Is 'positivism' just a deficient Kantianism, regardless of Kant's own faults, an inconsistent doctrine that cannot be judged by its own standards? — Sentience

In keeping with the existential psychology theme, while like LP, existentialism rests on phenomenology. However, the concept of being, becoming, and potentiality, relative to the human condition, did not seem to be on the radar for the LP's. Psychologists discovered in the early 20th century the importance of both/and versus either/or in phenomenology and resulting axioms of logic. By the mid-sixties, LP, and its limitations, seemingly became apparent in cognitive science and its popularity waned.

I don't think Kant specifically addressed cognitive science...though I would welcome correction because it certainly seems he was encroaching into a domain that perhaps he was not qualified to speak to... .

In any case it's important to underscore that existential psychology (along with other groups) uncovered the limits of verbal, analytic, conceptional rationality by subordinating those to raw experience, prior to any concepts or abstractions (much like the metaphysical Will/Voluntarism)..

And so as a segue to the synthetic a priori knowledge, if one has both a phenomenal experience combined with an a priori inclination to posit things like causational concepts or judgements, the LP would claim irrelevant. The irony is, most all theories in physics involve (start with) synthetic propositions.

both distinctions are very important for Kant, so one could suspect that they are somehow interconnected. It seems that, after all, the connection is indirect — through the doctrine of synthetic a priori judgments. — Sentience

Neither one are that important, the one merely sets the stage for what Kant needed to logically prove, that Hume was wrong....or at least incomplete....insofar as there is such a thing as an priori pure reason, and one has a better understanding of his own knowledge, if he doesn’t “commit it to the flames”, and the other is merely a tacit admission that the human intuitively based representational system of a posteriori knowledge acquisition is not necessarily the only kind there is.

As for positivists and such.....ehhhh.....I don’t care that much. They’re just names, after all. All certain knowledge of real things is given from experience, to be sure, but not all certain knowledge is of real things. The problem rests entirely on the respective susceptibility to proofs, and the methodology by which they are obtained.

I’d be interested in an expansion on your line 3 reasoning. Without that, I’d withhold comment on the questions derived from the line of reasoning.....which I might not agree with.

Neither one are that important — Mww

I had in mind analytic/synthetic distinction on the one hand and between phenomena and noumena on the other.

I’d be interested in an expansion on your line 3 reasoning. — Mww

Well, prima facie, the basics seem quite clear — since time, space, and causality are 'subjective' precisely because of grounding on synthetic a priori judgments, the role of the latter in the Copernican turn is decisive. As for the noumenal/phenomenal, it is a more complicated matter, but it is at least clear that this dualism is simply an integral part of the Copernican turn. So, I myself wonder, whether there can be an explanation of how the Copernican turn could be possible without appeal to synthetic a priori truths. The situation is complicated by the fact that the Copernican turn was seen by Kant as a metaphysical enterprise, whereas 'positivists' consider metaphysics 'meaningless'.

I'd say there are at least some grounds for positing noumena...

1. you cannot experience another's self-awareness, since then you'd be them instead ^{(self-awarenesses are indexical)}
2. so there are things you cannot experience, always just over the horizon, noumena
3. you are not everything, self-identity, individuation, self versus other
4. but you can know thereof by interaction, be it the rubble in the driveway or others

(Could likely be expressed better.)

time, space, and causality are 'subjective' precisely because of grounding on synthetic a priori judgments.......

I think this is backwards. Pure intuitions are subjective, but by being subjective, that is, “...as the formal capacity of the subject's being affected by objects, and thereby of obtaining immediate representation...”, with respect to space and time only (not causality, which belongs to the pure categories of the understanding), synthetic a priori judgements become possible. From “...For there are no other subjective representations from which we can deduce synthetical propositions a priori, as we can from the intuition of space...”, it is clear the subjective representation is always antecedent to any proposition constructed by means of it.
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........the role of the latter in the Copernican turn is decisive. — Sentience

Granted, in as much as the logical proof of the possibility of synthetic a priori conditions justified the metaphysical leap from objects being necessary and sufficient for human knowledge, to objects being necessary, but not in themselves sufficient.
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As for the noumenal/phenomenal, (...) it is at least clear that this dualism is simply an integral part of the Copernican turn. — Sentience

I don’t see it, myself. The metaphysical paradigm shift, re: “...When he found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge....”, has nothing to do with a dualism, per se, but only with a singular concise, logical methodology.

Key is “nature of our faculty of intuition”, which is the source of phenomena. Noumena, on the other hand, as has been mentioned, is the preview of understanding, and its propensity to think objects which never avail themselves to the human version of intuitive representation. In the Kantian cognitive system, understanding is far removed from intuition, requiring a synthesis with it, and in the case of pure thought, has no synthesis with it at all.

Now, you may be of the mind that noumena are things-in-themselves, which gives rise to a natural dualism. But noumena are not things-in-themselves, thus the dualism is destroyed. To say noumena could be things-in-themselves to rationalities other than those using the human representational variety, is an altogether empty assertion, for it would be impossible for us to even understand how such could be the case.
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whether there can be an explanation of how the Copernican turn could be possible without appeal to synthetic a priori truths. — Sentience

I would say not, at least from an Enlightenment approach. The necessity and universality of a priori cognitions in general had to be proven possible, in order to give the transcendental theory the power of logical law. To make it irreducible to inductive principles alone, in other words, which is the mistake he accused Hume of administering as a valid epistemological philosophy. It bears remembering that Kant was an Aristotelian logical advocate, thus grounded his theory on syllogisms out of respect for their susceptibility to empirical proofs, which Hume and the empiricists of the day could not provide.
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'positivists' consider metaphysics 'meaningless'. — Sentience

Do they? Or do they think the science of metaphysics is meaningless? If so, it’s probably because there is no such thing as a proper science of metaphysics, as even Kant himself came to admit. But that takes nothing away from metaphysics being a valid explanatory cognitive theory.

Anyway....if you’ve got decent counterarguments, fire away.

My question concerns whether Kant is justified in positing the existence of the noumenal world — philosophy

To the extent that I can discern, there's no reason not to posit noumena. In other words, Kant can't be penalized for his concept of noumena.

That said, there maybe enough justification to apply Occam's razor - the world with both noumena and phenomena would be orders of magnitude greater in complexity than just phenomena without the noumena.

But noumena are not things-in-themselves, thus the dualism is destroyed. To say noumena could be things-in-themselves to rationalities other than those using the human representational variety, is an altogether empty assertion, for it would be impossible for us to even understand how such could be the case. — Mww

I don't fully understand why noumena are not things-in-themselves and would rather say that noumena are things-in-themselves from the point of view of Kant's implicit assumptions. But my point was not so much about dualism as about the Copernican turn. So let me summarize.

1. The analytic/synthetic dichotomy is grounded on the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal, not vice versa.
2. The Copernican turn is thus possible based just on the analytic/synthetic dichotomy without appeal to synthetic a priori truths.
3. The Copernican turn has nothing to do with a dualism, per se, but only with a singular concise, logical methodology.

Granted these points are true, the questions arise: what does the Copernican turn consist in and how could it be ensured? Isn't a "singular concise, logical methodology" in question precisely the analytic/synthetic dichotomy in the first place? If this is so, then my main question could be reformulated as follows: what is the "bridge" between the analytic/synthetic dichotomy and the Copernican turn, given that the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal is supposedly not an integral part of the latter?

To the extent that I can discern, there's no reason not to posit noumena. In other words, Kant can't be penalized for his concept of noumena.

That said, there maybe enough justification to apply Occam's razor - the world with both noumena and phenomena would be orders of magnitude greater in complexity than just phenomena without the noumena. — TheMadFool

Yes, and you can also, broadly speaking, treat like cases likely and different cases differently. And as such, that is really the one basic premise behind synthetic a priori knowledge. It's different because of its synthesis. In any case, we still cannot determine the true nature of these things-in-themselves.

Consciousness remains a mystery... . But once again, the irony is that the synthetic a priori is very useful in science. Go figure :smile:

I don't fully understand why noumena are not things-in-themselves and would rather say that noumena are things-in-themselves from the point of view of Kant's implicit assumptions. — Sentience

That is a falsification of Kantian theoretical conditions. The thing of the thing-in-itself is a real physical object, the affect on our sensibility giving us sensations. The in-itself of the thing in itself is that which is not represented in us as phenomena, but is that which belongs to the thing as it is in itself without being represented. But that which is not so represented, is not thereby noumena. The common misunderstanding of Kantian theoretical conditions is that just because we don’t know the thing as it is in itself, and we do not know conceptions represented as noumena at all, that the thing in itself is noumenal. This is catastrophically false, from a purely transcendental Kantian point of view. There is no reason whatsoever to consider objects the understanding thinks, which are mere conceptions, as being equivalent to that which belongs to an object as it is in itself, the very conceptions of which are unavailable to us.
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Isn't a "singular concise, logical methodology" in question precisely the analytic/synthetic dichotomy in the first place? — Sentience

Before I respond to that, I would ask, how would you think it is so?

This is catastrophically false, from a purely transcendental Kantian point of view. — Mww

Before this suggestion can be treated as catastrophically false, the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal must itself be justified. However, we have preliminary seen that it at least cannot be justified by appealing to the analytic/synthetic dichotomy or the Copernican turn since it supposedly constitutes the ground for them. So, please, let us concentrate more on the questions above.

Before I respond to that, I would ask, how would you think it is so? — Mww

Well, prima facie, because the dichotomy in question is perhaps the main logical innovation of Kant that occupies a central place in his argumentation.

Isn't a "singular concise, logical methodology" in question precisely the analytic/synthetic dichotomy in the first place?
— Sentience

Before I respond to that, I would ask, how would you think it is so? — Mww

Well, prima facie, because the dichotomy in question is perhaps the main logical innovation of Kant that occupies one of the central places in his argumentation. — Sentience

Kant didn’t innovate the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, those having been in philosophical existence for millennia, and to which he paid little mind. Aristotle, remember? All he did was propose, then prove, the validity of a certain kind of synthetic proposition, the a priori kind, which itself came to occupy a central place in his argumentation. The others he merely considered as given, and of no particular import with respect to transcendental philosophy.

So I still don’t know how you think this is so.

So I'm reading on this thread that Kant might not have believed in a thing in itself. I understand the Antimonies as arguing that phenomena says nothing about what noumena is and that noumena is something we can't understand because of the Antimonies. If you throw out the noumena all we have is appearance that contradicts itself. Can this really be Kant's position?

Kant didn’t innovate the analytic/synthetic dichotomy — Mww

I cannot agree with this — it is Kant who introduced the sharp separation, that is, a dichotomy, between the analytical and synthetical truths. It is well established in the history of philosophy. So it is even not true to assert that Hume is close enough to Kant in this regard. Therefore, those who reject synthetic a priori propositions but adhere to the dichotomy itself are still Kantian enough to create a controversy I have formulated.

Ok. So you think that because Kant gave a synopsis of the differences between analytic and synthetic judgements, truths...whatever...that he is responsible for the reality of them? Do you see there is scant difference between Aristotelian necessity/contingency propositional dualism, and Kantian analytic/synthetic propositional dualism? What is different, and strictly Kantian, is the a priori designation for synthetic propositions, those having nothing whatsoever to do with experience, not in their proofs, but in their construction, the validity of which neither Aristotle nor Hume considered.
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it is even not true to assert that Hume is close enough to Kant in this regard. — Sentience

Correct. Hume rejected a priori truths, and a priori reason in general, being a proponent “constant conjunction” rather than admitting the purposes and validity of pure a priori cognitions.
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Therefore, those who reject synthetic a priori propositions but adhere to the dichotomy itself are still Kantian enough to create a controversy I have formulated. — Sentience

Those who reject the a priori synthetic domain reject transcendental epistemological philosophy, hence cannot call themselves Kantian enough for anything. Adherence to the dichotomy itself, merely the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions alone, could apply to anyone who thinks about it. But it all goes haywire for the common understanding when the a priori conditions are appended.

Not to say there isn’t some controversy formulated, but I don’t really understand what it is. Guess I’m just not feeling it, as you’ve put it forward.

Those who reject the a priori synthetic domain reject transcendental epistemological philosophy, hence cannot call themselves Kantian enough for anything. — Mww

Not to interject into the wonderful discussion, but since physicists (cosmology) start with synthetic propositions, wouldn't those who reject them not wonder at all (no advancement of a theory is possible)? And if there is no wonder, there is no advancement in science and humanity (?).

Do you see there is scant difference between Aristotelian necessity/contingency propositional dualism, and Kantian analytic/synthetic propositional dualism? — Mww

Yes, simply because in Aristotle, there is no analytic/synthetic dichotomy since Kant has elaborated not only the synthetic a priori/a posteriori part of the distinction but the analytic as well. And this is of primary importance when it comes to the (post-)Kantian character of 'positivism'.

Those who reject the a priori synthetic domain reject transcendental epistemological philosophy, hence cannot call themselves Kantian enough for anything. — Mww

How can they adhere to the Copernican turn then?

Don’t we need to distinguish between rejecting synthetic propositions, and a priori synthetic propositions? I agree the rejection of the a priori would seem to halt the thinking that is always antecedent to hypotheticals, but wouldn’t necessarily halt the thinking, if not antecedent to then at least in conjunction with, observation.

And the scientific method, hence the physicalists, always start from observation, so I agree, synthetic qua contingent propositions cannot be rejected. Actually, I don’t think a priori synthetic propositions are rejected either; it’s just that they are not recognized as such.

Yes, and you can also, broadly speaking, treat like cases likely and different cases differently. And as such, that is really the one basic premise behind synthetic a priori knowledge. It's different because of its synthesis. In any case, we still cannot determine the true nature of these things-in-themselves.

Consciousness remains a mystery... . But once again, the irony is that the synthetic a priori is very useful in science. Go figure — 3017amen

Can you break down this analytic, synthetic, a priori, a posteriori concepts for me? You'll be doing me a big favor. These concepts appear to be dependent on, what to me is, more basic ideas viz. noumena and phenomena. I'm probably wrong but I'd like to hear your take on these matters. Thanks.

How can they adhere to the Copernican turn then? — Sentience

The pure empiricists don’t, holding with the assertions that the physical world is primary, as opposed to the rationalists who hold with subjectivity being the primary. The transcendental idealist, on the other hand, recognizes the equality of both, in conjunction with each other.

The pure empiricists don’t — Mww

How can they be completely un-Kantian if they adhere to the analytic/synthetic dichotomy? W.V.Quine has even written the article titled Two Dogmas of Empiricism, one dogma being precisely this adherence. And if this dichotomy were so "traditional", it could not play any serious role in the Copernican turn, which is hardly admissible.

And the scientific method, hence the physicalists, always start from observation, so I agree, synthetic qua contingent propositions cannot be rejected. Actually, I don’t think a priori synthetic propositions are rejected either; it’s just that they are not recognized as such. — Mww

Agreed, they really can't because then no real novel discoveries would take place at all (?). Meaning in principle, you would just speak in terms of tautologies all day long, which would not make sense in an experiential world that we live. (In science, synthetic statements are used because they can be tested.) Otherwise, I suppose it's like speaking in tongues, as it were.

I think of synthetic a priori examples in a couple easier ways:

1. That structure uses math to describe it (and arguably explains its existence-metaphysical).
2. Could that structure be described in mathematical terms(?)
3. Could that galaxy have mathematical properties for its existence(?)
4. He used abstract math to calculate the laws of gravity.

Those are easy examples of a synthesis of a priori concepts in themselves (abstract mathematical knowledge) that don't require experience (using a calculator), along with physical phenomena that requires sensory experience to perceive, apprehend, and advance an understanding of.

I think Kant used the sentence : A straight line between two points is the shortest. as an example in his CPR. An interesting interpretation is that the truths of arithmetic and geometry aren't true in this way, they are true in a "once you realize they are true you realize that they always-already HAD to be true" kind of way.

But back to the metaphysics part. Having an innate (a priori) sense of wonder becomes logically necessary to posit such synthetic judgements, no? Meaning, it seems a priori knowledge has inner necessity and also true universality.

But generally speaking: Synthetic Statements: A synthetic sentence is a sentence, which may or may not be true. It would need non-linguistics, information about the subject the speaker is referring to. Synthetic statements are based on our sensory data and experience.

And so as an aside, I have this so-called sixth-sense (a priori) that 'all events must have a cause' and as a physicist, I'm going to advance that theory through similar a priori mathematical abstracts. And if that little scenario seems cogent, what then even causes one to posit such judgments (about causation in that case) to begin with? I think those are some meaningful synthetic metaphysical questions relative to consciousness. (In other words, why do I care whether all events are causational, and what causes me to wonder about cause?)

And if this dichotomy were so "traditional", it could not play any serious role in the Copernican turn, which is hardly admissible. — Sentience

It is traditional, it doesn’t play a part in the Copernican turn, as you call it, admissibility aside.

The real dichotomy on Kantian metaphysics, is between sensibility and understanding, the former historically the only condition for knowledge, derived from experience alone, the latter forthwith being shown to be just as valid as a knowledge source, but derived from pure thought alone, and actually is the ground for knowledge a posteriori. It’s always been that way, Kant just made the reality of it accessible.
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How can they be completely un-Kantian if they adhere to the analytic/synthetic dichotomy? — Sentience

I never said they were. I said to be un-Kantian is to reject a priori synthetic propositions, the domain of principles and what is derivable from them.

It occurs to me that you may be attempting to understand Kant with some post-modern analytic system. If you can do that, fine. I haven’t seen it yet, but that only means either you haven’t done it, or you have done it and it flew right over my head. Either way....my interest is waning.

No one else tossed in a nickel here, so allow me......for whatever my nickel’s worth:

Kant might not have believed in a thing in itself. — Gregory

It isn’t a question of believing. There are things, our knowledge of those things only extends as far as the representation of them, therefore there very well could be something left over in the thing that isn’t represented. That’s not a fact, it’s merely possible, because otherwise, we are justified in claiming complete knowledge of things, yet time and again we have been shown to be wrong. So either the fault in knowledge is from the system we use to acquire it, or, the thing wasn’t as well known as we thought. If we can prove the apodeictic certainty of our knowledge system, then it remains that the fault lays in the thing itself. Or, the thing as it is in itself.
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If you throw out the noumena all we have is appearance that contradicts itself. — Gregory

Noumena are already great big nothings anyway, so throwing them out isn’t really doing anything.

In Kant, appearance is how physical sensation....the output from sense organs to the cognitive system....is represented in the system. As such, appearance cannot contradict itself because mere appearance isn’t yet anything contradictory. It just is something, the nature of which system has not yet determined. From sensing a tickle, we do not yet know what caused it. Could be a hair, a bug, the wind...whatever.

In Kant, the only part of the system that contradicts itself is understanding, and the part that contradicts the system as a whole, is judgement.

they really can't because then no real novel discoveries would take place at all — 3017amen

That’s the way I see it. Humans have this propensity for “what if...”, for no apparent reason, other than some arbitrary question simply presents itself. At the immediacy of “what if...”, all is a priori. Thereafter of course, pure reason becomes practical.
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it seems a priori knowledge has inner necessity and also true universality. — 3017amen

Agreed; the conditions under which contradiction is impossible. And if contradiction is impossible, that for which necessity and universality are the grounding principles, absolutely must be true, re: the shortest distance between two points is a straight line, all bodies are extended....and a host of others.
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In other words, why do I care whether all events are causational, and what causes me to wonder about cause?) — 3017amen

Ya know.....we as plain folks probably don’t. But reason does, because in order to answer a question with absolute certainty, it must not be met with merely another question. In other words, the answer must be unconditioned, have no contingent predicates. But it’s not the finding of the unconditioned by which we think as humans, it is the search for it by which we think, and when we’re all happy, insofar as this any one question is answered sufficiently, we stop looking for the unconditioned by simply neglecting its relevance.

That’s the way I see it. Humans have this propensity for “what if...”, for no apparent reason, other than some arbitrary question simply presents itself. At the immediacy of “what if...”, all is a priori. Thereafter of course, pure reason becomes practical. — Mww

But reason does, because in order to answer a question with absolute certainty, it must not be met with merely another question — Mww

Mww!

If only Schopenhauer and Kant could have a sit-down! An Existentialist and arguably a Phenomenologist have a summit meeting!

This all reminds me of philosophical Voluntarism. My translation or interpretation of your forgoing quote suggests concepts like stream of consciousness and metaphysical Will.

As an example, if in my stream of consciousness, through no volition of my own, my Will causes me to wonder about causation, and I put those thoughts into judgements and propositions regarding questions (synthetic sentences/synthetic a priori) about how I got here (my existence), what kind of logic is that? In other words, that entire process of thinking or process of thought become what, a phenomenon of sorts(?).

What shall we consider as its purpose, when it confers no Darwinian survival advantages(?). I believe these questions are part of why they are considered or associated with Kant's metaphysics. Why ask why, and how do we ask why. What comprises those means and methods within consciousness...

And that all speaks to things like Kantian innate intuition, the questions about noumena, so on and so forth.

I read the passage cited above by Tim Wood carefully, and the last sentence says it clearly that there is no noumena in the sense of another world we are indirectly interacting with. My understanding is that Kant did believe he has once nursed on his mother's breasts. That is, he believes in the reality of consciousness coming from matter. We get awakened to a priori thoughts by synthetic thoughts (i.e. while nursing). First we have the subconscious, then the world comes to meet us, birthing the conscious ego. A priori is logic, awaken by the senses. It slowly developes into adult logic. To even think of noumena is to posit synthetic a priori, which is barely not in itself a contradictory category for Kant. You simply can't prove anything transcendent from human experience. Whether the world is made of necessary stuff or contingent stuff is a completely different question from what Kant was addressing

I read the passage cited above by Tim Wood carefully, and the last sentence says it clearly that there is no noumena in the sense of another world we are indirectly interacting with. My understanding is that Kant did believe he has once nursed on his mother's breasts. That is, he believes in the reality of consciousness coming from matter. We get awakened to a priori thoughts by synthetic thoughts (i.e. while nursing). First we have the subconscious, then the world comes to meet us, birthing the conscious ego. A priori is logic, awaken by the senses. It slowly developes into adult logic. To even think of noumena is to posit synthetic a priori, which is barely not in itself a contradictory category for Kant. You simply can't prove anything transcendent from human experience. Whether the world is made of necessary stuff or contingent stuff is a completely different question from what Kant was addressing — Gregory

Well, you seem to have a theory. Good luck with that, seriously.

Kant argues that ... We apply metaphysical concepts to the world in order to make experience possible at all. In other words, synthetic a priori metaphysical concepts are the pre-conditions of all experience. Hence, Kant distinguishes between the world as [we] experience it (the world as it is experienced given the application of said concepts) and the world as it is independent of our experience. — philosophy

As Kant well understood, there is personal private experience and then there is public instrumental scientific experience. For science, it can be taken for granted that the whole purpose is to investigate a noumenal world that otherwise is a complete mystery.

The preconditions and mechanics of personal experience are a complex, as a glass seen through darkly. We cannot easily tell whether the world we recreate in our imagination when awake, or dreaming, is even close to overcoming biological and psychological limitations.

In either case, there is no reasonable alternative to some form of independent noumenal world that's out there around us.

In either case, there is no reasonable alternative to some form of independent noumenal world that's out there around us. — magritte

If I understand that correctly (which I may not be), the one problem with that would be causation. If causation didn't exist, then the argument for a non-noumenal realm is stronger. But causation exists, whether it's a unending string of turtles or one super turtle, etc.. Likewise, other reasonable alternatives to noumena could be the concept of other possible worlds (Multiverse) and the world of mathematical abstracts.

How does one have a mathematical experience?

The thing of the thing-in-itself is a real physical object — Mww

Check.

The in-itself of the thing in itself is that which is not represented in us as phenomena, but is that which belongs to the thing as it is in itself without being represented. — Mww

This seems wrong*.

But that which is not so represented, is not thereby noumena. The common misunderstanding of Kantian theoretical conditions is that just because we don’t know the thing as it is in itself, and we do not know conceptions represented as noumena at all, that the thing in itself is noumenal. This is catastrophically false, from a purely transcendental Kantian point of view. There is no reason whatsoever to consider objects the understanding thinks, which are mere conceptions, as being equivalent to that which belongs to an object as it is in itself, the very conceptions of which are unavailable to us. — Mww

Until this I thought I had a handle on the meaning of noumena as that which causes perception, which, being prior to perception, remains inaccessible to perception. For example: over there is something that over here in my perception I call a brick. Over there the ding an sicht selbst, over here the brick. Can you say positively and concretely where and what the noumenon, -a, is/are?

*Thinking along with Kant seems always laborious and labor intensive. In the interests of a direct brevity (to block introduction of thickets of confusion), I am going to suppose that what I find problematic above, at second look you do too. Along the lines of appearing to say the backside of something is qualitatively different from the front side because we can see the front side, which I'm quite sure you did not mean, or mean to imply.