I agree, but I understand the Kantian distinction as saying exactly that; the only thing that can be known (said) about noumena is that you cannot know (say) anything about them. They are even "them" only insofar as they logically correspond to phenomena. — Janus

I get the similarities between what early Wittgenstein was doing with his Tractatus and what Kant was doing with his Critique. Both are about limits. The limits of language, the limits of reason. The book I have on Wittgenstein's Tractatus makes comparisons.

What you call "noumena", I call nonsense.

What you call "noumena", I call nonsense. — S

Yes, and it is literally non-sense, 'phenomena' pertains to what is of the senses, and 'noumena' pertains to what is not.

Noumena can never relate to any empirical relation, and noumena can be talked about. — Mww

Noumena can never have anything to do with meaning, for meaning always has its object. — Mww

If noumena can be talked about then they must have something to do with meaning. Did you mean to say instead that they cannot be talked about?

I would say that the idea of noumena, the idea of things which cannot be known or talked about, can be talked about. But if there is an idea of something which cannot be known or talked about then that something cannot be known or talked about, which is strictly in accordance with the very idea itself.

I tell ya what Sapientia... If you'd like to, I'd love to...

There has yet to have been a formal debate on this forum. I think that our discussion has shown several conflicts between our respective views regarding linguistic meaning. Let's have a debate. You can call all your friends if you'd like to help you. You'll need it if this thread is any indication...

Does meaning transcend language use?

That would be the debate topic. You could argue in the affirmative, and I in the negative. We could set the parameters up after the agreement is made. Or if you'd like a different topic question... just say so. I'm down...

Whaddaya say? Ready to show everyone how clever you are?

:wink:

There are some natural occurring instances of the pattern. The mathematical Fibonacci series are intentionally produced. — Janus

Is the naturally occurring pattern a different pattern from the intentionally produced pattern then?

I tell ya what Sapientia. — creativesoul

Oh shit, deadnamed :scream:

Naturally occurring patterns will usually be visual, whereas mathematical series are conceptual. Does that mean they are different? A part of a Fibonnacci series could be represented like this:

I I II III IIIII IIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

or this:

IIIII IIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

are those two patterns the same?

What about these?:

OOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO

OIOIOIO OIOIOIO OIOIOIOIOIOIOI
OIOIOIOIOIOIOIOIOIOIO

No physically instantiated pattern can represent the whole series, or even any more than the tiniest part of it. So, although both natural and man-made patterns may instantiate the intentionally conceptualized series, the series as mathematically expressed is not a visual pattern, but a pattern that consists merely in a recurring specific operation of addition.

If noumena can be talked about then they must have something to do with meaning. — Janus

If viewed as you said, a logical correspondence to phenomena, and as I said, an intelligible extant, then there is no meaning associated with them.

It is apparent you may already be familiar with the interpretation that noumena serve the same purpose as schemata, wherein the conflict with impossibility of objective validity is reconciled. I personally don’t buy it, but I ain’t nobody, so........

But yes, the idea of noumena is subject to critical examination, in which case it is the idea with its object, and not noumenon.

What about codes? Where do they fit? I mean, crystals form patterns, but the pattern doesn't have any consequences. Whereas DNA encodes biological information, which determines the form of organisms i.e. it's morphological. It conveys something. In that respect, DNA is something like a language (hence, biosemiosis.) But nothing like that occurs outside the biological or mental domain, does it?

in respect of 'noumenal':

The Greek word νοούμενoν nooúmenon is the neuter middle-passive present participle of νοεῖν noeîn "to think, to mean", which in turn originates from the word νοῦς noûs, an Attic contracted form of νόος nóos[a] "perception, understanding, mind."[3][4] A rough equivalent in English would be "something that is thought", or "the object of an act of thought".

...The Oxford Companion to Philosophy writes "Platonic Ideas and Forms are noumenon, and phenomena are things displaying themselves to the senses. [...] that noumena and the noumenal are objects of higher knowledge, truths, and values is Plato's principal legacy to philosophy."

...In Kant's account, when one employs a concept to describe or categorize noumena (the objects of inquiry, investigation or analysis of the workings of the world), one is employing a way of describing or categorizing phenomena (the observable manifestations of those objects of inquiry, investigation or analysis). Kant posited methods by which the understanding makes sense of, and thus intuits, phenomena: the concepts of the transcendental aesthetic, as well as of the transcendental analytic, logic and deduction.[8][9][10] Taken together, Kant's "categories of understanding" are the principles of the human mind which necessarily are brought to bear in attempting to understand (that is, to understand, or attempt to understand, "things in themselves"). In each case the word "transcendental" refers to the process that the human mind must exercise to understand or grasp the form of, and order among, phenomena. Kant asserts that to "transcend" a direct observation or experience is to use reason and classifications to strive to correlate with the phenomena that are observed. Humans can make sense out of phenomena in these various ways, but in doing so don't know the "things-in-themselves", the actual objects and dynamics of the natural world in their noumenal dimension - this being the negative correlate to phenomena, and that which escapes the limits of human understanding. — Wikipedia

So, 'the noumenal' is not merely an illusion, but closer to being 'an ideal object' that is known in the same way that numerical propositions are known, i.e. by being grasped directly by the intellect. Whereas knowledge of phenomena is knowledge of 'what appears'. Kant's interpretation actually picks up on some aspects of the 'matter-form' dualism that was characteristic of the preceding philosophical tradition.

If we cannot say what the meaning might be, it is the same as saying there isn’t one. — Mww

I don't agree with this. Forgetting about noumena now (so as not to muddy the waters unnecessarily) if you found an ancient manuscript with what appeared to be a completely unfamiliar script, you could not say what its meaning is, or even whether it will be actually possible to decipher it.

Moreover, however unlikely it might be, it's possible it could simply be intentionally produced undecipherable marks that are designed to mimic script, but have no actual meaning beyond that. More likely, though, is that it would be intentionally produced meaningful script. So, that's what should be said about it: it is likely that it is meaningful, even though we cannot say, and may never be able to say, what the meaning is.

So saying that we cannot say what meaning is there, is certainly not the same as saying there is no meaning there.

Moreover, however unlikely it might be, it's possible it could simply be intentionally produced undecipherable marks that are designed to mimic script, but have no meaning. More likely, though, is that it would be intentionally produced meaningful script. So, that's what should be said about it: it is likely that it is meaningful, even though we cannot say, and may never be able to say, what the meaning is. — Janus

Certainly, we can say - with great likelihood - that the ancient text was meaningful to the language users. Upon what ground do you conclude that it remains meaningful after the language users perish?

That is precisely what's at stake... yes?

it's possible it could simply be intentionally produced undecipherable marks that are designed to mimic script, but have no meaning — Janus

@S

This may have already been mentioned, but what about unintentionally produced marks that seem to have meaning but don't. Borges' library of Babel, or a million monkeys.The likelihood of these things happening doesn't matter so much as the fact that they're possible in principle.

So wild sci-fi scenario - for some reason a civilization sends out some spaceship with a computer on it - as a kind of voyager golden disc thing. It's basically a giant word processor and printer. It crashes on a planet with some monkey-type species who mess around with it, eventually, against all odds, producing a totally novel short story in english. Not only does it have plot and characters - it has voice.

Let's say such marks don't have meaning. Still, whoever finds them, should they be a english speaker, is going to meaningfully interpret them. They'll be moved by the story. Does that mean these marks didn't have meaning until they were given meaning by the person who read them - and so, because of that, retain meaning forever after?

Or are they meaningful as soon as they're produced, even though unintentional?

It's a far-fetched scenario, granted, but still.

@Baden Curious what your take is as well.

I edited that line out to prevent the uproar sure to follow. It was put there with respect to noumena, with which I will hold in its original assertorial configuration.

That being said, and empirically speaking, that which is assumed to contain possible meaning, must still meet the criteria of possible decryption and possible understanding. Failing either of those, the actual meaning remains no more than assumption, and becomes factually irrelevant. There is nothing given from these failings that even suggests a congruent rationality imbued the assumed meaning in the first place.

From a practical point of view, I got no Interest in a meaning I can’t understand.

Does that mean they didn't have meaning until they were given meaning by the person who read them - and so, because of that, retain meaning forever after? — csalisbury

The logical possibility of some kind of 'million monkey's' scenario, however unlikely, or even physically impossible such a thing might be, presents an interesting question.

If something like that actually happened, then I would call it a mis-attribution of meaning. The meaningfulness of nature itself as the intentional 'book of God' may or may not be such a mis-attribution of meaning.

I'd say that whatever meaning might be mis-attributed by interpreters to such a phenomenon, the phenomenon would not retain meaning ever after, merely on account of mis-attribution; because it would not be meaning inherent in the phenomenon itself.

From a practical point of view, I got no Interest in a meaning I can’t understand. — Mww

Yes, but the existence of your interest or ability to decipher meaning says nothing about the existence of meaning itself; it only speaks to your interest or ability to decipher meaning which may or may not exist.

I'd say that whatever meaning might be mis-attributed by interpreters to such a phenomenon, the phenomenon would not retain meaning ever after, merely on account of mis-attribution; because it would not be meaning inherent in the phenomenon itself. — Janus

But what is the 'phenomenon' here? Say someone reads the meaningless text, is moved by it, and so transcribes it, creating an identical text. Then they're killed by the monkeys, dropping the text near the original. Someone else finds both. There's no way to tell which is which - they're phenomenologically identical

On the fact that it might be possible to decipher its meaning. If there were no meaning their to be deciphered then, of course, it would be meaningless. I don't know why I am even bothering to repeat what I have already stated many times.

It's an interesting thought experiment. I don't believe such a thing could actually happen, but if it did, for sure we would not be able to tell the difference. But I still maintain that if something is not intentionally produced then it is not intentionally meaningful. It could be accidentally meaningful, I guess; I think that's a valid distinction. I mean, that is exactly the distinction that pertains to the possibility of meaning in nature itself; intentionally meaningful if created as such, and accidentally meaningful if not.

Yeah, I totally agree that such a thing almost certainly would never happen. But I think it's enough to drive a wedge, and hopefully draw something out?

so, intentional vs accidental meaning - Is the hallmark of an artifact that has intentional meaning that its creator intended that object to bear the meaning they've endowed it with, in order to convey it to others?

But I think it's enough to drive a wedge, and hopefully draw something out? — csalisbury

Yes, well it drew out the distinction between intentional and accidental meaning, I guess.

so, intentional vs accidental meaning - Is the hallmark of an artifact that has intentional meaning that its creator intended that object to bear the meaning they've endowed it with, in order to convey it to others? — csalisbury

That raises another interesting question! I think the script on which any work is written is already imbued with meaning. In the 'million monkeys' scenario, the monkeys are already, by virtue of typing letters, making intentionally (on account of the intentionality embodied within the typewriter) meaningful marks.

Those letters become more (accidentally) meaningful if they form meaningful words. More meaningful again if phrases are accidentally created, and still more meaningful if there are whole sentences.

If an entire coherent text with no non-words or nonsense phrases and sentences at all were accidentally created then that would be the limit case. So, in the 'monkey' case it is only the letters that have intentional (not by the monkeys but by the creator(s) of the typewriter) meaning.

On the fact that it might be possible to decipher its meaning. — Janus

Logical possibilities are not facts.

If there were no meaning their to be deciphered then, of course, it would be meaningless. — Janus

This is precisely what's at issue. How do you determine whether or not a text has meaning? What standard do you use as a means for comparison/contrast when considering all the different candidates?

It is a fact that it might be, at some time if not now, possible to decipher its meaning. It is also a fact that it might not ever be possible. There is also a fact of the matter as to whether the text was created to be meaningful. If it was then there is a meaning there that is, in principle, decipherable, even if it is in practice not presently possible to do so.

This is precisely what's at issue. How do you determine whether or not a text has meaning? — creativesoul

No, it's not what is at issue at all. Whether or not a text has meaning is not dependent on whether we can determine that it does. This is exactly the same kind of thing as to say that whether or not the universe was created by God or spontaneously arose or never had a beginning at all is not governed by whether we can determine which alternative is true.

Editing...

Logical possibilities are not facts.

What is it that it might not be? — creativesoul

It might or might not be possible to decipher the text in the future even if it is impossible now.

Logical possibilities are not facts. — creativesoul

You are either confusing yourself, or deliberately attempting to confuse me, by conflating the idea that it is a fact that certain things are possible, and others are not possible, with the idea that possibilities are not facts.

I haven’t read through much of this thread, but isn’t the question whether a mind is needed to give the text meaning? Is that the point of this thread?

This is precisely what's at issue. How do you determine whether or not a text has meaning?
— creativesoul

No, it's not what is at issue at all. Whether or not a text has meaning is not dependent on whether we can determine that it does. — Janus

You're right. That's not what is at issue at all. The fact that you do not have a clear cut criterion for what all meaning consists of is at issue.

Sorry, couple pages behind but need clarification:

If it's impossible to understand the meaning, because e.g. nothing that speaks any language exists, how are words in a dictionary different from random scratches in a rock, or the pattern of waves on the ocean? — Echarmion

For any language to work at all, we need to be able to mirror other humans to some extend. — Echarmion

But that intentionality is only visible to an intelligence with something akin to human "rationality". Without an intelligence, the patterns would still be there, but patterns are literally everywhere. — Echarmion

Echarmion, I did not mean to pick you exclusively, but you said it most concisely. Based on the above, here is a hypothetical that I would like to know what your side thinks (if this point has already been made, sorry - I try to read carefully):

All human go extinct very suddenly. Our written word survives everywhere. Libraries are full of books, some may last thousands of years. To further help the case, computers can digitally preserve information for eons, someone will just have to provide electricity and turn them on (yes there will be limits and difficulties). Beyond that, many words are literally carved in stone or other methods that would result in long-term preservation.

So, for your beliefs none of those texts have any meaning once humans (or a language capable being) disappear...right?

What if 1000 years later aliens arrive or a new species evolves (gonna need more than 1000 years) with language capabilities and somehow finds a largely preserved database of human information. Like humans re-discovered the meaning of cuneiform or Egyptian hieroglyphs, these new beings could rediscover the meaning of our texts...right?

Please list all aspects of this hypothetical that are wrong because it creates a bit of a problem for your side: So that dictionary (or whatever surviving texts) had meaning when humans were alive, then had no meaning for a long time, then suddenly had meaning again when the next "language capable" being shows up?

How are you interpreting the definition of meaning? google says meaning is (had to combine with definition for "mean" because google uses "meant" in definition of "meaning"): intending to convey, indicate, or refer to (a particular thing or notion); signify.

Where does your side's, "relative to an observer" come from? Don't get me wrong, obviously without an observer there is no one to understand the meaning. But so what? Totally separate point. Maybe someone will come along...right? And when that new person arrives, they do not invent the meaning...right? So it already existed...or not?

It might or might not be possible to decipher the text in the future even if it is impossible now. — Janus

Set it out.

What all would have to also be the case in order for us to decipher the meaning of an ancient text?