However, in any scenario where there are no meaning makers at all left and no potential, even in theory, for decipherability, the connection is short-circuited, and I don't think it then makes sense to identify meaning (or non-meaning). So, the most sensible way of talking about this from my point of view is to admit meaning does not have to be in the here and now (it's not tied to some active brain state etc) but there must be potentializability for it to make sense to talk about it being instantiated in any given text. — Baden

Okay, you get a gold star too. Although if you close this discussion I'm taking it back. I don't quite agree, but I like it, and it's a lot better than what some others have come out with.

I don't see a need for your terminology of theory and potentiality. My solution seems simpler, and makes use of logic. If the following conditional is true:

If there was a being capable of understanding the text, then the text could be understood.

Then the text has meaning.

(This is not to get at the "truth" of the matter, but to try to offer the least problematic solution.) — Baden

Mine seems less problematic.

What you say seems to make good sense to me. It is verging on introducing the idea of the impossibility of saying anything about the noumenal. And that is to 'step up' to another level of discourse about what can meaningfully be said about 'things in themselves' in general.

I have been trying to address the question just from the 'commonsense' perspective of ordinary language use where 'meaning' indicates that something that has been encoded is either deciphered or at least decipherable.

So, if there is, for example, an ancient tablet inscribed a million years ago by a now extinct literate species on a planet 200.000.000 light years from any other sentient beings, that is potentially decipherable then we would ordinarily say that it is meaningful, even though there may be zero possibility of its ever actually being deciphered.

I suppose a succinct way to put it would be: If there is to be a question of meaning, there must, in principle (if not in practice), be a question poser (meaning-maker). And where there is a question poser, there must, in principle (if not in practice), be an answer to the question.

:up:

Mine seems less problematic. — S

I don't have a huge problem with your straightforward view (less so than the opposition's alternatives). It mostly works. But I'm going for some extra nuance that deals with the sneaking-in-the-meaning-maker-by-the-back-door thing. Where do you see my view as being more problematic?

Edit: Maybe your edit addresses that.

I have been trying to address the question just from the 'commonsense' perspective of ordinary language use where 'meaning' indicates that something that has been encoded is either deciphered or at least decipherable. — Janus

I like that way of putting it.

So, if there is, for example, an ancient tablet inscribed a million years ago by a now extinct literate species on a planet 200.000.000 light years from any other sentient beings, that is potentially decipherable then we would ordinarily say that it is meaningful, even though there may be zero possibility of its ever actually being deciphered. — Janus

Zero possibility? Wouldn't there just be an extremely low probability - next to nothing, but not zero?

I suppose a succinct way to put it would be: If there is to be a question of meaning, there must, in principle, be a question poser (meaning-maker). And where there is a question poser, there must, in principle, be an answer to the question. — Baden

There must be a question poser (meaning-maker), or there must have been one? It seems the latter to me.

I would say you get into murky territory when you posit a scenario that brackets out all meaning-makers to the extent that the question becomes somewhat incoherent. Is something still meaningful? There's no-meaning-maker, even in principle, to decide unless, again, they get snuck in by the back door.

I don't have a huge problem with your straightforward view (less so than the opposition's alternatives). It mostly works, but I'm going for some extra nuance that deals with the sneaking-in-the-meaning-maker-by-the-back-door thing. Where do you see my view being more problematic? — Baden

Your use of terminology seems more open to problems of interpretation. Logic is good for cutting out ambiguity.

Zero possibility? Wouldn't there just be an extremely low probability - next to nothing, but not zero? — S

That's an interesting question. I guess it depends on what is physically possible. Is it physically possible for any vessel to travel at light-speed? At greater than light-speed? We just don't know, so I guess all we can say is that there seems to be "an extremely low probability".

But in any case, it seems absurd to think that whether or not the tablet is meaningful is dependent upon whether or not anyone could get to see it, regardless of whether anyone actually does get to see it.

Maybe at that level, it's a matter of taste. But I draw the line slightly more strictly than you as a defence against what I see as the only effective line of attack on the position, which is to point to an incoherence in completely bracketing out meaning-makers while seeming to rely on the logic, at least in principle, of their presence.

I would say you get into murky territory when you posit a scenario that brackets out all meaning-makers to the extent that the question becomes somewhat incoherent. Is something still meaningful? There's no-meaning-maker, even in principle, to decide unless, again, they get snuck in by the back door. — Baden

Oh no. Now you've gone and done it. We were doing so well until you suggested that there needs to be a "meaning-maker" to "decide" whether or not there is meaning.

The meaning-maker could have died hundreds of thousands of years ago. No one else "decides" the meaning. He decided it hundreds of thousands of years ago. Everyone else is redundant in that very specific sense. The either decipher or they don't. They either get it right or wrong.

Again, I mean in principle, not necessarily in practice. There doesn't have to be a decision on meaning only the theoretical possibility of one to allow for a world where the presence of meaning makes sense.

Again, I mean in principle, not necessarily in practice. There doesn't have to be a decision on meaning only the theoretical possibility of one to allow for a world where the presence of meaning makes sense. — Baden

But "decision" is the wrong word. It's not a matter of decision. It's a matter of figuring out. The meaning has already been made.

I'm ok with using that term*. It doesn't affect the gist of what I'm saying. I'm in line with this:

It is verging on introducing the idea of the impossibility of saying anything about the noumenal. And that is to 'step up' to another level of discourse about what can meaningfully be said about 'things in themselves' in general. — Janus

If that helps.

*The "deciding" is in the figuring out

Anyhow, late and got work to do. Talk more anon.

What do you mean by "Fibonacci sequence"? Do you refer to natural phenomena such as the whorls of seeds on the face of a sunflower, or a written series of numbers where each one (except of course the first) is the sum of the two preceding numbers? — Janus

That's what I asked you, don't turn the question back on me. I don't use your system of classification, so I'm asking you, how you would class the Fibonacci sequence. Does it qualify as a naturally produced pattern, or is it an intentionally produced pattern, under your system of classification?

There are some natural occurring instances of the pattern. The mathematical Fibonacci series are intentionally produced.

That's an interesting question. I guess it depends on what is physically possible. Is it physically possible for any vessel to travel at light-speed? At greater than light-speed? We just don't know, so I guess all we can say is that there seems to be "an extremely low probability". — Janus

I'm a bit of a Humean on "laws" of physics. It's possible that tomorrow I'll turn on the tap and the water will flow upwards. This logic ultimately reigns over whatever physics has to say, although this can be trivial in the sense that I would assign something like that a probability of, like, 0.00000000000(...) 1. But possible nevertheless.

With things like this, it's always ultimately just an extremely low probability.

But in any case, it seems absurd to think that whether or not the tablet is meaningful is dependent upon whether or not anyone could get to see it, regardless of whether anyone actually does get to see it. — Janus

If in principle they could understand what the text says, then it's meaningful. If in practice they can't, because, say, they can't even get there, no matter how hard they try, then that says nothing at all.

I'm a bit of a Humean on "laws" of physics. It's possible that tomorrow I'll turn on the tap and the water will flow upwards. — S

Of course it is logically possible that the water may flow upwards, and it may even be physically possible; but it may also not be physically possible; the latter possibility is what I was getting at.

It is verging on introducing the idea of the impossibility of saying anything about the noumenal. And that is to 'step up' to another level of discourse about what can meaningfully be said about 'things in themselves' in general. — Janus

My current thinking is that even playing along with that Kantian language game is part of the problem.

I tend to think of the Kantian insight as being not merely a language game, but as stemming from the realization that, although we can think of the independent existence of things, the actual existence of things that we can speak in positively meaningful terms about is always the existence of things for us.

Of course it is logically possible that the water may flow upwards, and it may even be physically possible; but it may also not be physically possible; the latter possibility is what I was getting at. — Janus

Okay, well, if it is physically possible, then that would just make my tap water example a bad example. I realised what you were getting at, and that's what I tried to get at in my reply. What I'm saying is that physical impossibilities aren't really impossible, but only conditionally so. They're really just extremely improbable. This is because, as I said, logical possibility reigns supreme. It overrides physical impossibility.

It doesn’t, actually. Noumena can never relate to any empirical relation, and noumena can be talked about. Otherwise, the word and its use wouldn’t stand in its philosophical place. Neither things-in-themselves nor noumena can be known as they actually must be, from either experience for lack of an intuition, or from understanding for lack of a conception.

“....noumena in the negative sense, that is, of things which the understanding is obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, consequently not as mere phenomena...”
“....cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them intelligible existences (noumena)...”
“....noumena have no determinate object corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective validity....”

Noumena can never have anything to do with meaning, for meaning always has its object.

I tend to think of the Kantian insight as being not merely a language game, but as stemming from the realization that, although we can think of the independent existence of things, the actual existence of things that we can speak in positively meaningful terms about is always the existence of things for us. — Janus

I would say that there are just things. And I can talk about them.

Of course, we could never know, so, for us, only the logically impossible can be definitely impossible. But it is logically possible that there are absolute limits inherent in the nature of any possible physical thing as to what is physically possible. It is also logically possible that there may not be any such limits.

Yes, from a commonsense perspective that is true.

You really don't remember? — S

Really. (And people expect me to remember something like a Schopenhauer book I read 40 years ago., haha.)

Sometimes I can't even remember what movie I watched yesterday (I'll remember it when I look it up, but offhand, sometimes it's a challenge to remember what it was without looking it up). I would blame it on age, but I've always been like that.

Of course, we could never know, so, for us, only the logically impossible can be definitely impossible. But it is logically possible that there are absolute limits inherent in the nature of any possible physical thing as to what is physically possible. It is also logically possible that there may not be any such limits. — Janus

:up:

Yes, from a commonsense perspective that is true. — Janus

I'm not just speaking common sense. I'm rejecting the Kantian distinction, shocking as that might be for some. There are things. And things are just things. And then there is language, and facts and the like. And on the other side of that boundary, there is nonsense. Anything that can be said at all can be said clearly, and whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

Really. (And people expect me to remember something like a Schopenhauer book I read 40 years ago., haha.)

Sometimes I can't even remember what movie I watched yesterday (I'll remember it when I look it up, but offhand, sometimes it's a challenge to remember what it was without looking it up). I would blame it on age, but I've always been like that. — Terrapin Station

I remember the word "sphygmomanometer", how to pronounce it, and what it means. I likewise remember "lysergic acid diethylamide". I remember the year of the Glorious Revolution: 1688. I remember other historical names and dates. I remember that Brain Hugh Warner, better known as Marilyn Manson, was born in Canton, Ohio, 1969. And I didn't even have to look any of that up. I know it off by heart.

I more or less remember the order of Kings and Queens from William the Conquerer right up to our present Queen.

But I forget what day it is, and when I'm asked by my boss whether I'm working tomorrow, or what time, I never know the answer. And I can forget things I was only told a matter of minutes ago.

Anything that can be said at all can be said clearly, and whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. — S

I agree, but I understand the Kantian distinction as saying exactly that; the only thing that can be known (said) about noumena is that you cannot know (say) anything about them. They are even "them" only insofar as they logically correspond to phenomena.