequences. And there will be mixed results. Some people will conclude that it is wrong nevertheless.

I also disagree with your view that beliefs are simply latent actions. I think that that is far too simplistic a view, and that a better view would be more complex, and involve the recognition of variance, and require a more sophisticated understanding of belief. How would my belief that Ross 248 is a star in the constellation of Andromeda have otherwise lead to action? (Obviously it is a belief that has now resulted in action, since it motivated me to mention it in this discussion - and that can't be avoided if I am to attempt to provide a counterexample). It is quite conceivable that it would never have done so, and that it wasn't a latent action at all, but simply a belief. But then, it's a catch-22, isn't it? Because you could call anything a latent anything, couldn't you? All you have to do is postulate that it hasn't yet manifested itself. I am a latent explosion, and so are you, and so is everyone else. This reminds me a bit of the the argument that John Locke and others were involved in about innate knowledge. The problem is that it's not falsifiable.

By the way, do you mean to talk about belief in general or just ethical belief? Because you didn't specify.

I have a belief that it is wrong to rape someone in Alabama, but I'm probably not going to do anything about it, even if I were to go to Alabama. If I ever go to Alabama, it will probably be just to go there on holiday and do the sorts of things that people usually do on holiday in Alabama. Do you question my honesty or will? Must I take action against everything that I believe is right or wrong in order to meet your high expectations? If so, then most people won't meet your standards.

There is no moral obligation that we all dedicate our lives to standing up for everything that we believe in and that we speak out against everything that we object to. There are other important things in life, and my way of life is too valuable for me to give up for your moralism.

So, only beliefs which lead to action are useful? Well, usefulness itself, and what you in particular judge to be of use, isn't the be all and end all. I believe what I believe, whether it's useful or not, and I still believe that some beliefs are right and some beliefs are wrong.

I agree that what is concerning, or alarming even, about bad beliefs is that we can imagine what will happen if these beliefs are put into practice. But whether that is the sole reason for our judging them to be bad is arguable.

Did you catch where I explained that in my view, ethics IS about one's feelings (or "feelings") about interpersonal behavior? — Terrapin Station

Yes, and I agree that ethics is about feelings, at least in part. But I don't think that that resolves the issues I raised. That's why I said "in spite of your explanation...".

So yeah, if one doesn't feel that something is an ethical issue, then it's not a ethical issue for that person. It's not as if anything is objectively an ethical issue or not--when we're talking about ethical issues, we're talking about how individuals think about things. — Terrapin Station

But this is about more than what an individual personally feels is an ethical issue. That makes sense to me in normative ethics, but we're talking about a meta-ethical issue, and it is descriptive. We can use reason and observation to determine the right answer. We're discussing what is rightly or appropriately categorised as the sort of thing that can be right or wrong. We don't arrive at the conclusion that a category error has been made by appealing to how an individual feels about it. It wouldn't even be a category error in accordance with this overblown relativism. In that case, we could just say "Okay, red isn't a colour for you". But that would be silly.

It's not as if anything is objectively an ethical issue or not--when we're talking about ethical issues, we're talking about how individuals think about things. — Terrapin Station

We're not talking about ethical issues, like whether abortion is right or wrong, and under what circumstances. I'm sympathetic towards ethical anti-realism in that regard. We're talking about ethical classification, which is a meta-ethical issue. And I don't think that an individualistic uncritical approach based soley on how someone feels about it or even thinks about it will lead to the right answer.

I react emotionally with approval or disapproval to certain interpersonal behavior, in the sense of "physical" actions between people, not merely beliefs or expression. I care about how people act towards others, including me. What they believe or say isn't sufficient for me to care about in any moral sense. — Terrapin Station

Yes, well, even if what you claim about yourself is true, I said "we", as in people in general.

Sure, IF you care about beliefs and expression morally, and you consider that behavior in the relevant sense, so that you morally "yay" or "boo" some beliefs. — Terrapin Station

People generally do care about beliefs and expression morally, which is part of the justification for my general point. I'm not saying that you must care, or that you must categorise beliefs as a moral category; I'm saying that you should. In the former case, because they matter, even if they don't matter to you; and in the latter case, because it is appropriate and makes sense.

It's relative to individuals. — Terrapin Station

No, it's relative to how a community reasonably categorises. An individual can unreasonably categorise something in stark contrast to that, and that's when it's appropriate to simply say that that individual is wrong: that he or she has made a category error.

But this is about more than what an individual personally feels is an ethical issue. — Sapientia

What is it about that's more than that?

What is it about that's more than that? — Terrapin Station

I've got a backlog of replies to get through, by the way. Including several of yours. I haven't caught up yet.

Can I ask you to clarify something?

If it is sensible to say that an act is good or bad, 'eating babies is morally wrong', say, then beliefs that lead to eating babies are on the face of it also morally wrong. This seems inescapable, and hardly worth a long discussion.

So the question you seem to be asking is not that? Is it rather a question of culpability? Am I culpable for my morally wrong beliefs and the morally wrong acts that flow from them?

If that is the question, one needs to consider that beliefs are formed socially, and accepted more or less uncritically. So the poor benighted cannibal is minimally culpable for his beliefs (and for the eating of babies that he indulges in), until the missionaries turn up and explain that God has written this book and says not to. And once those ideas have gained currency, then the cannibal ought to know better.

So I think it goes, that one is more responsible (for good or ill), for one's beliefs the more they are at variance with social norms. — unenlightened

As I just mentioned to Terrapin Station, I have a backlog of replies to get through, and I feel like I'm 'jumping the queue' by replying to yours before others, but my reply will be brief.

I agree with your first paragraph (after your first question). I think that that should be enough to refute the position that no beliefs can be wrong. But then there is also the related question of whether beliefs can be wrong in themselves, or at least without that condition.

It has come to light throughout this discussion that Terrapin Station's view - and he can correct me if I've got it wrong - is not, as I initially interpreted his comment, that no belief or expression can be morally wrong, but merely that that no belief or expression can be morally wrong for him and presumably anyone who shares his view. So that poses no real challenge to the claim that beliefs can be morally wrong. He would answer "Yes, in some cases", as would I. And the discussion then turns to different but related issues, like whether he and others like him should change their mind, or whether his sort of moral relativism is credible.

The culpability issue was also an interesting side issue, and I more-or-less agree with your take on it.

Terrapin Station's view - and he can correct me if I've got it wrong - is not, as I initially interpreted his comment, that no belief or expression can be morally wrong, but merely that that no belief or expression can be morally wrong for him and presumably anyone who shares his view. So that poses no real challenge to the claim that beliefs can be morally wrong. He would answer "Yes, in some cases", — Sapientia

I would simply stress that it's a matter of the people in question feeling that some beliefs or expressions are morally wrong. It's not that they can factually be morally wrong (since a fortiori, nothing is factually morally wrong).

Also, re the comment you're responding to re beliefs leading to actions, I'd only consider that if the beliefs in question always led to particular actions (at least barring significant intervening factors), so that we could say those beliefs were causal to the actions in question.