Well it is in layman's terms, not typically in philosophical circles though, I would venture to guess... — creativesoul

The only way you'd guess that is by not being very familiar with academic philosophy. "Ethics" is conventionally the name used for the field of philosophy. What do we study in that field? Everything that anyone calls "ethics" or "morals/morality/moral philosophy."

So you believe that concepts somehow exist prior to people constructing them?

What's interesting here, at least for me, is not the exegesis so much as the notion of someone who has no interest in right and wrong. What might that look like? — Banno

I sort of wonder at the thought of someone who has no interest in right and wrong. To put it bluntly anyone who has an articulated opinion such that they are beyond good and evil or that they are nihilists sort of betrays in that act that they are more interested in right and wrong than most people are.

So I wonder if you mean someone who has reflected upon these issues and come to such a conclusion, or if you mean a sort of person who simply is the ubermensch?

One interesting thought Nietzsche put forward in criticizing himself, -- which he often does -- was that Jesus was such a man because he broke the tablet of values before him and reforged the image of goodness for everyone.

If you can't know the difference between good food and bad food, it's hard to see that you know what food is at all. Plato covered this one better than Moore, I think. Knowing and judging good, or not, are inseparable. Taking all terms as categorial (if not categorical) leads us into needless confusion. You don't need to classify a thing to know what it is, and if it's a good one. Logic separates knowledge of terms from what can be inferred from them. It's a kind of madness, that.

I don't think Nietzsche accepted the validity of systems; where systems are understood to be universal, overarching. It doesn't follow from that that his thinking was not systematic. — Janus


Yep.

We will disagree on rules, since private rules are not rules or not private. That's another discussion.

What's interesting here, at least for me, is not the exegesis so much as the notion of someone who has no interest in right and wrong. What might that look like? — Banno

Firstly, I don't see why an individual could not have a private set of rules that governs their moral behavior. Although of course there are common rules governing moral behavior many people who think for themselves probably have their own unique sets of such rules. There is no need for, or perhaps any possibility of, any of the rules that make up such individually unique sets of rules to be absolutely original, either. Is that just the point you wanted to make?

Secondly, I don't think Nietzsche can rightly be characterized as someone who had no interest in right and wrong: he could be said to have no interest in general rules of right and wrong, though, that would fit I think.

the arguments against a private language are a specific form of a more general argument against private rules. A rule that was unstated, internal, not shared, could not be a rule because there could be no criteria for checking that it had been followed. Discussions of the private language argument tend to people talking past each other, so let's not follow that path here. Rather I will allow that someone might set up a rule for themselves, and say write it in their diary in a shared language so that it might be checked, were they inline to show it.

I don't think Nietzsche can rightly be characterized as someone who had no interest in right and wrong: he could be said to have no interest in general rules of right and wrong, though, that would fit I think. — Janus

On the face of it, I don't see that anything but a general rule could be properly called a rule. The general form of a rule is perhaps a conditional: If X do Y; and the "if X" bit is general.

Further, if what is proposed is to be a moral rule, it perhaps has an additional clause such that anyone who finds themselves in situation X ought do Y.

Hence I think there is good reason to take Nietzsche as doing ethics, but not playing the game of morality.

note that I'm adopting the usual terminology such that ethics is the study of what we ought do, while morality is a set of rules about what we ought do.

Here's the disagreement. What Bob values is just what Bob values. You haven't shown that this is evidence of a value independent of what it is behind the human valuing, namely preference and feeling. Bob probably gets enjoyment out of his life and is not suicidal. Otherwise, he might well choose the poison. — S

So an empirical model (in my view) should not only be predictive, but also explanatory. If Bob drinks the water then, on the model's premise that life and well-being are valuable for human beings, there is nothing that needs explaining. Whereas if Bob drinks the poison, then that does need an explanation. Perhaps Bob drank the poison simply because Bob wanted to drink the poison. But that's an a priori answer one could give for any behavior that someone exhibits, however strange, and so doesn't really give us any insight into what is going on.

Whereas the above model demands a deeper (causal) explanation that is consistent with its assumptions. For example, did Bob misread the labels, or did he have a mental illness, or an incurable disease that caused him great suffering? If a satisfactory explanation can be discovered, then we have potentially learned something new (about the accidental conditions that change its predictions) and the model has been useful. If no satisfactory explanation can be found, then we have a puzzle. Perhaps we just haven't figured out the explanation yet, or perhaps there is a problem with the model. If so, is there a better model?

If you point to behaviour, and to acts, like, say, kicking a puppy, then that's all you're pointing to: behaviour, actions, a puppy, a person. Where's the morality to be found there, independently, as though it has a place in nature? — S

Yes, I'm pointing to human actions. If Joe murders Bill then Joe's action is wrong. That's a perfectly ordinary example using a moral predicate.

What makes a specific action moral (or not) is a function of what is universally valuable for human beings (namely, life and well-being).

To make a parallel with your paragraph above, suppose Alice claims that it is raining outside. If you point to behaviour, and to acts, like, say, claiming it is raining, then that's all you're pointing to: behaviour, speech acts, rain. Where's the truth to be found there, independently, as though it has a place in nature?

Yet we do say that Alice's claim is true (or not) independent of her preferences or opinions on the matter.

Why couldn't it be that you're predicting what his preferences will probably be, based on knowledge of most persons' preferences? — Terrapin Station

If one simply prefers whatever one does, then the model will predict preferences as well. But the purpose of that model is to predict (and explain) behavior.

An approach that might work is looking at capabilities. Martha Nausbaum. Usable stuff. — Banno

I notice that she incorporates Aristotle and eudaimonism in her work. So it seems we are in the same ball park.

Yeah, the counterfeiter made the Kantian “better calculation”, and if never found out, there is reason to suspect he was quite thoroughly pleased with himself, and only immoral upon reflection by another. — Mww

And similarly for a runner who cheats to win a race.

What I'm getting at here is that contrary to the counterfeiter's self-serving calculation, a moral calculation factors in the life and well-being of all relevant agents. The counterfeiter could have done that, but chose to reject it. For everyday purposes, most of us can correctly figure out what actions are moral most of the time. For Aristotle, moral action becomes habitual through practicing virtue.

And one might change one's feelings and then change one's judgements and the rules that proceed from them, and that might from the outside appear as an inconsistency, whereas it is actually a matter of remaining consistent with one's moral feeling. It would be like changing one's aesthetic tastes. The key to understanding Nietzsche is that for him everything is a matter of aesthetics. — Janus

The problem as I see it is that it is easy for people to be self-serving about what they feel. If Joe feels that he must kill Bill then, as far as Nietzsche is concerned, he should go for it, rules be damned. Aesthetics would seem to replace morality (and reason).

On the face of it, I don't see that anything but a general rule could be properly called a rule. The general form of a rule is perhaps a conditional: If X do Y; and the "if X" bit is general.

Further, if what is proposed is to be a moral rule, it perhaps has an additional clause such that anyone who finds themselves in situation X ought do Y. — Banno

I can't see why someone could not have a moral rule for themselves that takes the general form of 'if X do Y'. I mean it would more accurately be expressed as 'If x then I do Y'.

So, I can't see why that could not be proposed as a rule that applies only to myself, and it could, but need not, have the additional clause you are suggesting. If it did have that additional clause then it would be intended as a general rule, but not otherwise.

The problem as I see it is that it is easy for people to be self-serving about what they feel. If Joe feels that he must kill Bill then, as far as Nietzsche is concerned, he should go for it, rules be damned. Aesthetics would seem to replace morality (and reason). — Andrew M

I think Nietzsche would say that Joe should have a very good reason to kill Bill, and not act compulsively as a slave to passion, because such a disposition is not beautiful; it lacks aesthetic quality. Have you actually read much Nietzsche?

I think Nietzsche would say that Joe should have a very good reason to kill Bill, and not act compulsively as a slave to passion, because such a disposition is not beautiful; it lacks aesthetic quality. Have you actually read much Nietzsche? — Janus

Not for a long time, but I'm happy to be convinced to take another look.

Do you think the crime of the century (a robbery, say) would count as having aesthetic quality? Well thought out and perfectly executed.

What I'm trying to understand is whether Nietzsche ends up endorsing a defensible morality or whether his aesthetics take him some place else.

I don't think Nietzsche can be read as endorsing any general set of moral rules. He certainly does have an aesthetic notion of something like "greatness of spirit" so I think that he would assess any act that he understood to be lacking greatness of spirit as being morally bankrupt; perhaps he might see it as a petty act driven instead by ressentiment, jealousy or envy, for example.

I think Nietzsche is definitely concerned with ethics, with how to live, and his general answer would be something like: 'live a rich, beautiful and noble life'. He perhaps would have admired a "great" robbery.

OK, thanks!

:smile:

As an aside: I think Hegel also rejects the notion of "moral rules". I seem to recall reading a passage in one of his works to the effect that where there are rules, there is no morality; the idea being that morality depends on conscience and conscience in turn depends on moral intuition.

Of course Hegel's reasoning is very different to Nietzsche's, since the former was no supporter of individualist thinking. Hegel assumes that a properly rational subject will be motivated by moral intuition and conscience; and perhaps there are affinities here with Aristotle's "phronesis" or practical wisdom. I think this idea of practical wisdom can also be tied in with Heidegger's notion of "authenticity", and the general existentialist idea of owning one's personal responsibility.

So there is no morality beyond conceived morality? — Janus

Rather, our conventional notions/conceptions of morality are constructs of language. All conceptions of morality involve in some way or other what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. I would argue that we already have some crude sense of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour prior to language acquisition.

So you believe that concepts somehow exist prior to people constructing them? — Terrapin Station

No. All concepts are language constructs. I hold that not everything conceived of is. Some concepts have referents that exist in their entirety prior to our naming and describing them. Morality is one such thing. Truth(as correspondence) another. Meaning yet another. Thought/belief as well.

To put it bluntly anyone who has an articulated opinion such that they are beyond good and evil or that they are nihilists sort of betrays in that act that they are more interested in right and wrong than most people are. — Moliere

Like a performative contradiction, yeah?

The Great Moustache was most certainly more obsessed with the God of Abraham than many believers.

So it seems we are in the same ball park. — Andrew M

Nuh. I'm on the cricket pitch. :razz:

I would argue that we already have some crude sense of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour prior to language acquisition. — creativesoul

Fundamentally just a moral feeling then, upon which explicit moral injunctions are based and elaborated?

I'm more comfortable not calling it a "moral" feeling. More like rudimentary thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. These would include 'feelings', simple emotions. 'Feelings' are necessary but insufficient for thought/belief, moral thought/belief notwithstanding.

Moral injunctions seem a bit too complex for a pre-linguistic human. Although, I am attempting to provide a basis from which such complexities 'grow'...

The way I see it a moral feeling at simplest would just be an un-selfconscious disposition to behave towards others in ways motivated by empathy or compassion

Nothing there that I would balk at... I just avoid the 'feeling' talk. I think it is no where near as nuanced as it need be. But yeah, I agree that compassion/empathy matters.

I don't know why you would want to avoid talk about feeling. Compassion and empathy are fundamentally feelings no matter how conceptually elaborated they might be.

I don't know why you would want to avoid talk about feeling. Compassion and empathy are fundamentally feelings no matter how conceptually elaborated they might be. — Janus

I agree that without emotion there is neither compassion nor empathy. Emotion is necessary but insufficient for both. It takes thought/belief about another's situation/circumstance... understanding unspoken cues(facial expressions like wincing in pain, etc). Thought/belief like that includes emotion, as does thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

Most talk about 'feelings' I find very unhelpful.

If one simply prefers whatever one does, then the model will predict preferences as well. But the purpose of that model is to predict (and explain) behavior. — Andrew M

Say wha?

In other words, the reason he picks one over the other is because of his preferences. You don't have to personally query his preferences to make a prediction about which he'll choose with a great chance of success, because that's such a common preference. But that doesn't imply that it's not about a preference he has.

We don't agree re concepts being language constructs, but what I'm interested in is what you're taking to be evidence of morality existing outside of/prior to the concept of it.

I'm more comfortable not calling it a "moral" feeling. More like rudimentary thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. — creativesoul

That's simply terminological whims. The different terms aren't picking out different phenomena. They're simply different terms.

on the model's premise that life and well-being are valuable for human beings, there is nothing that needs explaining. — Andrew M

Unless we want to know what we're referring to ontologically re something being valuable. That is, we want to know what's going on ontologically to make that the case if it is.

You can proceed where you don't care about it so you're just not going to bother figuring out what's going on ontologically there, but we can be interested in it. That's what I've been focusing on.

We don't agree re concepts being language constructs, but what I'm interested in is what you're taking to be evidence of morality existing outside of/prior to the concept of it. — Terrapin Station

Observing that pre-linguistic humans find certain behaviours unacceptable.

I'm more comfortable not calling it a "moral" feeling. More like rudimentary thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.
— creativesoul

That's simply terminological whims. The different terms aren't picking out different phenomena. They're simply different terms. — Terrapin Station

No. You're mistaken. If the terms picked out the same things, I wouldn't have an issue. They don't, so I do.