By your standard it's what's right in what sense?

If you're just saying that it's what you prefer, then why should I do what you prefer? — Terrapin Station

In the moral sense, if we're talking about morality. And simply because it's what I judge you should do. Of course, you might judge it differently, but I'm not going by your judgement, am I? That wouldn't make any sense.

In the moral sense, if we're talking about morality — S

First, we were talking about word usage. But we could talk about morality instead. The moral sense of "it's right" is that it's how you feel about interpersonal behavior, the behavior that you'd prefer.

Moral shoulds (rather than, say, conditional shoulds--conditional shoulds being that "if S wants y, S should do x, because that will give S y") are just a way of saying that you'd prefer if everyone behaved how you prefer . . . which of course makes sense, given what preferences are. There's nothing more to moral "shoulds" than that.

First, we were talking about word usage. — Terrapin Station

That's okay, the reasoning I used there is basically the same in either context.

The moral sense of "it's right" is that it's how you feel about interpersonal behavior, the behavior that you'd prefer.

Moral shoulds (rather than, say, conditional shoulds--conditional shoulds being that "if S wants y, S should do x, because that will give S y") are just a way of saying that you'd prefer if everyone behaved how you prefer . . . which of course makes sense, given what preferences are. There's nothing more to moral "shoulds" than that. — Terrapin Station

I don't think it has to be everyone. I'm not a moral universalist. But otherwise, sure. I don't really disagree on the preference thing. I just call it moral judgement, which is based on moral feelings. But we seem to be pretty much talking about the same thing here. Calling them "preferences" invites those stupid comparisons to ice cream and the like. At least combine it with "moral" each time, so you get the term "moral preferences".

Hi.
I have a paragraph about Moore. I have trouble understanding it. I think it is wrong and in conflict with Moore's opinion. Please correct me if I'm wrong. And I'm not good at english.
Here is the paragraph:

Actually, the term “naturalistic fallacy” originates with British philosopher G. E. Moore in his 1903 book Principia Ethica. His point that qualities associated with goodness are themselves good was a bit narrower
than Hume’s. In other words, if good things tend to be visually attractive, then visual attractiveness must also be good. (This is not strictly true, as attractiveness may be incidental to moral goodness.)