Is 'positivism' just a deficient Kantianism, regardless of Kant's own faults, an inconsistent doctrine that cannot be judged by its own standards? — Sentience
both distinctions are very important for Kant, so one could suspect that they are somehow interconnected. It seems that, after all, the connection is indirect — through the doctrine of synthetic a priori judgments. — Sentience
I had in mind analytic/synthetic distinction on the one hand and between phenomena and noumena on the other.Neither one are that important — Mww
Well, prima facie, the basics seem quite clear — since time, space, and causality are 'subjective' precisely because of grounding on synthetic a priori judgments, the role of the latter in the Copernican turn is decisive. As for the noumenal/phenomenal, it is a more complicated matter, but it is at least clear that this dualism is simply an integral part of the Copernican turn. So, I myself wonder, whether there can be an explanation of how the Copernican turn could be possible without appeal to synthetic a priori truths. The situation is complicated by the fact that the Copernican turn was seen by Kant as a metaphysical enterprise, whereas 'positivists' consider metaphysics 'meaningless'.I’d be interested in an expansion on your line 3 reasoning. — Mww
time, space, and causality are 'subjective' precisely because of grounding on synthetic a priori judgments.......
I think this is backwards. Pure intuitions are subjective, but by being subjective, that is, “...as the formal capacity of the subject's being affected by objects, and thereby of obtaining immediate representation...”, with respect to space and time only (not causality, which belongs to the pure categories of the understanding), synthetic a priori judgements become possible. From “...For there are no other subjective representations from which we can deduce synthetical propositions a priori, as we can from the intuition of space...”, it is clear the subjective representation is always antecedent to any proposition constructed by means of it.
————-
........the role of the latter in the Copernican turn is decisive. — Sentience
As for the noumenal/phenomenal, (...) it is at least clear that this dualism is simply an integral part of the Copernican turn. — Sentience
whether there can be an explanation of how the Copernican turn could be possible without appeal to synthetic a priori truths. — Sentience
'positivists' consider metaphysics 'meaningless'. — Sentience
My question concerns whether Kant is justified in positing the existence of the noumenal world — philosophy
I don't fully understand why noumena are not things-in-themselves and would rather say that noumena are things-in-themselves from the point of view of Kant's implicit assumptions. But my point was not so much about dualism as about the Copernican turn. So let me summarize.But noumena are not things-in-themselves, thus the dualism is destroyed. To say noumena could be things-in-themselves to rationalities other than those using the human representational variety, is an altogether empty assertion, for it would be impossible for us to even understand how such could be the case. — Mww
To the extent that I can discern, there's no reason not to posit noumena. In other words, Kant can't be penalized for his concept of noumena.
That said, there maybe enough justification to apply Occam's razor - the world with both noumena and phenomena would be orders of magnitude greater in complexity than just phenomena without the noumena. — TheMadFool
I don't fully understand why noumena are not things-in-themselves and would rather say that noumena are things-in-themselves from the point of view of Kant's implicit assumptions. — Sentience
Isn't a "singular concise, logical methodology" in question precisely the analytic/synthetic dichotomy in the first place? — Sentience
Before this suggestion can be treated as catastrophically false, the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal must itself be justified. However, we have preliminary seen that it at least cannot be justified by appealing to the analytic/synthetic dichotomy or the Copernican turn since it supposedly constitutes the ground for them. So, please, let us concentrate more on the questions above.This is catastrophically false, from a purely transcendental Kantian point of view. — Mww
Well, prima facie, because the dichotomy in question is perhaps the main logical innovation of Kant that occupies a central place in his argumentation.Before I respond to that, I would ask, how would you think it is so? — Mww
Isn't a "singular concise, logical methodology" in question precisely the analytic/synthetic dichotomy in the first place?
— Sentience
Before I respond to that, I would ask, how would you think it is so? — Mww
Well, prima facie, because the dichotomy in question is perhaps the main logical innovation of Kant that occupies one of the central places in his argumentation. — Sentience
Kant didn’t innovate the analytic/synthetic dichotomy — Mww
it is even not true to assert that Hume is close enough to Kant in this regard. — Sentience
Therefore, those who reject synthetic a priori propositions but adhere to the dichotomy itself are still Kantian enough to create a controversy I have formulated. — Sentience
Those who reject the a priori synthetic domain reject transcendental epistemological philosophy, hence cannot call themselves Kantian enough for anything. — Mww
Do you see there is scant difference between Aristotelian necessity/contingency propositional dualism, and Kantian analytic/synthetic propositional dualism? — Mww
Those who reject the a priori synthetic domain reject transcendental epistemological philosophy, hence cannot call themselves Kantian enough for anything. — Mww
Yes, and you can also, broadly speaking, treat like cases likely and different cases differently. And as such, that is really the one basic premise behind synthetic a priori knowledge. It's different because of its synthesis. In any case, we still cannot determine the true nature of these things-in-themselves.
Consciousness remains a mystery... . But once again, the irony is that the synthetic a priori is very useful in science. Go figure — 3017amen
How can they adhere to the Copernican turn then? — Sentience
The pure empiricists don’t — Mww
And the scientific method, hence the physicalists, always start from observation, so I agree, synthetic qua contingent propositions cannot be rejected. Actually, I don’t think a priori synthetic propositions are rejected either; it’s just that they are not recognized as such. — Mww
And if this dichotomy were so "traditional", it could not play any serious role in the Copernican turn, which is hardly admissible. — Sentience
How can they be completely un-Kantian if they adhere to the analytic/synthetic dichotomy? — Sentience
Kant might not have believed in a thing in itself. — Gregory
If you throw out the noumena all we have is appearance that contradicts itself. — Gregory
they really can't because then no real novel discoveries would take place at all — 3017amen
it seems a priori knowledge has inner necessity and also true universality. — 3017amen
In other words, why do I care whether all events are causational, and what causes me to wonder about cause?) — 3017amen
That’s the way I see it. Humans have this propensity for “what if...”, for no apparent reason, other than some arbitrary question simply presents itself. At the immediacy of “what if...”, all is a priori. Thereafter of course, pure reason becomes practical. — Mww
But reason does, because in order to answer a question with absolute certainty, it must not be met with merely another question — Mww
I read the passage cited above by Tim Wood carefully, and the last sentence says it clearly that there is no noumena in the sense of another world we are indirectly interacting with. My understanding is that Kant did believe he has once nursed on his mother's breasts. That is, he believes in the reality of consciousness coming from matter. We get awakened to a priori thoughts by synthetic thoughts (i.e. while nursing). First we have the subconscious, then the world comes to meet us, birthing the conscious ego. A priori is logic, awaken by the senses. It slowly developes into adult logic. To even think of noumena is to posit synthetic a priori, which is barely not in itself a contradictory category for Kant. You simply can't prove anything transcendent from human experience. Whether the world is made of necessary stuff or contingent stuff is a completely different question from what Kant was addressing — Gregory
Kant argues that ... We apply metaphysical concepts to the world in order to make experience possible at all. In other words, synthetic a priori metaphysical concepts are the pre-conditions of all experience. Hence, Kant distinguishes between the world as [we] experience it (the world as it is experienced given the application of said concepts) and the world as it is independent of our experience. — philosophy
In either case, there is no reasonable alternative to some form of independent noumenal world that's out there around us. — magritte
Check.The thing of the thing-in-itself is a real physical object — Mww
This seems wrong*.The in-itself of the thing in itself is that which is not represented in us as phenomena, but is that which belongs to the thing as it is in itself without being represented. — Mww
Until this I thought I had a handle on the meaning of noumena as that which causes perception, which, being prior to perception, remains inaccessible to perception. For example: over there is something that over here in my perception I call a brick. Over there the ding an sicht selbst, over here the brick. Can you say positively and concretely where and what the noumenon, -a, is/are?But that which is not so represented, is not thereby noumena. The common misunderstanding of Kantian theoretical conditions is that just because we don’t know the thing as it is in itself, and we do not know conceptions represented as noumena at all, that the thing in itself is noumenal. This is catastrophically false, from a purely transcendental Kantian point of view. There is no reason whatsoever to consider objects the understanding thinks, which are mere conceptions, as being equivalent to that which belongs to an object as it is in itself, the very conceptions of which are unavailable to us. — Mww
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.