If something is TRANSCENDENTAL to human consciousness (e.g., Euclidian space, time, and the categories), then does this mean that what is EMPIRICAL to human consciousness (e.g., matter and energy) must be TRANSCENDENT to human consciousness? — charles ferraro
My question, then, is whether, or not, matter and energy exhibit any necessary and strictly universal (a priori) properties or characteristics. Are matter and energy objects of HUMAN perception? Or, do they fall outside of HUMAN perception? Are they transcendent? — charles ferraro
You state that "matter and energy are phenomena, so they are empirical and not transcendent". OK, I agree with you. But, what, then, are the necessary and strictly universal (transcendental) characteristics matter and energy must exhibit which make it possible for them to become perceptual phenomena; i.e., objects of human perception, in the first place? As I understand Kant, In order to be an object of human intuition or perception, said object, not matter and energy, must exhibit spatio-temporal characteristics. — charles ferraro
If something is TRANSCENDENTAL to human consciousness (e.g., Euclidian space, time, and the categories), then does this mean that what is EMPIRICAL to human consciousness (e.g., matter and energy) must be TRANSCENDENT to human consciousness? — charles ferraro
??Transcendent means an entity which lacks the necessary and strictly universal (a priori) properties or characteristics (Euclidian space and time) which would make it an object of HUMAN perception. — charles ferraro
OK. But, again, what am I misunderstanding when I ask whether, or not, the human mind imposes Euclidean space and time on matter and energy? — charles ferraro
Furthermore, even if it is granted that the human mind imposes Euclidian space and time on matter and energy, would this be all that is required to explain the production of the empirical, phenomenal objects that we actually perceive about us and interact with every day? — charles ferraro
Arthur Schopenhauer did not think so and he explained what he considered to be missing from Kant's epistemology in his critique of it. — charles ferraro
You say: "Matter and energy are what you get after the mind imposed time and space." And I would ask: ON WHAT??? — charles ferraro
I do not agree with this statement at all. If anything, Kant claims that PERCEPTUAL OBJECTS are what you get, not matter and energy, when the forms of intuition are applied to raw sense data, or, as he refers to it, to the manifold of sensation. — charles ferraro
Matter and energy can only be experienced and studied in an a posteriori way and in accordance with the principles of non-Euclidean geometry. — charles ferraro
Matter and energy are empirical, but not perceptual, objects because, as Einstein showed and as physical experiments verified, they do not conform to the principles of Euclidean geometry or to the Newtonian notions of absolute space and time. In fact, from the frame of reference of quantum physics, matter and energy even seem to defy certain principles of logic. — charles ferraro
Locke considered matter to be a "something, I know not what."
Berkeley considered matter to be synonymous with "Nothing," and — charles ferraro
Hume claimed that experimental observations can be conducted without any assumption of the existence of material objects. — charles ferraro
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