https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore-moral/Consider a particular naturalist claim, such as that “x is good” is equivalent to “x is pleasure.” If this claim were true, Moore argued, the judgement “Pleasure is good” would be equivalent to “Pleasure is pleasure,” yet surely someone who asserts the former means to express more than that uninformative tautology. The same argument can be mounted against any other naturalist proposal: even if we have determined that something is what we desire to desire or is more evolved, the question whether it is good remains “open,” in the sense that it is not settled by the meaning of the word “good.”
It seems that Moore might say that a moral statement can be both true and an expression of what one thinks we ought do.
Contrast that with those who might consider moral statements only to express a preference - that is, what one ought do. — Banno
It seems that Moore might say that a moral statement can be both true and an expression of what one thinks we ought do. — Banno
Contrast that with those who might consider moral statements only to express a preference - that is, what one ought do. — Banno
it's both. — frank
"...is good" is simple and unanalysable, according to Moore. — Banno
If goodness is subjective, then you can be right and I can be right, even if our views contradict one another.
Hence a subjectivist cannot claim their moral view is true. — Banno
...the content of moral propositions between parties — Wallows
The expression, assuming sincerity in speech, reflects one's moral belief. — creativesoul
If goodness is subjective, then you can be right and I can be right, even if our views contradict one another.
Hence a subjectivist cannot claim their moral view is true. — Banno
"There ought be a rose garden" is true if one promised to plant a rose garden. — creativesoul
They can claim that their moral view is subjectively true. True for them and anyone who agrees with their position (whatever that may be). Seems like subjectivism taken to the extreme must privilege the right to be different. — emancipate
Following the line of reason Wallows begat, instead of looking at moral actions as deducible from a set of universal tenets, we could look at it as an endeavor to negotiate and compromise through the conflict that naturally emerges from those varied and sometimes conflicting premises.
If we can agree on premises as interacting-individuals, or interacting-groups, then we can at least ensure the validity of or moral acts. Where we disagree or run into conflict, we're left to compromise (or not) in whatever way we think best serves our goals. In these cases, moral arguments tend to take an inductive form where they're strong or weak depending on how well they appeal to existing values.
Rather than wonder what kind of metaphysical setup might give rise to objectively true moral propositions, I prefer to stop the buck and just accept the values that we do have. If we assume morality ought to serve human values, we can still derive appropriate actions even in the face of conflict/variation, it's just a whole lot messier (i.e: probabilistic). — VagabondSpectre
creativesoul wallows towards "One ought keep one's promises". — Banno
Can you elaborate on this notion of promises as moral fact? In itself, a promise is communication about my intent. How does it turn into a sort of fact? — Echarmion
On my view, facts are 'states' of affairs, events, what has happened and/or is happening, the case at hand, the world, etc.
Making a promise is the moral fact of the matter. — creativesoul
The expression, assuming sincerity in speech, reflects one's moral belief.
— creativesoul
Shouldn't it also reflect the truth? Else, why bother? — Banno
But only the promise is part of the state of affairs. — Echarmion
The promise is what makes it a moral state of affairs. — creativesoul
The issue is that moral judgements are about what should be done. They're not speculative and individual like the question what a person would do, given a set of circumstances. A partial truth cannot support an general statement, so how can the subjectivist make any moral statements? — Echarmion
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