I often wish you'd provide references to companion literature, — Terrapin Station
Yes, that's a good example, actually. I didn't read through the whole thing yet (obviously given the time between you posting the link and me posting this), but even though I disagree with some of the author's claims to the point I read to, the vast majority of it is intelligible to me. I'm not left wondering what in the world he might be talking about or feeling that it's almost like he's just stringing words together randomly or a la the pomo essay generator.You mean like....? http://www.nbi.dk/natphil/salthe/NatPhil_of_entropy.pdf — apokrisis
Yes, that's a good example, actually. — Terrapin Station
Even in this last post, I just can't make sense of "You are trying to fit things into a view of existence that lacks spatiotemporal scale" — Terrapin Station
The use of psychological terminology here is to risk blurring pansemiosis with panpsychism. So it has to be done carefully. — apokrisis
Yes, or so the argument goes. Not everyone agrees, of course. My understanding is that Ray Brassier, for instance, would consider such a view to be nothing more than a thinly veiled anthropomorphism, and of course many post-Heideggerian phenomenologists would take issue with the notion that reality is exhausted by the conceptual.Yes, the very notion that the world could somehow not be conceptually articulated is, when you look at it closely, utterly unintelligible. — John
What I was trying to get at it is that since the mind-conceived 'mind-independent world' is always, obviously, conceived; then it is always conceptually articulated. We cannot have any idea what it could mean for something to be actual and yet not be in conceptualized form; any such thing would thus be "as nothing". — John
If they're not focusing on people mentally judging the relation, that would require some sort of mapping or comparison mechanism, too. — Terrapin
But more importantly than that, what are they taking to be evidence that "the structure of the world" in general matches "the structure of thought"? — Terrapin
Obviously "the structure of thought" would match "the structure of the world" insofar as we're talking about that part of the world that consists of thought--since they're identical in that case, but re the world outside of thought, what's the evidence or argument for that? — Terrapin
My understanding is that Ray Brassier, for instance, would consider such a view to be nothing more than a thinly veiled anthropomorphism, and of course many post-Heideggerian phenomenologists would take issue with the notion that reality is exhausted by the conceptual. — Aaron R
What I was trying to get at it is that since the mind-conceived 'mind-independent world' is always, obviously, conceived; then it is always conceptually articulated. — John
Of course there is, we must imagine, 'something' independently of human being. — John
If something is conceptualizable, then it is articulated in the same, or an isomorphic, manner as concepts are, i.e. logically. So, it seems that we are committed to thinking there is a logos in nature independently of human being. — John
I don't think that's obvious at all. From a human perspective it can simply be observed/perceived.What I was trying to get at it is that since the mind-conceived 'mind-independent world' is always, obviously, conceived; — John
For example, "the earth revolves around the sun" is true by referring to what is the case, and objective by being true independently of whether anyone says or believes it. — jkop
I don't know what it could mean to say that truth is objective. The idea of truth seems to be the idea of something really being the case; the idea of an objective state of affairs or actuality. So, truth is the idea of the objective, it is of the objective, but is not itself objective, it is of actuality, but is not itself actual. — John
My answer to him was, "John, when people thought the earth was flat, they were wrong. When people thought the earth was spherical, they were wrong. But if you think that thinking the earth is spherical is just as wrong as thinking the earth is flat, then your view is wronger than both of them put together."
Naturally, the theories we now have might be considered wrong in the simplistic sense of my English Lit correspondent, but in a much truer and subtler sense, they need only be considered incomplete.
I do believe there is an objective truth. I don't see how there could not be. — anonymous66
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